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Abstract 
This thesis analyses UMNO factionalism from the perspective of the 
elite’s manipulation of the various modes of nationalisms. This thesis argues that 
UMNO factionalism, which is seemingly a power struggle between competing 
UMNO elites, has been significantly shaped by contesting nationalist ideologies 
that reflect the unresolved questions of national identity in Malaysia.  
These two issues, that is, nationalism and UMNO factionalism, have 
shaped Malaysian politics in significant ways. UMNO factionalism has been 
related to such major political events as the 1969 ethnic riots, the introduction of 
the New Economic Policy, the UMNO split in 1987 and the Reformasi (Reform) 
movement in 1998. Frequently, the impact of these disputes extended beyond 
UMNO politics and affected wider Malaysian politics. At the same time, due to 
unresolved questions of national identity, nationalism has occupied a central 
position in Malaysian political discourse. There are ambiguities regarding the 
relationships among the various ethnic identities and national identity and 
between the individual and the larger Malaysian community that enable elites to 
construct and manipulate nationalist ideologies. In this thesis, the conflicting 
nationalisms are captured by five different concepts of nationalism – ethnocultural, 
civic and multicultural nationalisms in one group and collectivist-authoritarian 
and individualistic-libertarian nationalisms in another.  
The Malaysian Prime Ministers have constructed nationalist ideology to 
define the Malaysian nation in their attempts to resolve the unresolved problems 
of national identity. The challengers’ arguments, to mobilise the community, 
mirror the community’s (negative) responses to the Malaysian Prime Ministers’ 
nationalist visions. In addition, the ideological arguments in the disputes extend 
the dispute beyond the elites, involving the community as well. Furthermore, 
because of the ideological conflicts, these factional disputes affect the direction of 
government policies in significant ways. This study shows that UMNO factional 
disputes have followed this pattern of ideological conflicts, although the exact 
contents may vary.  
The 1969 factional dispute was a clash between Tunku Abdul Rahman’s 
shift towards multicultural nationalism and its challengers’ ethnocultural   ii
nationalism. Tunku Abdul Rahman’s nationalist vision moved away from 
ethnocultural nationalism in pursuit of national integration. The challengers, 
reflecting the Malay community’s response to the Prime Minister’s vision, took a 
strong ethnocultural Malay nationalist stance. The successful mobilisation of the 
Malay community by ethnocultural Malay nationalists contributed to the policy 
shift towards ethnocultural nationalism in the 1970s. In the 1987 dispute, 
Mahathir’s economic policy, which moved away from ethnocultural nationalism, 
was challenged by Razaleigh’s ethnocultural nationalist argument. After the 
dispute, Mahathir could only mobilise the community by tactically employing the 
rhetoric of ethnocultural Malay nationalism.  
In the 1990s, Mahathir’s attempt to define the national identity of 
Malaysia by constructing a civic Malaysian nation, Bangsa Malaysia, relieved the 
tension surrounding the ambiguous national identity of Malaysia. It was facilitated 
by rapid economic growth that ameliorated ethnic contests over limited economic 
resources. However, the collectivist-authoritarian aspect of Mahathir’s 
nationalism raised another nationalist question concerning the subordination of 
individual liberty and rights to the collective community’s will and interests – a 
nationalism that justified his authoritarian rule. There was tension between an 
increasingly confident civic Malaysian society and Mahathir’s collectivist-
authoritarian control of the society. The 1998 UMNO dispute was a clash between 
Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalism and Anwar Ibrahim’s 
individualistic-libertarian nationalism. The latter attempted to mobilise Malaysian 
society with his nationalist position (the Reformasi movement) which was 
expressed in the demand for liberal political reform. After the dispute, Mahathir 
was able to regain lost political ground through the politics of fear. It seems, 
however, that the fundamental question remains unresolved. This unresolved 
tension between the demand for individual liberty and rights and authoritarian 
control by state elites is likely to shape the ideological arguments in future 
UMNO factional disputes.    iii
Table of Contents 
Abstract.............................................................................................................. i 
Table of Contents.............................................................................................iii 
List of Tables .................................................................................................... v 
Glossary and Abbreviation............................................................................... vi 
Acknowledgement .........................................................................................viii 
1.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................... 1 
1.1.  LITERATURE REVIEW: UMNO FACTIONALISM............................................. 2 
1.2.  UNRESOLVED NATIONALIST QUESTION AND THE PATTERNS OF NATIONALIST 
CONFLICT IN MALAYSIA............................................................................. 12 
1.3.  COMPETING NATIONALISMS: MODELS FOR ANALYSIS................................. 22 
1.4.  MAIN ARGUMENTS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THESIS STRUCTURE.......... 32 
2.  ABDUL RAHMAN’S MULTICULTURAL NATIONALISM AND 
ETHNOCULTURAL NATIONALIST CHALLENGE: 
FACTIONALISM IN 1969........................................................................... 45 
2.1.  ABDUL RAHMAN’S MULTICULTURAL NATIONALISM.................................. 47 
2.2.  UMNO ULTRA’S ETHNOCULTURAL NATIONALISM..................................... 66 
2.3.  THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE 1969 CRISIS: TOWARDS AN ETHNOCULTURAL 
NATIONALIST STATE................................................................................... 84 
2.4.  CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 96 
3.  MAHATHIR’S WEAKENED MALAY NATIONALISM AND 
RAZALEIGH’S ETHNOCULTURAL NATIONALIST CHALLENGE: 
THE 1987 DISPUTE................................................................................... 110 
3.1.  UMNO FACTIONALISM IN THE 1980S: AN OVERVIEW.............................. 112 
3.2.  MAHATHIR’S ECONOMIC POLICY AND ITS NATIONALIST IMPLICATIONS.... 116 
3.3.  RAZALEIGH’S ETHNOCULTURAL ALTERNATIVES: LONG LIVE THE NEP!.. 132 
3.4.  FRESH RACE FOR NATIONALIST LEGITIMACY AFTER THE MAHATHIR-
RAZALEIGH CLASH IN THE 1987 UMNO ELECTIONS................................ 142 
3.5.  CONCLUSION............................................................................................ 156 
4.  UNRAVELLING MAHATHIR’S NATIONALISM IN THE 1990S: 
COLLECTIVIST CIVIC NATIONALISM AND AUTHORITARIAN 
POLITICS.................................................................................................... 167 
4.1.  MAHATHIR’S CIVIC NATIONALISM AND ITS SUCCESS................................ 168 
4.2.  MAHATHIR’S COLLECTIVIST-AUTHORITARIAN NATIONALIST VIEW.......... 191 
4.3.  MAHATHIR’S RHETORIC OF THREATS TO THE CIVIC MALAYSIAN NATION 203 
4.4.  CONCLUSION............................................................................................ 216 
5.  CONFLICT BETWEEN COLLECTIVIST-AUTHORITARIAN AND 
INDIVIDUALISTIC-LIBERTARIAN NATIONALISM: THE 1998 
UMNO DISPUTE AND POLITICAL CRISIS........................................ 227 
5.1.  THE MAHATHIR-ANWAR RELATIONSHIP AND TENSIONS IN THE 1990S..... 230 
5.2.  ANWAR’S INDIVIDUALISTIC-LIBERTARIAN NATIONALISM ........................ 234 
5.3.  THE 1998 UMNO DISPUTE AND COMPETING NATIONALIST VIEWS: FROM THE 
1997 ECONOMIC CRISIS TO THE REFORMASI MOVEMENT.......................... 246   iv
5.4.  INSTITUTIONALISATION OF REFORMASI AND COMPETITION BETWEEN THE 
TWO IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS.................................................................. 266 
5.5.  MAHATHIR MOBILISES PEOPLE WITH A COLLECTIVIST “GARRISON-UNDER-
SIEGE” STRATEGY..................................................................................... 281 
5.6.  CONCLUSION............................................................................................ 295 
6.  CONCLUSION............................................................................................ 309 
Bibliography.................................................................................................. 320 
 
   v
List of Tables 
 
Table 1-1. Civic, ethnocultural and multicultural nationalisms............................ 28 
Table 1-2. Individualistic-libertarian/collectivist-authoritarian nationalisms....... 32 
 
Table 2-1. Allocation of Parliamentary seats in Alliance Party, 1955-69 ............ 59 
Table 2-2. Votes polled by UMNO/PMIP in Malay Heartlands: 1964/1969 ....... 77 
 
Table 3-1. Development Budget Allocation for Ethnic Restructuring, 1986–90 125 
Table 3-2. Changes in share ownership: 1970–1990 (%)................................... 126 
Table 3-3. 1990 Malaysian General Elections Results (Parliament) .................. 156 
 
Table 5-1 Major Economic Policy Change from in 1997-98*............................ 256 
Table 5-2 Major Parties’ Performance in Recent Elections: Parliament Seats... 276 
Table 5-3 Parliament elections results of selected states/ selected parties.......... 278 
Table 5-4 By-elections from 1999 General elections until the end of 2002....... 295   vi
Glossary and Abbreviation  
ABIM: Angakatan Belia Islam Malaysia; Malaysian Islamic Youth Council 
BA: Barisan Alternatif; Alternative Front 
Bangsa Malaysia: Malaysian Nation 
Bangsa Melayu: Malay nation 
BCIC: Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community 
BMF: Bank Malaysia Finance 
BN: Barisan Nasional; National Front 
CIC: Capital Issues Committee  
CLC: Communities Liaison Committee 
Dakwah: Islamic missionary 
DAP: Democratic Action Party 
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka: Language and Literature Council 
EPU: Economic Planning Unit 
Felda: Federal Land Development Authority 
FIC: Foreign Investment Committee 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
Gerakan: Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia; Malaysian People’s Movement party  
HICOM: Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia 
ICA: Industrial Coordination Act 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
IMP: Independence of Malaya Party 
ISA: Internal Security Act 
Keadilan: Parti Keadilan Nasional; National Justice Party (until 2003) or Parti 
Keadilan Rakyat; People’s Justice Party (since 2004) 
KLSE: Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
KMM: Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia; Malaysian Mujahidin Group  
MARA: Majilis Amanah Rakyat; People’s Trust Council 
MCA: Malaysian Chinese Association (before 1963, Malayan Chinese 
Association) 
Melayu Baru: New Malay 
Menteri Besar: state chief minister   vii
Merdeka: Independence  
MIC: Malaysian Indian Congress (before 1963, Malayan Indian Congress) 
NCP: New Cultural Policy 
NDP: National Development Policy 
NEP: New Economic Policy 
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations 
NOC: National Operation Council 
Orang Kaya Baru: New Rich People 
PAP: People’s Action Party  
PAS: Parti Islam Se-Malaysia; Pan Malaysian Islamic Party or PMIP 
PBB: Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu; United Pesaka Bumiputera Party 
PBS: Parti Bersatu Sabah; Sabah United Party 
Pernas: Perbadanan Nasional; National Corporation 
Petronas: Petroliam Nasional Berhad; National Petroleum Corporation 
PNB: Permodalan Nasional; National Equity Corporation 
PPP: People’s Progressive Party 
PRM: Parti Rakyat Malaysia; Malaysian People’s Party 
PSRM: Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia; Malaysian People’s Socialist Party 
Reformasi: Reform movement 
SEDCs: State Economic Development Corporations 
Semangat 46’: Parti Semangat 46’; Sprit of 1946 Party 
SNAP: Sarawak National Party 
Suhakam: Human Right Commission  
SUPP: Sarawak United People’s Party 
UDA: Urban Development Authority 
UEM: United Engineering Malaysia 
Ulama: religious teacher 
UMNO: United Malays National Organization 
USNO: United Sabah National Organization 
Wawasan 2020: Vision 2020   viii
Acknowledgement 
As I submit this humble thesis, I cannot help but think of the help that 
contributed to the completion of this small work. Although a human being’s life is 
unthinkable without numerous relationships with others, the people I have met, 
talked with and shared good and bad moments merit particular mention here.  
My appreciation first of all goes to my supervisor, David Brown. He 
introduced me to a new field, ethnic politics and nationalism. He taught me 
critical thinking and self-discipline in academic writing. Without his constructive 
supervision, my efforts during the past five years would have been wasted. Staff, 
professors and lecturers at the School of Politics and International Studies and of 
the Asia Research Centre of Murdoch University – Richard Robison, Garry Rodan, 
Jane Hutchison, Kanishka Jayasuriya, Ian Cook, Del Blakeway, Tamara Dent, 
Greg Acciaioli, Vedi Hadiz, Sally Sargeson, Jim Warren, Jeannette Taylor – have 
been very kind to me and made my time at Murdoch enjoyable and valuable. My 
friends and colleagues in Perth, Donna Turner, Sidney Adams, Tsukasa Takamine, 
Miyume Tanji, Jane Sayers, Jerry Clode, Kathleen Turner, John McCarthy, Toby 
Carroll, and David Ballantyne helped me survive the pressure and loneliness of 
being overseas on my own. Because of them, my five years in Perth are 
unforgettable.  
In Malaysia, Khoo Boo Teik of USM, gave me valuable advice and 
encouragement, as well as access to people and information. Norani Othman of 
UKM was very helpful as my interim supervisor during my fieldwork in Malaysia. 
IKMAS and its staff at UKM kindly extended their facilities to me during the 
fieldwork. Abdul Rahman Embong of UKM and Francis Loh of USM gave me 
helpful advice on my research project. Also, my special thanks go to such 
politicians, commentators and activists as Tan Sri Musa Hitam, Rustam Sani of 
the former PRM, Khalid Jaafar of Keadilan, Khairy Jamaluddin of UMNO, Dr 
Syed Azman Syed Ahmad of PAS, Teresa Kok and Lim Kit Siang of DAP, Dr 
Toh Kin Woon of Gerakan, Anil Netto and P. Ramakrishnan of Aliran, Chandra 
Muzaffar of JUST, Shahrir Samad of UMNO, and MGG Pillai.  
I cannot forget the affection and help I have received from members of the 
Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. The Institute led me to Southeast   ix
Asian studies and helped me stick to the subject. Although space limitations 
prevent me from naming all the members of KISEAS, I have to give special 
thanks to Prof. Yoon Jinpyo, Prof. Shin Yoon Hwan, Prof. Park Sa-Myung, Dr 
Jeon Je Seong, and Dr Hwang In-Won. Also, Prof. Ahn Byung Joon (now retired), 
Prof. Shin Myung Soon, Prof. Moon Jung In, Prof. Yang Seung Ham, Prof. Jang 
Dong Jin of Yonsei University and Dr Park Kyung San deserve my special thanks. 
They introduced me to the study of politics when I was an undergraduate student 
and helped me remain in the discipline. I also have to thank to the “Korean-
ASEAN Academic Exchange Fellowship”. The second field research for this 
thesis was possible because of the financial of the fellowship.    
My friends in Korea and overseas have always supported me in various 
ways. I would like to say thanks to them – Lee Woo Jung, Lee Bong Kyu, Han 
Joong Hee and Kim Dong Soo in Korea, my family friends, Samuel Yang and 
Jane Lee in Perth, Australia, and Suan, Azman, Yen Yen and Park Eun Sil in 
Malaysia.  
My father, Lee Moon Hee, and my mother, Lim Kum Ja, and my 
grandmother, Kim Soon Yi, did not just support me; they are the reasons for who 
I am today. No words can describe the support they have given me and my 
appreciation for them. My sisters, Lee Jae Kyung and Lee Jae Sun, and their 
husbands, have always been strong supporters of my study and they encouraged 
me tremendously. In addition, I must mention my father-in-law and mother-in-law 
who trusted me a lot. Last but not least, I would like to express my deepest 
appreciation to my beloved wife, Lee Ji Young, and my daughter, Lee Son Ho. 
They helped me through the most difficult time of my research and kept me safe 
from all the frustration and hardships.  
   1
1. Introduction 
When former Malaysian Prime Minster, Mahathir Mohamed, sacked his 
deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, on 1 September 1998, after a few years of simmering 
tension between the two, it heralded the beginning of one of the most important 
political developments in Malaysian history, the Reformasi (Reform) movement. 
Thereafter, the protracted conflict between the then incumbent Mahathir and the 
Barisan Nasional (BN;  National Front) on one hand, and Anwar and the 
Reformasi movement on the other dominated political discourse in Malaysia for 
several years, providing fresh confirmation that UMNO (United Malays National 
Organization) factionalism, in significant ways, shapes not just UMNO politics 
but also Malaysian politics.  
The factional dispute and the Reformasi movement challenged the BN’s 
long-entrenched political dominance in Malaysian politics, providing additional 
support for the thesis that any meaningful regime change in Malaysia will begin 
with fracture and fragmentation in the ruling coalition (see Gomez, 1998; 
Jesudason, 1996). Indeed, when the Reformasi movement was at its peak, many 
observers of Malaysian politics predicted that the mass protests would undermine 
the BN’s political hegemony and shift Malaysian politics towards a more 
pluralistic direction, in the sense that meaningful opposition could challenge the 
BN’s political dominance (Case, 1999; Funston, 1999; H. Singh, 2001). By now, 
however, it seems that political developments since 1998 fell short of bringing 
about a fundamental change of the existing regime. Nevertheless, the political 
developments prove that UMNO factionalism can significantly influence the 
entire Malaysian political scene. In the 1999 elections, Mahathir’s once seemingly   2
invincible political grip was seriously undermined because of anti-Mahathir and 
anti-UMNO political mobilisation by the Reformasi movement.  
The developments in Malaysian politics since 1998 are not exceptional in 
that there have been major factional disputes every decade since UMNO’s 
establishment in 1946 and they have been closely related to the most important 
political developments in the country. For example, the UMNO dispute in 1969 
between the incumbent leadership and a rising new generation unfolded right after 
the ethnic riots in May 1969 and affected the nature of state that emerged in the 
1970s. The 1987 electoral showdown between Mahathir and his challenger, 
Razaleigh Hamzah, who attempted to take over the party power, resulted in 
UMNO being split into two parties. This development seriously jeopardised 
UMNO’s and Malay political supremacy in Malaysian politics. Therefore, in 
general, UMNO factionalism has been more than an internal party struggle with 
importance extending beyond UMNO.  
 
1.1. Literature review: UMNO factionalism 
Do we have an adequate framework to understand UMNO factionalism, 
one of the most important issues in Malaysian politics in the past five decades? 
What analyses have been done so far? By answering these questions, this 
literature review will clarify the topic of this research and will show how this 
research can supplement and contribute to existing knowledge on UMNO 
factionalism and Malaysian politics.  
The two different understandings regarding UMNO factionalism may be 
summarised as follows.
1 The first is that UMNO factionalism is primarily about   3
power, personal rivalry and patronage conflict among competing political elites; it 
downplays the significance of ideological arguments. The second recognises that 
in the disputes, there have been ideological arguments, which reflect ideological 
debates in the community. Most researchers in this category, however, regard the 
ideological arguments as justifications for the elites’ political manoeuvring. 
Regarding the fundamental cause of the disputes, they argue that the disputes are 
about the question of power.  
This thesis does not reject the existing observations entirely – the question 
of power is indeed significant. By emphasising the role nationalist ideological 
conflicts play in UMNO factionalism, this thesis intends to develop a better 
framework to understand UMNO factionalism with regards to the unresolved 
questions of Malaysia’s national identity.  
 
Ideology as a non-variable in factional disputes 
In his study of the political dynamics surrounding the 1969 elections and 
the ethnic riots that followed thereafter, J. Bass acknowledged the underlying 
ideological difference between the mainstream and the ‘ultra’
2 factions of UMNO 
(Bass, 1973). Bass, however, argued that ‘its explanatory power with respect to 
the origin and course of particular intra-UMNO conflicts is generally slight’. 
Instead, ‘[f]or the most part, ideological and policy commitment has provided the 
trappings or rationalization for personal or factional struggles of power’ (Bass, 
1973: 528). Therefore, Bass concluded that the 1969 dispute was simply ‘a 
doomed attempt by a handful of party figures to topple the Tengku [Abdul 
Rahman] as Prime Minister and UMNO president’ rather than a ‘culmination of a   4
long struggle between ultra and moderate forces in UMNO’ (Bass, 1973: 528-
529).  
Harold Crouch surveyed developments before and after the 1987 dispute, 
as well as the dispute itself, briefly but meticulously, in his “Authoritarian Trends, 
The UMNO Split and the Limits to State Power” article, observing an increasing 
authoritarian trend after the 1987 dispute (Crouch, 1992).
3 Crouch  manifestly 
rejected any ideological difference between the two factions in the 1987 dispute. 
He maintained, ‘Ideological and policy differences seem to have played almost no 
part in the UMNO split… The UMNO split can be largely understood as a 
struggle for power and position revolving around the question of succession to 
Mahathir’ (Crouch, 1992: 30-31). 
Hwang’s examination of Malaysian politics arrived at a conclusion similar 
to the previous studies of UMNO factionalism (Hwang, 2003). Regarding the 
1987 dispute between Mahathir’s Team A and Razaleigh’s Team B, Hwang 
argued that the dispute was an inter-elite personal rivalry. According to Hwang, 
the dispute occurred when Mahathir’s attempt to maximise his political 
dominance in UMNO was challenged by a few prominent elites who were 
constantly in competition with Mahathir over the issue of party power (Hwang, 
2003: 127-132). Hwang believed that the 1987 dispute was particularly severe 
when compared to disputes in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s because Mahathir had 
violated the unwritten rule of Malaysian politics, that is, accommodation among 
elites, as he attempted to monopolise power in the first half of the 1980s (Hwang, 
2003: 143-145).    5
Hwang similarly regarded the 1998 dispute as a consequence of personal 
rivalry. He noted: 
Anwar himself, like it or not, had to step on [Mahathir’s close associates] 
to expand his power base. The more ground he gained, the more enemies 
he made within the government and the ruling party. Given this, there 
were plenty of reasons for conspiring to destroy Anwar and ensure 
Mahathir’s cronies’ continued hold on their political and economic 
interests. (Hwang, 2003: 282) 
Regarding the 1998 dispute, Ian Stewart played down Anwar’s ideological 
commitment to political liberalism, stating there was doubt, even within the 
opposition coalition, about Anwar’s commitment to political reform (Stewart, 
2003: 18). More to the point, Ian Stewart argued that the personal rivalry between 
Anwar and Mahathir exploded during the economic crisis, especially after Anwar 
mounted a veiled attack on Mahathir, championing the corruption issue. 
According to Ian Stewart, under Mahathir, ‘[A]nyone who stood in [Mahathir’s] 
way was likely to find himself bereft of any influence or standing in the party’ 
(Stewart, 2003: 88).
4  
Cheah Boon Kheng also noted that the 1998 dispute arose from personal 
rivalries (Cheah, 2002: 224-226). During the economic crisis, the personal 
rivalries and tensions between Anwar and Mahathir surfaced because of their 
different approaches to the crisis. Eventually, Anwar was dismissed because he 
opposed Mahathir’s approach, which was an attempt to protect the economic 
interests of those who were ‘closely linked with the government’ (Cheah, 2002: 
227).  
Chandra Muzaffar described the clash as a consequence of the power 
struggle between Anwar and Mahathir. He observed:   6
At the root of expulsion of Anwar from the government and the party is 
the question of power. Mahathir sensed an attempt to ease him out of 
power. He responded to the perceived challenge with vigour and without 
scruples. Anwar felt that Mahathir’s power base was weakening. He 
sought to send a message – and was repulsed. (Muzaffar, 1998) 
Funston also denied any policy or ideological difference between Anwar 
and Mahathir (Funston, 1999). He argued that Mahathir, because of UMNO’s 
power structure, prevailed over Anwar on policy matters, rejecting alleged policy 
differences over economic management. In Funston’s opinion, the developments 
in 1998 were a consequence of a power struggle between the two prominent 
leaders. The problem was that, during the 1997-98 economic crisis, Anwar 
attempted to ‘outshine the Master’, thereby incurring Mahathir’s wrath (Funston, 
1999: 166). As Funston argued, ‘[c]onflict between a Prime Minister and his 
deputy is, to a certain degree, institutionalized’ (Funston, 1999: 169).
5  
William Case, on the Anwar-Mahathir dispute, did not differ much from 
Funston (Case, 1999). Case argued that the differences developed in the context of 
the conflict over patronage between Anwar on one hand and Mahathir and his 
close ally-cum-former Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin on the other. Also, as 
was the case with Funston, Case observed that Mahathir ‘fear[ed] that his deputy 
was eclipsing him on the world scene’ (Case, 1999: 4). Case, however, went a 
step further to note that there was disagreement on policy matters between 
Mahathir and Anwar and argued that the two political leaders had different views 
on ‘a considered notion of how best to right the economy’ (Case, 1999: 4).
6 
 
   7
Ideological arguments as reflection of social debates 
A.B. Shamsul pointed out that the 1987 dispute was an indirect projection 
of social conflicts within the newly rising Malay middle class. The growing 
middle class ‘has engendered its own internal contradictions as different factions 
within this class struggle for the control of economic resources and access to 
political positions, in turn heightening competing interests and aspirations and, 
therefore, increasing the potential for open conflicts’. And the tensions, which 
were exacerbated during the economic crisis in the mid 1980s, inevitably ‘are 
mediated through UMNO politics’ (Shamsul, 1988: 173-174). Shamsul, however, 
rejected the possibility that there were any substantive ideological or policy 
differences between the elite factions, saying ‘both camps…did not really differ in 
their overall philosophy, policy, and approach to many important national issues’ 
(Shamsul, 1988: 179). 
Khoo Kay Jin argued that the New Economic Policy (NEP), in particular 
Mahathir’s economic policies, led to ‘the creation of a more differentiated Malay 
community’ with conflicting interests (K. J. Khoo, 1992: 62). This development, 
in turn, created ‘certain fundamental strains within…Malay society’ (K. J. Khoo, 
1992: 48). The economic crisis in the mid 1980s crystallised the divisions along 
competing interests and persuaded rival political elites to take the initiative.
7 
Rivalry amongst the UMNO elites regarding the succession issue provided ‘a 
match’ to ignite widespread conflicts in Malay society (K. J. Khoo, 1992: 68).
8 
Roger Kershaw’s research on the 1987 dispute investigated the ideological 
debates between the two competing teams on party traditions, party democracy, 
party unity, constitutional arguments and Islamic credentials (Kershaw, 1988). A   8
significant conclusion of Kershaw’s study was that the members of the 
challenging faction ‘badly needed to differentiate themselves ideologically from 
the incumbents, precisely because they had previously supported the policies of 
the government’ (Kershaw, 1988: 155). Nevertheless, the challenging team, 
despite its attempts, could not really achieve ‘ideological differentiation, so 
essential for a successful challenge’ because of ‘[challenging Team B’s]
9 
commonality of interest as the beneficiaries of the Malay dominant party system’ 
with Mahathir’s faction (Kershaw, 1988: 155).  
John Hilley and Khoo Boo Teik viewed the clash in 1998 primarily in 
terms of ideological and policy differences. Hilley noted that there were 
ideological and policy differences between Mahathir and Anwar (Hilley, 2001: 
95-97: 105). He argued, however, that the differences would not have caused such 
a dispute, were it not for the economic crisis. According to Hilley, Mahathir 
viewed Anwar’s differences as an attempt to undermine the economic prosperity 
that Mahathir had brought about in the past 17 years (Hilley, 2001: 105). 
Therefore, for Mahathir, Hilley argued, Anwar’s differing approach to the 
economic crisis was simply not acceptable.
10  
Khoo Boo Teik argued that the 1998 dispute cannot be explained by one 
factor but required a ‘multi-faceted’ answer (B. T. Khoo, 2003: 73). While Khoo 
believed that economic policy differences, political power struggle of personal 
rivalries and ideological differences had contributed to the Anwar-Mahathir 
dispute, he emphasised the underlying ideological differences between the two as 
well. He observed that the fundamental ideological differences between Anwar 
and Mahathir made cooperation between Mahathir and Anwar, which had lasted   9
for 16 years since 1982, impossible during the economic crisis. Khoo also 
observed that, despite the seemingly contradictory fact that Anwar had been 
involved with UMNO for many years, there was consistency in Anwar’s 
commitment to political liberalism (B. T. Khoo, 2003: 86-96).  
 
An alternative way to investigate UMNO factionalism 
The review of literature on UMNO factionalism indicates that there are 
two different arguments. The first emphasises personal rivalry, patronage conflict 
and high-level power struggle as the “fundamental causes” of factional disputes in 
UMNO. However, the scope of investigation, which focuses on only these 
“fundamental causes,” is too narrow. Other important aspects of the disputes, such 
as the ideological language used, have been neglected. Such an approach 
discourages potentially fruitful examination of the ideological arguments made by 
competing elites.  
The second argument, while acknowledging that the disputes were 
prompted by personal rivalries and power struggle, examines the ideological and 
policy conflicts in the disputes. While such issues as class conflict prompted by 
the rise of the Malay middle class, discourse of democratic politics and 
democratisation were considered, nationalist ideologies did not merit much 
attention, although nationalism has been one of the most extensively debated 
issues in Malaysian and UMNO politics. Because of ethnic diversity, the issue of 
nationalism has always been at the centre of political debate in Malaysia. 
Furthermore, as UMNO claims to be the Malay nationalist party, Malay 
nationalism has been the core ideological basis of the party.   10
To supplement the existing studies, this thesis examines UMNO factional 
disputes from the perspective of conflicting nationalist ideologies. This thesis 
argues that ideological difference constructed by political elites is as important as 
other variables such as patronage, power struggle, personal rivalry and so on, well 
studies in existing researches of UMNO factionalism. Perhaps more immediate 
and direct cause of factional dispute in UMNO could be politically opportunistic 
and pragmatic variables mentioned above. Nevertheless, an explanation of 
disputes is never complete without a proper look at the justification of rivalry 
itself and of one’s position against opponents. Therefore, without an appreciation 
of ideological discourses utilised for such justifications, the understanding of 
UMNO factionalism is burdened with a crucial weakness.  
Furthermore, ideological positions set by political elites are important 
because it restrains their political behaviour. Of course, the ideological position 
has two possibilities i.e. it can be a genuine conviction or a convenient tool to 
camouflage one’s real intention, developed in the evolution of dispute.
11 Whatever 
the case, the discourses constrain political elites’ future behaviour. If an 
ideological position for justification is talk only, political elites will lose 
credibility in the eyes of their followers and of wider constituency. Therefore, 
political elites will try to reflect what they have said and argued for in the form of 
policy or political action. The relationship between pragmatic political intention 
and ideological discourses may vary case by case – it can be sincere or disguised. 
What is certain, however, the ideological position and discourse, having real 
political meaning, deserves a through analysis.    11
The importance of ideological element in UMNO factionalism is not only 
found in the conflict itself, but also in the impacts and consequences of the 
disputes. As a tool to mobilise support, elites’ ideological position have to have 
interaction with ideological perception of wider constituency. To be effective, the 
ideological positions of the elites are not made in the vacuum and must have 
resonance with wider community’s idea. So much so that a careful examination of 
the ideological languages in UMNO factional disputes provides an opportunity to 
put the dispute in a broader context, beyond the level of elites manoeuvring for 
political power, thereby shedding new light on the map of competing ideological 
visions in Malaysia society.  
To go further, because of the mobilisation of wider constituency by the 
elite-constructed ideological discourses, the impacts of factional disputes go 
beyond elite level i.e. change of power-holder, elite coterie reshuffle and so on. 
The consequence of factional dispute can create significant ideological divisions 
or exacerbate existing divisions in the community along the competing ideological 
positions at the elite level.     
In sum, the point I wish to make here is that regardless of the relationship 
between political opportunism and pragmatism on the one hand and ideology on 
the other, and of relative weights of the two factors, ideological positions aired by 
competing political elites in factional dispute have significant political importance 
and meaning, and deserve a through analysis to complete our understanding of 
UMNO factionalism.  
    12
At the heart of the ideological dimension of UMNO factionalism are the 
different visions of Malaysia’s national identity, as formulated by the contesting 
political elites. In UMNO factionalism, the competing nationalist ideologies of the 
contesting elites typically comprise the vision of the Prime Minister to define 
national community and to integrate diverse ethnic identities, resonating with the 
view of a section of community and the unfavourable response from another 
section of the community to the Prime Minister’s attempts, mediated by the 
challenging elites. 
A question, however, remains – why nationalism instead of other 
ideological aspects? The coming section will answer this question and will 
explain why this particular ideological debate is central in Malaysian politics, 
significantly shaping UMNO factional disputes. 
 
1.2.  Unresolved nationalist question and the patterns of 
nationalist conflict in Malaysia 
This section explores the issue of national identity in Malaysia to justify 
the analysis of UMNO factionalism from the perspective of nationalism. The 
ethnic diversity in Malaysia makes it difficult to clarify the relationship between 
the various ethnic identities and national identity institutionally. In addition, from 
a different angle, the question of national identity unsettled in Malaysia can be 
captured by a tension between collectivist nationalism and individualistic 
nationalism. It is a conflict between incumbment elites or government that depict 
itself as ‘the spokesman’ of the singular ‘people’ (collectivist) and its critics who 
counteract, arguing for individuals’, minorities’ and subgroups’ rights in a nation 
(individualistic). The clash is often expressed in the form of a conflict between   13
authoritarian rule and demand of more liberal politics. The result is an ambiguous 
national identity that fuels different interpretations of national identity, that is, 
competing nationalist ideologies or nationalisms. In such a situation, the political 
elites attempt to construct and manipulate the nationalist ideologies to resolve the 
nationalist questions and, by doing so, to legitimise political power.  
 
1.2.1.  Ethnic diversity and the question of national identity 
One of the reasons for the persisting tension among the conflicting 
nationalist ideologies in Malaysia is that, because of its multiethnic nature, the 
nature of the Malaysian nation was not clearly defined initially.
12 Malaysia has 
diverse ethnic-cultural groups. It includes three major ethnic groups, that is, 
Malay, Chinese and Indian, and such smaller groups as the indigenous peoples in 
the interior of the peninsula and in East Malaysia – Sabah and Sarawak – as 
well.
13 In this complicated ethnic mix, there are different interpretations regarding 
the nature of Malaysian nation. As a well-known scholar of Malaysian history, 
Wang Gungwu, noted as early as 1962:  
Most Malays believe that this common culture should have as its nucleus 
traditional Malay culture. This would follow if it is recognized that 
Malayan nationalism
14 has Malay nationalism as its nucleus. But most 
Chinese and Indians would deny that this is a fair claim. In their view, the 
Malayan nation should involve only a new political loyalty and not a 
denial of the multi-cultural basis of the present society. A third minority 
view, held mainly by the English-educated Chinese and Indians, is that 
cultural differences may remain so long as most people accept more 
intensive modernization and come to share a common outlook which is 
not deeply anchored in any single traditional culture. (Wang, 1981: 207)   14
The three arguments respectively depict a ‘Malay Malaysia’ where Malay 
ethnic characteristics define the Malaysian nation; a ‘multiethnic Malaysia’ in 
which ethnic groups enjoy autonomy and preserve their own identities; and a 
‘Malaysian Malaysia’ in which a particular ethnic identity is not relevant as the 
identity of the nation. Indeed, these three arguments have been frequently used by 
Malaysian political elites:  
Let us make no mistake – the political system in Malaysia is founded on 
Malay dominance. That is the premise from which we should start. The 
Malays must be politically dominant in Malaysia as the Chinese are 
politically dominant in Singapore.
15 
We should ensure that legislations and policies are favourable to the 
existence and development of the language, education and culture of all 
ethnic groups in the country as is their Constitution right.
16  
The obvious task of a responsible and intelligent political leadership in 
Malaysia must be…to consolidate our national existence by giving our 
multi-racial people the firm sense of a common national identity, purpose 
and destiny.
17 
The Malaysian political elites were unable to clearly define what kind of 
nation they were building. As Cheah Boon Kheng observed, ‘The Alliance parties 
failed to spell out the features of Malaya’s nationality in the Constitution because 
they were uncertain how to define its national identity’ (Cheah, 2002: 5). A 
‘Malay Malaysia’ would have been acceptable to the Malays but would have 
alienated the non-Malays, thereby undermining the fragile national integration. On 
the other hand, a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ would have the support of the non-Malays 
but such a national identity might estrange the Malays, who constituted the largest 
single bloc in the Malaysian population.    15
This unresolved question is reflected in the Merdeka (Independence) 
constitution. The constitution was a product of ethnic compromise and bargaining 
among the elites from the major ethnic groups (Means, 1976: chapter 12; Parmer, 
1964: 322-328). Significantly, this constitution failed to clearly define national 
identity (Cheah, 2002; Gullick, 1981: 115; Harper, 1996; H. G. Lee, 2001: 2-3; 
Shamsul, 1997: 244). Cheah noted the ambiguity regarding Malayan citizenship in 
the constitution. He stated: ‘Malaya’s citizenship in the 1957 Constitution…was 
known only as “Federal citizenship”. “Federal citizenship” meant membership of 
a nation, like a membership of a club with rights and duties. Nationality, however, 
meant a national identity, which was something else’ (Cheah, 2002: 5). T. N. 
Harper also observed: 
The constitutional framework for the future nation…was very ambiguous. 
It gave limited citizenship rights to non-Malays; yet this citizenship did 
not amount to a nationality, and the citizenship rights for non-Malays in 
no way impinged on the special rights of the Malays. Malayness was 
enshrined in the Constitution; the new entity was translated as Persatuan 
Tanah Melayu. The “Malayan” had no status, no legal definition at all. It 
was a state, but not a template for a nation. Thus, there remained 
fundamental contradictions between the formation of a new nation-state 
and the cultural basis on which it was to evolve. (Harper, 1996: 240) 
In fact, some clauses of the Merdeka constitution indicate incompatible 
identities of the Malayan nation in the constitution. For example, Article 8(2) of 
the constitution states unequivocally: 
Except as expressly authorised by this Constitution, there shall be no 
discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, 
descent, place of birth or gender in any law or in the appointment to any 
office or employment under a public authority or in the administration of 
any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of property or   16
the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, 
vocation or employment.  
On the other hand, the constitution boldly stipulates that Islam is the 
official religion (Article 2) and Malay is the national language (Article 152). Also, 
the traditional Malay rulers, the Sultans, are the Supreme Heads of the Federation 
(Article 32) and of the various states (Article 70). All these are distinctive 
symbols of the Malay community. The clauses, thus, indicate the special position 
of the Malays vis-à-vis the other ethnic groups in the constitution. Furthermore, 
despite the clear commitment to ‘no discrimination’ on the bases of religion, race, 
descent and so on, the constitution recognises Malay special rights as indigenous 
people in terms of land reservation (Articles 89 and 90) and of quotas for public 
sector employments and various permits and licenses (Article 153).  
This ambiguous national identity raises questions regarding the national 
identity of Malaysia – Is Malaysia a Malay nation, a Malaysian nation or a 
collection of nations of Malay, Chinese, Indian and so on, and, ultimately, who 
are Malaysians? Because the political elites at the time of Independence could not 
elucidate the national identity, the federal constitution does not provide a clear 
answer to these questions. Consequently, the ambiguity of national identity 
resulted in competition and tension because of different constructions of 
nationalist identity, that is, competing nationalisms.   
Within UMNO, factional disputes frequently become an arena of 
competing nationalist ideologies. UMNO elites construct, manipulate and employ 
nationalist ideologies to answer the national identity question in their attempt to 
legitimise their political power. Or factional contestants insist that their nationalist   17
vision is better to justify their quest for power. UMNO factionalism has been a 
political conflict between the incumbent leadership and elites who challenge the 
incumbent leadership of the party. The incumbent UMNO leader, who is also the 
Prime Minister,
18   sets the ideological battleground, formulating nationalist 
ideology and vision. The Prime Minister, as a leader of the multiethnic Malaysia, 
attempts to resolve the unanswered question of national identity with his own 
vision and ideology. He does this by constructing a nationalist ideology through 
which he hopes to define national identity. For example, Cheah Boon Kheng 
observed:  
All four Prime Ministers upheld and worked the Social Contract of 1955 
and 1957 and have attempted to juggle and balance the communal 
demands and interests of the respective communities. Every one of these 
Prime Ministers started off their political career as an exclusivist Malay 
nationalist, but ended up as an inclusivist Malaysian nationalist. (Cheah, 
2002: 236) 
The competing nationalist position of the challenger is a reaction to the 
incumbent leader’s nationalist project. Cheah continued, ‘The fact that UMNO’s 
leaders did not develop their nationalism into an exclusive nationalism of “Malaya 
for the Malays” would make the future nation-state always subject to continuous 
pressures and challenges from its own members and from other Malay nationalists 
and organizations to realize their goal in the future’ (Cheah, 2002: 6). The 
challengers in UMNO find fault with the incumbent leader’s nationalist position, 
interpreting the Malay community’s problems as a result of the misplaced 
nationalism of the incumbent leader. They argue that their nationalist position 
provides a better future for Malay community. The challengers attempt to   18
mobilise the Malay community with their nationalist position so that they win the 
political contest against the incumbent leader.  
 
1.2.2. Democracy,  authoritarianism and nationalist ideologies 
in Malaysia 
In Malaysia, another debate concerning nationalist ideology focuses on the 
relationship between community and individual. This debate is closely related to 
the nature of politics – authoritarian or democratic politics. In 1962, Wang 
Gungwu, regarding democratic politics, nationalism and ethnic diversity, 
observed: 
Already some politicians are asking if democracy is efficient enough for 
the building of a new nation almost from scratch. [Their questions are] Is 
nationalism in Malaya compatible with democracy? If we want our 
people to be identified solely and fully with Malaya…can we afford to 
use only the methods of persuasion and education? Do we have the time 
which we badly need to convert, if not most people of this generation at 
least the bulk of the next generation, to the national ideal? The modern 
state machinery can be a powerful weapon, on the one hand, for 
education and indoctrination and, on the other, for coercion and strict 
political control. (Wang, 1981: 209) 
This observation indicates that there were political elites who considered 
sacrificing democratic politics for nation building – either the Malay or Malaysian 
nation – or for ethnic and political stability as early as the early 1960s when 
Malaysia was barely independent.  
A common characterisation of Malaysian politics is that it is 
authoritarian.
19  William Case argued, ‘while elections are held regularly in 
Malaysia, and opposition parties win parliamentary seats, civil liberties are so   19
truncated beforehand that government turnovers have normally been difficult to 
imagine’ (Case, 1997: 81). Similarly, Harold Crouch observed that while formal 
political institutions such as elections and the parliament are functioning, the 
government is well equipped with authoritarian apparatus to control the 
opposition in Malaysia (Crouch, 1993: 136-137).
20  
Authoritarian politics in Malaysia is a legacy of historical experiences 
such as insurgency and multi-ethnic composition of population and a logical 
consequence of elite response – imposition of elite-sanctioned official national 
identity – to the historical experiences. As this thesis shall argue, Malaysian 
political elites attempt to construct a nationalist vision and to impose the officially 
sanctioned national identity, drawn from the vision, to resolve the issue of ethnic 
diversity and to integrate diverse ethnic groups. The nationalist ideology of 
political elites, according to them, represents the collective national will and 
benefits the community as a whole. Therefore, it follows that the community has 
to consent to the vision of the elites for the benefit of the whole community. 
Sheila Nair captured the logic as follows: ‘The ruling elite’s claims of legitimacy 
are currently rooted in the state’s provision of interethnic harmony; this goal may 
be accomplished, according to this elite, only if civil society consents to the large 
programmatic mission of the state-representing-the-nation’ (S. Nair, 1999: 93). 
Authoritarian politics in Malaysia can be characterised by the limitation on 
civil liberties that might be a source of alternatives to the official national identity 
and authoritarian suppression of any challenging ideas to it, which, elites suspect, 
might undermine ethnic stability. Regarding the limitation on civil liberties in 
Malaysia, William Case observed, ‘the government has acted systematically to   20
cap...participation, registering and circumscribing groups through the Societies 
Act, extending a near monopoly over media ownership that dampens free 
expression..., and using the Internal Security Act regularly to jail ardent critics’ 
(Case, 1993: 77). 
Since the ideas and views of the political elites represent the will and 
interests of the entire community, any ideological challenge to the elites’ ideas 
and views, the elites claim, should be regarded as a challenge to the entire 
community. Therefore, the elites argue, such challenges as alternative ideas about 
national identity that are conceived by the contesting elites or by civil society 
independent from the state must be suppressed on behalf of the community’s 
interests, using the authoritarian and coercive state apparatus. Zakaria Ahmad 
observed that the Malaysian political leaders’ authoritarian politics is based on 
‘strong fears that too much democratization in terms of freedom of speech and 
association can only quickly and surely destroy the system’ (Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 
1989: 371). In sum political elites attempted to deprive individuals of rights to 
think and question what has been officially sanctioned on behalf of the interests 
and will of the community. In addition, if individuals digress from the officially 
sanctioned ideological path, they are exposed to a danger of being face sanctions 
by the hands of authoritarian political elites.  
If authoritarian politics in Malaysia has been justified in such a way and if 
political elites imposed an officially sanctioned national identity to resolve the 
national identity problem, the resolution of the tension with a vision of national 
identity may weaken the justification for authoritarian politics. Mahathir’s civic 
nationalist visions such as Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian Nation) and Wawasan   21
2020 (Vision 2020), along with his strategy of fostering forward-looking 
optimism
21  together with economic growth in the 1990s were successful in 
reducing the ambiguity in an aspect of national identity. The pro-Malay policies 
since the 1970s have now produced a confident and competent Malay middle-
class, different from their predecessors who demanded never-ending pro-Malay 
policies of the state. In addition, economic growth, especially within the Malay 
community, has reduced the Malay community’s collective ethnic fear of other 
non-Malay communities and increased its confidence (see Abdul Rahman 
Embong, 2001b; Abdul Rahman Embong, 2001c; Ho, 1994; S. Khoo, 1999; 
Shamsul, 1999; Williamson, 2002).  
These developments resulted in strong support for Mahathir’s vision in the 
Malay community. The support indicated a crucial shift in popular focus among 
the Malays, from a focus on ethnic loyalty to a focus on the building of a more 
civic Malaysia. Khoo Boo Teik described the success of Mahathir’s nationalist 
vision as follows: ‘Somehow Malaysians were inspired…to discover their ability 
to imagine themselves as a community, and to do so with a sense of the 
“ineradicable Goodness of the nation”’ (B. T. Khoo, 2003: 22).  
The success decreased the tensions surrounding the unresolved question of 
national identity. The development, however, raised another nationalist question – 
regarding the relationship between community and individual that was expressed 
in the tension between authoritarian politics and opposition to it. The success of 
Mahathir’s nationalism through economic growth and the ensuing optimism 
resulted in a more confident and assertive Malaysian society. Abdul Rahman 
Embong noted, ‘the new middle class come forward not only with new forms of   22
association, self-expression, and initiative, but also with new ideas regarding the 
proper balance among state, market, and civil society’ (Abdul Rahman Embong, 
2001b: 63). This development increased the questioning of the necessity for 
authoritarian control and the nationalist assumptions behind it, that is, the 
community’s will and interests above individual liberty and rights.  
Accordingly, the competing nationalisms have been reconfigured. On one 
hand, there is nationalism that underpins authoritarian politics and on the other, 
there is the newly rising awareness of individual liberty and rights as reflected in 
the demand for democratic politics and vibrant civil society as an autonomous 
space of free individuals. This rising demand for democratic politics assumes that 
individual rights and liberty are more important than or is as important as the will 
and interests of the whole community. This assumption is different from the 
nationalist view that justifies the elites’ imposition of national identity and the 
suppression of different ideas and voices in the name of the common interest of 
the community.   
 
1.3. Competing nationalisms: models for analysis 
The previous section surveyed the competing nationalist arguments 
constructed by political elites in UMNO factional disputes and argued that the 
unresolved question of national identity and the ambiguous relationship between 
community and individual cause debates and conflicts in Malaysia. This section 
will explore five models of nationalism, through which this thesis explains the 
competing nationalist ideologies in UMNO factionalism. These five models can 
be divided into two groups for analytical convenience – ethnocultural, civic and   23
multicultural nationalisms on one hand, and collectivist-authoritarian and 
individualistic-libertarian nationalisms on the other.  
Before explaining the models, it should be noted that the categorisation is 
only for the purpose of analysis. That this analytical framework is about ideal 
types has two meanings. First, this categorisation is used, at least in this thesis’ 
context, as a guide, not as a tool for black-or-white identification. The nationalism 
categiorisation adopted here is about relative degree and general tendency of 
specific political actor at specific time-frame and in specific political context. 
Therefore, a political actor or a policy scheme described by one of nationalism 
types should be understood as having such tendency in a relative term and context, 
not as being exemplary case in an absolute term and context.  
Second and similarly, in actual politics and the arguments used by political 
elites, the two groups can be combined. For example, ethnocultural, civic and 
multicultural nationalisms can be associated with either collectivist-authoritarian 
nationalism or individual-libertarian nationalism. Therefore, theoretically, we can 
have six different models: collectivist-authoritarian ethnocultural; collectivist-
authoritarian civic; collectivist-authoritarian multicultural; individualistic-
libertarian ethnocultural; individualistic-libertarian civic and individualistic-
libertarian multicultural nationalisms. As the models suggested here are for 
analysis, in the actual nationalist arguments made by political elites, the elements 
of the different models are mixed. In the analysis of UMNO factionalism in the 
coming chapters, a particular elite’s nationalist ideology is defined by the most 
significant element in it, which distinctively characterises the nationalist ideology 
of a political leader.   24
1.3.1. Models  of  ethnocultural, civic and multicultural 
nationalisms 
Nationalism is an ideology through which political elites attempt to secure 
political legitimacy and support. David Brown has described nationalism as ‘an 
ideology, invented and employed by new political élites aspiring to power in the 
modern state, who seek alternative sources of legitimacy to replace appeals to 
divine right or colonial mandate’ (Brown, 2000: 31).
22 Nationalist ideology has to 
provide a sense of community in which people feel included and safe. Having 
experienced such social disruptions as the imposition or the end of colonial rule, 
the introduction of capitalism, an influx of exogenous elements into a traditional 
community, physical transplantation of a community to a new territory and so on, 
people seek attachment to a community. Nationalism enables people ‘[t]o make 
sense of complex social and political arrangement, caused by social disruption’ 
(Breuilly, 1982: 343). When political elites successfully invent a national identity 
and suggest a nationalist vision, it is akin to providing a new home and the sense 
of belonging resolves the problems that people face.  
Referring primarily to David Brown’s categorisation of three distinctive 
models of nationalism, ethnocultural, civic and multicultural nationalisms (Brown, 
2000;2001), this study analyses the nationalist discourses in UMNO 
factionalism.
23  First, ethnocultural nationalism, according to Brown, ‘indicates 
that full status and membership of the national community be given only to those 
possessing the required ethnic attributes’ (Brown, 2001: 4). A. D. Smith called 
this model the dominant-ethnie model (Smith, 1991: 110).
24 The ‘ethnocultural 
sameness, which stems from the common ancestry of its members’ is the most 
important criteria that determines who is included and who is not (Brown, 2000:   25
35). The ethnocultural nationalist view shapes the nature of the state. In 
ethnocultural nationalism, the state is viewed as an ‘agency of whichever social 
group in society captures it’ (Brown, 2000: 36). The ethnocultural nationalist state, 
thus, is not neutral but biased towards the ethnic group that dominates the state. 
Consequently, the state is expected to protect and elevate the identity and the 
interests of the ethnic group that has captured it. At the same time, the 
ethnocultural state ‘promotes [cultural] assimilation’ of the minorities into the 
dominant ‘majority ethnoculture’ that captures the state (see Brown, 2000: 127, 
figure 2). Through cultural assimilation, ethnocultural state elites attempt to 
address the problems that develop when several ethnic groups live within a 
territorial boundary.
25  As Brown argued, ethnocultural nationalists assert: 
Individuals who have not inherited such attributes, may nevertheless be 
able to acquire them (through intermarriage, religious conversion, 
language acquisition, etc.) and this process of assimilation implies the 
corresponding acquisition of belief in the common history and ancestry of 
the adoptive community. The potential problem of ethnic diversity is thus 
resolved by the promise of assimilation. (Brown, 2000: 128) 
Those who are not assimilated – ‘to a national government they are a 
foreign body in the state to be either assimilated or rejected’ (Kedourie, 1960: 
122) – become second-class citizens in the nation-state and may be discriminated 
against by the state, even if legal citizenship has been conferred upon them.  
Second, civic nationalism is based on the assumption that ‘all citizens are 
granted equal status irrespective of their ethnic attributes, on the sole condition 
that they grant loyalty to the public institutions of the territorial community’ 
(Brown, 2001: 5).
26  Therefore, ethnocultural backgrounds are irrelevant when 
acquiring membership in a civic nation. Instead, what is important is the   26
individual’s commitment and loyalty to the institutions of the state. The members 
of a civic nation proclaim their loyalty to the state, not because they have 
biological or ancestral links to the state but because the state, as a neutral agent, 
protects the safety and interests of the individual members of the national 
community. Brown discussed the neutrality of the civic nationalist state as 
follows: 
If the state were viewed simply as the whole set of institutions relating to 
the administration of public affairs in a given territory, then we might 
wish to regard nationalism as the development within that territorial 
society, of a sense of identification with, and collective pride in, those 
institutions… [G]overnments seeking to defend and enhance the authority 
and status of the society’s public institutions, are likely to articulate 
legitimatory nationalist ideologies. The nationalism which emerges…is 
civic nationalism. (Brown, 2000: 36) 
In this tradition, to construct a culturally homogeneous nation and to 
resolve the problems posed by multi-ethnicity, the state promotes ‘difference-
blindness’ among its people (Brown, 2000: 127, figure 2). Both civic and 
ethnocultural nationalisms pursue ‘the elimination of difference within its 
territory’ (Guibernau, 1996: 101) but in different ways – integration and 
assimilation. The cultural integration of a nation is supposed to be accomplished 
via the creation of a new civic culture, which is very difficult to achieve, rather 
than through adoption of ethnocultural attributes of an ethnic group that 
dominates the state. A. D. Smith observed: 
The fact that many of these dominant-ethnie states encounter fierce 
opposition from ethnic minorities within the state reveals the failure to 
“invent” a new political culture and mythology, one that can encompass 
or transcend the ethnic identities of both dominant and minority ethnie at 
a time when ethnic nationalism is mobilizing the peripheral, demotic   27
communities and giving them a new, self-aware political assertiveness’. 
(Smith, 1991: 114)
27  
Third, according to the multicultural nationalism model, a national 
community can be composed of several ethnic groups. Each group has cultural 
autonomy that the nation-state cannot violate. As David Brown observed: 
[multicultural nationalists] seek, rather, to establish an encapsulating 
social justice community which is bound together by common values 
relating to the celebration of ethnic diversity, and the commitment to 
inter-ethnic equity. They seek a national community within which the 
diverse ethnic communities can flourish, and within which disadvantaged 
ethnic minorities can be guaranteed the rights and resources necessary for 
the attainment of their full development. (Brown, 2000: 128-129) 
Thus, a nation-state is composed of autonomous ethnic-cultural sub-units. 
Ethnic and cultural integration or assimilation is not an option for multicultural 
state elites in resolving ethnic tension. Instead, they believe that a nation-state can 
be built on the recognition of difference.
28 When state elites adopt multicultural 
nationalism, the state and its institutions can be considered ethnoculturally neutral 
but the neutrality of multicultural nationalism actively recognises the differences 
among ethnic groups. In this regard, Miller observed:  
Multiculturalism…regards the state as an arena in which many kinds of 
individual and group identity should be allowed to co-exist and flourish. 
The state should not merely tolerate but give equal recognition to each of 
these identities. No special weight should be given to national identities 
indeed, such identities are somewhat, suspect, in so far as they are likely 
to be the product of political manipulation, whereas identities stemming 
from gender, ethnicity, religious belief, and so forth are to be celebrated 
as authentic expressions of individual difference. (Miller, 1995: 120, 
emphasis added)   28
Thus, while civic nationalism is about ‘ethnic blindness’, multicultural 
nationalism is about ‘ethnic arithmetic’ (Brown, 2000: 48, 131) and 
‘consociationalism’ (Lijphart, 1977) or ‘institutional plurality’ (van Amersfoort, 
1995) can be one of the options for this ‘ethnic arithmetic’ or ‘power-sharing 
basis’ (Kellas, 1998: 70).
29  
Table 1-1. Civic, ethnocultural and multicultural nationalisms 
  Basis of nation  Role of state  Ethnic minority 
Civic 
nationalism 
A community bound 
by belief in and loyalty 
to the institutions of 
state. 
A neutral state indifferent 
to individual ethnic 
backgrounds. 
Ethnic minority is 
not recognised. 
Ethnocultural 
nationalism 
A community bound 
by shared historical 
memories such as 
common ancestry etc. 
State prioritises the 
interests and identity of 
the dominant community.
Minorities are 
supposed to be 
assimilated into 
the dominant 
ethnic culture. 
Multicultural 
nationalism 
A community of equal 
and autonomous ethnic 
communities. 
A neutral state that 
guarantees the autonomy 
of minorities. 
Ethnic minority’s 
autonomy is 
recognised. 
  
1.3.2. Models of collectivist-authoritarian and individualistic-
libertarian nationalisms 
This categorisation of collectivist-authoritarian and individualistic-
libertarian nationalisms is based on the analytical framework developed by Liah 
Greenfeld (Greenfeld, 1992). These two types of nationalism, according to 
Greenfeld, have different views on where sovereignty is actually located in a 
nation. Collectivist-authoritarian nationalism exists when individual liberty and 
rights are subjected to the collective community which interests and will are 
defined by political elites. Here, sovereignty is supposedly possessed by the 
collective community but is actually exercised by political elites. On the contrary, 
individualistic-libertarian nationalism rejects the idea of the collective community   29
as a sovereign entity prevailing over individuals. Instead, it claims that every 
individual in the community is a sovereign entity. Based on these different 
assumptions, the two models have different political consequences – authoritarian 
and liberal politics. 
Collectivist-authoritarian nationalism is characterised by collectivism and 
rhetorical warning of threats to the community. Liah Greenfeld explained 
collectivism in terms of the location of sovereignty. In the collectivist tradition, it 
is the nation as a whole that has sovereignty. Therefore, clear emphasis is placed 
on the community as a unique entity rather than on the individuals who constitute 
that community. Greenfeld argued: 
The national principle was collectivistic; it reflected the collective being. 
Collectivistic ideologies are inherently authoritarian, for, when the 
collectivity is seen in unitary terms, it tends to assume the character of a 
collective individual possessed of a single will, and someone is bound to 
be its interpreter. (Greenfeld, 1992: 11)
30 
The political consequence of collectivism is illiberal and authoritarian 
politics, characterised by the forceful imposition on the community of the national 
vision conceived by political elites and non-tolerance of dissent. As Greenfeld 
discussed, in this collectivist community, there exists inequality between political 
leaders and ordinary people. And she continued that elites ‘are qualified to 
interpret the collective will and…the selected few dictate to the masses who must 
obey’ (Greenfeld, 1992: 11).
31 The interpretation of nationalist vision and goal by 
political elites are imposed on the community since it is only the political elites 
who are able and entitled to figure out a better nationalist vision for the 
community. It is likely that under these political elites, any questioning of,   30
opposition to or dissent from the political elites’ nationalist vision is forbidden. 
Any deviance from the goals or national interests as defined by the political elites 
is portrayed as a challenge to the community as a whole and is suppressed in an 
authoritarian way.
32  
The other important element of collectivist-authoritarian nationalism is the 
presence of internal and external enemies that are perceived to be threatening the 
community’s or nation’s survival, goal or interests. As Alter contended, ‘images 
of a hostile world beyond… borders were evoked to whip up support at home for 
the nationalist cause; ongoing political tensions with other countries were 
artificially heightened to bolster national loyalty’ (Alter, 1989: 42). Threats such 
as the existence of ethnic groups (other than the dominant group) are used by the 
political elites for political purposes. The elites try to instil a ‘garrison under 
siege’ mentality
33 with, for example, anti-Western or anti-colonial rhetoric, fear of 
re-colonisation, terror of violent ethnic conflict and so on. The fear created 
through the alleged presence of enemies and threats to the community resonates 
with the insecurities of people who want to be included in the national community. 
Political elites channel these fears and insecurities to justify authoritarian control 
of the community.   
Nationalism that develops in an ‘individualistic-libertarian’ manner has 
different ideological underpinnings. Free individuals are the basis of 
individualistic-libertarian nationalism.
34   Greenfeld discussed the core of 
individualism through sovereignty. She argued that sovereignty is exercised by 
‘some individuals, who were of the people’, but essentially is owned by 
individuals and ‘these individuals exercised sovereignty’ in an individualistic   31
tradition (Greenfeld, 1992: 10-11).
35 By implication, the political leaders describe 
themselves merely as representatives of the people who have the ultimate right to 
interpret nationalist goals and to shape their own future. In individualistic-
libertarian nationalism, national vision and goal are matters to be discussed in 
civil society through debates and through ‘the consent of the individuals 
concerned’ (Canovan, 1996: 5).
36  
Therefore, in the debates and discussions regarding national goals and 
vision, it is natural to permit different opinions and ideas to flourish, according to 
nationalism in the individualistic-libertarian mode.
37  Consequently,  internal 
dissent is allowed, as it is not the enemy of the community but an essential part of 
formulating nationalist goals. Dissent is viewed as constructive criticism rather 
than an attempt to undermine the integrity and safety of the community.  
In addition, individualistic-libertarian nationalism resonates with the more 
confident and secure classes or sections of society. As Alter discussed, 
individualistic-libertarian nationalism (‘Risorgimento nationalism,’ in his words) 
is ‘defined as an emancipatory political force that accompanies the liberation…of 
new social strata’ (Alter, 1989: 28).
38 This description of the supporters or carriers 
of individualistic-libertarian nationalism shows that those who support 
individualistic-libertarian nationalism is less vulnerable to the political elites’ 
rhetoric of external and internal dangers and threats, unlike their insecure 
counterparts who willingly accept the rhetoric of threats and dangers highlighted 
by the authoritarian political elites. When the political elites exaggerate dangers 
and threats to the community, it is primarily the insecure and less confident 
sections of the society who are affected. The confident sections of the society are   32
not readily mobilised or demobilised by the political elites’ rhetoric of the threat 
and danger to the nation’s survival and interests.    
Table 1-2. Individualistic-libertarian/collectivist-authoritarian nationalisms 
  Nationalist goal  Threat to nation  Political practices 
Collectivist-
authoritarian 
Nationalism 
Collectivist—
emphasises collective 
will as interpreted by 
political elites. 
State elites identify 
threats to mobilise 
people. 
Authoritarian 
politics—suppressive 
and authoritarian to 
counter the threat. 
Individualisti
c-libertarian 
Nationalism 
Individualistic—out 
of debates in civil 
society among 
sovereign individuals. 
The audience is less 
affected by the 
threats. 
Liberal politics—open 
and liberal, dissident 
is allowed. 
 
1.4.  Main arguments, research questions and thesis 
structure 
So far, three arguments have been made as follows. First, existing studies 
have ignored the ideological arguments in UMNO factionalism, or if they did not, 
they have not paid much attention to the issue of nationalism. Second, nationalist 
ideologies have been at the centre of Malaysian politics because the questions of 
national identity have been unresolved. The questions include the ambiguities in 
Malaysia’s national identity and in the relationship between community and 
individual. In the analysis of ideological arguments by competing elites in UMNO 
factionalism, nationalism is a topic of crucial importance in the understanding of 
UMNO factionalism. Third, these unresolved questions might be conceptualised 
through a theoretical framework of five models of nationalist ideology – civic, 
ethnocultural and multicultural nationalisms in one group and collectivist-
authoritarian and individualistic-libertarian nationalism in another.  
This study argues that UMNO factional disputes are more than personal 
power struggles. The nationalist ideological arguments, which have been largely   33
ignored in the existing studies, have been effectively utilised by the UMNO elites 
involved in the disputes and it played a crucial role in the disputes. The 
disagreements among the elites reflect the unresolved questions of national 
identity in Malaysia, that is, the ambiguous relationship between ethnic and 
national identity and the tense relationship between individual liberty and rights 
on one hand and the interests and will of the collective community on the other. 
Furthermore, because the elites attempt to mobilise the community with their 
ideological arguments, the impact of the disputes extends beyond the party elite 
level, spilling over to the wider society, shaping not just UMNO politics, but also 
Malaysian politics as a whole.     
If we analyse UMNO factional disputes from the perspective of nationalist 
ideological arguments, it involves the arguments from two sides: the nationalist 
vision constructed by the Prime Ministers to resolve the question of national 
identity and the countering nationalist ideology constructed by the challenging 
elites, reflecting the (negative) response, towards the vision, from the community. 
As I have just mentioned, this thesis is focusing on elite level dynamics rather 
than on a survey of wider Malaysian community. The grass-root or wider 
constituency, although it does not mean that they are not important, will be 
considered in this thesis only minimally when needs arise.  
This thesis, investigating elite level nationalist discourse in factional 
disputes, involves understanding: 
1)  the Prime Ministers’ attempts to manage the unresolved questions of 
national identity by formulating a nationalist ideology;    34
2)  the consequences of the attempts or the responses of the Malay 
community to the Prime Ministers’ attempts;  
3)  the nationalist arguments put forward by challenging UMNO elites 
to mobilise the Malay community; and  
4)  the consequences of the disputes from the perspective of nationalism.  
The nationalist vision of the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
who was challenged in the 1969 dispute, was shaped more by the imperative of 
national integration and ethnic stability, which affected his nationalism to move 
away from an ethnocultural nationalist position. Mahathir in the 1980s put more 
emphasis on the imperative of economic growth than on the ethnic redistribution 
goal of the NEP that defined the ethnocultural Malay nationalism of the 1970s. In 
such crises as the ethnic riots in 1969 and the economic downturn in the mid 
1980s that weakened the support for the Prime Ministers, some UMNO elites 
attempted to weaken the Prime Minister’s support by mobilising the Malay 
community with their ethnocultural nationalist alternatives.   
The last case, the 1998 dispute, also has a similar structure. There was a 
crisis of the Prime Minister’s vision during the 1997–98 economic crisis. The 
challenging elites attempted to tap Malay support with countering nationalist 
ideology in their challenge to the Prime Minister. However, the circumstances of 
factional conflict in 1998 were different from those in 1969 and 1987, and it 
requires another analytical framework. Rapid economic growth and affluence 
reduced once stark ethnic competition over limited economic resources and 
particularly, decreased the feeling of vulnerability of economically weaker ethnic 
group. In such context, Mahathir’s civic nationalist vision and corresponding   35
policy changes made ethnocultural, civic or multicultural nationalist manipulation 
less effective as an ideological tool to mobilise political support. Instead, there 
was a different tension – that between collectivist nationalism and individualistic 
nationalism. These are the competing nationalist ideologies in the 1998 UMNO 
factional dispute.   
The main questions addressed by this thesis are as follows: 
How did a particular Prime Minister attempt to resolve the question of 
national identity by constructing a nationalist ideology? And what were the 
consequences of the attempt? 
How did some challenging elites construct their alternative nationalist 
position against the incumbent leader? And what were their arguments? In what 
circumstance did they mount challenges to the incumbent, deploying such 
arguments? 
What were the consequences of the dispute from the perspective of 
nationalism? Were the tensions between conflicting nationalist ideologies 
resolved?   
What was the reason behind the relative success of the management of 
ethnic tension by Prime Minister? And what kind of new nationalist tension arose 
from it? 
Before I move on to an outlining of individual chapters of this thesis, a 
note should be made regarding the methodological aspect of this research. The 
main methodology adopted in this research is analysing the ideological – 
nationalist – discourses of political elites and its reflection in concrete policies, 
and comparing two competing nationalist positions in factional disputes. The   36
analysis and comparison, of course, will be done considering long and short term 
political context of factional disputes. The analysis and consequential description 
of political elites’ nationalist positions, however, does not intend to identify what 
they were – was he or she really believed what they said or was he or she really a 
person of such ideology? – or what they really intended. Of course, thus, a 
rhetoric adopted might be merely a disguise of their real political intentions.  
Instead, this research will show the nationalist rhetoric used by political 
elites and carefully put them in a matrix of nationalisms. This research is more 
concerned with relative ideological positions and its political consequences rather 
than revealing illusive true political intention. Consequentially, when a political 
elite is described as ethnocultural nationalist, it does not necessarily mean that he 
or she is an exemplar of such nationalist position. Rather it means he or she had 
more tendency towards a particular nationalist direction in comparison to his or 
her opponents or to what he or she said and did before. Thus, the description is 
about a tendency and should be understood in relative terms. 
This thesis is composed of six chapters, including this introduction and a 
conclusion. Following this introduction, from Chapter 2 to Chapter 5, I will 
discuss each factional dispute in UMNO. Chapter 2 analyses a dispute in 1969 
between the older generation personified by the first Prime Minster, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman and the new generation, spearheaded by Mahathir Mohamed, focusing on 
the discourses of nationalism held by the competing factions. This chapter first 
examines Malay nationalism held by the Tunku that shifted from ethnocultural 
Malay nationalism to multicultural nationalism. Second, the nationalist ideology 
constructed by ethnocultural nationalist, who challenged the Tunku’s multicultural   37
nationalism is explored. This can be shown in a few political developments in the 
late 1960s. The last part of the chapter looks at the consequence of the factional 
dispute, that is, how the arguments of the ethnocultural nationalist elites were 
reflected in the reform and changes initiated by a new government.  
Chapter 3 discusses the 1987 UMNO factional dispute between Team A 
(led by Mahathir) and Team B (led by Razaleigh Hamzah and Musa Hitam). First, 
the chapter investigates Mahathir’s nationalist vision, as reflected in his economic 
policies of deregulation of the NEP and privatisation. These policies were a 
significant shift away from the ethnocultural Malay nationalism of 1970s. It will 
then be argued that the challenging team constructed their ethnocultural Malay 
nationalist position as a reaction to Mahathir’s new direction, criticising 
Mahathir’s policy and upholding the ethnocultural nationalism of the original 
NEP. Finally, the consequences of the dispute will be explained, highlighting the 
two factions’ attempts to win over the Malay community’s support.   
Chapter 4 provides a background of the new dimension of nationalist 
tension in Malaysia. The topic of Chapter 4, the socio-economic and political 
situation in Malaysia in the early 1990s, became a political milestone as far as 
nationalist tension and conflict in Malaysia is concerned. The first part of the 
chapter shows the relative success of Mahathir’s civic nationalist vision, 
buttressed by economic growth. Specifically, it will be shown how Mahathir tried 
to capture the Malay community with his civic vision. The second part of the 
chapter, which is also divided into two smaller sections, examines the collectivist-
authoritarian aspect of Mahathir’s nationalist vision. In the first section, 
Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalism is explored through his own   38
arguments and in the authoritarian politics under his leadership. In the second 
section, I will investigate Mahathir’s strategy of identifying various threats to 
community in an attempt to shore up political legitimacy and support for his 
nationalist vision.  
Chapter 5 explores the 1998 UMNO factional dispute from the perspective of 
nationalist conflict between Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalism and 
Anwar’s individualistic-libertarian nationalism. The second part of the chapter, 
after a brief review of the 1990s’ factional dynamics, explores Anwar’s 
individualistic-libertarian nationalist position. In the third section of the chapter, 
the 1998 factional dispute, beginning with the onset of the 1997 economic crisis to 
Anwar’s sacking in 1998, will be explained, focusing on their different arguments 
regarding the authoritarian Malaysian politics and, thus, by implication, the 
relationship between individual and community. The institutionalisation of the 
individualistic-libertarian position into an opposition coalition and its ultimate 
showdown against Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalism in 1999 
election will be described. The final section of the chapter will examine how 
Mahathir, manipulating various international and domestic developments, 
regained his lost ground by re-asserting his collectivist-authoritarian civic 
nationalist position. 
                                                 
1 Hari Singh’s study provided us with a more complicated scenario (H. Singh, 2001). 
His analysis suggested two possible outcomes: democratisation or oligarchic restructuring. 
Anwar’s fallout with Mahathir could have resulted in democratisation if Anwar’s 
democratic commitment was guided by the grassroots aspirations of Reformasi. 
Otherwise, Anwar’s dispute with Mahathir, if he had succeeded, would have ended up 
with oligarchic restructuring within the same elite coterie. Regarding ideological 
differences between Anwar and Mahathir, Singh argued that to overcome Mahathir, who 
had significantly centralised political power in his hands after 1987, ‘Anwar had little 
choice but to adopt an ideological stance that contrasted with that of Mahathir. Hence, he   39
                                                                                                                                      
espoused democracy as an alternative to an authoritarian socio-political order [of 
Mahathir]’ (H. Singh, 2001: 540). Thus, in Singh’s view, the eventual consequences of 
the 1998 dispute would be decided by the future trajectory of the Reformasi movement, 
rather than the cause of the elite-level dispute itself.  
2 An “ultra” faction in UMNO, in the context of the 1960s, refers to a group of newly 
rising UMNO elites, who is generally said to be much more pro-Malay nationalist when 
compared to their predecessors. This group included Harun Idris, Syed Nasir Ismail, 
Jaafar Albar and UMNO second echelon elites at that time such as Mahathir Mohamed, 
Razaleigh Hamzah, Musa Hitam and Abdullah Ahmad, although the individuals included 
vary by observers. The term, “ultra,” was first coined, with somewhat of a negative 
connotation, by Lee Kuan Yew in the controversy of Singapore’s secession from 
Malaysia in 1965. Lee Kuan Yew dubbed some UMNO elites who were critical of the 
PAP (People’s Action Party) and himself as Malay “ultras,” by which he meant ultra 
Malay nationalists or chauvinists. 
3 Harold Crouch noted significant changes in the class composition in Malaysia in the 
1980s. However, he did not relate these changes to any ideological or policy difference in 
the 1987 UMNO factional dispute.  
4  Interestingly, Ian Stewart also observed that Anwar made a number of political 
enemies within UMNO who later played a crucial role in Anwar’s sacking. They included 
Ghafar Baba, Sanusi Junid, Rafidah Aziz, and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, according to 
Stewart (Stewart, 2003: 15, 24).  
5 In his article, written in the early stages of the dispute, Funston also mentioned the 
possibility of regime change in Malaysia. He argued that although the dispute itself was 
far from ideological or policy-related, the aftermath of the dispute, the Reformasi 
movement, could be the beginning of significant political change in Malaysia. 
6  Like Funston, William Case considered the possibility of regime change from a 
‘Semi Democracy’ to a ‘Fuller Democracy’ because of the Anwar-Mahathir dispute. His 
conclusion was that while the grassroots mobilisation in the form of Reformasi was 
significant, the regime would withstand the winds of change. 
7  Khoo debated, ‘strains resulted as much from an evident policy shift as from 
underlying economic fundamentals. In effect, political and policy decisions and actions 
[“a turning point of the social tension”] interacted with underlying economic 
fundamentals [“undercurrent tension in society”] to create a climate in which a split could 
occur when and if the personalities were available to take up the cudgels, irrespective…of 
what those cudgels [“an ignition by elite rivalry”] represented’ (K. J. Khoo, 1992: 48). 
8 Khoo depicted the situation thus: ‘All it needed was a match. Mahathir’s personality 
(“leadership style”), the unsettled and unsettling question of who was to succeed 
Mahathir leading to power plays in the upper reaches of Government, and Tengku 
Razaleigh’s and Musa Hitam’s decision to challenge Mahathir, provided that match’ (K. J. 
Khoo, 1992: 68). 
9 In the 1987 UMNO dispute, the two competing factions were dubbed Team A, which 
was Mahathir’s faction, and Team B, which was the faction of the challenger, Razaleigh. 
The two teams eventually split the party and were re-born as UMNO Baru and Semangat 
46’ (Spirit of 1946) respectively.  
10 Hilley observed, ‘But there may have been a much more fundamental issue at play 
here. Mahathir had given 17 years of sustained effort to building economic prosperity, 
Vision modernity and UMNO hegemony, none of which he intended to see sacrificed 
ignominiously in a moment of domestic uncertainty, albeit a critical one. Not only was 
Anwar taking the economy in a direction that, for Mahathir, threatened to undo those   40
                                                                                                                                      
achievements, but his relationship with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] nexus 
suggested a wider strategy to replace him’ (Hilley, 2001: 105). 
11 It is very tempting to imagine that there is a clear distinction and cleavage between 
political opportunism and genuine ideological conviction in political behaviours of a 
political actor. We, however, do not know what the real political intention of a political 
actor behind a political episode was. Even if the political actor confesses their intention, 
there is no ground to believe it true. Furthermore it is likely that political opportunism and 
genuine ideological conviction are often all mixed up without clear boundary. Only we 
can do is to make a judgement on it considering context of the political happening, 
pretending that there is a clear distinction between opportunism and genuine conviction. 
Otherwise, we have to choose one aspect to explain a political episode, not losing touch 
with the other dimension of it.  
12 Before the British colonial period, there were immigration waves into the peninsula 
from nearby archipelagos (Bugis and Minankabau people) and from distant regions such 
as the Middle East, India and China. The immigrants from the distant areas came to the 
Malay Peninsula along with international trade and, in the case of Middle Eastern and 
Indian immigrants, introduced Islam to the peninsula. The immigrants before British 
colonial rule were assimilated to the indigenous people in the peninsula. Clearly being 
minority, a small number of immigrants from different cultures were easily assimilated 
into the indigenous society, adopting the Malay way of living, language and to a certain 
degree, religion as well. In addition, there were a substantial number of intermarriages 
between the indigenous people and the immigrants, which expedited the assimilation 
(Andaya & Andaya, 1982: 93-97).  
13 According to the Malaysian Census 2000, Bumiputera (which literally means ‘son 
of the soil’), composed of Malay and other indigenous people, accounted for 65.1 per cent, 
Chinese 26.0 per cent and Indians 7.7 per cent of the population in 2000. It was 60.6 per 
cent, 28.1 per cent and 7.9 per cent in 1991 respectively. Unlike the Peninsula, in East 
Malaysia, local indigenous ethnic groups form the majority. In Sarawak, the Iban is the 
majority (30.1 per cent), outnumbering the Chinese (26.7 per cent) and the Malays (23.0 
per cent). In Sabah, the Kadazan Dusun accounts for 18.4 per cent, the Bajau 17.3 per 
cent and the Malays 15.3 per cent (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2001).  
14  Malaysia was officially called Malaya before it included Singapore, Sabah and 
Sarawak in 1963. After the inclusion of these three territories, the official name of the 
country became Malaysia. 
15 A speech by Abdullah Ahmad, an UMNO Member of Parliament, at the Institute of 
International Affairs, Singapore on 30 August 1986. This speech was published in (Das, 
1987: 1-10). 
16  From an article by Kua Kia Soong, Director of the Malaysian human rights 
organisation, Suaram, and former opposition Member of Parliament. This article is from 
(Kua, 1987b: 94). 
17 A speech by Secretary-General of DAP (Democratic Action Party) and Member of 
Parliament, C. V. Nair, at the Annual Dinner of the University of Malaya Graduate 
Society in Seremban on 11 June 1966. This speech was published in (C. V. D. Nair, 1969: 
123-129) 
18 Until now, all Prime Ministers are selected from within UMNO (UMNO Presidents) 
because of its numerical dominance in the ruling coalition (Alliance party and later BN) 
that always secured more than a simple majority in every election since the Independence. 
Likewise, all the Deputy Prime Ministers are from UMNO as well. The Deputy President 
of UMNO usually assumes the position.   41
                                                                                                                                      
19 These descriptions give different names to the Malaysian political regime. William 
Case calls the Malaysian political regime a semi-democracy (Case, 
1992;1993;1997;2001b) or a pseudo-democracy (Case, 2001b). Harold Crouch (Crouch, 
1992;1993) dubbed the Malaysian regime as “neither authoritarian nor democratic”, given 
its elusive nature. Zakaria Ahmad coined a term, “quasi democracy” for the Malaysian 
regime (Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 1989) while Khoo Boo Teik observed increasingly 
authoritarian politics in Malaysia since its independence in 1957 (B. T. Khoo, 1997a).  
20 Likewise, Zakaria Ahmad pointed out, ‘Plural Malaysia cannot be characterized as 
nondemocratic if popular choice of government is a primary index of democratic 
performance. On the other hand, the dictates of and perceived need for a “strong” 
government able to deal effectively with the competing demands of an ethnically divided 
society, with strong laws that may even deny specific instances habeas corpus.... , and 
other features present a cameo of authoritarian elements’ (Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 1989: 
349). 
21 David Brown commented on ‘forward-looking optimism’ as follows: ‘The potential 
tension between the two [nationalisms] has…been defused by a forward-looking 
optimism which looks towards an ideal where the political community and the 
ethnocultural community coincide in the one “nation-state”. This forward-looking 
optimism has been facilitated by economic development…which ensured that political 
integration and ethnocultural assimilation could successfully interweave so as to generate 
the new nation-state’ (Brown, 2000: 38-39). David Brown argued that state elites in a 
modern nation-state, facing ethnic tension, have ‘portrayed themselves as the agents of 
equitable development, so that the image of the nation has been reconstructed as the 
social justice community’ in which acute tension among ethnic interests becomes blurred 
in the context of economic affluence (Brown, 2000: 38). The tension and contradiction 
regarding nationalist vision can still be there in a nation-state, but, as Brown depicted, the 
political elites try to manage the tension ‘not by resolving the disparity, but by distracting 
attention from it’ (Brown, 2000: 38). Economic development in this strategy has a central 
importance. To reduce tension among ethnic groups, it is important to foster a feeling of 
security since nationalism was supposed to provide such a feeling in their imagined home. 
Economic development deepens the sense of security in these ethnic groups that their 
future will be safe and prospering. With economic affluence, confrontation and 
competition among ethnic groups can decrease significantly. This may create a sense of 
contentment that the state takes care of their interest. Economic affluence becomes a 
strong incentive for the minorities to join the vision that the state elites project, rather 
than remaining outside, losing economic opportunities (Beissinger, 1998: 176; Brown, 
2000: 39) 
22 There are three different conceptual languages of nationalism, that is, primordialism, 
situationalism and constructivism. This study follows the constructivist position.  
In the primordialist approach, a nation is ‘based upon a natural, organic community, 
which defines the identity of its members, who feel an innate and emotionally powerful 
attachment to it’. In the situational approach, national identity is not ‘natural instinctual 
ties to organic community’, but ‘resources employed by groups of individuals for the 
pursuit of their common interests’. In constructivism, ‘national identity is constructed on 
the basis of institutional or ideological frameworks which offer simple and indeed 
simplistic formulas of identity, and diagnoses of contemporary problems’ (Brown, 2000: 
4-29). A. D. Smith suggested a more diversified categorisation of competing conceptual 
languages of nation and nationalism. According to Smith, there are combinations of 
competing notions such as 1) organicist versus voluntarist understanding of the nation (a 
debate between primordialism and instrumentalism); 2) perennialist versus the modernist   42
                                                                                                                                      
approaches to nations and nationalism (antiquity and modernity of nations); and 3) social 
constructionist and the ethnosymbolic approaches to nation and nationalism (Smith, 2000: 
2-3). As summarised in Smith’s book, the constructivist position is as follows: ‘the 
assumption that nationalism created and continues to create nations, rather than the 
opposite; The belief that nations are recent and novel products of modernity, so far 
sharing the modernist view; A view of nations as social constructs and cultural artefacts 
deliberately engineered by elites; The idea that nationalists “invent” and “imagine” the 
nation by representing it to the majority through a variety of cultural media and social 
rituals; The belief that only in modern conditions is such invention and imagination 
possible and likely; a sense of the suppression of the age of nations along with that of 
modernity in a more globalizing epoch’ (Smith, 2000: 52).   
23 There are other names for civic nationalism such as patriotism (Viroli, 1995), civic-
territorial nationalism (Smith, 1991), territorial nationalism (Smith, 1986), political 
nationalism (Smith, 1998) and social nationalism (Kellas, 1998). Also, ethnocultural 
nationalism has other names such as Romantic nationalism (cultural nation) (Guibernau, 
1996), nationalism (against patriotism) (Viroli, 1995), ethnic nationalism (Greenfeld, 
1992; Kellas, 1998), cultural nationalism (Hutchinson, 1987), ethnic-genealogical 
nationalism (Smith, 1991), ethnonationalism (Connor, 1994) and so on. 
24 With specific reference to the new states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Smith 
defined ethnocultural nationalism as the “dominant ethnie model”. He argued that in the 
dominant ethnie model, ‘the culture of the new state’s core ethnic community becomes 
the main pillar of the new national political identity and community, especially where the 
culture in question can claim to be “historic” and “living” among the core community… 
Though other cultures continued to flourish, the identity of the emerging political 
community is shaped by the historic culture of its dominant ethnie’ (Smith, 1991: 110).  
25When it comes to cultural assimilation for nation building according to ethnocultural 
nationalism, there could be two possibilities. The first is absolute exclusion of exogenous 
elements while the second is conditional acceptance of the foreign elements if they are 
culturally assimilated. Although the two are not differentiated here, Kellas regarded them 
as different kinds of nationalisms; the former is ethnic nationalism and the latter is social 
nationalism. See (Kellas, 1998: 66). 
26 A. D. Smith similarly described the building of a civic nation as ‘creating a supra-
ethnic “political culture”. He continued, ‘In these cases there is not acknowledged 
dominant  ethnie; either the new state contains a number of equally small ethnic 
communities…or a number of rival ethnies’ (Smith, 1991: 112).  
27  Also, David Brown argued, ‘It is certainly true that the civic ideal of ethnic 
neutrality may be as rarely achieved as is the ethnocultural ideal of ethnic exclusivity’, 
although once it is built, it could provide ‘a powerful and distinct vision’ and ‘act as a 
buffer between ethnic majoritarian and ethnic minority visions’ (Brown, 2001: 5, 7). 
28 Guibernau found roughly three practical configurations of multicultural nationalism. 
First, it can ‘acknowledge the “cultural differences” of its minority or minorities, without 
allowing more than the cultivation and promotion of their own culture and the 
maintenance of some deep-rooted elements of the socio-cultural tradition’. Alternatively, 
there could be ‘a certain degree of autonomy within the state’. Third, the state ‘permits 
the highest degree of self-determination for nations without a state’ as long as the ‘nations 
[are] integrated within a federation’ (Guibernau, 1996: 101). 
29 Some have suggested institutional configuration for multicultural nationalist nation 
such as institutional plurality (van Amersfoort, 1995), consociationalism or 
consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1977). Arend Lijphart’s consociationalism consists 
of four major elements: ‘government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all   43
                                                                                                                                      
significant segments of the plural society’; ‘the mutual veto or “concurrent majority” 
rule’; ‘proportionality as the principle standard of political representation, civic service 
appointments, and allocation of public funds’; and ‘a high degree of autonomy for each 
segment to run its own internal affairs’ (Lijphart, 1977: 25-52). Kellas, likewise, saw 
consociationalism as a configuration in which diverse ethnic characteristics can be 
moderated and contained. He stated, ‘In a state organised along “consociational” lines, 
the situation is not as polarised. Ethnic nationalist parties, and ethnic sections of state-
wide parties, are not anti-state, but seek maximum power within the state. Thus, the 
Fleming and Wallon nationalist parties in Belgium, and the Fleming and Wallon Socialist 
and Christian Socialist Parties, seek the maximum power for their ethnic groups within 
the Belgian state on a consociational or ‘power-sharing’ basis’ (Kellas, 1998: 70). Hans 
van Amersfoort argued that institutional plurality such as federalism could be an option 
when elimination of ethnic difference (civic nation) failed and marginalisation of 
minorities only can be achieved in the long-term (van Amersfoort, 1995: 169). Therefore, 
he seemed to maintain that multicultural nationalism is an alternative to failed civic 
nationalism on the way to eventual ethnocultural nation.  
30 Canovan similarly depicted the collectivist tradition as a core characteristic of the 
‘Romantic-collectivist view’ of nationalism. She contended that in the Romantic-
collective view, ‘nations exist as whole of which individuals are but parts, so that it is the 
collective nation that should form the basis of political organization’ (Canovan, 1996: 5). 
Thus, she observed, ‘Nationalists of [Romantic-collectivist] stamp see the nation rather 
than its members as the possessor of sacred rights, and stress that individuals are parts of 
something greater than themselves, with a duty to serve the whole’ (Canovan, 1996: 7). In 
this tradition, as Alter put it, ‘You are nothing, your people everything’ (Alter, 1989: 38). 
Breuilly also, explaining Nazism, captured the core of illiberal-collective tradition of 
nationalism. He observed, ‘it insist[s] that there was a national community and that its 
interests took priority over individual or sectional interests within the nation or any 
supranational interest’ (Breuilly, 1982: 4).  
31State elites in the collectivist tradition, as depicted by Alter, are ‘the self-appointed 
guardians of this national interest, …reserved for themselves the exclusive right to 
determine what it actually was’ (Alter, 1989: 42). It means that when individuality is 
absolutely subjected to the community’s will, state elites, who lead the community, have 
the right to interpret the will of the community. Accordingly, they become most powerful 
and inviolable. Also, as David Brown similarly observed, ‘[the state leaders] depict the 
diverse individuals and groups within their society as comprising one community with 
one will… [They] claim that they constitute the sole legitimate articulator and defender of 
the common interest or will of the people as a whole… they depict themselves as the 
experts who can deliver what the singular entity ‘the people’, want or need. They thereby 
identify the interests of the whole community with the interests of themselves as the elite’ 
(Brown, 2001: 3). In this situation, as Alter put it, ‘Il duce ha sempre ragione – the leader 
is always right’ (Alter, 1989: 38). 
32  Thus, Alter observed, ‘Anyone who resisted demands [of state elites] would be 
dispatched with force if necessary. In the putative interest of the nation, [the state elites] 
clamped down on dissident, pluralism...and autonomous institutions’ (Alter, 1989: 39). 
33  David Brown argued, in the case of Singapore, that the purpose of a ‘garrison 
mentality’ is ‘to publicize the various dangers and threats facing Singapore which make 
the defensive unity of the whole community imperative to the country’s very existence. It 
is this siege view of politics which lies behind the idea, promoted by the government after 
1965, that Singapore’s national ideology was the “ideology of survival”’ (Brown, 1994: 
84-85).    44
                                                                                                                                      
34 Canovan asked who is ‘the people’ believed to be sovereign in a democracy. She 
contended that the relationship between free individuals and the community should be 
clarified because, without a clear conceptual understanding of who constitutes ‘the 
people’, the discussion of democracy as an expression of the people’s sovereignty 
becomes problematic (Canovan, 1996). The free individual, in individualistic-libertarian 
nationalism, does not mean an individual without any community affiliation. As was the 
case with collectivist-authoritarian nationalism, the individual in individualistic-
libertarian nationalism is still included in a national community (see Patten, 1999; Tamir, 
1993; Vincent, 1997). Rather, the question is whether the individual has meaningful 
choice within a community or nation instead of whether the individual is absolutely free 
of duties and constraints imposed by the community. For a similar discussion, see (Smith, 
2000: 6). 
35 A. D. Smith, while he explained Hans Kohn’s Eastern and Western nationalisms, 
captured the distinctive nature of individualistic-libertarian and collectivist-authoritarian 
nationalisms very well. He stated, ‘[T]he two kinds of nationalism displayed a number of 
contrasting features, but the basic opposition concerned the relationship of individual to 
the collectivity. In both kinds of nationalism the individual must belong to a nation; there 
is no chance of surviving outside the bond of the nation. But in the voluntaristic type, the 
individual can, in principle, choose to which nation she or he wishes belong to; in that 
limited sense, the nation is a contractual political association. A voluntarist idea of the 
nation guarantees the right of individuals to choose their nation of belonging. In contrast, 
organic versions of nationalism reject any such right. The individual is born into a nation, 
and is indelibly stamped with its character and genius for life’. (Smith, 2000: 6) 
36 In other words, as characterised by Canovan, ‘nations are defined not by historic 
destiny but by individual identification’ (Canovan, 1996: 11). This, of course, is in stark 
contrast to the collectivism in which only state elites can interpret nationalist goals and 
individuals are subjected to the goals dictated by the elites. Also, for Alter, Risorgimento 
nationalism is equivalent to individualistic-libertarian nationalism. It has an 
‘emancipatory and liberal character,’ according to Alter (Alter, 1989: 27). Risorgimento 
nationalism was a struggle against suppression. Alter argued, ‘the struggle [of 
Risorgimento nationalists] against the old feudal régime, against monarchs and dynasties, 
appeared to be a struggle for the creation of an egalitarian, democratic and liberal society’ 
and it dates back to the French Revolution, which goal was ‘the universal human ideals of 
liberty, equality and fraternity’ (Alter, 1989: 29-30, 78). In short, individualistic-
libertarian nationalism embodies ‘freedom, equality and self-determination for both 
nation and individual alike’ (Alter, 1989: 78). 
37  For example, according to David Miller, ‘Without freedom of conscience and 
expression, one cannot explore different interpretations of national identity, something 
that takes place not only in political forums, but in the various associations that make up 
civil society… These discussions must proceed on the basis that no one should be 
penalized or excluded for expressing views that challenge the traditional understanding of 
national symbols and historic events.’ (Miller, 1995: 128) 
38  Also see Hall’s article, “Nationalisms, Classified and Explained” for a similar 
discussion regarding the experience of Europe in the 19th century (Hall, 1995: 16). Hall 
argued that, first, the significant increase in education and then economic development 
influenced people. A nationalism shaped out of these developments, ‘deserves to be 
considered liberal – that is, it stressed civic loyalty within a democratic regime rather than 
ethnicity’.   45
2.  Abdul Rahman’s Multicultural nationalism and 
Ethnocultural Nationalist Challenge: Factionalism in 
1969 
1969, undoubtedly, is one of the significant turning points in recent 
Malaysian political history since independence in 1957. In the 1969 general 
elections, the ruling coalition, the Alliance party,
1 lost its two-thirds majority. The 
ruling coalition – including the BN, the off-shot of the Alliance – had never lost 
its two-thirds majority in parliament except in the 1969 elections. Soon after the 
elections, ethnic riots, known as the May 13 Incident, shook the peninsula, 
resulting in not a small number of casualties and significant loss of property. The 
ethnic clashes were a vivid reminder of the volatile ethnic tension and instability 
and exacerbated the already tense ethnic relations in the country. An UMNO 
factional dispute which followed the ethnic riots destabilised the party further. In 
the long term, the dispute contributed to the exit of then incumbent leader, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, and brought about substantial changes in the party’s leadership. 
Furthermore, these changes in UMNO paved the way for such significant 
socioeconomic and political changes in the 1970s as the implementation of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) and the formation of a larger coalition, the Barisan 
Nasional (BN).  
This chapter explores the 1969 UMNO factional dispute from the 
perspective of the contesting nationalist ideologies of the political elites and the 
consequences of the ideological conflict. Existing studies have not focused on the 
1969 UMNO factionalism on its own but have primarily discussed it in a passing 
manner as a part of the wider political dynamics in 1969. Furthermore, in many   46
studies, the clashing nationalist arguments in the dispute were regarded as merely 
camouflage for the underlying power struggle. Other studies observed that the 
challenging faction championed Malay nationalism but failed to connect that fact 
to the unresolved question of national identity.
2  
This chapter will first thoroughly examine the dispute from the perspective 
of clashing nationalist arguments, placing the nationalist arguments at the centre 
of the analysis and locating the debate in the context of the unresolved question of 
national identity. Second, by analysing the nationalist language UMNO elites 
adopted, the nationalist vision of Prime Minister, Abdul Rahman, and the 
responses of the Malay community – in the form of the arguments of the 
challenging faction – can be explored. Third, by analysing the nationalist 
arguments in the 1969 dispute, it will try to find a pattern of nationalist 
ideological clashes in UMNO factionalism that can be applied in the analysis of 
subsequent disputes.  
The competing nationalist ideologies in the 1969 UMNO factional dispute 
reflect the unresolved question of national identity in Malaysia. Abdul Rahman’s 
multicultural nationalism assumed that Malaysia was a nation in which different 
ethnic groups co-exist without sacrificing their distinctiveness. Politically, this 
was expressed in the Alliance coalition that included representatives from the 
three major ethnic groups: the Malays, Chinese and Indians. Against this, 
ethnocultural Malay nationalist UMNO elites claimed that as Malaysia was a 
Malay nation, the Malay community should be dominant politically, culturally 
and economically. The challengers constructed and manipulated nationalist   47
ideology, reflecting to a certain degree the response of the community to the 
Prime Minister’s nationalist vision.  
This chapter will argue that Abdul Rahman’s nationalist position moved 
away from the ethnocultural Malay nationalism of early UMNO towards the 
multicultural nationalist direction as indicated in the making of the Malaysian 
constitution and in the working mechanism of the Alliance coalition. The 
arguments of the ethnocultural Malay nationalist UMNO elites will then be 
examined. In the late 1960s, ideological challenges to Abdul Rahman over several 
issues clearly indicated that these elites disagreed with Abdul Rahman’s 
nationalist position. Finally, the changing nationalist direction of the state in the 
1970s, when the UMNO national leadership was replaced by more ethnocultural 
Malay nationalist elites, will be investigated. The new policy initiatives of the new 
leadership were clearly pro-Malay, reflecting the ethnocultural Malay nationalist 
arguments of the challenging faction in the 1969 UMNO factional dispute.  
 
2.1. Abdul Rahman’s multicultural nationalism 
The main purpose of this section is to explore Abdul Rahman’s nationalist 
vision, an axis of competing languages of nationalism in the 1969 dispute. In short, 
Abdul Rahman’s nationalist position from the mid 1950s moved away from 
ethnocultural Malay nationalism, shifting towards multicultural nationalism. 
UMNO’s early nationalism was clearly ethnocultural, given its demands of 
Malaya as a Malay nation and Malay privilege and special rights as indigenous 
people in the peninsular, which was clearly seen in the Malayan Union 
controversy.
3 Abdul Rahman’s initial ethnocultural Malay nationalism was shaped   48
by this UMNO’s nationalist position. His ethnocultural Malay nationalism, 
however, faced the crucial question of how to integrate diverse ethnic groups into 
a nation when independence was imminent. Abdul Rahman’s increasingly 
multicultural nationalist position was his answer to this question, as envisaged in 
the negotiation and outcome of Merdeka Constitution. Furthermore, the Alliance 
coalition system, which embodied the principle of consociational configuration, 
reflected Abdul Rahman’s changing nationalist commitment.  
 
2.1.1. UMNO’s  ethnocultural  nationalism and the shaping of 
Abdul Rahman’s nationalism 
The shaping of UMNO’s ethnocultural Malay nationalism 
British colonial rule created a society that was ethnically diverse and 
segregated on the Malay peninsula (Abraham, 1983; Ariffin Omar, 1993; Gullick, 
1981; Roff, 1967). By the 1920s, there were almost as many indigenous Malays as 
there were immigrant non-Malays.
4 The immigrants were organised under such 
leaders as the ‘Kapitan China’ and ‘Kangani’ (overseer) into exclusive 
communities (Andaya & Andaya, 1982: 175-181) while the Malays were left 
alone in their traditional “kampung” (rural villages). This made communications, 
interactions and eventually the integration of the various ethnic communities 
extremely difficult. The ethnic division of labour, that is, the overrepresentation of 
non-Malays in the modern sectors and Malay dominance in subsistence 
agriculture, brought about noticeable economic inequalities among the ethnic 
communities (Faaland, Parkinson, & Saniman, 1990: 5-8).    49
It was behind this background of an ethnically diverse but segregated 
society that the Malayan Union controversy in the mid 1940s decisively shaped 
ethnocultural Malay nationalism and resulted in the formation of UMNO as the 
torchbearer of ethnocultural Malay nationalism. Malay nationalism, which was 
first articulated by religious reformist movements,
5  increasingly took on such 
discourses as ethnic competition, Malay indigenous privilege and special rights, 
Bangsa Melayu (Malay nation) and Tanah Melayu (land of the Malays) in the 
1930s (L. E. Tan, 1988: 9-10).  
As ethnic consciousness increased, what made Malay nationalism 
decisively ethnocultural was the Malayan Union Proposal in 1946. When the 
British reoccupied the Malay Peninsula in 1945, after a brief Japanese occupation, 
the colonial government prepared a radical scheme to integrate all the Malay 
sultanates, including Penang and Malacca, but excluding Singapore, into one 
political entity. The British’s immediate concerns were to bring the Malay 
peninsula under their control again and to unite separate territories under a unitary 
British authority (Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, 1974: 16). At that time, the Malay 
Peninsula was divided into a few sultanates and territories under direct British 
rule.
6 
Two aspects of the British’s proposal – the status of the sultans and the 
issue of citizenship – were controversial as they were viewed as threats to the 
Malay identity and their status as an indigenous people, thus making Malay 
opposition to the proposal ethnocultural.
7   First, the Sultans’ status was 
downgraded, so that they would only have legislative power over Islamic affairs 
and preside over a Malay Advisory Council (Von Vorys, 1975: 65). The   50
relegation, as Mohamed Noordin Sopiee observed, meant ‘the transfer of 
sovereignty’ and ‘reduction of the position of the Rulers to the status of mere 
social and religious leaders’ (Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, 1974: 21-23). As Malay 
identity was defined in terms of Kerajaan (Kingdom), that is, of being ‘subjects of 
[the] sultan’ (Kessler, 1992; Milner, 1991: 108-109), the British proposal was a 
serious challenge. The sultans were to lose their sovereignty and become ‘mere 
social and religious leader[s]’.  
Second, the new citizenship regulations proposed that anyone who was or 
would be born thereafter in the Malay Peninsula and Singapore would acquire 
citizenship. Also, anyone who was not born but who had resided in the territory 
for more than 10 years would be deemed citizens of the Malayan Union (Ongkili, 
1985: 41). The implication was that the immigrants would readily have the same 
rights as the Malays. Although the immigrants already outnumbered the Malays in 
the 1930s, the immigrants did not have full rights. If the immigrants were to 
acquire full citizenship readily, it would be a matter of time before the Malays lost 
their demographic dominance in the coming independent Malaya. Ariffin Omar 
summarised the point as follows: ‘Giving citizenship under liberal terms to the 
non-Malays was thus considered an act of betrayal of the trust that the Malays had 
in the British. If implemented, the Malays would be reduced from a nation to a 
mere community among other communities in a land that was historically theirs’ 
(Ariffin Omar, 1993: 55-56). 
The Malay opposition was led by the Malay traditional ruling elites, who 
later became the core of the first Malay nationalist party, UMNO. Using the 
arguments as set forth above, the leaders effectively mobilised the Malay   51
community and eventually successfully forced the British to withdraw the 
proposal. The initial momentum of the organised opposition to the proposal came 
from Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjong (Movement of Peninsular Malays) under 
the leadership of Onn Jaafar from Johor. As a strategy to oppose the proposal, 
Onn Jaafar, together with several other prominent organisations such as Persatuan 
Melayu Selangor (Selangor Malay Union) and Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu 
Selangor (Selangor Malay Nationalist Organisation), organised Konggres Melayu 
Sa-Tanah Melayu (Pan-Malayan Malay Congress) in March 1946 (Means, 1976: 
98-99). The congress decided to form a political party called UMNO and Onn 
Jaafar was elected as its first leader. As the nationalist organisation that led the 
Malay community in its opposition to the British proposal, the Malay nationalism 
of the early UMNO was substantially ethnocultural.  
 
Onn Jaafar’s civic nationalist trial 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Onn Jaafar’s nationalist vision 
increasingly became civic. This change deserves mention because Abdul 
Rahman’s earlier nationalist position was a reaction to Onn Jaafar’s civic attempt. 
Ironically, the very success of UMNO’s ethnocultural Malay nationalist 
opposition to the Malayan Union Scheme made the party, especially the party 
leadership, search for a new direction. After the British withdrew the Malayan 
Union Scheme and proposed the Malayan Federation Proposal, the party suddenly 
lost its defining goal, that is, opposition to the Malayan Union Scheme. The 
Malayan Federation Proposal substantially addressed the Malay complaints – such 
as citizenship and sovereignty issues (Ongkili, 1985: 53-59). In other words, the   52
new proposal incorporated the ethnocultural Malay nationalist demands, raised by 
UMNO and by the Malay community in the opposition to the Malayan Union 
Proposal.  
It was in this context that nationalist outlook of Onn Jaafar, the first 
UMNO president and a respected Malay nationalist, began searching for a new 
direction shifting towards civic nationalism. His new idea was that UMNO should 
represent all the ethnic groups in the Malay Peninsula. This idea was quite 
different from the original rationale of UMNO, which was ensuring the survival 
and protecting the interests of the Malays. In 1949, Onn Jaafar proposed accepting 
non-Malays as associate members of UMNO as the first step towards national 
integration and the building of a multi-ethnic UMNO. Although Onn Jaafar did 
not have any high position in the government, it seems that he, as president of the 
biggest nation-wide political organisation, UMNO, was increasingly concerned 
about ethnically integrated Malayan nation. Onn Jaafar was then involved with the 
Communities Liaison Committee (CLC),
8   which was composed of a few 
prominent leaders of the major ethnic groups and set up by the British in 1949 
(Means, 1976: 124-125). His involvement in the CLC was partly responsible for 
his changing attitude. In 1950, Onn Jaafar urged UMNO party members to accept 
a citizenship recommendation from the CLC which was less strict – for example, 
a shorter residential requirement before a non-Malay would qualify for citizenship 
(Cheah, 2002, 24-25). Facing opposition and criticism within UMNO, Onn Jaafar 
threatened to resign but party members persuaded him to retract his resignation 
(Vasil, 1971: 44-45). In late 1950, Onn Jaafar proposed a more radical scheme of 
accepting non-Malays as UMNO members and changing the name of the party to   53
‘United Malayan National Organization,’ emphasising ‘Malayan’ rather than 
‘Malay’. However, when Onn Jaafar again threatened to resign, the party rejected 
Onn Jaafar’s proposal and replaced him with Abdul Rahman.  
Within a few years, Onn Jaafar had changed from being the most 
dedicated supporter of Malay rights to being an ardent devotee of a multi-ethnic 
UMNO to accommodate all ethnic groups under the roof of a single political party. 
Analytically, this attempt meant an initiative towards the building of a civic 
Malaysian nation. Onn Jaafar might have thought that with the Malayan 
Federation Proposal, the question of Malay rights and privileges had been 
resolved and that it was time to move towards ethnic integration. While Onn 
Jaafar’s proposal sounded impressive, his grand scheme failed to get much 
support. Instead, Onn Jaafar was increasingly regarded as a ‘traitor of the 
Malays’.
9 As Bass argued, the Malays – ordinary Malays and elites alike – were 
not prepared to accept Onn’s ‘growing emphasis on communal equality’ since ‘his 
proposal…so greatly diverged from Malay sentiment’ (Bass, 1973: 526). 
 
Abdul Rahman’s ethnocultural nationalist reaction 
When Abdul Rahman became UMNO president in 1951, his initial 
nationalist position was clearly an ethnocultural nationalist one. He was entrusted 
by UMNO members to strengthen the party’s commitment of protecting Malay 
interests and identity. Onn Jaafar’s leadership in the late 1940s had failed to do so 
and his failure resulted in Abdul Rahman being selected to be UMNO’s top leader. 
Abdul Rahman’s early nationalist position, thus, reflected the party members’ 
demands, which was a reaction to Onn Jaafar’s civic trial. While closing the ranks   54
of the party, Abdul Rahman clearly indicated his vision of Malaya (Malaysia) and 
the direction that he wanted UMNO to go. Notably, Abdul Rahman’s 
ethnocultural direction can be seen in three aspects: his definition of the Malayan 
nation, his views on non-Malays in the Malay nation and his opposition to Onn 
Jaafar’s Independence of Malaya Party (IMP).
10  
First, Abdul Rahman defined the coming independent Malaya as a Malay 
nation. In his inaugural speech as UMNO President in 1951, succeeding Onn 
Jaafar, Abdul Rahman maintained: 
With regard to the proposal that independence should be handed to the 
“Malayans”, who are these “Malayans”? This country was received from 
the Malays and to the Malays it ought to be returned. What is called 
“Malayans”, it is not yet certain who they are; therefore let the Malays 
alone settle who they are. (quoted in Cheah, 2002: 1) 
Abdul Rahman’s remarks reflected the very essence of ethnocultural 
Malay nationalism. In his remarks, Abdul Rahman rejected the concept of 
“Malayan” as an entity on which the independence of the peninsula would be 
conferred. Instead, he asserted that as the peninsula was taken from the Malays, it 
should be returned to the Malay community as the rightful owner. By implication, 
it meant that Malaya was fundamentally a Malay nation.  
In the same speech, Abdul Rahman reemphasised the view that the Malay 
community was the rightful owner of the peninsula, recognising that the peninsula 
had been taken from the Malay community. He argued that as independence 
should be given to the Malays, the Malay community had the right to decide who 
could be Malayan. He noted:  
[i]t is for the Malays to demand independence because independence was 
taken away from them. When we have got our independence back, we   55
shall decide what is best for us to do and who are to invite to share our 
independence with. (Original text was from The Straits Times, August 28 
1951, p. 8, quoted in Cham, 1975: 448)  
In another occasion following his inauguration as UMNO president in 
September 1951, Abdul Rahman maintained: 
We cannot tolerate this ridiculous situation…We cannot afford to have a 
split in our ranks. The policies of the IMP and the UMNO are opposed… 
It is the policy of the IMP to open membership to all person who are 
resident in this country. There was no qualification as to their allegiance, 
loyalty or birthright. Can you form a nation with such flimsy 
materials?… It is not fair for the Malays to throw in their lot with others 
when others refused to be naturalised, refused to study the language, and 
refused to adopt the customs of the country. (quoted in Vasil, 1971: 51-
52) 
These remarks indicate Abdul Rahman’s ethnocultural Malay nationalist 
views on the non-Malay community and on Onn Jaafar’s IMP. As Abdul Rahman 
argued in the above quote, he was of the opinion that the non-Malay community, 
to be a part of the coming independent Malaya, should adopt a Malay way of 
living and culture. In other words, he maintained that the non-Malay community 
should be assimilated culturally into Malay culture or, as he described it, should 
be “naturalised”. This demand of cultural assimilation of minority groups into the 
dominant group is clear evidence of Abdul Rahman’s ethnocultural Malay 
nationalism.  
Regarding the IMP, Abdul Rahman argued that the multi-ethnic IMP did 
not make sense for the Malay community as it would not properly protect Malay 
interests and identity, unlike UMNO. He believed that the multi-ethnic 
membership of the IMP was not the right material to build an independent nation   56
where the loyalty of part of the people, that is, of the non-Malays, was in doubt. 
Such a perspective, while indicative of the nationalist position of Abdul Rahman, 
was forged in the context of UMNO’s contest with IMP for the Malay mandate, 
which consisted of the largest bloc of the population. In addition, Abdul Rahman 
intended to close the ranks of UMNO, which had been destabilised by the 
departure of Onn Jaafar, with his condemnation of the IMP.  
The initial nationalist position of Abdul Rahman, as observed above, was 
definitely more ethnocultural Malay nationalist, in comparison to Onn Jaafar’s 
civic trial. When opposing Onn Jaafar’s IMP, Abdul Rahman made it clear that 
independent Malaya was a nation of the Malay community and that the non-
Malays were invited guests. The Malays, thus, had the right to decide ‘who was in 
and who was out’ in the new nation and for the non-Malays to be part of the new 
nation, they were required to assimilate into the Malay ethnic heritages. Indeed, 
Abdul Rahman’s stance, immediately after succeeding Onn Jaafar, was in stark 
contrast to his image as Prime Minister after Malaya gained independence in 1957, 
who was accused of being soft and making too many concessions to the non-
Malays and of being indifferent to Malay aspirations and demands. In the coming 
sections, the changes in Abdul Rahman’s nationalist position that led to his being 
criticised by ethnocultural Malay nationalists in UMNO will be examined.  
 
2.1.2. Abdul  Rahman’s  multicultural nationalism, as reflected 
in the formation of the Alliance coalition  
In the mid 1950s, the growing prospect of independence and, with it, the 
change of Abdul Rahman’s position from a Malay leader to a Malayan leader, 
significantly transformed his Malay nationalism. The first elections (the Federal   57
Legislative Council elections) in the Malayan Peninsula, still under British rule, 
were held in 1955. In the elections, the UMNO-Malayan Chinese Association 
(MCA)
11  interim alliance won 9 out of the 12 seats contested, putting Abdul 
Rahman in charge of the interim government of six ministers, with the title of 
Chief Minister. After the elections, Abdul Rahman’s new position and the 
prospect of independence made the question of integrating the various ethnic 
groups in Malaya urgent. To be a credible political leader of independent Malaya, 
Abdul Rahman needed to come up with a blueprint and vision for the independent 
nation. To accomplish this task, Abdul Rahman’s approach towards the non-
Malay community became increasingly compromising and accommodating, 
moving towards a multicultural nationalist direction.  
Beginning in the mid 1950s, Abdul Rahman’s nationalist position 
displayed a quick and dramatic shift from ethnocultural Malay nationalism in the 
early 1950s towards a more multicultural nationalist position. Abdul Rahman later 
described the nationalist position he pursued as follows: 
Malayan nationalism had to be forged out of the major impulses of the 
Malays and Chinese. The narrower nationalisms of these two 
communities were the beach-heads on which a Malayan nation could be 
forged. They could also be nettlesome, and if intensified on the basis of 
opposition to each other and mutual suspicion, make smithereens of the 
entire country. The UMNO and MCA worked hard against often 
overwhelming odds to prevent any polarisation of races. It was the legacy 
of the two parties that they made possible Malayan nationalism in the 
early 50s. (Abdul Rahman, 1985: 211) 
The formation of the Alliance coalition came in this context. The coalition 
reflected Abdul Rahman’s multicultural nationalist attempts at national integration 
by sharing power with elites from the other ethnic groups. The idea of a   58
multiethnic coalition was ideal for the national integration cause as well as for 
electoral success.
12  
The Alliance system began as an electoral pact between the UMNO Kuala 
Lumpur branch and the MCA Selangor branch. During the Kuala Lumpur 
Municipal Council elections in 1952, the UMNO-MCA interim alliance proved 
successful, winning 9 out of the 12 contested seats. In 1953, the two parties 
entered into a formal agreement regarding electoral cooperation. In 1954, the 
coalition included MIC (then, Malayan Indian Congress) as the representative of 
the Indian community.  
The Alliance coalition, which is regarded as a consociational-type power 
structure (Case, 1996; Mauzy, 1978), is characterised by multi-ethnic power-
sharing, elite level consultation, consensus and concession, and ethnic interest 
aggregation and articulation through individual ethnic parties, at the sacrifice of 
UMNO’s monopoly of political power. Theoretically, it is argued that the 
consociational power-sharing model is one of the political settings that enshrine 
multicultural nationalism (Brown, 2000: 130-132). First, the Alliance party 
represented an ethnic power-sharing system. It was Abdul Rahman’s concession 
to the non-Malay groups in the name of national integration, mirroring his shift 
towards multicultural nationalism. Power sharing among the coalition partners 
was indicated in a few aspects, in which political benefits were allocated, 
proportional to the size of the parties and to the size of the communities that they 
represented. For example, UMNO, despite the Malay community’s dominant size 
in the peninsula, did not monopolise the parliament seats. In the 1955 elections, 
MCA was allocated 15 seats (29 per cent) to contest out of the 52 seats contested,   59
although the Chinese community consisted only 11.2 per cent of electorate in 
1955. Likewise, MCA contested 32 seats out of 104 in the 1959 elections, 35 seats 
out of 104 in the 1964 elections and 33 seats out of the 154 in the 1969 elections 
(See Table 2-1).   
Table 2-1. Allocation of Parliamentary seats in Alliance Party, 1955-69 
1955 1959 1964 1969   
Number % Number % Number % Number % 
UMNO  35 67  70 67 68 65 67 64
MCA  15 29  31 30 33 32 33 33
MIC  2 4  3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: (Goh, 1971: 12) 
Cabinet posts were similarly shared among the parties in the coalition. In 
the 1955 cabinet, UMNO had 6, MCA 3, and MIC 1 ministry posts in the cabinet 
(B. T. Khoo, 2004: 130)
13. Before the 1970s, the MCA controlled such economy-
related ministries as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade. The 
presence of MCA and MIC in the cabinet worked as a veto power against the 
potential dominance of UMNO. As Lijphart noted, veto power is one of the 
characteristics of consociationalism (Lijphart, 1977: 25-52). MCA figures in key 
ministries, for example, Tan Siew Sin as Finance Minister, limited UMNO’s 
ability to implement pro-Malay policy. Regarding the impact that Tan Siew Sin, 
who served as Finance Minister under Abdul Rahman for 16 years from 1959 to 
1974, had on government economic policies, Milne and Mauzy reported: 
His closeness to Tunku added to his clout on financial matters, which he 
could use to the MCA’s advantage. According to him, before 1969, when 
he was consulted as Finance Minister about introducing measures that 
would have produced policies resembling those of the subsequent NEP, 
he simply refused to consider the idea, and the matter was dropped. 
(Milne & Mauzy, 1999: 92)   60
In addition, the Alliance party’s elite level consultation, consensus and 
concession indicated multicultural nationalism, in which each ethnic group’s 
interests were not ignored for the sake of the interests of the dominant group, but 
compromised. The ethnic elites in the coalition consulted each other to avoid 
political clashes among the coalition parties and arrived at consensus on issues 
which were ethnically sensitive. In the process, the parties involved made various 
concessions in the interests of ethnic stability and national integration. As I will 
explain later, the give-and-take dealings made in the process of preparing the 
Alliance’s proposal for the constitution, which was largely accepted by the Reid 
Commission, reflected the practice of closed-door consultations and consensus 
building among the top ethnic elites in the Alliance.  
The component parties in the coalition claimed they represented the major 
ethnic groups in the peninsula, that is, the Malays, Chinese and Indians, and that 
the individual ethnic groups expressed their interests through the component 
parties, which were ultimately discussed and resolved among the ethnic leaders. 
Abdul Rahman once said, ‘The best thing was to try to build up unity through 
diversity which means that UMNO would represent the Malays, the 
MCA…would represent the Chinese and the MIC, the Indians’ (Abdul Rahman, 
1985: 209). And he went on to argue that the Alliance was a system in which ‘all 
[speak] through their own parties with one voice’ (Abdul Rahman, 1985: 219). In 
other words, ethnic interests were articulated through the individual parties, but 
eventually they compromised and arrived at consensus to be ‘one voice’. This 
process indicated a structure in which the individual group’s interests were not   61
ignored–unlike ethnocultural or civic nation--but in the end, with elite level 
compromise and concession, a consensus was arrived at.  
The multiethnic consociational power structure that resonated with Abdul 
Rahman’s multicultural nationalism, of course, was a partial surrender of 
ethnocultural Malay nationalism. UMNO policies intended to favour the Malay 
community were unable to avoid a compromise with non-Malay Alliance 
component parties’ demands and thus the interests of the non-Malay ethnic groups. 
Otherwise, UMNO’s recalcitrant attitude to reflect Malay demands might have 
undermined the integrity of the election-winning coalition. Consequently, UMNO 
leaders in the government had limited autonomy in decision making and 
implementing pro-Malay policies within the context of multi-ethnic power sharing. 
By the mid 1960s, as Butcher observed, ‘Many Malays, including a significant 
number within UMNO itself, accused the UMNO leadership of being too willing 
to compromise with the Chinese over fundamental issues such as language and 
education’ (Butcher, 2001: 36). And, as Jesudason noted, ‘both Malay officials in 
the [ministries] and Malay business leaders were beginning to take the view that 
Malay business failures were the result of non-Malay economic strangulation 
rather than their own shortcomings’ (Jesudason, 1989: 54).  
As seen in this section, the Alliance coalition was a consociational setting, 
which is one of the models of a multicultural nation. The fact that Abdul Rahman 
established such a coalition system and tried to maintain the system indicated that 
his nationalist position had undergone significant change. The direction of the 
change was from his earlier ethnocultural Malay nationalist position to a more 
multicultural nationalist view. Similarly, Funston discussed, the Alliance system   62
was visible evidence of Abdul Rahman’s ‘conversion to non-communalism, or 
even trans-communalism’ and ‘establishing the Alliance was inconsistent with the 
Tunku’s earlier attitude’ which was more communal or ethnocultural (Funston, 
1980: 138). As I examined in this section and in the previous one, through the 
building of the Constitution and the Alliance system, it can be said that Abdul 
Rahman’s nationalist position changed significantly from ethnocultural Malay 
nationalism towards multicultural nationalism. 
 
2.1.3. Abdul  Rahman’s  multicultural nationalism in the building 
of constitution 
Abdul Rahman’s changing nationalist position was clearly reflected in 
Malaysia’s first constitution. During negotiations amongst the components of the 
Alliance coalition to prepare the Alliance proposal for a new constitution, Abdul 
Rahman made significant concessions to his non-Malay partners, notably in the 
citizenship regulations, although he managed to introduce a few ethnocultural 
Malay nationalist clauses. This crucial concession evidenced that Abdul 
Rahman’s nationalist position differed from when he defined the soon-to-be 
independent Malaya as a Malay nation. Indeed, the Alliance proposal substantially 
shaped the new constitution. The national identity in the constitution was very 
ambiguous, reflecting, in a sense, Abdul Rahman’s growing disinclination to 
define Malaya as a Malay nation.  
To prepare a constitution for independent Malaya, the Alliance invited 
foreign experts to conduct research and to produce a basis for a constitution. This 
group of foreign experts, known as Reid Commission, conducted surveys and 
consulted with concerned individuals and groups in Malaya in 1956. When the   63
Commission eventually released its recommendations for the Constitution of 
Malaya, it was known that the Alliance’s memorandum submitted to the 
Commission was accepted with little change, although the Alliance was not the 
only organisation to submit a memorandum to the Commission (Means, 1976: 
173). In major aspects, the Commission’s report reflected the consensus reached 
among ethnic elites in the Alliance.  
Some aspects of the Constitution appeared to be ethnocultural Malay 
nationalist. The Constitution contained substantial safeguards of Malay identity 
and interests. For example, Islam was stipulated as the official religion of the new 
country and the Sultan, who defines Malay political identity, was specified as the 
sovereign ruler of the peninsula. In constitutional clauses, the Malays were 
identified as the indigenous people in the peninsula and were entitled to some 
privileges as indigenous people. These special rights included land reserve, a 
Malay quota system in government employment and scholarships from the 
government to protect Malay economic and social interests. 
Nevertheless, the identity of the new nation reflected in the new 
constitution still fell short of the nation as envisaged from the ethnocultural Malay 
nationalist perspective. The main stumbling bloc for defining Malaya as an 
exclusively Malay nation was the issue of citizenship as set forth in the 
Constitution. In the Merdeka Constitution, all who are born in Malaya after 
Independence, regardless of ethnic background, can be citizens, without 
conditions. And, non-Malays, who were born before Independence, can also be 
citizens, if they meet such requirements as a period of residence and language 
fluency. These requirements were much less rigorous compared to those of the   64
Malayan Federation (see Ongkili, 1985: 41, 56-58, 112-114).
14 These liberal terms 
for citizenship were introduced into the Constitution in exchange for the special 
position and privilege of the Malay community mentioned above.  
The substantially liberal citizenship clauses in the new constitution 
rendered the position of the Malay community as the sole owner of the Malay 
Peninsula ambiguous and subject to challenge. The citizenship terms in the 
Constitution were a significant departure from those in the Malayan Federation. In 
fact, they were rather close to the Malayan Union proposal for citizenship. In the 
Malayan Federation scheme, the jus soli principle was effectively rejected, since 
the citizenship of non-Malays was subjected to such conditions as language ability 
and having maintained a period of residence in the peninsula, even if they had 
been born in Malaya. In contrast, under the Malayan Union scheme, which 
citizenship regulations were the most liberal, all born in Malaya could be citizens, 
without conditions, including those who were citizens of Singapore.  
The citizenship clauses indicated a reversal of Abdul Rahman’s earlier 
views on the national identity of Malaya. As I mentioned in the previous section, 
Abdul Rahman, as soon as he became the party president, announced that Malaya 
should be a Malay nation and that non-Malays should embrace Malay language 
and culture to be part of Malaya, that is, cultural assimilation into the dominant 
Malay community. The Constitution written under Abdul Rahman’s leadership, 
however, repealed nearly all requirements pertaining to cultural assimilation of 
non-Malays, going against the concept of ethnocultural Malayan national identity. 
Von Vorys observed that the Alliance constitutional framework was very similar 
to that of the Communities Liaison Commission (CLC)’s a few years before the   65
Reid Commission. Then, UMNO members had rejected Onn Jaafar’s citizenship 
proposal, made through the CLC. In a similar way, Ramlah Adam compared the 
liberal citizenship clauses of the Malayan Union and those of the Merdeka 
Constitution. He argued:  
Through the 1946 Malay Congress, the Malays had opposed the Malayan 
Union which destroyed and ended the preferential status of the Malay 
states, the Malay rulers and the citizenship of the indigenous Malays. 
Citizenship of the Malayan Union was opened to whoever was born in 
Malaya and Singapore without any earlier connection with Malaya. This 
was rejected by the Malays at the time but the same policy was accepted 
by UMNO in 1956 in the memorandum to the Reid Commission… 
(Ramlah Adam, 1995: 51) 
In addition to the citizenship clauses, the new constitution stated that all 
Malayan citizens were entitled to equal rights, regardless of their ethnic 
background. Furthermore, the Constitution allowed different ethnic cultures to 
flourish in Malaya. On one hand, these clauses contradicted other parts of the 
Constitution that recognised the Malays as indigenous people, entitling them to 
special rights and privileges. In short, the people of Malaya were all equal but the 
Malay community had special rights. This contradiction rendered the national 
identity envisioned by the constitution ambiguous.  
In a few years, Abdul Rahman’s position had changed in that he had 
moved away from his initial strong ethnocultural Malay nationalism. Cheah Boon 
Kheng argued that the Merdeka Constitution was a consequence of the ‘dilution of 
the UMNO’s Malay nationalism’ under Abdul Rahman. According to Cheah 
Boon Kheng: 
This constitutional arrangement represented a compromise and a dilution 
of the UMNO’s Malay nationalism and its initial stand of an exclusive   66
“Malaya for the Malays” nation-state. Given the strident nationalist 
appeals of its early days from 1946, its transformation in the 1955–57 
period of state formation was, indeed, remarkable. In order to achieve 
national independence, it had become a “nucleus” of an inclusive, wider, 
multiethnic nationalism which has been called “Malayan nationalism”... 
(Cheah, 2002: 6) 
The prospect of independence and Abdul Rahman’s changing position and 
outlook affected his nationalist view, shifting it towards multicultural nationalist 
direction. This shift was reflected in the formation of the Alliance coalition, in 
which Malay political elites shared power with other community elites and 
concessions were made to the non-Malay community, constraining the promotion 
of Malay interests. The changing nationalist perspective of Abdul Rahman is also 
reflected in the crucial concessions made during the internal Alliance negotiations 
for constitution. The nation envisaged in the Constitution failed to meet the 
aspirations of ethnocultural Malay nationalist demand of Malaya as a Malay 
nation.  
 
2.2. UMNO ultra’s ethnocultural nationalism 
By the mid 1960s, some UMNO elites, who subscribed to a stronger 
ethnocultural Malay nationalist vision against Abdul Rahman’s multicultural 
nationalist direction, had emerged. In several developments with ethnic 
connotations, these ethnocultural Malay nationalists argued that Malay(si)a was 
indeed a Malay nation. Specifically, they claimed that the Malays, as the owners 
of the country, should be politically, culturally and economically dominant in the 
peninsula. This ethnocultural Malay nationalist argument was employed by some 
UMNO elites to discredit Abdul Rahman and to justify their political   67
manoeuvring against Abdul Rahman during the 1969 factional dispute. These 
UMNO elites maintained that the withdrawal of Malay support for UMNO in the 
1969 elections and the 1969 riots were the expression of Malay frustration with 
Abdul Rahman’s failure to uphold strong ethnocultural Malay nationalism. This 
section will examine the details of the ethnocultural Malay nationalist criticism of 
Abdul Rahman in major developments in late 1969, including the Singapore issue, 
the Language Bill issue, the 1969 elections and riots, and the factional dispute. 
 
2.2.1.  A matter of political and cultural dominance: Singapore’s 
secession and Language Bill issues 
Singapore’s secession in 1965 
The first major political controversy that caused ethnic tension in the 
1960s was Singapore’s inclusion in and secession from the Malayan Federation. 
Singapore’s merger with Malaya in 1963 was not a smooth political development. 
Instead, the merger was plagued by conflicts and tension from the beginning, 
especially between UMNO and People’s Action Party (PAP) of Singapore.
15 PAP 
attempted to replace MCA in the Alliance coalition as the representative of the 
Chinese community (Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, 1974: 193). However, the PAP’s 
repeated attempts failed when Abdul Rahman refused to drop MCA from the 
Alliance to admit PAP. When the PAP realised there was no hope they would be 
included in the Alliance, it challenged the Alliance coalition by appealing directly 
to the Chinese community. In 1964, breaching its agreement with the Alliance, 
PAP fielded its own candidates in some peninsular electoral districts during the 
1964 elections, to extend their political influence. Out of nine PAP candidates,   68
only one was elected. From then on, PAP openly appealed to Chinese voters in the 
peninsula and questioned Malay special position and privileges, advocating the 
concept, ‘Malaysian Malaysia’. The PAP, together with a few opposition parties 
such as UDP (United Democratic Party), PPP (People’s Progressive Party) and 
SUPP (Sarawak United People’s Party) declared:  
A Malaysian Malaysia means that the state is not identified with the 
supremacy, well-being and interests of any one particular community or 
race. A Malaysian Malaysia is the antithesis of a Malay Malaysia, a 
Chinese Malaysia, a Dayak Malaysia, an Indian Malaysia or Kadazan 
Malaysia and so on. The special and legitimate interests of different 
communities must be secured and promoted within the framework of the 
collective rights, interests and responsibilities of all races’ (quoted in 
Cheah, 2002: 101). 
The ethnocultural UMNO Malay nationalists regarded the PAP’s 
“Malaysian Malaysia” concept as a threat to Malay political dominance. Against 
the PAP’s “Malaysian Malaysia” concept, a Malay newspaper, Utusan Melayu, 
which frequently published the views of ethnocultural nationalist UMNO elites, 
argued, ‘to be a co-owner of Malaysia [as “Malaysian Malaysia” claims], the 
people should be converted into Muslims and adjust their way of life similar to 
that of the Malays’ (Means, 1976: 347).  
Some UMNO elites, notably Syed Jaafar Albar, accused Abdul Rahman of 
‘treating PAP too softly’ and demanded strong action against Lee Kuan Yew who 
allegedly had attempted to undermine Malay political dominance (Case, 1996: 
104). Indeed, Abdul Rahman, in an attempt to save the merger, proposed a ‘looser 
arrangement’ intended to provide more autonomy to Singapore’s PAP 
government. In Abdul Rahman’s new proposal, although it was not realised, the   69
federal government was to retain authority only over defence and internal security. 
Furthermore, when Syed Jaafar Albar was sent to Singapore to rebuild the 
Alliance coalition there, he organised an ‘Action Committee’, which contributed 
to an ethnic riot in Singapore in 1964, to put pressure on the Singapore 
government to institutionalise Malay special position in Singapore (Means, 1976: 
342-343).  
What was at stake in the Singapore issue was the political dominance of 
the Malays in Malaysia. The ethnocultural Malay nationalists in UMNO argued 
that Singapore’s “Malaysian Malaysia” was a serious threat to Malay Malaysia, 
which meant that Malaysia was deemed to be a Malay nation. Furthermore, the 
PAP’s political intrusion into the peninsula was a threat to Malay political 
dominance in Malaysia. As tacitly agreed to among the Alliance coalition partners, 
Malay political dominance was one of the basis that buttressed the concept of 
Malay Malaysia.  
 
The national language issue in 1967 
The ethnocultural Malay nationalists argued that the Malay language, as 
the cultural symbol of the Malay community, should be the sole official language 
of Malaysia. The Merdeka Constitution permitted English to be used for official 
purposes, along with the national language, Malay, for 10 years after 
Independence (Von Vorys, 1975: 136). Other vernacular languages were allowed 
to be used freely in the private sphere. In 1967, as the 10 year period permitted by 
the Constitution for the use of languages other than Malay came to an end, some 
UMNO elites attempted to make Malay the sole official language and to ban the   70
use of other languages. Abdul Rahman, however, to avoid incurring the wrath of 
the non-Malay communities, tabled a new language bill which extended the use of 
English for official purposes. The bill, was passed in parliament (see Cheah, 2002: 
102-105; Von Vorys, 1975: 200-210).
16  
This bill faced strong criticism from such UMNO elites as Syed Nasir 
Ismail, the director of Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Language and Literature 
Council), Mahathir Mohamed (UMNO Executive Committee member), Harun 
Idris (Selangor Menteri Besar), Abdul-Rahman Ya’kub (Minister of Lands and 
Mines). Syed Nasir Ismail, who was supported by Barisan Bertindak Bahasa 
Kebangsaan (National Language Action Front), demanded that Malay be made 
the sole official language. In a statement, “Pengorbanan Orang Melayu” (The 
Malay Sacrifice), Syed Nasir Ismail asserted: 
[T]he question of Malay becoming the National language and the official 
language of this country is a logical fact and a right of the language. After 
Independence what do we see? Not only is the status of Chinese 
preserved, it is now more widespread than before Independence. The 
government does not close down Chinese schools; the government does 
not prohibit the teaching of Chinese up to university level. Instead the 
government has spent millions of dollars to assist and build additional 
buildings to Chinese schools and pay the salaries of their teachers. (Von 
Vorys, 1975: 204)  
The assumption at the root of this criticism was reflected in Mahathir’s 
book, The Malay Dilemma.
17 According to Mahathir, as the ‘Definitive People’ on 
the peninsula, ‘the Malays are the rightful owners of Malaya’ (Mahathir, 1970: 
126, 152). Mahathir asserted: 
In other countries language, immigration, citizenship and national 
education are the major factors which definitive people insist on   71
controlling. [In those countries,] [t]he culture of the definitive race is 
perpetuated through control of language, immigration, citizenship and 
education… [However, in Malaysia] [i]n pushing into the background the 
claims of the Malays as the definitive people of the Malay Peninsula, the 
initial chance to mould a homogeneous citizenry was missed. The present 
policies are not likely to succeed in bring in the races together. (Mahathir, 
1970: 152-153) 
As the controversy developed, Abdul Rahman, as the Prime Minister of 
multiethnic Malaysia and as the president of a Malay nationalist party, UMNO, 
was increasingly torn between satisfying the ethnocultural Malay nationalists and 
the non-Malays. As Means pointed out, ‘[t]he militant faction of “Malay Ultras” 
in UMNO harbored a resentment against Tunku Abdul Rahman and the top 
Alliance leaders for conceding too much to the non-Malays and for pursuing 
policies which threatened to relegate the Malays permanently to a secondary 
position in the economic and cultural life of the country’ (Means, 1976: 392).  
For the ethnocultural Malay nationalists, the adoption of Malay as the sole 
official language would mean the cultural dominance of the Malay community in 
Malaysia, that is, Malaysia would be a Malay nation with Malay culture as its 
base. The controversy related to Singapore’s inclusion into and exclusion from 
Malaysia, the Language Bill issue provided the ethnocultural Malay nationalist 
with another opportunity to criticise Abdul Rahman. Although Abdul Rahman’s 
critics did not achieve their goals, the Language Bill controversy publicised what 
they stood for and eventually led to the 1969 factional dispute. 
 
 
   72
2.2.2.  The issue of Malay economic development 
The backwardness of Malay economy 
In the late 1960s, although Malaysia had had a Malay-dominated post-
independence government for a decade, the economic gap amongst the various 
ethnic communities had increased rather than decreased. Although the incidence 
of poverty amongst Malays decreased 1.9% nationwide,
18  other  economic 
performance figures indicated that the Malays were not closing the gap. The 
household income of Malays did not show any improvement, relative to the other 
ethnic groups. While the mean monthly household income of Malay families had 
increased from RM 139 in 1957/58 to RM 177 in 1970, the mean monthly 
household incomes of Chinese (from RM 300 to RM 399) and Indian families 
(from RM 237 to RM 310) had increased more rapidly. The mean monthly 
household income ratio between the Chinese and the Malays deteriorated from 
2.158 to 2.541 in the same period while that between the Indians and Malays 
widened from 1.705 to 1.751 (Osman-Rani, 1990: 9).  
A persistent imbalance in employment structure of the various ethnic 
groups had contributed to the widening income gap.
19  In 1970, the Malays 
accounted for 68 per cent of all employees in the agricultural sector. Their 
representation in manufacturing, construction and commerce, relatively 
modernised sectors of the economy which were likely to provide higher income, 
were 29, 22 and 25 per cent of total employees respectively. The Malays’ low 
participation in modern sectors of the economy contrasted with Chinese 
dominance in the same sectors. The Chinese accounted for 65, 72 and 65 per cent 
of all employees respectively in manufacturing, construction and commerce   73
(Snodgrass, 1980: 96).
20  In addition, the Malay community, the largest ethnic 
group in the country, accounted for only a tiny fraction of corporate share 
ownership, 1.9 per cent in 1970. Foreign capital accounted for 60.7 per cent of 
corporate share ownership, while the Chinese owned 22.5 per cent in the same 
year. Except for the transportation and communication sector (13.3 per cent), 
Malay ownership in other sectors did not exceed 4 per cent (Gomez & Jomo, 
1997: 20).
21  
 
The ethnocultural Malay nationalists’ view on the Malay economic 
problem 
UMNO ethnocultural Malay nationalists claimed that the continuing 
problem of Malay economic backwardness was a result of Abdul Rahman’s 
policies that reflected the dilution of his ethnocultural Malay nationalism. 
Mahathir, a leading ethnocultural nationalist critic of Abdul Rahman in the 1960s, 
discussed the problems of Malay economic backwardness in The Malay Dilemma. 
Mahathir pointed out that the government had been unsuccessful in resolving the 
problem of Malay economic backwardness. According to Mahathir, post-
independence policies further enriched the already-rich non-Malays, while letting 
down Malay aspirations that the Malay dominated government would promote the 
interests of the Malay community:  
It is no exaggeration to say that it was the Malays who wanted 
independence most. They knew that a Government in which they had a 
greater say would be more liberal in aiding them in commerce as well as 
in other fields… [on the contrary, Chinese] foresaw an invasions of a 
Malay socialist state in which all the wealth amassed by them would be 
expropriated. In the event, few of the expectations of the Malays were 
fulfilled. But what is more amazing, not only were the fears of the   74
Chinese tycoons proved to be unjustified, but independent Malaya 
actually opened up for them, more and better avenues for their acquisition 
of unlimited wealth. (Mahathir, 1970: 42) 
In the view of the ethnocultural Malay nationalists, whatever the 
government did to promote economic growth and development only increased the 
wealth of the already rich non-Malays, making the gap between the ethnic groups 
wider.  The government’s laissez-faire approach in shaping and implementing its 
economic polices
22  did not help the Malays because they were structurally 
disadvantaged.
23 Mahathir observed: 
the economic  dilemma of the Malays still exists. It is there because for 
every step forward that the Malays make in the economic field other 
races make ten. It is there because other policies of the independent 
Government of Malaysia offset the policy towards helping the Malays. 
(Mahathir, 1970: 47) 
In addition to criticising Abdul Rahman, the ethnocultural nationalist 
UMNO elites proposed ethnocultural nationalist remedies. To solve the structural 
problems in the Malaysian economy, the ethnocultural nationalist UMNO elites 
demanded a strong ethnocultural nationalist state on behalf of the Malay 
community. Mahathir asserted: 
If the [political] leaders are to turn their attention to leading the Malays to 
a better life it will need but little effort to study the causes and prescribe 
the remedies. The measure must be drastic, as were the measures taken 
by the Malay leaders during the political crisis involving the Malayan 
Union… Where necessary, laws must be promulgated in order to render 
effective whatever economic policy may be considered necessary. Harsh 
punitive measures should be meted out to those who impede the elevation 
of the Malays to an equality with the other races… No one is going to say 
that measures to create a more equitable society are wrong. Similarly, it 
should not be wrong for the Malays to cling to a system which can   75
elevate them to the status of other races, thus creating a more equitable 
society. (Mahathir, 1970: 60, 177) 
Although Mahathir did not elaborate as to what “economic policy [might] 
be considered necessary,” his view was that the Malay political leaders had to 
actively protect and promote Malay interests. Thus, indirectly, the ethnocultural 
Malay nationalists of UMNO were visualising a state and government that would 
actively use economic policy to remedy Malay economic backwardness and 
would discriminate against the non-Malays, if necessary. The ethnocultural Malay 
nationalists assumed that, through state intervention, Malay economic strength 
would be elevated to the level of the non-Malays and beyond. The ethnocultural 
Malay nationalists viewed Malay economic dominance (like political and cultural 
dominance) as an essential part of the realisation of a Malay Malaysia. 
 
2.2.3.  The ethnocultural nationalist interpretation of the 1969 
elections 
The 1969 elections and the Alliance’s setback 
The gravest challenge to Abdul Rahman’s political power came from 
without rather than within UMNO in the form of the 1969 electoral setback and 
the ensuing ethnic riots. The election results turned out to be a disaster for the 
coalition. Only 66 Alliance candidates were returned (64 per cent) while the 
opposition parties won 37 out of 103 seats contested in West Malaysia. Moreover, 
the opposition which received 51.6 per cent of valid votes cast, performed better 
than the Alliance (Snider, 1970; Vasil, 1972: 73).
24  UMNO lost eight seats, 
reducing its share from 59 to 51. The biggest casualty was the MCA, which lost   76
14 seats (from 27 seats to 13 seats). This poor performance ignited a debate on the 
relevance of the MCA in the Alliance as a legitimate representative of Chinese 
voters.
25 In the State Legislative Assembly elections, the Alliance retained Perlis, 
Negri Sembilan, Melaka, Johor and Pahang, while the coalition was seriously 
threatened by the opposition in Kedah. The opposition won, significantly, three 
states (Trengganu, Kelantan and, Penang), while it tied with the Alliance in 
Selangor.
26   
Within the Malay community, the Malay defection from the Alliance 
reduced UMNO’s and even MCA’s share of support.
27 The discontented Malay 
voters supported the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP) instead.
28  This 
development was particularly relevant in the Malay belt,
29  where  Malay 
population was concentrated. In that area, the major electoral contenders had 
always been UMNO and PMIP (See Table 2-2). According to the 1969 election 
results, with the exception of Kelantan, where the PMIP was already dominant 
from the 1959 elections, UMNO experienced a serious setback and PMIP gained 
big swings in Kedah, Perlis and Trengganu. UMNO lost nearly 10 percentage 
points of support in parliament and state assembly elections in Kedah, Abdul 
Rahman’s home state, and 20 percentage points of votes (for parliament) in 
neighbouring Perlis. Of course, UMNO’s loss became PMIP’s gain. In Kedah and 
Trengganu, PMIP’s support soared 15 percentage and 20 percentage points 
respectively.    77
Table 2-2. Votes polled by UMNO/PMIP in Malay Heartlands: 1964/1969 
State Parliament  State Parliament  Kedah  1964 1969 1964 1969  Perlis  1964 1969 1964 1969 
UMNO  50.35 41.58 56.48 45.20 UMNO  48.71 53.51 68.93 51.15
PMIP  25.21 41.55 25.11 41.06 PMIP  37.13 43.84 31.07 42.14
State Parliament  State Parliament  Trengganu 
1964 1969 1964 1969 
Kelantan 
1964 1969 1964 1969 
UMNO  52.80 48.42 56.52 49.99 UMNO  40.63 45.49 42.94 47.50
PMIP  32.79 51.44 32.10 50.01 PMIP  57.13 52.23 56.86 52.40
Source: (Vasil, 1972) All in Percentage. 
The interpretation of election results by ethnocultural Malay 
nationalists 
When the 1969 elections results became available, some ethnocultural 
nationalist UMNO elites interpreted the results from the perspective of 
ethnocultural Malay nationalism. They claimed that the Malay frustration at 
Abdul Rahman’s inability to serve the Malay community had been translated into 
the community’s withdrawal of support from UMNO. Von Vorys conveyed their 
reasoning as follows: 
Dr. Mahathir…concluded that the Chinese had “betrayed” him… [and 
articulated] a new posture for the Alliance, one more sensitive to Malay 
communal interest and less concerned about the MCA. He was prepared 
to bury the latter altogether. Several members of the Johore parliamentary 
delegation tended to agree with him… The MCA, in their view, was 
dramatically discredited. The Prime Minister himself evidently lost most 
of his prestige. The failure of “concessions” to the Chinese, they 
concluded, was there for all to see. It was the time for new initiatives and 
a more determined pursuit of Malay interests and aspirations… Dr. 
Mahathir…was thinking… [that] if UMNO was to survive, it must 
reunite in its ranks all Malays. This was a task of highest priority and had 
to be accomplished at all cost. At a cost to the Chinese, and even at the 
cost of the Prime Minister. (Von Vorys, 1975: 309-311)  
Mahathir explained why the Malays initially supported UMNO, why the 
Malays withdrew their support and what the problem was with the non-Malays in   78
his book, The Malay Dilemma, which was published after he was expelled from 
UMNO in 1969. He argued: 
UMNO came into being because of the Malay fear of losing out to the 
Chinese…But the gradual divergence of the leaders from the stated 
policies of UMNO, and the conditions and more forthright demands of 
the Chinese within and outside the MCA, soon awakened the old fears…  
It is clear that by the 1969 elections approached, all sections of the people 
were disenchanted with the Government. The Malays were disenchanted 
because in their eyes the Government continually favoured the Chinese 
and had failed to correct the real imbalance in the wealth and progress of 
the races. (Mahathir, 1970: 10, 13) 
The ethnocultural nationalist elites viewed the Malay defection from the 
Alliance as an expression of the Malay community’s discontent with the direction 
of Abdul Rahman’s nationalism. It is clear, from Von Vorys’ recap and 
Mahathir’s own words, that some UMNO elites held Abdul Rahman’s failure to 
prioritise the Malay interest and making too many concessions to the non-Malays 
responsible for UMNO’s election setback. They also believed that the non-Malays 
in general, and the Chinese component in the ruling Alliance in particular, were 
increasingly encroaching on the Malay’s special position and interests, as 
guaranteed in the Constitution. For ethnocultural Malay nationalists, these 
developments, which were unfavourable to the Malay community, were 
threatening the concept of Malay Malaysia, which meant that Malaysia belonged 
to the Malay community and that the Malay community should be dominant in 
Malaysia. In the end, the ethnocultural nationalist critics, such as Mahathir, Syed 
Jaafar Albar and Syed Nasir Ismail, issued a newspaper statement right after the 
elections, demanding that Abdul Rahman drop the MCA from the Alliance   79
coalition and asserted that UMNO should form a one-party state in Malaysia 
(Case, 1995: 94; Von Vorys, 1975: 372).   
 
2.2.4.  The ethnocultural nationalist interpretation of the 1969 
ethnic riots 
The 1969 ethnic riots 
The worst ethnic clash in Malaysian history, the 1969 ethnic riots, left a 
deep scar in an already troubled ethnic relationship.
30  According  to  the 
ethnocultural Malay nationalists, the riots began with provocation from the non-
Malay community, which attempted to undermine Malay dominance after the 
extraordinary 1969 elections outcome. The Malay response to the non-Malay 
provocation was, in the eyes of ethnocultural Malay nationalists, an expression of 
the community’s frustration with their powerlessness in their homeland. The 
ethnocultural Malay nationalists blamed Abdul Rahman for the developments.  
The 1969 ethnic riots were closely related to the election results in the 
same year. After the 1969 elections, the opposition was exuberant. Non-Malays, 
especially the Chinese opposition, regarded the election results as a victory. The 
Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) and DAP managed to control two state 
governments, an unprecedented development. A few days after the elections, the 
supporters of the Chinese opposition took to the streets, claiming their election 
victory and shouting such slogans as ‘Kuala Lumpur sekarang China punya!’ 
(Kuala Lumpur now belongs to the Chinese), which provoked the Malays, 
especially UMNO supporters, who were already shocked by the election results. 
The 1969 ethnic riots sprang out of this tension in Kuala Lumpur. By 13 May   80
1969, the tensions and show of force were full-fledged between the ethnic 
communities, mainly between the Malays and the Chinese, resulting in substantial 
loss of life and property. Officially, the number of casualties was 178 dead and 
6,000 displaced; however, the actual number was said to be much higher. It took 
the government a few days to restore basic order (Means, 1976: 397). 
 
The ethnocultural nationalist interpretation of the riots 
The ethnocultural nationalist UMNO elites consistently interpreted all 
political developments, from the Singapore issue to the 1969 ethnic riots, as 
resulting from the failure of Abdul Rahman’s increasingly multicultural 
nationalism. They argued that Abdul Rahman’s indifference to Malay demands 
and his concessions to non-Malays made the Malays discontented and the non-
Malays arrogant. These criticisms peaked right after the 1969 riots. Shortly after 
the ethnic riots, Mahathir, the leading figure who spearheaded the ethnocultural 
nationalist criticism of Abdul Rahman and his policy, sent a letter to Abdul 
Rahman. In his letter, Mahathir contended: 
You yourself told me that you have prevented a riot by commuting the 
death sentence of the 11 subversive Chinese. In truth this very action 
sparked the riots of 13 May, which resulted in the death of many, many 
more. Your “give and take” policy gives the Chinese everything they ask 
for. The climax was the commuting of the death sentence, which made 
the majority of the Malays angry… That was why the Chinese and the 
Indians behaved outrageously toward the Malays on 12th May. If you had 
been spit in the face, called dirt names and shown obscene gestures and 
private parts, then you could understand how the Malays felt. The Malays 
whom you thought would never rebel went berserk, and they hate you for 
giving too much face. The responsibility of the deaths of these   81
people…rests on the shoulders of the leader who hold views based on 
wrong assumptions. (Von Vorys, 1975: 373)  
Mahathir argued that the election results and ethnic riots clearly showed 
Malay anger and frustration. The Malays were second-class citizens economically 
in their homeland, subordinate to the non-Malays who were better off than the 
Malays. He claimed that, in the 1969 elections, the Malays deserted the Alliance. 
They were disillusioned with the Alliance government, which could not solve the 
Malay plight. Eventually, when provoked by the non-Malays, the Malays felt their 
political supremacy, even their survival in their homeland, threatened by the non-
Malays. The younger nationalists viewed political developments in 1969 as a 
consequence of the UMNO leadership, especially Abdul Rahman, failing to fulfil 
its original nationalist commitment to the Malay community and accommodating 
the non-Malays too much. 
 
2.2.5.  The UMNO dispute in 1969  
Unlike the other disputes examined in this thesis, the 1969 dispute did not 
have a clear-cut confrontation but consisted of several instances of criticism and 
counter-criticism between two loose conflicting factions. In fact, the cases 
examined in the previous section – the Singapore issue, the Language Bill 
episodes, the debates after the 1969 elections and the 1969 ethnic riots as well as 
the developments from 1969 to Abdul Rahman’s retirement in 1970 – constituted 
the dispute in a broad sense. But, in general, the UMNO dispute in 1969 included 
the developments from the upfront criticism by some UMNO elites, notably   82
Mahathir, of Abdul Rahman right after the May 1969 ethnic riots to the expulsion 
and dismissal of those rebels from UMNO a few months later.  
The ethnocultural Malay nationalist elites in UMNO who challenged 
Abdul Rahman formed a loose group. They were often called ‘UMNO ultra,’ 
which carried a negative connotation of being Malay chauvinists. Although the 
individuals included in this category varied by account and by issue, they 
generally included such UMNO figures as Syed Jaafar Albar (UMNO Secretary-
General), Syed Nasir Ismail (director of Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka), Harun Idris 
(Selangor Menteri Besar), Mahathir Mohamad (UMNO Central Committee 
member), Musa Hitam (Assistant Minister to Deputy Prime Minister), Razaleigh 
Hamzah (appointed member of UMNO Supreme Council) and Abdullah Ahmad 
(political adviser to Abdul Razak).
31 
The confrontation between the UMNO ethnocultural Malay nationalist 
elites and Abdul Rahman in 1969 centered on Mahathir’s criticisms and Abdul 
Rahman’s responses. Two days after the outbreak of the 1969 ethnic riots, 
Mahathir, together with Syed Jaafar Albar and Syed Nasir Ismail, issued a 
statement in a newspaper, requesting Abdul Rahman to keep the MCA out of the 
government (Von Vorys, 1975: 372). The MCA withdrew from all the cabinet 
positions they held when the party lost substantial support from the Chinese 
community in the 1969 elections. Despite the danger of alienating non-Malay 
voters, ethnocultural Malay nationalists asserted that ‘the “immigrant” votes could 
and should be written off and Malay voters be wooed to the fullest’ (Goh, 1971: 
16-17). Abdul Rahman immediately countered the statement, stating that the only   83
way for the critics to help restore order in the country is to refrain from issuing 
statements that might make aggravate the situation (Von Vorys, 1975: 372).  
On 18 June, Mahathir sent another letter to Abdul Rahman. Copies were 
also sent to a few UMNO leaders and distributed widely in the Malay community, 
to the embarrassment of Abdul Rahman. In his letter, Mahathir, first, criticised 
Abdul Rahman’s inability to fully understand the plight of the Malay community. 
Second, Mahathir charged that Abdul Rahman was too accommodating to the 
non-Malays, especially to the Chinese. Third, Mahathir urged Abdul Rahman to 
resign as Prime Minister and UMNO president, which was practically unthinkable 
until then (for part of a translated copy, see Von Vorys, 1975: 372-374).
32 Stunned 
by the open letter, Abdul Rahman responded, alleging that the young ultras were 
‘extremists’ and responsible for the growing ‘power struggle’ within UMNO. He 
also accused them of desiring to ‘set up a Republic’, and abolishing constitutional 
monarchy (Abdul Rahman, 1969: 136-157).
33 
The controversy, however, did not end with Abdul Rahman’s response to 
his critics. Abdul Rahman gave Mahathir an ultimatum to resign from the party or 
face expulsion (Von Vorys, 1975: 375). In July, the Executive Council of UMNO 
expelled Mahathir. Despite the presence of such sympathisers as Harun Idris at the 
Executive Council meeting, apparently the view that no revolt, regardless of cause, 
was allowed prevailed (Von Vorys, 1975: 376-377). In the same month, Musa 
Hitam, another prominent member of the rebel group, was forced to resign from 
his position as Assistant Minister in the Deputy Prime Minister’s office.  
It would appear that Abdul Rahman won the battle when he successfully 
silenced the rebels in UMNO. The agitation, however, created widespread hostile   84
reactions towards Abdul Rahman. Mahathir’s strong pro-Malay positions had 
gained him large numbers of followers among Malay students and intellectuals in 
the universities, who staged demonstrations throughout July, August and 
September of 1969. Finally, the National Operations Council (NOC), which had 
temporarily replaced the functions of the government and parliament during the 
emergency rule following the ethnic riots, took a strong stance against the 
demonstrations that demanded Abdul Rahman’s resignation and sweeping policy 
changes in favour of the Malay community (Milne & Mauzy, 1978: 87-89).  
After these developments, Abdul Rahman lost his grip on power in the 
government. Although Abdul Rahman remained as Prime Minister until his 
resignation in September 1970, it was, in fact, the NOC, under the leadership of 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Abdul Razak, which ran the government. Milne and 
Mauzy observed, ‘The Tunku remained as a multi-racial symbol, but, increasingly, 
important policy decisions, such as the pace of return towards parliamentary 
democracy, and the re-orientation of foreign policy, bore the imprint of Tun 
Razak’ (Milne & Mauzy, 1978: 89). Thus, Abdul Rahman, after the 1969 
elections and riots, and the internal squabbles in the same year, lost the confidence 
of the Malay community and was deprived of political power by his deputy. 
Eventually, in September 1970, Abdul Rahman handed over the UMNO party 
president position to Abdul Razak.  
 
2.3.  The consequence of the 1969 crisis: towards an 
ethnocultural nationalist state 
This section explores the nature of the new government that emerged in 
the 1970s through its major reform policies. The direction of the new government   85
was shaped in the context of the 1969 political crisis, including the UMNO 
factional dispute and the ensuing debates about the direction of the new 
government.
34 Here, it will be argued that the reform policy direction of the new 
government indicated an ethnocultural Malay nationalist direction. The 
ethnocultural reform and measures included Rukunegara, constitutional 
amendments and the New Cultural Policy (NCP), the New Economic Policy, the 
formation of Barisan Nasional and the recruiting of younger nationalist elites into 
UMNO.  
 
2.3.1. Laying the institutional bases for an ethnocultural 
nationalist state 
Institutionally, the new government tried to ensure that the dominance and 
special position of the Malay community would not be challenged again. 
Ideologically, the special position of the Malays was assured, as it was reinforced 
by legal measures that forbade any questioning of the Malay special position. 
Furthermore, it was acknowledged, through a new cultural policy, that the cultural 
characteristics of Malaysia should be based primarily on Malay culture. These 
measures were the new government’s attempts to define Malaysia as a Malay 
nation, as much as it could politically and culturally.  
The Rukunegara was announced in August 1970 as the national ideology 
of Malaysia. Its purpose was to reiterate the ethnocultural Malay nationalist 
aspects in the Constitution, especially the special position of the Malays. The five 
principles of the Rukunegara – Belief in God, Loyalty to King and Country, 
Upholding the Constitution, Rule of Law and Good Behaviour and Morality – 
appeared neutral on the surface. In official commentaries of the principles,   86
however, there was clearly an ethnic bias. According to the commentaries, the 
Rukunegara emphasised that ‘Islam is the official religion of the Federation’ 
(principle 1) and ‘Every citizen…must be faithful and bear true allegiance to His 
Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’ (principle 2) (Malaysia, 1977). Without 
doubt, Islam and the Agong constitute the core of Malay identity. The emphasis 
on these Malay symbols was clearly ethnocultural Malay nationalist.  
The promulgation of the national ideology was followed by constitutional 
and legal measures to prevent any questioning of the special position and 
privileges of the Malays in the future. Before the government amended the 
Constitution, the NOC had already amended the Sedition Act in 1970 with 
Emergency Ordinance No. 45, which read: ‘to question any matter, right, status, 
position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the 
provisions of Part III of the Federal Constitution or Article 152, 153 or 181 of the 
Federal Constitution’ is ‘a seditious tendency’ and is applicable to Sedition Act 
(quoted in Milne & Mauzy, 1978: 95). Constitution Articles 152, 153 and 181 
focussed on Malay as the national language, the special position of the Malays 
and the sovereignty of the ruler respectively, while Part III focussed on citizenship 
regulations.  
Later in 1971, the government amended the Constitution, with the help of 
Sarawak-based parties, which provided the ruling coalition with the parliamentary 
seats to make up the required two-thirds majority. The proposed amendments to 
the Constitution were important since, together with the even more restrictive 
Sedition Act, they banned questions on the issues stipulated in the Part III 
provisions of the Federal Constitution or Article 152, 153 or 181 of the Federal   87
Constitution in the Parliament and State Assemblies. By amending Article 63 (on 
Privileges of Parliament) and 72 (on Privileges of Legislative Assembly) of the 
Constitution, Members of Parliament and of State Assemblies were no longer 
protected by law when they questioned Malay privilege, the national language and 
the position of the ruler (Milne & Mauzy, 1978: 97).
35 This meant that questions 
on the national identity, based on Malay identity, were forbidden, even in the 
Parliament and State Assemblies. Although due protection of non-Malay rights 
was made – for example, Sedition Act bans questioning of non-Malay citizenship 
and other rights as well, it was clear that the emphasis of the legislation and 
measures was on making sure that the Malay privileges were safeguarded tightly.   
While the Rukunegara and constitutional amendments reiterated what 
were already in constitution, a new and more pro-active cultural policy 
promulgated in 1971 clearly indicated that the government’s cultural policy was 
moving towards cultural assimilation of the non-Malays into Malay culture. The 
National Cultural Policy, along with the NEP, was launched in 1971 as part of a 
series of new initiatives to promote national integration. The government 
convened the Congress on National Culture in 1971 to discuss a blueprint for 
future cultural policy. Non-Malay communities were not represented in the 
Congress. The NCP, which was intended to integrate diverse cultural groups in 
Malaysia into a homogeneous cultural identity, was substantially biased towards 
the dominant Malay culture. It defined national culture, with a clear emphasis on 
Malay culture, as follows: ‘it must be based on the indigenous culture of the 
regime; suitable elements from the other cultures can be accepted as part of the 
National Culture; and Islam is an important component in the moulding of the   88
National Culture’ (Kua, 1987a: 3).
36 By this, the NCP stipulated Malay culture as 
the basis of national culture, which meant that the Malay cultural identity was the 
foundation of cultural identity of Malaysia.  
 
2.3.2. New  Economic  Policy 
The most significant development that demonstrated the shift of the new 
government towards an ethnocultural nationalist direction was the implementation 
of the New Economic Policy (NEP).
37 The NEP embodied the argument of the 
ethnocultural Malay nationalists that the state should be actively involved in 
promoting and developing the Malay economy (B. T. Khoo, 1995: 27; Means, 
1991: 23-27; Milne & Mauzy, 1978: 322-426). The two most widely known and 
significant goals of the NEP were the eradication of poverty and the ethnic 
restructuring of the economy. The Second Malaysia Plan that was revealed in 
1971 indicated that the two goals were:  
To reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and 
increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of 
race…[and] accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society to 
correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the 
identification of race with economic function. (Malaysia, 1971: 1) 
If the eradication of poverty ‘irrespective of race’ was more or less even-
handed goal from the ethnic point of view, the second goal of restructuring 
economy was unmistakably ethnocultural Malay nationalist.
38 By ‘eliminat[ing’ 
the identification of race with economic function,’ the second goal intended to 
correct the over-representation of the non-Malay in modern sectors which 
guaranteed better income and of the Malay in traditional sector i.e. agricultural   89
sector which did not contribute to the capital accumulation. With this restructuring, 
the government hope to rectify the income structures among ethnic groups and 
when necessary, the government directly participated in economic activities to 
give the Malay more economic opportunities.  
The main tactic to implement this ethnocultural Malay nationalist goal – 
the second goal of the NEP – was the heavy intervention of state in the economy 
on behalf of Malay community. The most fundamental difference between Abdul 
Razak’s and Abdul Rahman’s economic policies would be found in the role of the 
government (Rajah Rasiah, 1997: 126). The basic inclination of the Abdul 
Rahman government was laissez-faire to guarantee the free economic activities of 
the private sector, including foreign capital (Searle, 1999: 34-35). In such a 
paradigm, the role of the government was limited. This changed dramatically 
during the Abdul Razak government with the implementation of the NEP. The 
Second Malaysia Plan indicated: 
As Malay representation in the modern sector of the economy is at 
present limited, it is difficult to envisage that economic growth by itself 
will uplift the economic position of the Malays to any significant degree. 
In fact, in the absence of Government action, it may be expected that 
existing differentials in value added per worker among the Malays, on the 
other hand, and other Malaysians on the other, will be aggravated. Such a 
situation certainly will not be tolerable in a multi-racial society. The 
government’s efforts to alter the existing racial employment pattern are 
clearly crucial to the success of the NEP. (Malaysia, 1973: 76, emphasis 
added) 
In the NEP, ‘Government action’ was manifested in the form of 
government agencies and state enterprises that were established to help the 
Malays in various ways.
39  Many of them were dedicated to create ‘Malay   90
commercial and industrial community’. As the Mid-Term Review of the Third 
Malaysia Plan indicated, government action to create a Malay business 
community consisted of roughly four components: credit assistance, training and 
technical assistance, administrative support, and direct government participants 
(Malaysia, 1979: 50-53).
40  Furthermore, to increase the Bumiputera portion of 
corporate ownership, the government, on behalf of Malay community, 
participated in acquiring corporate shares (Gomez & Jomo, 1997: 29-32; Sieh & 
Chew, 1985). The government planned to re-distribute the shares to individual 
Malays at discounted prices when they were able to acquire the stock. The 
government justified its extraordinary involvement in wealth re-distribution, 
arguing: 
While there will be greater Malay private savings to finance expanded 
share capital ownership as the economy grows and as Malay participation 
in economic activity expands, a significant part of the financial resources 
required in the earlier years will have to come from the Federal and State 
Governments and institutions which harness Malay savings. These 
resources will have to be used to acquire a significant part of the 
increases in the growth of the total financial stock of the economy and to 
hold them in trust for the Malays and other indigenous people until they 
are in a position to acquire them from their own savings. (Malaysia, 
1973: 84-85) 
The main direction of Abdul Razak’s economic policy, as discussed, was 
ethnocultural Malay nationalist, which aimed to make the Malay community the 
dominant community, not just culturally and politically, but also economically as 
well. When the government justified the policy with national integration based on 
equality, it meant equality of actual economic share by ethnic groups, rather than 
equal opportunity. This was a reflection of the new government’s diagnosis of   91
what went wrong in the pre-1969 period and of the ethnocultural Malay 
nationalists’ view that was critical of Abdul Rahman’s multicultural nationalism.  
 
2.3.3.  UMNO dominates the new coalition, Barisan Nasional 
To ensure the success of the new nationalist initiatives, the new Prime 
Minister needed stronger political backing. The weakened Alliance coalition, 
besieged by a stronger opposition, was not strong enough to support Abdul 
Razak’s new nationalist initiatives. Therefore, Abdul Razak attempted to reshuffle 
the existing party system by expanding the ruling coalition at the expense of the 
opposition. Between 1970 and 1972, the Alliance party added six more parties to 
form the Barisan Nasional (BN). The new component parties in the coalition 
included Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS, formerly called PMIP), People’s 
Progressive Party (PPP), Gerakan, Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), Parti 
Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (United Pesaka Bumiputera Party or PBB) and Sabah 
Alliance Party. 
Political parties in Sabah became the first target of Abdul Razak’s project 
to build a larger ruling coalition. The opposition in Sabah had already been 
dismantled by the United Sabah National Organization (USNO) in 1967. Abdul 
Razak subsequently formed an alliance with the USNO called the Sabah Alliance, 
which also included a small local party, Sabah Chinese Association. In Sarawak, 
Abdul Razak successfully incorporated SUPP, Sarawak Chinese Association into 
the Sarawak Alliance, which consisted of Party Bumiputera and Party Pesaka 
Anak Sarawak (Pesaka), outmanoeuvring the opposition, Sarawak National Party 
(SNAP), in 1970.    92
In 1972, Gerakan, which was undergoing internal divisions, was co-opted 
into the BN to form a coalition government in Penang. The federal government 
guaranteed Gerakan the post of Chief Minister in Penang and a few higher federal 
cabinet posts in exchange. In the same year, PPP reached an agreement with BN 
to join the coalition, getting a minister post. BN also co-opted PAS into BN, 
forming a coalition government in PAS-dominant state, Kelantan, and allocating a 
few federal cabinet posts to PAS in return (see Mauzy, 1983: Ch. 2). This 
manoeuvring marginalised the opposition substantially, leaving only one 
opposition party in the peninsula, the DAP.  
This manoeuvre apparently not only strengthened the ruling coalition’s 
power with more seats in Parliament but also had the effect of checking Chinese 
influence in the coalition. The limitation on the influence of the Chinese 
component meant the expansion of UMNO’s autonomy in the coalition and in the 
government. Notably, the inclusion of Gerakan, a Chinese-based party that had 
split from the MCA in the 1950s, ‘undermined the position of the MCA as the 
sole spokesman for the Chinese in the government’ (Mauzy, 1983: 79). The 
inclusion of the Gerakan not only weakened the MCA’s symbolic importance as 
the sole party representing the Chinese in the government; the MCA also had to 
surrender some of its seats and cabinet positions to Gerakan. In addition, the 
MCA was embroiled in an internal dispute between the radicals and the moderates 
on how to regain its lost prestige in the coalition.
41 UMNO could pull the strings 
of both Chinese parties as the two parties were competing against each other in 
the coalition. After this, UMNO took over important economy-related posts in the 
cabinet from the MCA. By 1974, the MCA had lost such important positions as   93
Finance Minister, Trade and Industry Minister and Head of Economic Planning 
Unit (EPU) to UMNO (Jesudason, 1989: 78-79). Instead, the party was given less 
important cabinet posts such as Health, Transport, Labour and so on (Crouch, 
1996a: 46). 
 
2.3.4.  New blood into UMNO 
As soon as Abdul Razak consolidated his power in the party and in the 
government, the young challengers of the 1969 dispute – Mahathir Mohamad, 
Razaleigh Hamzah and Musa Hitam – were promoted or recalled to the party and 
to the government to support Abdul Razak’s policies. Abdul Razak also recruited 
new nationalist blood such as Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Shahrir Abdul Samad, 
Sanusi Junid and so on and removed the old elites from Abdul Rahman’s period, 
that is, Senu Abdul Rahman, Khir Johari, Sardon Jubir, Ghazali Jawi, Harun Idris 
and Tun Mustapha.
42 These individuals were not only identified with the pre-1969 
elites that purportedly shared Abdul Rahman’s increasingly multicultural 
nationalist vision, they were also believed to hold political grudges against Abdul 
Razak, believing that Abdul Rahman was pushed out of power by Abdul Razak 
(Means, 1991: 54). By this Abdul Razak attempted to draw a clear line between 
old, multicultural nationalist elites and his new ethnocultural nationalist 
supporters. In addition, it was advantageous for Abdul Razak to strengthen his 
grip on power with new elites with more Malay nationalist image who were also, 
‘better educated and technocratically oriented’ (Crouch, 1980: 13). 
The career paths of three nationalist elites of the challenging team in 1969 
shows how quickly they returned to the centre of power in the 1970s, assisted by   94
the new Prime Minister. Mahathir was readmitted to UMNO in March 1972 and, 
three months later, was elected as an UMNO Supreme Council member with the 
highest votes. In 1975, he was elected as a Vice President. In the government, 
Mahathir was given the prestigious appointment of Education Minister in 1974 
and was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister in 1976. In a span of only six years, 
Mahathir who was once an outcast from UMNO had become the second most 
powerful individual in Malaysia.  
Similarly, Musa returned to UMNO as Vice Chief of UMNO Youth in 
1971 and became an UMNO Supreme Council member in the same year. In the 
government, he was appointed as deputy Minister of Trade and Industry in 1971 
and was promoted to the Minister of Primary Industry in 1974. Likewise, another 
new generation member, Razaleigh – he was not expelled from the party – 
became Finance Minister in 1976. Prior to this appointment, Musa was in charge 
of a few state enterprises such as Pernas (Perbadanan Nasional or National 
Corporation) (established in 1970) and a party company, Fleet Group (1972). Also, 
in the party, he was elected as Supreme Council member in 1971 and became one 
of the vice presidents of UMNO in 1974. The three key members of the new 
generation who had challenged Abdul Rahman’s nationalism were in charge of 
the party and the government as Supreme Council members, as Vice President, as 
Deputy President, and as Ministers by the middle of 1970. 
Before this thesis move on to a dispute in the 1980s from a dispute in the 
1960s, a brief mention on the 1970s should be made. Malaysian politics in the 
1970 does not get much attention in this research. In fact, there was a factional 
dispute in the 1970s as well, which is often said to be an extended one from the   95
one in the 1960s. In the mid 1970s, there was a backlash from old guard 
associated with Abdul Rahman, protesting Abdul Razak’s alienation of the old 
guard. Especially, Tun Mustapha of Sabah and Harun Idris were resistant against 
Abdul Razak’s attempt to deprive them of power and influence. The old guard 
tried, after Abdul Razak’s death and Hussein Onn’s succession, to tarnish the 
image of the new elite group around Hussein Onn such as then Deputy Prime 
Minister, Mahathir, with an allegation that they were connected with communist.  
The reason why this thesis deliberately excluded dispute in the 1970s is 
because the dispute happened in an extraordinary situation with reverberating scar 
of 1969 ethnic riot. As I mentioned earlier, Abdul Razak could push his 
ethnocultural nationalist policy reform and political restructuring very hard thanks 
to the extraordinary circumstances. The devastating experience of 1969 ethnic riot 
prevented an opposition to a strong drive of the government towards ethnocultural 
direction in favour of the Malay community in nearly every aspect of society. 
Also, this explains why Abdul Razak’s nationalism did not shift towards 
multicultural or civic nationalist direction unlike what happened to Abdul Rahman 
in the 1960s and Mahathir in the 1980s, in addition to his short term in Prime 
Minister’s office – five years. For Abdul Razak, the general mood of Malay 
community wanting pro-Malay state was too overwhelming.  
This extraordinary situation also means that challenging faction of old 
guard against Abdul Razak could hardly question the nationalist commitment of 
Abdul Razak without losing Malay community’s support. This was why the 
competing ideological position against Abdul Razak did not develop along 
countering nationalist vision. Instead, in the dispute between Abdul Razak and the   96
proxies or members of the old guard, the latter attempted, with reasonable, but not 
complete success, to utilise anti-communist rhetoric to attack those new elites 
around Abdul Razak. Although specific ideological argument was different from 
other disputes’ nationalism, it still hold effect that factional dispute in UMNO, in 
addition to politically pragmatic and opportunistic reasons, requires ideological 
contending point as well.   
 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter explained UMNO’s internal squabble in 1969 as a clash 
between Abdul Rahman’s increasingly multicultural nationalism and the newly 
rising UMNO elites’ ethnocultural Malay nationalism. Of course, this chapter did 
not intend to reject other dimensions of the dispute such as personal rivalry, a 
clash of patronage network, personal political ambition etc. Rather this chapter 
attempted to shed new light on the ideological discourses – nationalism – of 
competing political forces.  
Since independence, Abdul Rahman’s nationalism developed in a more 
multicultural nationalist direction. He increasingly attempted to seek his political 
legitimacy as a leader of multiethnic Malaysia who brought about ethnic stability 
and integration, not as the protector of Malay identity and interests. However, the 
ethnocultural nationalists in UMNO maintained that they represented the Malay 
nationalist aspirations better. According to them, Malaysia was essentially a 
Malay nation where the Malay community should be politically, economically and 
culturally dominant vis-à-vis the non-Malay immigrant community.   97
Abdul Rahman took over the UMNO presidency, embracing strong 
ethnocultural Malay nationalism when the party rejected Onn Jaafar’s civic 
nationalist trials. However, his nationalist commitment quickly moved towards a 
more multicultural direction as reflected in the constitution and in the formation of 
the Alliance coalition. With the prospect of independence, Abdul Rahman 
increasingly sought his political legitimacy from ensuring ethnic co-existence and 
integration rather than from championing Malay interests. The ambiguous 
definition of national identity in the constitution, which was a consequence of 
give-and-take dealing with non-Malay counterparts, reflected Abdul Rahman’s 
shift towards multicultural nationalism. Of course, the constitution fell short of the 
expectations of ethnocultural Malay nationalism that saw Malaya as a Malay 
nation. The consociational format of the Alliance, characterised by ethnic power 
sharing, ethnic consultation, consensus and concession, also reflected the growing 
multicultural nationalist tendency of Abdul Rahman. This structure was far from a 
clearly Malay-dominant power structure. Furthermore, the Alliance setting 
increasingly hampered the implementation of pro-Malay policies when UMNO’s 
political power was largely dependent on the support of non-Malay components in 
the coalition.   
Against this, the ethnocultural Malay nationalists in UMNO argued that 
Malaysia was a nation where Malay constituted its core politically, economically 
and culturally. This line of argument was clearly seen in several political episodes 
in the late 1960s. During Singapore’s inclusion, ethnocultural Malay nationalists 
argued that Malaysia was a Malay nation where Malay should be politically 
dominant, which opposed Singapore’s Malaysian Malaysia concept. On the   98
Language Bill issue, they claimed that Malay culture was the basis of Malaysian 
culture, as Malaysia was a Malay nation. In addition, they saw Malay economic 
backwardness as unacceptable. In their opinion, the Malay community as the 
owner of the country should get more economic benefits and should be 
economically dominant too. After the 1969 elections and ethnic riots, their 
criticism was directed at Abdul Rahman. They saw Abdul Rahman’s leadership as 
being unable to fulfil the ethnocultural Malay nationalist tasks, which resulted in 
Malay frustration with and defection from UMNO.  
The ethnocultural nationalist challenge was defeated in the short term 
when core members of the faction were expelled or forced to resign; in the long 
term, the new Abdul Razak government moved towards an ethnocultural Malay 
nationalist direction. Powered by the autonomy acquired in the emergency rule 
after 1969 crisis, the new government under Abdul Razak initiated reforms and 
new policies such as the Rukunegara, legal and constitutional amendments, and a 
new cultural policy that laid the bases for a pro-Malay state. These initiatives 
intended to strengthen and entrench the politically and culturally dominant 
position of the Malay community. In addition, through the New Economic Policy, 
the government tried to enhance the economic power of the Malay community to 
make it economically dominant as well. Also, Abdul Razak reshuffled the ruling 
coalition in an attempt to enhance the UMNO’s autonomy to implement pro-
Malay policies and recruited ethnocultural Malay nationalist elites into UMNO 
and government to support his new policy. 
Methodologically, the analysis of this chapter can guide the examination 
of other UMNO factional disputes. A pattern was found in this chapter’s   99
investigation. The nationalist vision of the Prime Minister was changed by the 
multiethnic reality of Malaysian politics, as Abdul Rahman’s nationalism moved 
from an ethnocultural to a multicultural one. The Prime Minister, who is ethnic 
Malay, had to be inclusive to encompass non-Malay communities as well. 
Although it was not examined in detail, Onn Jaafar’s position likewise shifted 
from ethnocultural nationalism – he was, after all, a leading figure of Malay 
opposition to Malayan Union and founder of UMNO – to a civic nationalist 
direction. Against this, challengers to the Prime Minister tended to take up the 
cause of stronger ethnocultural Malay nationalism, criticising the incumbent’s 
changing nationalist position. Abdul Rahman, as the new party president in the 
early 1950s embraced strong ethnocultural nationalism against Onn Jaafar, and 
younger UMNO elites including Mahathir, took up the cause of ethnocultural 
Malay nationalism against Abdul Rahman. It is likely that this pattern would be 
repeated in the analysis of coming UMNO factional disputes, although the exact 
contents of nationalist arguments can be different.  
                                                 
1  The Alliance Party is a coalition of three parties, that is, UMNO, the Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). Although the 
Alliance party was a coalition of separate parties, it worked as a single party by fielding 
candidates for elections in the name of the Alliance. This arrangement was first tested by 
an electoral pact between UMNO and MCA in the 1952 Kuala Lumpur Municipal 
Elections and formalised in 1953. Later, the coalition added the MIC to its ranks. After its 
poor performance in the 1969 elections, the coalition was replaced by the Barisan 
Nasional, an expanded and strengthened version of the Alliance under Abdul Razak’s 
leadership. For additional details, please see Section 2.1.2 of this chapter on the Alliance 
and Abdul Rahman’s nationalism. 
2 First, there is no study that examines the 1969 UMNO factional dispute on its own. 
Most studies examine the 1969 dispute as part of a larger political development, 
beginning with the 1969 elections and ending with the establishment of new Abdul Razak 
government in 1970, which of course, includes the 1969 ethnic riots. Second, many of the 
existing studies neither discuss the nationalist ideologies at work during the 1969 dispute 
nor regard them as important variables. Bass admitted there was a significant nationalist 
division in the Malay community as well as in UMNO, but argued, “The Ultra objective 
was at a maximum to gain control of UMNO and at a minimum to increase their relative   100
                                                                                                                                      
influence in the party.” (Bass, 1973: 540). Studies by Ahmad Atory Hussain (Ahmad 
Atory Hussain, 1993), Funston (Funston, 1980), von Vorys (Von Vorys, 1975) are 
included in this category. Third, some other studies have indeed observed that there was a 
difference between Abdul Rahman’s nationalist argument and that of his challengers (B. 
T. Khoo, 1995; Reid, 1969). Notwithstanding, they did not see that the difference is 
essentially connected with the unresolved question of national identity — the relationship 
between ethnic identities and national identity of Malaysia.  
3  When the British regained control of the Malay Peninsula after the Japanese 
occupation, the British prepared a plan called the “Malayan Union” to integrate the 
separate Sultanates in the peninsular under a single British authority. However, the plan 
faced strong Malay opposition because it was viewed as a threat to the Malay 
community’s position as indigenous people. Eventually, the plan was abandoned and, out 
of this controversy, UMNO was born as a Malay nationalist party. For additional details, 
please see Section 2.1.1 of this chapter. 
4 In 1921, the immigrant population, primarily Chinese and Indians, already made up 
49.49 per cent of the population, exceeding the Malays, who made up 48.8 per cent of the 
population. (Abraham, 1983: 22). By 1931, excluding Singapore, where the Chinese were 
demographically dominant, the Malays (49.2 per cent) were out-populated by the non-
Malays (50.8 per cent) (Means, 1976: 12). 
5 William Roff attributed the development of the first Malay nationalist movement to 
such publications as Al-Imam in Singapore in the early 1900s. The earlier movements, led 
by Arab or Indian Muslim descendants, not by the Malays, were more concerned with 
‘religion and not directly with social, even less with political, change.’ (Roff, 1967: 57) 
As Gullick argued, although the early Malay nationalist movements had an ‘awareness of 
the presence of other major communities in Malaya’, they were more involved with ‘an 
anxious self-examination and the advocacy of various reforms.’ He went on to claim, ‘For 
a generation or two the Malay intelligentsia saw the salvation of their community in terms 
of better education and the abandonment of passive conservatism in their social values 
rather than in political action.’ (Gullick, 1981: 40, emphasis added) The initial Malay 
nationalist movement in the 1920s was succeeded by a conflict between the Kaum Muda 
(Young Faction) and the Kaum Tua (Old Faction). The Kaum Muda, influenced by 
religious reformist movements in the Middle East and led mainly by urban-based Arabs, 
Jawi Peranakan, or Indonesians, challenged the Kaum Tua, led by Malay traditional elites 
and  ulama (religious teacher). The Kaum Muda’s main argument was ‘the 
acceleration…of social and economic change for the betterment of Malay society, a 
process held to be retarded by traditional Islam [of Kaum Tua]’ (Roff, 1967: 78). 
However, the Kaum Muda in the 1920s still had little ethnic consciousness, in the sense 
of ethnic competition in the peninsula. 
6  The sultanates in the peninsula were not only divided into two British-made 
categories – the Federated Malay States (FMS) and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS), 
they also traditionally had separate sovereignties. British colonial rule in the Malay 
Peninsula began in 1874 with the signing of the Pangkor Treaty between the British and 
Perak, which resulted in the British Resident system. Subsequently, four states -- Perak, 
Selagor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang -- which were economically more valuable than the 
rest of the sultanates, came under British authority in 1896 as the Federated Malay States. 
The remaining four states -- Johor, which was less submissive to colonial power than the 
other sultanates, and the remote northeastern states, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu -- 
were grouped as the Unfederated Malay States (UMS), which came under a “looser” 
British influence in 1909 (Andaya & Andaya, 1982: 154-198; Ariffin Omar, 1993; Milne 
& Mauzy, 1978: 15-18).   101
                                                                                                                                      
7   Other than the contents of the proposal, the way the British obtained the 
endorsements of the Sultans was also controversial. It was said that when the British 
envoys’ met with the sultans, the atmosphere was intimidating. The envoys were believed 
to have been arrogant and, in some cases, even pressured and threatened the sultans to 
obtain their approvals. (Ongkili, 1985: 38-39). 
8 The Community Liaison Committee (CLC), which included such prominent leaders 
as Onn Jaafar and Tan Cheng Lock, was established by the British colonial government in 
1949. The purpose of the CLC was to provide an opportunity for conservative ethnic 
leaders to discuss ethnic issues developing in the peninsula and to promote ethnic 
understanding. 
9 Cheah observed a sudden change of Onn Jaafar’s political fate in relation to his 
changing nationalist position. He commented, ‘He, therefore, became the first UMNO 
president to become a casualty in the cause of “Malayan nationalism”. He had 
transformed himself from an exclusive Malay nationalist to an inclusive “Malayan” 
nationalist … His departure from UMNO marked his eventual decline in politics, and is 
one of the strangest ironies of recent Malay political history. Yet who could have 
predicted his fate in 1946–47 when he was at the height of political success and 
popularity? Onn was a hero of the Malays, courted by the Malay Rulers and British 
officials.’ (Cheah, 2002: 25) 
10 Onn Jaafar had already established the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) before 
he officially departed UMNO in 1951. The IMP indicated clearly that it was championing 
the interests of Malayan people rather than the interests of the Malay community. 
Launched as a vehicle to realise what Onn Jaafar had proposed when he was UMNO 
president, the IMP’s direction was non-communal and quite civic nationalist. A resolution 
passed during the first meeting of the party committed it to the task of “provid[ing] and 
maintain[ing] an efficient non-communal national organization in Malaya.” (quoted in 
Vasil, 1971: 50) Nevertheless, as Vasil commented, the IMP lacked popular Malay 
support and the support from the Sultans because of Onn Jaafar’s confrontative attitude 
towards Sultans. (Vasil, 1971: 52-53) The party was defeated miserably in the 1952 
Kuala Lumpur Municipal Elections. The party won only two out of the 12 contested. The 
UMNO-MCA coalition won nine seats. Although a few MCA leaders, including Tan 
Cheng Lock, cooperated with Onn Jaafar in setting up IMP in their individual capacities, 
the MCA joined with UMNO to compete against IMP in the 1952 elections. In 1954, Onn 
Jaafar formed a new party, the Party Negara, which succeeded the IMP. This party, 
despite its self-description as ‘an all community party’ was understood as a Malay party. 
It had already lost the MCA’s support before the 1952 elections. The formerly strong 
Indian support dwindled after the MIC was added to the Alliance. In the 1954 Johor State 
elections and the 1955 Legislative Council Elections, the party failed to win a seat. In the 
1959 elections, when Onn Jaafar adopted a strong pro-Malay attitude, the party won one 
parliament seat. However, that was the end of the party and Onn Jaafar died in 1962 
(Vasil, 1971: 82-92). 
11  The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was called the Malayan Chinese 
Association before the formation of Malaysia in 1963. Initially, after independence, 
Malaysia was called the Federation of Malaya. After 1963 when the federation included 
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, it acquired a new name, the Federation of Malaysia. The 
change in MCA’s name reflected the change of the country’s name. This was also the 
case with MIC whose name changed from Malayan Indian Congress to Malaysian Indian 
Congress after 1963.  
12 Abdul Rahman had good reason to stick to this coalition. The system guaranteed 
UMNO’s political power through the coalition, other Malay parties such as the IMP and   102
                                                                                                                                      
the PMIP, and class-based coalition, Socialist Front. Particularly, the coalition enhanced 
Abdul Rahman’s chance to secure non-Malay support, which became increasingly crucial 
in the elections after independence. In the 1955 elections, the Malays consisted 84.2 per 
cent of the voters, while the Chinese and the Indians consisted 11.2 per cent and 3.9 per 
cent of the voters respectively. After the independence, in the 1959 elections, the ethnic 
composition of the voters changed significantly. In 1959, the Malays consisted of only 
56.8 per cent of the voters, while the Chinese and the Indians consisted of 35.6 per cent 
and 7.4 per cent of the voters respectively, thanks to the new citizenship laws (Von Vorys, 
1975: 146). The UMNO-led Alliance’s electoral victories in the few elections between 
1955 and 1964 were greatly indebted to this unique system. 
Election results from the 1955 elections to the 1964 elections 
  1955  
Legislative Council  1959 Parliament  1964 Parliament 
UMNO  34 52 59 
MCA  15 19 27 
MIC  2 3 3 
Alliance  total  51 74 89 
Party Negara*  -  1  - 
PMIP  1 13 9 
Socialist Front  -  8  2 
Others -  8  4 
Oppositions total  1  30  15 
Total Seats  52  104  104 
Source: (Means, 1976: 252, 338; Ratnam, 1965: 196, 203; Vasil, 1972: 85). * former 
IMP 
Hence, for UMNO to secure more than 2/3 majority support to maintain political 
power, Abdul Rahman had to maintain the coalition to get non-Malay support as well. 
There are obviously other reasons that made the component parties in Alliance necessary 
for Abdul Rahman. One of the reasons often mentioned is UMNO’s financial dependence 
on MCA. Since the early UMNO was weak in terms of financial resources, the party had 
to depend a lot on financial help from especially MCA which had more resources to work 
with. The MCA was better off than the UMNO, largely due to political funds contributed 
by the wealthy Chinese business community. (see Gomez, 1996b). Reportedly, Abdul 
Rahman admitted that if the Alliance reduced the representation of MCA in the Alliance, 
the UMNO had to contribute more financially, but the party was unable to do that given 
its financial weakness (Moore, 1960: 113-114). 
13 The statistics were originally published in (Abdul Aziz Bari, 2002) and quoted in (B. 
T. Khoo, 2004: 130). 
14   The report initially faced criticism from both the Malay and non-Malay 
communities. The Malay community, including some members of UMNO, was not happy 
with the liberal citizenship provisions for the non-Malays. On the other hand, the non-
Malay community was discontented with the provisions providing for the special position 
of the Malays. Reflecting the Malay community’s concerns, Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy 
of PMIP said, ‘what has happened to the Alliance’s struggle for Malay nationalism? Is it 
true that there is still honesty in UMNO leaders struggling for the ambitions of Malay 
nationalism? Wouldn’t then UMNO’s struggle in the Alliance that is much hoped for be 
destroyed? UMNO’s struggle would then benefit others while his own race fight against 
each other and suffer in the end’ (quoted in Ramlah Adam, 1995: 51). Meanwhile, the 
Chinese press questioned why Malay privilege should be included in the Constitution and   103
                                                                                                                                      
argued that it proved ‘their [Malay’s] innate fear that they are unable to stand on their 
own feet’ (Von Vorys, 1975: 131-132). 
15 According to Noordin Sopiee, the underlying tension between Singapore and the 
Federation can be attributed to the following five factors. First, on the issue of finances, 
Singapore demanded a common export market with the Federation, while the Federation 
was more interested in Singapore making a larger financial contribution for the central 
government. Second, there was tension between the PAP’s populist style and the 
Alliance’s tendency towards behind-the-scene negotiations. Singapore’s popular appeal, 
which included confrontational criticisms of its political opponents, embarrassed the 
Alliance leaders. Third, Singapore wanted to be par on with Malaya, while the Alliance 
leaders viewed Singapore as one of the states in the federation. Fourth, Singapore 
ultimately wanted to replace the MCA in the Alliance, which UMNO leaders rejected. 
When this attempt failed, the PAP challenged the political supremacy of the Malays and 
UMNO. Fifth, the personal relationships between the leaders of Singapore and the 
Federation had not been established long and, in fact, was fragile from the beginning. 
(Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, 1974: 181-188) 
16 Cheah maintained that there was widespread support in the party for the view that 
the ethnocultural Malay nationalists’ criticism of Abdul Rahman over the Language Bill 
issues had gone too far, although their cause of upholding the Malay language was a 
laudable one. In addition, the ethnocultural nationalists in the party did not win the 
support of the rest of the party leadership. Key figures such as Abdul Razak (then Deputy 
President and Deputy Prime Minister) and Dr Ismail supported Abdul Rahman’s position. 
The ethnocultural nationalist critics in UMNO were vocal; it seems that they were the 
clear minority in the party. The bill, with the help of the MCA and the MIC, passed 
parliament (Cheah, 2002: 103-105). 
17 Mahathir’s Malay Dilemma, written after 1969 ethnic riot, is widely quoted here as 
a source best describing the ethnocultural Malay nationalists position and rhetoric. Of 
course, it was written after the riot and factional dispute, but still it is relavant as a good 
example of the ethnocultural nationalists’ idea because the book is rather a succinct 
summary of the ethnocultural Malay nationalist argument against Abdul Raham’s 
position than a new idea that sprang up newly after the riot and dispute. In addition, the 
intention of my analysis of the ethnocultural nationalist arguments is not revealing their 
real political intention behind such ideological rhetoric. Rather this thesis is concerned 
with analysing the rhetoric as it is and with what exactly they argued for regardless of 
their sincerity in ideological belief. In this regards, Mahathir’s rather unbalanced opinion 
in the book is relavant object for analysis.  
18  Between independence in 1957 to 1970, the incidence of poverty, regardless of 
ethnic groups, dropped from 51.2 to 49.3 per cent. Although the incidence of poverty in 
the Indian community increased from 35.7 to 39.2 per cent, it decreased among the other 
groups, especially in the Malay community, where the incidence of poverty dropped from 
70.5 to 64.8 per cent (Osman-Rani, 1990: 11). However, income polarisation deepened. 
In 1957/58, the top 20 per cent of the population earned 48.6 per cent of the income while 
the bottom 40 per cent accounted for only 15.9 per cent. The gap between these two 
groups increased from 32.7 percentage points to 44.9 percentage points in a decade. In 
1970, the top 20 per cent of the population accounted for 56.1 per cent of income but the 
bottom 40 per cent contributed only 11.2 percent (Osman-Rani, 1990: 7). 
19   British colonial policy resulted in what was popularly known as ‘economic 
dualism,’ that is often mentioned as an economic structure perpetuating the economic 
backwardness of Malay community (Faaland et al., 1990: 5-8). The Malaysian economy 
before the implementation of the New Economic Policy in the 1970s was characterised by   104
                                                                                                                                      
Malay under-representation in such modern sectors of the economy as manufacturing and 
commerce and over-representation in such traditional sectors as agriculture and fishery. 
On the other hand, non-Malays dominated the modern sectors of the economy because 
they had been employed in those sectors from the beginning of their settlement in the 
peninsula on behalf of British colonial economic interests. When Malaya gained its 
independence, these structural characteristics produced visible economic inequality 
between the Malay and the non-Malay communities. (see Faaland et al., 1990: 37-47; 
Parmer, 1964: 311-315; Snodgrass, 1980). 
20 Malay participation was significant only in the transportation and communication 
sector, accounting for 43 per cent. This record was largely due to government preference 
for the Malays when issuing licenses for the transportation business. 
21 Foreign capital constituted 75.3 per cent, 72.4 per cent and 63.5 per cent in the 
agriculture, mining and commerce sectors respectively. In addition, in the manufacturing 
sector, foreign capital was much ahead of the other players, accounting for 59.6 per cent. 
Chinese capital had a major share of the construction (52.8 per cent) and transportation 
(43.4 per cent) sectors. 
22 It is widely acknowledged that, before 1969, the fundamental economic direction of 
the Malaysian government was laissez-faire, that is, the role of the government in the 
economy was kept to a minimum (Osman-Rani, 1990: 4; Searle, 1999: 33-36; Toh & 
Jomo, 1983: 37). An economic development plan, drafted in the 1960s stated: ‘Perhaps 
the basic contribution that the government can make to industrial growth is the 
preservation of a sound and stable monetary and financial climate, free from all the 
restrictions, controls and uncertainties, which are the inevitable accompaniments of 
financial instability and inflation’ (Federation of Malaya, 1961: 19). This characteristic is 
proven by the substantial presence of British economic interests and Chinese dominance 
among domestic capital, which meant the laissez-faire Malayan government did not 
intervene in the economy of the newly independent country. According to the Second 
Outline Perspective Plan, in 1970, foreign capital still owned 63.3 per cent of corporate 
equity, while the Malays and non-Malays owned 2.4 and 32.2 per cent of corporate equity 
respectively (Economic Planning Unit, 1991b). 
23 Bass categorised the popular diagnosis of Malay economic disadvantage during the 
1960s into two groups – the structuralists and the culturalists. According to Bass, the 
structuralist group (in which the UMNO ultras were included) argued, ‘Most Malays 
remained trapped in subsistence agricultural and fishing because of non-Malay 
domination of the professions and the modern commercial and industrial sectors of the 
economy…Once entrenched…they acquire the resources to perpetuate their position and 
obstruct Malay mobility’ (Bass, 1973: 588). 
24 During the 1969 elections, the Malaysian electorate seemed to have been driven 
towards extreme nationalist positions by both Malay (inclusive of the UMNO 
ethnocultural Malay nationalists) and non-Malay political parties. Vorys explained, ‘the 
electorate was particularly vulnerable to unabashed appeals to parochial sentiment. The 
leadership could ignore such obvious political realities only at its peril; yet it was simply 
not in a position to espouse the aspirations of any one community. Such a strategy would 
have violated the most rudimentary requirements of the constitutional contract, and this, 
for the government party, would have been irresponsible. Such a strategy, moreover, 
would have discredited some of the Alliance partners, and thus for a coalition of Malay, 
Chinese, and Indian political organizations would have been disastrous’ (Von Vorys, 
1975: 265). During the 1969 elections, the Alliance, or narrowly UMNO, was unable to 
position itself in the context of rising ethnocultural nationalist sentiments in both the 
Malay and the non-Malay communities.   105
                                                                                                                                      
25 Soon after the announcement of the 1969 elections results, a disappointed MCA 
announced that it would withdraw from the cabinet and reconsider its participation in the 
Alliance. In response, some UMNO ultras proposed that UMNO should form a 
government on its own, excluding the MCA and the MIC. The sharp exchange between 
UMNO and the MCA further increased ethnic tensions. After the setup of the National 
Operation Council (NOC), which replaced parliament and took over a majority of the 
government functions, the MCA, persuaded by UMNO, rejoined the Alliance coalition. 
26 In Kedah, PAS threatened the Alliance, winning 10 out of 24 seats. In Trengganu, 
PAS displaced the Alliance state government, winning 11 out of 20 state assembly seats, 
while retaining its traditional stronghold, Kelantan, winning 19 out of 30 state assembly 
seats. The challenge was not just from the Malay opposition, but also from the non-Malay 
opposition. In Penang, the aligned force of Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian 
People’s Movement or Gerakan) and the DAP won 20 state assembly seats, while the 
Alliance kept four. In Perak, the People’s Progressive Party (12 seats), the DAP (6) and 
Gerakan (2) outnumbered the Alliance that managed to win 19 seats. In addition, in 
Selangor, the DAP and Gerakan created a deadlock between the opposition and Alliance, 
winning 14 out of 28 state assembly seats. 
27 The Malay defection in the 1969 elections damaged UMNO’s election performance. 
In addition, as Drummond and Hawkins observed, in ethnically mixed constituencies 
where the MCA fielded candidates, Malay support made a decisive impact on the 
elections results (Drummond & Hawkins, 1970). The Malay support that had previously 
gone to the MCA went to the PMIP instead in the 1969 elections. This unintentionally 
made non-Malay opposition candidates very competitive against MCA candidates. Vasil, 
regarding this point, elaborated: ‘in the case of the MCA the predominant pattern was that 
its candidates were successful, by and large, only in those constituencies where at least 25 
per cent of the electorate was Malay. Here, unless this Malay vote was split by the 
presence of PMIP candidates, the MCA candidates were successful despite a split caused 
in the Chinese vote by the presence of candidates of the non-Malay opposition parties’ 
(Vasil, 1972: 38-39). In other words, although the Malay vote could not reverse the major 
trend in a non-Malay constituency, it could still decide the winner. What this observation 
meant is that, even during the 1969 elections, the non-Malay parties were to a certain 
degree dependent on Malay support, mediated through UMNO. While this trend was not 
particularly strong during the 1969 elections, in fact, the dependency of the non-Malay 
parties in the ruling coalition on Malay support has increased steadily since independence. 
The Malay population had grown while that of the non-Malays had decreased. In addition, 
the delineation of electoral districts had been drawn in favour of the Alliance Party by the 
UMNO dominated government to increase Malay dominant electorates. Consequently, 
the number of districts where non-Malays were a simple majority had decreased. This 
development made the non-Malay parties in the ruling coalition increasingly dependent 
on UMNO, which could mobilise votes for the non-Malay coalition partners. For example, 
in the 1995 elections, the MCA won six seats in constituencies where the Chinese 
consisted of more than 50 per cent of the population. On the contrary, the party won 22 
seats in constituencies where the Chinese were less than 50 per cent of the population. Of 
these 22 constituencies, the Malays formed a simple majority, that is, more than 50 per 
cent of the voters in 13 constituencies. In the 1999 elections, the MCA won only eight 
seats in constituencies with a Chinese majority. The Chinese constituted less than 60 per 
cent of the population in six out of the eight constituencies. Meanwhile, the party won 10 
seats from constituencies where there were more Malays than Chinese. Additionally, in 
five constituencies, the difference between the constituent Chinese and Malay populations 
was less than 5 per cent. Regarding this trend, see also (Crouch, 1996b).   106
                                                                                                                                      
28 An Islamic party, PAS, was widely referred to as PMIP, an abbreviation for Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party, or Parti Islam Se-Malaysia in its earlier days. Later, retaining its 
Malay name, the party was increasingly called PAS. 
29 In 1970, the Malays consisted of 93.6, 92.4, 79.0 and 70.6 per cent of the population 
in Trengganu, Kelantan, Perlis and Kedah respectively (Leete, 1996: 23-24). 
30 There had been a few ethnic clashes in the peninsula and Singapore before the 1969 
ethnic riots. There were frequent clashes between the Malay community (which 
collaborated with the Japanese occupation forces) and the Chinese community (which 
backed the MPAJA, Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army) during the Japanese rule 
(Gullick, 1981: 82). In 1951, there was a riot, which lasted a few days, by the Malays in 
Singapore (Bass, 1973: 262-267). In 1964, when there was tension between Singapore’s 
PAP and Malaya’s Alliance, there was a clash between the Malays (who supported 
UMNO) and the Chinese (who supported PAP) over the issue of Malay special rights in 
Singapore (Bass, 1973: 267-270; Means, 1976: 342-343). In 1967, when Chinese 
shopkeepers in Penang staged a general strike to protest the devaluation of the pound 
sterling against the Malaysian ringgit, their Malay counterparts did not join in the strike. 
This caused racial tension in Penang which was defused only by the deployment of the 
military (Bass, 1973: 271-273; Gullick, 1981: 122). 
31  Funston included Jaafar Albar and Syed Nasir Ismail, who were from the first 
generation UMNO elites (Funston, 1980: 179), while von Vorys expanded the boundary 
even further to include Razaleigh Hamzah and Abdullah Ahmad in addition to Mahathir, 
Musa, Jaafar Albar and Syed Nasir Ismail (Von Vorys, 1975: 371-372). Meanwhile, Bass 
found differences between Jaafar Albar-Nasir Ismail and Mahathir-Musa in terms of their 
age, ideological orientation and so on. Bass saw the championing of Malay nationalism 
by Jaafar Albar and Nasir Ismail as arising from political ambition or from the political 
positions they held, while the younger generation was more ideological (Bass, 1973: 557-
562). 
32 Parts of his letter read as follows: ‘Your opinions were based on stories you heard 
from people who surround you, and tell you what they think you like to hear or should 
hear. Permit me to tell you what the position, the thoughts and the opinions of the people 
are really… Your “give and take” policy gives the Chinese everything they ask for… The 
Chinese…regarded you and the Alliance government as cowards and weaklings who 
could be pushed around… [I]t is high time you resign as our Prime Minister and UMNO 
leader’ (Von Vorys, 1975: 372-374). It was significant that Mahathir demanded Abdul 
Rahman’s resignation. Bass observed, ‘Prior to 1969, there was no prospect that the 
Tengku [Abdul Rahman] could be toppled from his government or party posts. 
Disagreement with the Tengku’s decisions or positions on issues seldom generated 
challenges to his leadership. Certainly, the possibility of the Tengku’s forcible removal 
from office was not seriously entertained. More likely, individuals at odds with the party 
leadership would themselves resign in protest’ (Bass, 1973: 530). 
33 Abdul Rahman later described the letter as follows, ‘It was a letter the like of which 
I had never seen before in all my political career, and the last and most unlikely 
communication I would have expected to get from a man who has always put himself 
forward, at least outwardly, as a staunch supporter of the Party even though he disagreed 
with some of its policies.’ (Abdul Rahman, 1969: 117) 
34 According to Wang Gungwu, there were five different ideas as to how the collapsed 
political system could be restored. The first was a return to the situation before the 1969 
ethnic riots, with parliamentary democracy and Abdul Rahman’s multicultural Malaysian 
nationalism. The second was institutional as well as ideological restoration to the pre-
1969 situation but with new political leadership. These two positions were held by Abdul   107
                                                                                                                                      
Rahman and his supporters in the Alliance respectively. The third position held that 
before the pre-1969 system could be restored, an assessment on what the pre-1969 system 
involved should be conducted first. The fourth and fifth positions represented more 
radical positions. The fourth position argued that the pre-1969 system was a total failure. 
It argued that the racial harmony and parliamentary democracy that Abdul Rahman 
dreamed of were illusory. As an alternative, there should be ‘a government firmly 
directed by a strong and efficient bureaucracy’. The fifth position shared the view that the 
pre-1969 configuration had failed. Some viewed the period from 1957 to 1969 either as a 
scheme to control the lower classes by the upper class or as a ‘representative 
government…exploited by immigrant new citizens to threaten and challenge established 
indigenous rights and privileges’ (see Wang, 1981: 225-227).  
35 Clause 63 (4) of the Malaysian Constitution states: ‘Clause (2) [that stipulates non-
liability of Members of Parliaments] shall not apply to any person charged with an 
offence under the law passed by Parliament under Clause (4) of Article 10 or with an 
offence under the Sedition Act 1948 as amended by the Emergency (Essential Powers) 
Ordinance No. 45, 1970’. Clause (4) of Article 10 stipulates that Parliament ‘may pass 
laws prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, status, position, privileges, 
sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provision of Part Ⅲ, Article 
152, 153 or 181’. The sedition act mentioned in the article 63 (4) is the amended Sedition 
Act under emergency rule as explained above. Article 72 (4) is exactly the same as 
Article 63 (4), but it applies to State Assemblies. 
36 Christine Chin explained the implication of the NCP as follows: ‘The National 
Cultural Policy 1971 that ran parallel to the NEP was expected to create a national 
identity of one culture, one language and one citizenry, with Malay heritage at its core. 
The intent was to encourage non-Malays voluntarily, or guided by state institutions, to 
assimilate into Malay culture’ (C. B. N. Chin, 2000: 1043). 
37 As far as the intention of the NEP was concerned, there was little disagreement that 
the policy was introduced to increase the economic power of the Malay community by 
state intervention. A rare deviation from this mainstream observation was that the NEP 
was the ‘embourgeoisement of a selected few of the Malay community while at the same 
time further benefiting the non-Malay capitalist class’ (Cham, 1975: 456). Therefore, as I 
have argued here, there seems to be consensus that the NEP, in its intention, was 
ethnocultural Malay nationalist. The main debate has centred on the NEP’s consequences. 
Faaland, Parkinson and Saniman observed that overall the NEP was successful, when the 
plan was not taking A’s property by force to enrich B (Faaland et al., 1990). Meanwhile, 
Stafford and Osman-Rani admitted that by statistics, the NEP was successful. However, 
they argued that, in terms of its contribution to national unity and reduction of ethnic 
tension, the impact was ambiguous (Osman-Rani, 1990; Stafford, 1997). Much criticism 
has focused on the NEP’s performance of poverty eradication. Tan, Jomo and Ishak, Hing, 
and Jomo all observed that in comparison to ethnic restructuring, poverty eradication was 
relatively neglected, while inequality between the rich and poor had actually widened 
(Hing, 1984; Jomo, 1989; Jomo & Ishak Shari, 1981; L.-H. Tan, 1981). In terms of the 
NEP’s impact on non-Malay communities, Heng, Khoo and Jesudason observed that 
initially the NEP limited not just non-Malay economic activities but other aspects of non-
Malay life as well. However, they all maintained that some non-Malay capital, because of 
their individual political connections with Malay politicians could avoid such limitations 
on non-Malay capital imposed by the NEP (Heng, 1997; Jesudason, 1989; B. T. Khoo, 
2001). In other studies, Yoshihara maintained that the implementation of the NEP 
delayed more rapid economic growth (Kunio, 1988) and Simon Tan argued that the NEP 
provided justification for authoritarian state capitalism (S. Tan, 1990).   108
                                                                                                                                      
38 There are observations claiming that the NEP was all about ethnocultural nationalist 
policy. They have several grounds. First, some argued that the poverty eradication was 
not ethnically even-handed at all. The goal of poverty eradication, for example, was not 
set out in specific enough terms to enable empirical assessments of whether the goal had 
been met (L.-H. Tan, 1981: 201). Second, during the 1970s, poverty eradication could be 
merely another tool to enhance Malay economic power, given that the Malays, as the 
poorest group, would be the biggest beneficiary of the effort (Milne & Mauzy, 1978: 328-
329). Third, what made this bias worse was political intervention in the NEP’s 
development programs (see Shamsul, 1983). Since the government was, especially after 
the implementation of the NEP, controlled by UMNO, the allocation of developmental 
funds and the initiation of the program were vulnerable to political intervention that 
channelled the development programs and funds as rewards for UMNO supporters. Thus, 
Malay-UMNO supporters were the largest beneficiaries of the program, while non-
Malays and non-UMNO supporting Malays were left out. Fourth, the aspects of poverty 
identified by the government economic plan were mostly agricultural and rural ones. For 
example, poverty issues that the Mid-Term Review of Second Malaysia Plan identified 
included smallholder agriculture, commercialisation of agriculture, movement of rural 
farmers from traditional to modern agriculture, movement of Malays from traditional 
agriculture to the modern industrial and commercial sectors, infrastructure and education 
for rural people, building new villages for rural dwellers and so on (Malaysia, 1973: 6-7). 
The rural population, heavily dependent on agricultural economic activities, was 
primarily comprised of the Malays. In the Second Malaysia Plan and the Mid Term 
Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, it would be difficult to find any mention of poverty 
issues in the urban areas inhabited primarily by the Chinese and the Indians (for example 
see Malaysia, 1971: 4-5; 1973: 6-7). 
39 There have been quite a number of studies on public enterprises and government 
agencies under the NEP. For example, see (Gale, 1981; Gomez, 1994; M. H. Lim, 1981; 
Puthucheary, 1984; Searle, 1999). 
40  Development Bank (Bank Pembangunan), Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC), 
Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Sdn. Bhd. (MIDF) and MARA (Majilis 
Amanah Rakyat; People’s Trust Council) were mobilised to provide needed credit for 
Bumiputera. Also, MARA, National Productive Centre (NPC), MIDF Industrial 
Consultants Bhd., MARA Technological Institute, Malaysian Industrial Development 
Authority (MIDA), Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) 
provided the necessary technical assistance. Also, MARA, Pernas, Urban Development 
Authority (UDA) and State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) under 
individual state governments were directly involved in economic activities to enlarge the 
Malay share of economic wealth under the auspices of the government. (see Malaysia, 
1979: 50-53) 
41 When the BN was formed, the inclusion of Gerakan, a multiethnic but primarily 
Chinese supported party, undermined MCA’s position as the sole representative of 
Chinese community in the coalition. To regain its position, MCA attempted to merge with 
Gerakan. When the attempt failed, there was an internal dispute in MCA between the 
‘new blood’ who were openly critical of how UMNO had undermined MCA’s position by 
forming BN and the ‘old guard’ who were likewise unhappy but decided to conform, 
refraining from an open confrontation with UMNO. Young elites such as Lim Keng Yaik, 
who were critical of the incumbent leaders’ inability to counter UMNO’s attempt to 
weaken the MCA, were expelled from the party by the older generation leaders. 
Resonating with the rebellious younger generation elites, some MCA divisions and 
branches, mainly in Penang and Perak, defied the party leadership, claiming that they   109
                                                                                                                                      
would contest all the seats that were supposed to be the share of the new Chinese 
component (Mauzy, 1983: 79-81). 
42 Senu Abdul Rahman was Minister of Information under Abdul Rahman, but lost his 
seat in the 1969 elections. Although he regained the seat in the 1974 elections, he was 
never appointed to a cabinet post again. Khir Johari lost his UMNO vice president post in 
1971 and was posted to the US as the Malaysian Ambassador. An UMNO maverick, 
Harun Idris was still influential in the early 1970s as UMNO Youth Chief and Selangor 
Menteri Besar but was subsequently removed from the party in the mid 1970s when he 
was charged with of corruption. Likewise, Tun Mustapha, who was Chief Minister of 
Sabah and once had an unassailable local power base, was removed from power by Abdul 
Razak in an attempt to weaken local independent powers. The rise of the new generation 
and the fall of the old generation have often been viewed as a factional dispute in the 
1970s. The UMNO factional dispute in the 1970s was about a dispute between newly 
rising generation elites who were favoured by Abdul Razak and the outgoing old 
generation elites who had grudges against Abdul Razak and the new elites. For the 
dispute in the 1970s, see (J. Chin, 1997b: 103-104; Crouch, 1980; Gale, 1982: 84; Means, 
1991: 211).   110
3.  Mahathir’s Weakened Malay Nationalism and 
Razaleigh’s Ethnocultural Nationalist Challenge: 
The 1987 Dispute 
The importance of the 1987 UMNO dispute is proven by a few firsts in 
UMNO politics. First, there has never been an open electoral challenge to 
UMNO’s top leadership as serious as the one in 1987. The one other case of 
electoral challenge was a storm in a teacup by comparison. During the 1978 
UMNO elections, an unknown UMNO member, Sulaiman Palestine, challenged 
acting UMNO president, Hussein Onn. Sulaiman was supported by some UMNO 
elites from the Abdul Rahman era as a protest against Hussein Onn and his 
predecessor, Abdul Razak, as well as against the rise of such young elites as 
Mahathir, Musa and Razaleigh. Sulaiman was easily defeated, getting only 250 
votes, as against Hussein Onn’s 898 votes. The 1987 electoral challenge, however, 
almost unseated the party president.  
Second, before and after the 1987dispute, UMNO was split down the 
middle into two competing factions. Eventually, the party split into two 
competing parties—UMNO Baru (New UMNO) and Semangat 46’ (The Spirit of 
1946). As UMNO was believed to be the symbol and embodiment of Malay 
political dominance, the split had important political meaning for the Malay 
community.  The split created a situation in which, for the first time, two secular 
Malay nationalist parties competed for the mandate of the Malay community.  
This chapter analyses the 1987 dispute in light of the competing nationalist 
ideologies constructed by the contesting elites. Most existing studies of the 1987 
dispute, although they explain other dimensions of the dispute related to political   111
pragmatism and opportunism quite well, do not take the ideological contest 
seriously. The studies concluded that the 1987 dispute was a power struggle 
between prominent political elites and the ideological rhetoric was merely 
camouflage for their actions.
1 In fact, the 1987 dispute is arguably less ideological 
than the other cases examined in this study. This, however, does not reduce the 
importance of the ideological competition. The competing nationalist ideologies 
in the 1987 dispute involved the Prime Minister’s nationalist vision and the 
disagreements with the vision. The latter was expressed in the form of a counter-
ideology, constructed and manipulated by the challenger. Furthermore, the dispute 
caused a deep split in UMNO, which later spilt over to the entire Malay 
community, in the form of a contest between two political parties with the same 
origin, UMNO. 
In the 1987 dispute, the competing nationalist ideological arguments 
constituted of pro-Malay policies, represented by Razaleigh and a weakening of 
pro-Malay policies, represented by Mahathir. To strengthen his political 
legitimacy as Prime Minister, Mahathir emphasised rapid economic growth rather 
than ethnic redistribution. The position of Prime Minister, unlike that of UMNO 
president, had to take the non-Malay communities into consideration. The 
mandate of the Prime Minister came not just from the Malay community but also 
from the non-Malay communities as well. Emphasising rapid economic growth 
instead of ethnic distribution could undermine the pro-Malay NEP of the 1970s, 
an embodiment of ethnocultural Malay nationalism. This policy shift implied that 
Mahathir’s nationalist commitment was moving away from ethnocultural Malay 
nationalism. Against this, the challenging faction maintained that the state should   112
maintain its efforts to advance the economic well-being of the Malay community 
to equal, if not surpass, that enjoyed by the non-Malays. Their position was that 
the Malay community, which defined Malaysian national identity, deserved such a 
status. The challengers attempted to legitimise their challenge to Mahathir’s 
authority with such an ideological assumption.  
 This chapter makes three separate analytical points. First, after a brief 
overview of UMNO factionalism in the 1980s, the following section argues that 
Mahathir moved away from the ethnocultural Malay nationalist NEP of the 1970s 
as a consequence of his prioritising economic growth over ethnic redistribution. 
This prioritisation was shown in the deregulation of NEP principles, rules for 
ethnic redistribution and in the privatisation policy. Second, against Mahathir’s 
shift away from ethnocultural Malay nationalism, Razaleigh attempted to mobilise 
UMNO members and Malay community with his stronger ethnocultural Malay 
nationalist argument, focusing on economic policy. His main arguments were the 
extension of the NEP and that Mahathir’s economic policy went against the Malay 
community’s interests. Third, it will be argued that after the party elections, the 
dispute was extended to a competition over a wider Malay mandate. In the end, 
Mahathir retained political power, with an effective use of a rhetoric of 
ethnocultural Malay nationalism, mobilising Malay community in support of him.  
 
3.1. UMNO factionalism in the 1980s: An overview 
UMNO factional disputes in the 1980s revolved around competitions 
amongst three political figures – Mahathir Mohamad, Razaleigh Hamzah and 
Musa Hitam. They entered into criss-crossing factional alignments in three   113
contests — the 1981, 1984 and 1987 party elections. Their rivalries dated back to 
the early 1970s. Of the three, Razaleigh was senior in party rank, as the other two 
had been forced to leave UMNO after the 1969 dispute. Razaleigh became an 
UMNO vice president, filling a post vacated by Hussein Onn who became the 
new deputy president in 1973. In the 1975 party elections, Mahathir was elected 
as the third Vice President.
2 In 1976, when Hussein Onn became party president 
upon Abdul Razak’s sudden death, the Deputy President post became available. 
Hussein Onn, going against UMNO’s seniority rule, selected Mahathir as his 
deputy.  (Razaleigh was then second Vice President and Mahathir was third Vice 
President.) During the 1978 party elections, Hussein Onn and Mahathir were 
endorsed as President and Deputy President respectively and Razaleigh was 
elected as the first Vice President (see Ahmad Atory Hussain, 1993: 53-54; Aziz 
Zariza Ahmad, 1997: 184-186).  
The competition among Mahathir Mohamad, Razaleigh Hamzah and Musa 
Hitam continued during the three UMNO elections in the 1980s.  In 1981, 
Hussein Onn resigned and Mahathir succeeded him as party president without 
much fuss.
3  The real concern in this transition of power was who would be 
appointed deputy president, who, in turn, by convention, would succeed to the 
presidency in the future. Mahathir, unlike his predecessors, did not openly 
announce the candidate he favoured. Soon, Musa Hitam and Razaleigh Hamzah 
emerged as strong contenders for the No. 2 post.
4 Musa was Education minister, 
traditionally regarded as a stepping-stone to the top position in UMNO (A. Ghani 
Ismail, 1983: 12) and had strong regional support from his hometown, Johor, 
which had one of the largest number of delegates to the UMNO general assembly   114
election. On the other hand, Razaleigh had strong support within the party and had 
substantial patronage resources and network, developed during his tenure as 
Finance Minister since 1976 (A. Ghani Ismail, 1983: 4-6). In addition, he was 
from the traditional ruling class, the royal family of Kelantan. In the elections, 
Razaleigh was defeated by Musa by a 205 vote margin out of the 1,250 votes cast.    
Although Razaleigh was defeated, he still had strong support in the party 
and was retained as Finance Minister. A. Ghani Ismail argued that, while the two 
were competing, Mahathir played a divide-and-rule strategy between the two 
prominent political figures, supporting Musa as his deputy, while retaining 
Razaleigh in the cabinet, ‘to counter-balance Musa’s power’ (A. Ghani Ismail, 
1983: 32). The 1984 UMNO elections replicated the 1981 elections, except that 
Musa was the incumbent and Razaleigh was the challenger.
5 Mahathir  openly 
indicated that he preferred Musa to be his deputy (Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 1985: 
207). In the elections, Musa defeated Razaleigh with an increased margin (243 
votes), but once again, Razaleigh proved that he had about 40 per cent of 
unassailable support in the party, as shown in the 1981 and 1984 elections. These 
two inner party competitions in 1981 and 1984 did not have strong ideological 
elements and they were not the competitions between the Prime Minister and 
UMNO challengers that are analysed in this research.  
A twist in the UMNO elite relationships came in 1986 when Musa 
suddenly resigned because, allegedly, Mahathir did not have confidence in him.
6 
Although the two denied any difficulties in their relationship, the tension between 
the two had already begun a few years earlier.
7   After Musa resigned, he 
maintained that he had different views on some policy matters, including   115
Mahathir’s economic management, and complained that he had been excluded 
from various UMNO and government affairs by Mahathir’s so-called kitchen 
cabinet. On the other hand, Mahathir criticised Musa for being disloyal and 
argued that Musa’s resignation stemmed from Musa’s political ambitions. 
Mahathir alleged that Musa wanted Razaleigh removed from the cabinet (Aziz 
Zariza Ahmad, 1997: 167) and that Musa wanted to replace Mahathir as UMNO 
President.  
For the 1987 party elections, Musa and Razaleigh, once erstwhile rivals 
during the 1981 and 1984 elections, formed a de facto coalition against Mahathir 
and his running mate, Ghafar Baba, by officiating each other’s division meetings 
in February and March 1987. In early February 1987, Musa announced that he 
would defend his deputy president post and on 11 April, 1987, Razaleigh 
eventually declared his candidacy. The two factions were dubbed as Team A 
(Mahathir-Ghafar) and Team B (Razaleigh-Musa).
8 The cabinet, party elites as 
well as grassroots members divided themselves into supporting the two teams. 
Some of them openly declared their support for Team B and said that they were 
ready to resign their cabinet posts, if they lost in the party elections (Shamsul, 
1988: 81). When the nomination results were revealed, Team A (Mahathir, 88 
nominations and Ghafar, 74) was ahead of Team B (Razaleigh, 37 and Musa, 50).  
The two competing factions were put to a test in the 1987 party elections. 
In a close election on 24 April 1987, Mahathir (761 votes) beat Razaleigh (718 
votes), with a narrow margin of 43 votes out of a total of 1,479 votes cast. Ghafar 
also made it, with a margin of 40 votes and 41 invalid votes. In the contests for 
the other party posts, the Mahathir faction was victorious, although Team B   116
members were not completely eliminated.
9   Although the defeated Team B 
members pledged to work with Mahathir for the sake of the party, it was not 
without conditions—Razaleigh made it clear that there should be no ‘witch-hunt’ 
of Team B members. However, shocked by the narrow margin of Team A’s 
victory, Mahathir was in no mood to compromise and accepted Razaleigh’s and 
Rais Yatim’s (then Foreign Minister), resignations immediately. Shortly thereafter, 
in a cabinet reshuffling, key members of Team B, that is, the three ministers 
(Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Shahrir Abdul Samad, Ajib Ahmad) and the four 
deputy ministers (Kadir Sheikh Fadzir, Radzi Sheikh Ahmad, Zainal Abidin Zin 
and Rahmah Othman) were dropped (Jayasankaran, 1987b: 4). Further, when 
Mahathir registered a new party, UMNO Baru, in accordance with the court 
decision that ruled UMNO illegal, most of the division and branch level leaders 
who were aligned with Team B were not included in the new party. 
 
3.2.  Mahathir’s economic policy and its nationalist 
implications 
This section examines Mahathir’s nationalist position, as shown in his 
economic policy. It argues that Mahathir’s economic policy shift in the 1980s 
implied a significant departure from his strong ethnocultural Malay nationalist 
position in the 1970s. Mahathir’s emphasis moved from ethnic redistribution for 
the “Malay community” towards economic growth for “Malaysia.” He put more 
weight on the role of the private sector (which was dominated by non-Malays) and 
de-emphasised the role of the state in the economy. This shift in Mahathir’s 
economic policy was conspicuous in two economic initiatives. First, Mahathir 
deregulated the strict NEP rules and principles for ethnic restructuring, giving   117
non-Malay private capital more room to move. Second, state projects and 
enterprises, which had contributed much towards ethnic redistribution in the 
1970s, were privatised, thereby reducing the role of state in the economy and also 
benefiting the private capital that secured the privatised projects.   
  A brief discussion of the nexus between Malay nationalism and economic 
policy is necessary in order to facilitate this analysis of Mahathir’s shift in 
economic policy. As indicated in the previous chapter, the ethnocultural Malay 
nationalists assumed that Malay dominance in politics, culture and economy was 
necessary for Malaysia to exist as a Malay nation. They viewed that a Malay 
Malaysia is the right of the Malay community as the indigenous people of the 
peninsula, which is why the debate regarding the direction of economic policy in 
the 1980s has nationalist implications. The NEP of the 1970s was an ethnocultural 
Malay nationalist attempt to assure the Malay community’s economic, political 
and cultural dominance. A shift from the course of the NEP, therefore, would 
mean abandonment of the ethnocultural Malay nationalist commitment embodied 
in the NEP.  
 
3.2.1.  Shifting emphasis from ethnic redistribution to growth 
When Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981, he changed the direction 
of Malaysian economic policy: instead of emphasising ethnic restructuring, he 
emphasised growth. Khoo Boo Teik noted that Mahathir was caught by tensions 
from different economic directions. According to Khoo Boo Teik, the economic 
policy in the 1970s had created increasing tension between the Malay-dominated 
government and Chinese private capital. In addition, there was disagreement even   118
within the Malay political-business community which was torn between pro-
distribution and pro-growth approaches (B. T. Khoo, 1995: 103-109). Khoo Su-
ming believed that Mahathir’s economic nationalism was fundamentally 
capitalistic and market-driven. Mahathir’s preference for capitalist economic 
development changed the direction of the economy in the 1980s. When the NEP 
conflicted with the market, Mahathir moved quickly to tone down the Malay 
nationalist elements in economic policy and resorted to market logic instead. 
Mahathir’s emphasis on economic growth over ethnic re-distribution was a 
product of this change, according to Khoo  (S. Khoo, 1999: 133-136).
10  
In the 1970s, government management of the national economy prioritised 
the restructuring of economy through state intervention and NEP policies 
favouring the Malay community. Peter Searle described the thrust of  economic 
policy in the 1970s as follows: ‘the laissez-faire Alliance state was replaced by 
one that was more interventionist and avowedly pro-Malay in its orientation, 
particularly where increasing Malay ownership of the economy and the fostering 
of Malay capitalism were concerned’ (Searle, 1999: 45). To achieve the goal of 
ethnic restructuring, the state participated as a major player in the economy to 
accumulate capital on behalf of Malay community and imposed regulations on 
non-Malay and foreign capital in the name of the NEP.  
In contrast, Mahathir in the 1980s was of the opinion that to encourage 
economic growth, the private sector, which was dominated by non-Malays, should 
be harnessed as the engine of growth, while the role of the state, which had led 
ethnic restructuring in the 1970s, should play only a secondary role. This change 
did not necessarily mean that Mahathir had abandoned pro-Malay policies entirely   119
and indeed, Mahathir maintained his support for pro-Malay policies. Nevertheless, 
the redirection indicated an analytically significant shift from the NEP’s stronger 
ethnocultural Malay nationalist commitment in the 1970s. In a speech before the 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)-US Economic Council in 1981, 
Mahathir, emphasising the private sector, argued, ‘the objective of stable 
economic growth can best be achieved in an environment of free enterprise in a 
market economy. Private investment, both domestic and foreign, is encouraged to 
expand and to seek new opportunities to raise productive capacity in the region’ 
(Mahathir, 1981b). 
While the private sector was to lead the Malaysian economy towards 
growth, the government was expected to remove stumbling blocks and to support 
and assist the private sector. In a 1983 speech, Mahathir argued: 
…the government becomes more the service arm of the enterprise. The 
Malaysia Incorporated concept therefore requires that the economic and 
service arm of the nation work in full cooperation so that the nation as a 
whole can gain in the way that a well-run corporation prospers… [T]he 
service sections of the Government, the policy and lawmakers, have a 
duty to ensure that no undue hindrance is put in the way of the private 
sector…because it is the private sector that provides the revenues 
necessary for government expenditure of every kind… The more revenue 
collected, the better would be the direct benefits to the public service. 
And more revenues can only be collected if there are more economic 
activities, particularly more profits.
 (Mahathir, 1983b) 
In a similar vein, in an address to a gathering of bank and financial 
institutions of Malaysia in 1984, Mahathir emphasised again the private sector’s 
leading role and the government’s subordinate role: 
The Government is committed to the control of public sector expenditure, 
in line with available resources, and to provide the framework and   120
infrastructure for private sector dynamism and initiative to flourish. In the 
true spirit of Malaysia Incorporated, the Government will seek trade 
initiatives within the international trade environment to assist the private 
sector to export competitively. But, the private sector must respond, not 
timidly with more and more demands for greater Government assistance, 
but with vision, initiative and daring, to penetrate new markets with new 
products and services.
 (Mahathir, 1984b) 
Mahathir’s commitment to private sector-led economic growth increased 
when the Malaysian economy experienced a downturn in the mid-1980s. The 
Fifth Malaysia Plan, revealed in the middle of economic crisis, clearly indicated 
the re-orientation of economic policies.
11 The plan, having the economic recession 
in the mid-1980s in mind, stated:  
The emphasis of development for the second half of the 1980s will be 
based on growth with stability… Since 1980, GDP growth slowed to 
about half the pace of the 1970s, export prices and demand deteriorated, 
large current account deficits emerged in the balance of payments, and 
domestic and external debts increased rapidly. The prospects for the next 
five years are not expected to depart from the trends of the early 1980s. In 
order to sustain the achievement so far, in terms of further reducing the 
incidence of poverty, expanding the employment creation capacity, and 
increasing Bumiputera corporation ownership, the economy, therefore, 
has to continue to expand… The pursuit of excessive restructuring 
objectives, however, in the face of anticipated slower economic growth 
may lead to adverse effects on overall long-term performance of the 
economy.  (Malaysia, 1986: 20-21, emphasis added) 
The message was clear. When faced with an economic downturn in 
particular and the need for economic growth in general, ethnic redistribution 
policies should not hinder economic development. By the mid-1980s, economic 
growth undoubtedly had priority over ethnic redistribution policies. In the next 
two sections, the Malay nationalist implications of Mahathir’s shift in economic   121
policy will be examined in greater detail through a study of two policies, the 
deregulation of NEP pro-Malay rules and principles and the privatisation policy.   
 
3.2.2.  Deregulation of pro-Malay NEP  
Less NEP regulation of the non-Malay dominated private sector  
One of the major themes of Mahathir’s new direction was the deregulation 
of the NEP’s ethnocultural Malay nationalist principles and rules that constrained 
non-Malay and foreign capital on behalf of Malay economic progress. The new 
UMNO leadership in the 1970s was strongly committed to regulating non-Malay 
and foreign capital which, if set free, would overwhelm and hinder the Malay 
community’s economic advancement. The stagnation of the Malay share of the 
economy under Abdul Rahman’s laissez-faire economic policies proved their 
point. The NEP principles that reflected such a view produced several strong 
regulatory schemes, such as the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA),
12 the Foreign 
Investment Committee (FIC)
13  and the Capital Issues Committee (CIC),
14 on 
private capital dominated by non-Malay and foreign capital. Expectedly, the 
government faced constant complaints from non-Malay capital, demanding  the 
ICA to lowers its criteria, and had to deal with a decrease in private investment 
and even capital flight (Jesudason, 1989: 138-147).
15  
When Mahathir emphasised the importance of the private sector for 
economic growth, the Malay preferential policies that constrained non-Malay and 
foreign capital abated considerably. Mahathir’s commitment to the deregulation of 
the NEP could be seen in the Fifth Malaysia Plan which stated:   122
In the Fifth Plan, steps will be considered to streamline the complex laws, 
regulations, and controls in order to provide a conducive environment for 
business activities. Rules and regulations which tends to restrain the 
growth of the private sector will be phased out…Greater emphasis will be 
placed on the market mechanism and price signals as a means of more 
effective decision-making on resource allocation. (Malaysia, 1986: 22) 
On foreign investment, Mahathir showed a much more flexible attitude, 
compared to the NEP’s regulation of foreign capital. At a conference of Malaysian 
business leaders in 1984, Mahathir stressed:  
What is loss to Malaysia if we allow largely foreign-owned big 
manufacturing establishments which use our rubber or tin or other 
resources? As I pointed out just now, we may never be able to go into 
those industries ever [without foreign investment]. If so, it is a case of 
half a loaf being better than no bread. But if those industries are located 
here, our small share in a big enterprise can be more substantial than a big 
share in a small enterprise. Then, of course, there will be the tremendous 
spin-offs, in terms of supporting industries, technological transfer, inflow 
of foreign capital, jobs and a host of others. This is why the government 
is studying the incentives for foreign investment.
 (Mahathir, 1984a) 
In 1985–86, during the worst economic crisis Malaysia experienced, 
Mahathir further emphasised the importance of deregulation (Leigh, 1992: 117). 
Despite the government’s counter-cyclical spending in the early 1980s to prevent 
the downturn, ballooning foreign debts had pushed the Malaysian economy into a 
deep recession. The debts were mostly incurred by ‘firstly, the counter-cyclical 
deficit budgets using foreign borrowings (1980–82), and then, foreign debt-
financed heavy industrial development (1982–84)’, (Jomo, 1989: 11). When faced 
with the crisis, Mahathir hastened the deregulation of the NEP and the promotion 
of private investments, thereby shelving ethnic restructuring of the economy.    123
During the economic crisis, the NEP regulations placed on foreign and 
private capital were eased via a series of policy changes, culminating in the 
temporary suspension of the NEP in 1986. An article in Malaysian Business 
summarised the government’s strategy at that point as follows: ‘the (domestic) 
[non-Malays] private sector plus massive infusions of foreign investment are the 
means envisaged by the government towards keeping the economy afloat’ 
(Malaysian Business, 1986b: 8).  
In July 1985, the government announced new guidelines for foreign equity 
ownership. Before the new guidelines were announced, complete foreign 
ownership was available only for companies exporting 100 per cent of its products. 
Otherwise, foreigners were permitted to have only 51 per cent or 30 per cent 
ownership, according to the proportion of products their companies exported. 
Under the new guidelines, 100 per cent foreign ownership of a Malaysian 
company was permitted if more than 80 percent of the company’s products were 
exported. Correspondingly smaller percentages of foreign ownership were 
permitted when smaller percentages of products were exported, that is, 80 percent 
foreign ownership when 79-51 per cent of products were exported, 51 percent 
foreign ownership when 20-50 per cent of products were exported and 30 percent 
foreign ownership when less than 20 per cent of products were exported. In 
addition, in the high technology industries, regardless of the percentage of 
products exported,  up to 51 per cent of foreign ownership of a Malaysian 
company was allowed (Jesudason, 1989: 187-188).  
In accordance with the new guidelines, the Industrial Coordination Act 
(ICA) was amended to promote private investments, especially from domestic   124
Chinese capital. By December 1985, the ICA, that had specified Bumiputera 
employment and ownership quotas, became applicable only to companies that 
employed more than 50 people and had paid up capital of over RM 1 million. 
Previously, the criteria were 25 employees and RM 250,000. In September 1986, 
the regulations were relaxed further and only companies with more than 75 
employees and had paid-up capital of RM 2.5 million came under the purview of 
the ICA (Bowie, 1994: 181).  
Furthermore, in late 1986, Mahathir announced that HICOM’s (Heavy 
Industries Corporation of Malaysia) debt, in Japanese Yen denomination, would 
be converted into equity of the company to relieve the debt-servicing burden 
(Seaward, 1986: 129). This meant that the equity of state enterprises were 
available for foreign ownership. It was a reversal of the NEP’s commitment of 
increasing Malay ownership of the corporate sector through reduction of foreign 
ownership. During his 1986 trip to Australia, Mahathir announced a temporary 
suspension of the NEP to promote foreign investment and to revive the sluggish 
Malaysian economy. Subsequently, it was observed that, by early 1986, ‘there 
[was] a growing perception…that social justice efforts [i.e. ethnic redistribution] 
may be forced to take a back seat to growth and wealth creation’ (Jayasankaran, 
1989: 4). 
 
Ethnic redistribution slowed down 
The deregulation of NEP principles and rules aimed at ethnic restructuring 
reflected a weakened commitment on the part of the government to promote 
Malay interests and resulted in a slowdown of the accumulation of Malay wealth.   125
In line with the relaxation of NEP ethnic restructuring regulations, there was a 
significant decrease in government spending on measures to improve Malay 
economic power. Between 1986 and 1990, the government budget allocation for 
various programs designed to help Malays enter modern sectors of the economy 
and entrepreneurial areas decreased significantly. Except for the budget for 
education and training programs which increased by 22.6 per cent, the allocations 
for business loans and premises and equity programs were cut by 56.7 per cent 
and 42.2 per cent respectively (See Table 3–1).  
Table 3-1. Development Budget Allocation for Ethnic Restructuring, 1986–90 
Programs Original  Allocation  Revised Allocation  Percentage change 
Business Loans 
and Premises  1,620.47 700.71  -56.8 
Education  
and Training  1,137.72 1,394.43  22.6 
Equity 523.44 301.70  -42.4 
Others 920.00 314.81  -65.8 
Total 4,201.63  2,711.65 -35.5 
Source: (Jayasankaran, 1989: 14). All figures in RM million. 
The weakened commitment to ethnic redistribution in economic policy 
under Mahathir had an impact on changes in corporate ownership, perhaps the 
single most important criterion of ethnic redistribution identified in the NEP. As 
Table 3–2 shows, since the implementation of the NEP, Malay corporate 
ownership had increased steadily. However, around 1983, the pace of Malay 
corporate ownership increase became noticeably slow. The increase between 1983 
and 1985 was only 0.4 percentage points and, between 1985 and 1990, a period of 
five years, it was only 0.2 percentage points. These increases contrasted starkly 
with the 6.8 percentage points (1970–75), 3.3 percentage points (1975–80) and   126
6.2 percentage points (1980–83) in previous periods. This record coincided with 
Mahathir’s de-regulation of NEP’s rules and principles.   
Table 3-2. Changes in share ownership: 1970–1990 (%) 
  1970 1975 1980 1983 1985  1990
16 
Malay  2.4  9.2  12.5 18.7 19.1 19.3 
Non-Malay  34.3 37.5 44.6 47.7 54.9 46.8 
Source: (Malaysia, 1971;1976;1981;1984;1986;1989). 
In contrast, non-Malay ownership, which growth rate had been slowed 
down by the NEP from 1970 to 1985, showed a substantial leap in 1985. In a mere 
two years, from 1983 to 1985, non-Malay share jumped by 7.2 percentage points, 
dominating more than 50 per cent of total corporate share. In the five years from 
1980 to 1985, it increased from 44.6 per cent to 56.7 per cent, that is, 12.1 
percentage points, compared to 3.2 percentage points and 7.7 percentage points, in 
every five years between 1970 and 1980. Although the non-Malay share 
decreased again towards 1990, the sudden boost of non-Malay ownership could be 
a result of Mahathir’s promotion of private investment, supplemented by the 
deregulation of NEP constraints on non-Malay capital in the early 1980s.  
The changes in policy and the consequences, with regards to the NEP, 
implied that Mahathir’s policies were moving away from the trends of the 1970s. 
The economic policies of the 1970s, as represented by the NEP, embodied a 
strong ethnocultural Malay nationalist commitment that the Malay community 
should be economically dominant. From the perspective of the ethnocultural 
Malay nationalist, Mahathir’s policy shift effectively undermined this 
commitment. By implication, this development indicated that the ethnocultural 
Malay nationalist commitment in Mahathir’s economic policy had become 
considerably weaker.     127
3.2.3. Privatisation  policy  and  its nationalist implications  
Mahathir’s privatisation policy had nationalist implication. Mahathir’s 
privatisation policy is, arguably, the most widely debated of his economic policy 
initiatives from the 1980s. The privatisation policy was introduced to rationalise 
the state enterprise sector and infrastructure projects that imposed financial 
burdens on the government. Mahathir contended:  
…public owned enterprises never seem to be profitable or efficient. Even 
when they are monopolies they cannot seem to earn their way, much less 
pay tax or dividends to the owner—the Government. More often than not, 
a privately owned enterprise which has been making profits and paying 
taxes, not only ceases to do both on nationalisation but requires subsidies 
and copious injections of capital every now and then by the Government.
 
(Mahathir, 1983b) 
On the contrary, when state enterprises were privatised, according to 
Mahathir, it would benefit all, including the government, because: 
…private business and enterprises are usually profitable. Profit-making 
private businesses are required to pay taxes amounting to 40–50% of total 
profit. If government enterprises are transferred to the private sector, the 
government will not lose its source of income. 40–50% of this income 
will continue to be received by the government.
 (Mahathir, 1983a) 
The privatisation policy was formally launched in 1983 and by 1991, 37 
projects had been privatised (Economic Planning Unit, 1991a).
17 The scope of the 
privatisation policy was far-reaching, including such enterprises and projects as 
television and radio stations, the construction of ports and roads, water supply, 
aviation, national parks, plantations, government printing, resorts, 
telecommunication, power supply and so on (Economic Planning Unit, 1991a: 
Appendix 1). Musa Hitam who was deputy Prime Minister from 1981 to 1986   128
said, ‘except education, everything is under scrutiny [for privatisation]’ (quoted in 
Ong, 1984: 197).
18 
The consequences of the privatisation policy could be interpreted as going 
against ethnocultural nationalist direction. First, under the privatisation policy, a 
significant number of state enterprises and projects were privatised. As noted 
earlier, state enterprises were the main thrust of NEP, helping the Malay to get 
more economic pie vis-à-vis non-Malays than they could have had where sheer 
market force have dominated. By implication, privatisation of the state enterprises 
could mean that the mission given to the state enterprises would be in danger.  
Mahathir recognised the potential dangers of privatisation and justified the 
initiative, especially if non-Malays were benefited. Mahathir admitted, ‘…the 
Government has moved into business in the interests of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP). This move was made necessary because there were not enough capable 
Bumiputeras, both in terms of skill as well as capital’ (Mahathir, 1983b). 
Mahathir tried to assure the Malay community that privatisation did not 
necessarily mean a loss to the Malay community. He observed:  
The position has now changed a great deal. In addition to a fairly large 
number of Bumiputera entrepreneurs, there are a number of funds owned 
by Bumiputeras which can be tapped as a source of capital…it 
[privatisation] will not negate the objectives of the NEP. The 
Bumiputeras will get their share in terms of equity and in employment.
 
(Mahathir, 1983b) 
As argued by Mahathir above, the privatisation policy was supposed to 
benefit newly rising Malay capital, thereby fulfilling the goals of the NEP, albeit 
in a different way. In a similar vein, the privatisation master plan observed that, 
‘in respect of the restructuring target of the NEP, the privatization programme has   129
helped to increase Bumiputera participation in the corporate sector. Most of the 
privatisation projects had at least 30% Bumiputera participation’ (Economic 
Planning Unit, 1991a).
19 Indeed, a significant portion of the state enterprises and 
government infrastructure projects were privatised to Malay businesses. Some of 
these privatised corporations and projects developed into conglomerates in the 
1980s and 1990s.
20  
Non-Malays, however, were not excluded completely. Through the 
privatisation policy, several politically connected non-Malay businessmen 
obtained substantial shares in many privatised entities and projects. Vincent Tan 
of the Berjaya Group was awarded Sports Toto, a lucrative lottery company, in 
1985 with only a two-page proposal. Subsequently, Berjaya secured some shares 
when TV3 was privatised. Lim Thian Kiat of Seri Angkasa Sdn. Bhd and Lim Ah 
Tam of KCB Bhd were jointly awarded the Jalan Kuching–Kepong Interchange 
project in 1985. In the Malaysian International Shipping Corporation equity sale 
in 1986, two well-known Chinese businessmen, Frank Tsao of Frank Tsao & Co. 
Ltd and Robert Kuok of Kuok Brothers Sdn Bhd were awarded shares of the 
national shipping corporation. In 1987, Brian Chang, jointly with a Malay 
institution, the Tabung Haji (Pilgrimage Fund), was awarded the Labuan Water 
supply project.
21  
Viewed against the NEP’s pro-Malay principles, the participation of some 
non-Malays in the privatisation projects was considered a betrayal of the original 
NEP principles. When the projects and enterprises were under government control, 
given UMNO’s dominance of the government, they were regarded as potential 
Malay wealth. After the projects and enterprises were privatised to non-Malays,   130
however, they were no longer under Malay control. Hence, to some Malays, the 
privatisation projects awarded to non-Malays were regarded as loss of Malay 
wealth (Gomez & Jomo, 1997: 88).  
Second, as Abdul Razak Abdul argued, the business transactions of state 
enterprises, in the form of sub-contracts, joint ventures and so on, had benefited 
burgeoning Malay businesses (Abdul Razak Abdul, 1984: 263).
22 With the sale of 
state enterprises to private parties, however, the Malay community could be 
adversely affected, even if the parties concerned were Malays. The privatised 
enterprises were now subject to market forces, instead of the government’s 
political will to favour Malays, thereby reducing the number of easy business 
opportunities available for Malay businessmen. Furthermore, given that state 
enterprises had guaranteed economic share for and employment of the Malays, 
privatisation, which meant commercialisation of the enterprises, could endanger 
the Malay community’s relatively secure employment and business opportunities. 
An article in a Malaysian business magazine commented on the political risk of 
the privatisation policy as follows:  
State enterprises were instrumental in helping to restructure equity and 
employment in favour of bumiputeras under the 1970 New Economic 
Policy. Privatisation, on the other hand, calls for doing away with these 
protective structures and giving free play to ethnically-blind market 
forces that reward enterprise and innovation—a policy that may boost 
efficiency and growth but be ‘politically suicidal’ [for UMNO] at this 
juncture. (Almeida, 1989: 15) 
Third, the state enterprises, the torchbearers of Malay economic 
advancement and ethnic restructuring, felt mounting pressure in the form of 
management replacement. Confronted with increasing inefficiency and loss,
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Mahathir replaced the Malay chief executives of some state enterprises with non-
Malay and foreign managers in an attempt to rationalise the management. For 
example, in 1987, when the Malaysian economy was barely out of an economic 
downturn, the executives of Proton, the Malaysian national car company, were 
replaced by Japanese executives from Mitsubishi. Likewise, Perwaja Trengganu 
Steel’s Malay director was replaced by a Chinese businessman, Eric Chia (Pura & 
Duthie, 1988). Kedah Cement’s manager was also replaced by a Chinese, Heng 
Keah Yong. Proton, Perwaja Trengganu and Kedah Cement had all been shining 
symbols of Malay involvement in the modern industrial sector. The replacements 
must have hurt Malay pride that they could be successful, like the non-Malays, in 
modern sector of the economy. As Bowie observed, this measure ran counter to 
the original ethnocultural Malay nationalist commitment of the NEP. He 
contended: 
The government was prepared to pass management (if not equity) control 
over state industries not just to non-Malays but to foreigners if necessary, 
if that would ensure the profitability of potentially embarrassing white 
elephants. Politically, the surrender of prestige government projects to 
Japanese and local Chinese business interests suggested a slap in the face 
for ethnic Malay pride and a downgrading of NEP redistribution 
objectives. (Bowie, 1994: 179) 
It is uncertain whether Mahathir’s new economic direction disadvantaged 
the Malay community in the long term, despite some signs of such consequences 
in the short term. Mahathir’s new economic policies could contribute to the 
elevation of Malay share when the overall economic pie grew rapidly. Perhaps, it 
was Mahathir’s deliberate intention to make the Malay community, eventually, 
stand on its own feet by the shock theraphy of privatisation and so on. An   132
assessment of the impact of Mahathir’s policies on the Malay community’s 
economic status and share of the economy, however, is beyond the scope of this 
section. What is significant is that Mahathir’s new direction in practical way and 
symbolic way as well went against the ethnocultural Malay nationalist economic 
measures of 1970s. Mahathir’s deregulation and privatisation policies effectively 
freed non-Malay capital and resulted in the state’s retreat from ethnic 
redistribution efforts, potentially undermining the economic benefits that the 
Malay community enjoyed in the 1970s. To the UMNO elites, who still believed 
in the ethnocultural Malay nationalist NEP of the 1970s, Mahathir’s new direction 
was perceived to be against the efforts in the 1970s to lift Malay community to an 
economically dominant position in Malaysia. The challenging factions’ nationalist 
argument was based on this perception.   
 
3.3. Razaleigh’s ethnocultural alternatives: Long Live the 
NEP! 
In this section, it will be argued that Razaleigh attempted to challenge 
Mahathir with his stronger ethnocultural Malay nationalist position. Razaleigh’s 
criticism of Mahathir’s economic policy indicated a nationalist direction different 
from Mahathir’s. Razaleigh’s position was largely influenced by debates in the 
Malay community regarding the approaching end of the NEP and by Mahathir’s 
economic policy of which nationalist direction shifted away from ethnocultural 
Malay nationalist direction. Shaped by this context, Razaleigh argued that the 
NEP should be extended beyond the 1990s since its goal of ethnic restructuring 
had not yet been achieved. Razaleigh also argued that Mahathir’s economic   133
policies betrayed ethnocultural Malay nationalism as reflected in the original NEP 
as they did not serve the interests of the Malay community.  
Although it is the 1987 dispute that is being studied, the materials that will 
be drawn on include arguments made by Razaleigh up to the early 1990s. As the 
1987 dispute effectively lasted to the early 1990s in the form of competition 
between Mahathir’s UMNO Baru and Razaleigh’s Semangat 46’, with an even 
more intense nationalist rhetoric, the later materials can be viewed as an 
elaboration of what Razaleigh argued during the 1987 dispute.
24 
 
3.3.1.  Razaleigh as a defender of the original NEP and Abdul 
Razak’s legacy 
Razaleigh, identifying himself and his faction with the strong ethnocultural 
Malay nationalism of the 1970s, argued for the continuation of the NEP to 
differentiate himself from Mahathir. In the late 1980s, there was a debate on the 
fate of the NEP, prompted by the fact that the NEP, being a 20-year plan which 
began in 1971, was scheduled to end in 1990. The major arguments in this debate 
have been categorised by Malek Merican into two groups: a pro-redistribution 
group (Group A) and a pro-growth group (Group B). He observed, ‘members of 
Group A argue about the ultimate proportions of corporate equities the Bumis 
[bumiputeras] should own,’ while ‘Group B worries about the need for a 
fundamental modification or replacement of the NEP restructuring exercise as 
presently conceived because…this programme in itself will cause the Malaysian 
economy to stagnate’ (quote in K. J. Khoo, 1992: 69).
25 In other words, Group A 
upheld the pro-redistribution argument, expressing ‘eagerness to assist the   134
Bumis,’ while  Group B’s position was economic growth first (K. J. Khoo, 1992: 
69).  
In the debate, Razaleigh supported the continuation of and even re-
strengthening the NEP.
26  Razaleigh, in his speech before the 1987 UMNO 
elections, unequivocally stated that, as the NEP was the most important and 
fundamental reference for any Malaysian economic policy, it should not be 
abused. He asserted, ‘[a]ll plans should be based on the spirit of NEP; all plans 
need to be measured from the perspective of Malay community’s benefit and 
opportunity. It should not serve the greedy appetite of political leaders who are in 
power at the moment’. (Razaleigh, 1987) A few years later, Razaleigh elaborated 
that the original NEP, which embodied the Malay economic aspiration, was 
already dead before its official termination because Mahathir had abandoned the 
policy. Razaleigh maintained:  
In fact, NEP did not end in 1990 as officially known. It has ended long 
before. In other words, (it was dead) since early 1980s when Tun Hussein 
Onn retired. Since then, attempts to eradicate poverty and to enhance 
Malay equity were interrupted. (Razaleigh, 1993) 
Razaleigh had the credibility to defend the NEP as he has often been 
identified as its ‘principal author’ (Case, 1996: 189). Razaleigh had an impressive 
career implementing government policy and managing state enterprises in the 
1970s and early 1980s that coincided with the vigorous implementation of the 
NEP. At the peak of his career, he was Finance Minister from 1976 to 1984. In 
addition, most of the state agencies and enterprises that he worked with were 
instrumental in the implementation of the NEP, that is, enhancing Malay 
economic power. In 1970, Razaleigh was appointed chairman of Bank   135
Bumiputera which had been set up to assist the economic activities of Malay 
community. In 1970, Razaleigh was in charge of Pernas as well (Gale, 1981: 86-
138). Since 1974, Razaleigh has been chairman of Petronas (Petroliam Nasional 
Berhad or National Petroleum Corporation). He also founded UMNO’s business 
arm, Fleet Holdings and served as its chairman from 1972 to 1982 (Gomez, 1990: 
51). These state agencies and enterprises had one thing in common: they were 
instrumental in expanding the Malay share of the economy under the NEP in the 
1970s.   
Razaleigh also identified his faction with previous leaders, especially 
Abdul Razak, who had implemented the NEP, in an attempt to differentiate 
himself from Mahathir (Kershaw, 1988: 146-148). Indeed, Razaleigh’s speech in 
the 1987 party elections made many complimentary references to previous 
UMNO leaders. He described the era of Abdul Razak as a period of ‘achieving the 
highest Malay unity’, a period of ‘rising nationalism’, an era of ‘high idealistic 
spirit and proper pragmatism’ (Razaleigh, 1987). According to a high-profile 
UMNO politician – he was a close ally of Musa Hitam, a Team B leader – I  
interviewed, who was extensively involved with Team B during the 1987 dispute, 
27 Team B represented the original NEP as envisioned by Abdul Razak, while 
Team A’s policy did not. He said:  
(Team B was) representing the ideology of Tun Razak… (which is) 
economic advancement of the Malay community through political 
affirmative action. That was difference (between Team A and Team B)… 
Team B (uphold) the continuation of the government in business which 
means government corporation, state enterprises…and more importantly 
distribution.
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According to him, Mahathir and Team A attempted to use ‘corporate 
strategies to enhance Malay economic power,’ such as the privatisation policy. 
Although he admitted that Mahathir’s policy was not a complete rejection of 
Razak’s pro-Malay policies, it was not the way to go and was a clear break from 
the NEP of the 1970s, in Team B’s opinion.
29 With these themes, Razaleigh and 
his colleagues attempted to differentiate themselves from Mahathir’s economic 
management. By identifying themselves with the political leaders of the 1970s 
who had vigorously pursued the NEP and with their support for the extension of 
the NEP, they depicted themselves as the defenders of the policy that had been 
developed  to position Malay community in an economically dominant status vis-
à-vis the non-Malays.  
 
3.3.2.  Razaleigh’s nationalist position, as shown in his 
criticism of Mahathir’s policy 
The issue of poor rural Malays 
Razaleigh’s criticism of Mahathir’s economic policies constituted an 
important part of the 1987 dispute. Razaleigh’s criticism indicated that he had a 
stronger ethnocultural Malay nationalist commitment than Mahathir. Razaleigh 
argued that Mahathir had betrayed the NEP and the Malay community’s 
aspirations by focusing on: the neglect of the economic interests of the Malay 
community, especially of rural and poor Malays; the increasing economic 
inequality that had been arrested to a certain degree in the 1970s and the adverse 
impact of Mahathir’s economic deregulation on the wealth of the Malay 
community as well as of the nation.    137
First, Razaleigh argued that Mahathir’s prioritisation of growth through 
industrialisation instead of ethnic redistribution abandoned the rural Malays and 
failed to address the pervasive problem of poverty in the rural Malay communities, 
a major issue that the NEP had attempted to tackle. Razaleigh, in his speech to 
UMNO members during the 1987 elections maintained: 
The voices of the rural citizens were becoming more and more distant 
from the hearing of the national leadership. This malady was becoming 
widespread due to the greater enthusiasm and attention given in visiting 
the major factories and industries in the world as compared to the 
attention given to visit the poor rural peasants… The fundings of mega 
and luxurious projects have directly and also indirectly caused the 
downwards of budgets allocation for agriculture and rural developments 
and educational services. For instance,  the budget allocated for the 
agriculture and rural developments was reduced to $1,187 million (1983) 
from $1,550 million (1982), and this was further cut down to $1, 122 
million in 1984… With the declining budgets illustrated above, the 
efforts to eradicate rural poverty were retarded and hence the agenda to 
eradicate poverty was receiving lesser and lesser importance and attention. 
(Razaleigh, 1987)
30  
According to Razaleigh, the decreasing emphasis on the development of 
rural Malay communities exacerbated the poverty problem. Razaleigh maintained 
that, despite rapid economic development in the 1980s, significant numbers of 
Malays were still living in the rural areas as poor peasants. They were the main 
supporters of UMNO and the main audience of Malay nationalism. Razaleigh, in 
his election-day speech, said, ‘those mega projects denied and undermined the 
development fund allocation for rural area…which had significant meaning for 
the Malay community, whose priority is still poverty eradication [rather than 
industrialisation]’ (Razaleigh, 1987).    138
A few years later, in a speech before Parliament when the Second Outline 
Perspective Plan was launched, Razaleigh elaborated further, arguing that, 
particularly under Mahathir, poverty eradication efforts had become sluggish. 
Quoting government statistics, Razaleigh maintained that, since 1984, the 
incidence of poverty had dropped from 18.4 per cent to 17 per cent until 1990, 
which meant a 1.4 percentage point drop in six years. He further maintained that 
this record could not compete with what Abdul Razak and Hussein Onn did in the 
1970s. From 1970 to 1984, that is, mainly under Abdul Razak and Hussein Onn, 
the incidence of poverty dropped from 49.3 per cent to 18.4 per cent, that is, a 
30.9 percentage points drop in 14 years. The previous Prime Ministers, Razaleigh 
claimed, took  better care of rural Malay and thus were more strongly committed 
to elevating Malay economic power (Razaleigh, 1991). 
 
On (ethnic) distribution 
Second, regarding another component of the NEP, redistribution, 
including ethnic redistribution, Razaleigh also strongly criticised what Mahathir 
had accomplished in the 1980s. He pointed out that under Mahathir, the economic 
gap between the haves and have-nots increased in general. He asserted:  
The economic lies were becoming more rampant and distinct due to the 
improper planning of certain projects and ever more so due to the 
tendency of distributing the wealth into the hands of a few who knew no 
boundary of monetary greed. Simultaneously, there were monetary and 
trading scandals abound and either discreetly or indiscreetly they are still 
on the increase. This clearly showed that there was no equitable 
distribution of the economic wealth amongst the bumiputeras. (Razaleigh, 
1987)    139
What was more problematic, where Razaleigh was concerned, was the 
effort to redistribute economic wealth among the ethnic groups. Razaleigh found 
that the Mahathir government’s efforts to enhance Malay equity ownership were a 
failure when compared to his predecessor’s. He noted:  
Between 1970 and 1983, the share ownership of Malay and other 
Bumiputera increased as much as 15.5 per cent i.e. from 2.5 per cent in 
1970 to about 18 per cent in 1983. Unfortunately, the pace of increase, 
however, became much slower under the leadership of today. From 1983 
to 1990 Bumiputera share ownership increased from 18 per cent to 20.3 
per cent. Only 2.3 per cent. I repeat! Only 2.3 per cent! The late Tunku 
had to cope with all kinds of problems such as Emergency and 
Confrontation at the early stage of independence, and had to lean on only 
revenues from rubber and tin. But still he was able to realise 2.5 per cent 
of share ownership of Malay and other Bumiputera. Now, when it is 
peaceful and stable, [the government was] only able to increase 2.3 per 
cent. Isn’t it an evidence of current government’s failure to achieve the 
original ambition of the NEP?
 (Razaleigh, 1991) 
Razaleigh’s argument that Mahathir had failed to achieve the NEP’s most 
important goal – ethnic redistribution – was indeed strong criticism of Mahathir, 
who had claimed that he was one of the most ardent defenders of the Malay 
community. To claim that Mahathir had failed to fulfil or ignored the goal of 
ethnic redistribution was equivalent to claiming that Mahathir had betrayed the 
Malay people and their economic aspirations and the nationalist position that he 
had assumed when he revolted against Abdul Rahman in 1969. At the same time, 
Razaleigh, by criticising Mahathir for failing to fulfil the Malay aspiration, tried to 
show that he would be the better Malay leader to deliver benefits to the Malay 
community and the stronger defender of Malay nationalism.  
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On economic deregulation and its impact 
Third, Razaleigh contended that with Mahathir’s economic deregulation, 
the nationalist economic achievements under previous nationalist leaders and, 
particularly the Malaysianisation or Malay-isation of national wealth, were in 
danger. Razaleigh noted that Mahathir’s big projects enriched only foreign capital 
and disappointed the Malays. Razaleigh, in his election day speech, asked, ‘What 
is the meaning of big and gigantic projects, if Malays become bystanders with 
paleface looking at the prosperity and benefit of the projects as it is siphoned out 
to overseas by foreign people who got all the special treatments [by the 
government]’ (Razaleigh, 1987). According to Razaleigh, as a consequence of 
Mahathir’s economic deregulation, which set foreign capital free to form joint 
ventures or enter into contracts to establish lucrative mega-projects, national 
wealth flowed out, not benefiting the Malay community.   
Later in 1991, Razaleigh discussed how the direction of Mahathir’s 
economic policies endangered Malaysian economy and the NEP. He explained the 
basis of the NEP and what economic policy under Mahathir meant: 
NEP tried to reflect the values of Malaysian nationalism, which is 
stronger basis of national development. This clearly announces national 
dream that Malay and Bumiputera will be far on with non-Malay and also 
with foreign capitalists in terms of ownership of capital share in this 
country. As an independent country, we do not want to be an independent 
nation in name only; where in actual fact our country’s wealth is freely 
owned by foreign capitalists. This policy [of Mahathir] does not touch 
this issue any more. Now under liberal policy of the government, with 
respect to foreign capital, individual foreign capitalist does not have to 
balance their ownership with local capital. The same goes for job 
opportunity, management and so on. It seems that they are free to secure 
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Moreover, Razaleigh elaborated particularly on how Mahathir’s economic 
deregulation contradicted NEP principles of ethnic redistribution and Malay 
favouritism: 
The government policy today that gives a guarantee that the (foreign) 
ownership will not be regulated again worries us. This means that Malay, 
as well as other Malaysian people, cannot get equity of new companies 
because foreign capital now can own 100 per cent. This also means that 
the Malay cannot amass their financial basis as to the level early 
implementation of NEP before.  
To me this policy is not the continuation of NEP… On the contrary, this 
keeps belittling the original aspiration of NEP which tried to balance 
foreign ownership and local one. I am worrying, without clear guidance 
concerning foreign investment, eventually, the fortune of our country, our 
people and our workers will not be very much different from that of 
colonial times. (Razaleigh, 1991) 
In the above argument, Razaleigh reiterated that the original intention of 
the NEP was ethnic restructuring. Although the NEP did not intend to deprive 
what non-Malay and foreign capital had, the NEP clearly imposed regulations on 
them. It was through these regulations that the government controlled the growth 
of non-Malay and foreign capital. The NEP envisioned that the larger part of the 
enlarged economic pie should be the Malay community’s share. What Razaleigh 
found in Mahathir’s privatisation and deregulation was a reversal of the original 
intention of the NEP. By giving freedom to non-Malay and foreign capital, the 
policy of promoting Malay ownership was in danger.  
As examined here, Razaleigh criticised Mahathir’s economic policy which 
had, he claimed, digressed from the ethnocultural nationalist path of the original 
NEP and maintained that the original NEP should be extended. Compared with   142
Mahathir’s position as shown in his economic policy, Razaleigh’s argument was 
clearly more ethnocultural Malay nationalist. Ethnocultural Malay nationalism 
assumes that Malaysia is a Malay nation, in which the Malay community is in a 
dominant position vis-à-vis the non-Malay community, culturally, politically as 
well as economically. Razaleigh argued that the NEP’s efforts to achieve Malay 
economic dominance should be maintained, to eventually achieve the Malay 
Malaysia.  
 
3.4. Fresh race for nationalist legitimacy after the Mahathir-
Razaleigh clash in the 1987 UMNO elections 
This section examines the protracted dispute between Mahathir and 
Razaleigh from the 1987 UMNO elections to the 1990 general elections. This 
section argues that the 1987 UMNO dispute was extended to a contest between 
the two political rivals over nationalist legitimacy and the Malay mandate until the 
1990 elections. In the inner party dispute, Mahathir’s narrow victory was 
insufficient to quell a further challenge that attempted to discredit Mahathir’s 
legitimacy in the wider Malay community beyond UMNO. To appeal to the 
Malay community, the competing factions attempted to “out-Malay” each other, 
adopting ethnocultural Malay nationalist arguments. Mahathir abandoned his 
earlier stance and tried to be an ethnocultural Malay nationalist leader to survive 
politically. Eventually, as shown in several by-elections results and the 1990 
elections results, Mahathir regained his legitimacy and support by 1990. 
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3.4.1.  The UMNO showdown and its aftermath 
UMNO elections and campaigning 
It is helpful to review the issues, the campaign and the results of the 1987 
UMNO elections as background for exploring the protracted dispute. The 
elections campaigns for the Team A and Team B showdown began in February 
1987 when the Razaleigh-Musa electoral pact emerged and ended on 24 April 
1987 when the elections were held. Other than the central issue of nationalism that 
has been examined in the previous sections, the competing elites raised 
disagreements over leadership matters and policies and resorted to personal 
attacks in their desperate attempts to outmanoeuvre their opponents. Team B used 
various scandals involving government enterprises such as BMF (Bank 
Bumiputera Finance) and Maminco to criticise Mahathir.
 31  Team  B  laid 
responsibility for the economic crisis in the mid-1980s on these scandals. They 
also criticised Mahathir’s undemocratic leadership style that excluded party elites 
from decision-making except his close allies such as Daim Zainnudin, Anwar and 
so on (Shamsul, 1988: 175).  
To counter these accusations, Team A members defended their past 
performance and insisted that only the current leadership could deliver more 
benefits to the Malaysian people. Team A also maintained that as the decisions 
related to the scandals were made when Razaleigh was Finance Minister and 
Musa was Deputy Prime Minister, Team B was equally responsible for the 
decisions. Mahathir also argued that not only was Team B’s challenge to the party 
president unprecedented and against Malay tradition, it would also undermine   144
party unity and stability and eventually harm the unity of the entire Malay 
community (Funston, 1988: 366-367; Kershaw, 1988: 134-139). 
The factions had to woo grassroots UMNO members to ensure that more 
delegates voted for them in the elections. The factions resorted to all sorts of 
means to maximise the winning chance. Delegates to UMNO elections were 
comprised of division members elected by their own divisions, which in turn were 
comprised of elected branch members sent to division meetings. While Mahathir 
could use the mass media to tell his version of the story, Team B was unable to do 
so since most of the mainstream mass media was controlled by the UMNO party 
president or by the government under Mahathir. Instead, Team B relied on widely 
distributed video and audiotapes (Shamsul, 1988: 178). In addition, when the 
delegates arrived in Kuala Lumpur, both factions offered accommodations in five-
star hotels, meals and even money. Despite complaints of pre-elections 
improprieties, the party ethics committee, divided into two teams, did not act on 
the complaints (E. Lee, 1987: 15; Malaysian Business, 1987a: 4).   
After a frenzy of last minute canvassing to win over uncommitted 
delegates and influential political figures (Gill, 1988: 34-35), the party entered 
polling on 24
 April 1987. The elections resulted in a close victory for Team A, 
with Mahathir obtaining 761 votes and Razaleigh 718 votes. Some scholars 
attributed Team A’s victory to the last minute support of such influential political 
figures as Najib Razak (Gill, 1988: 35; Shamsul, 1988: 185) while others 
maintained that Team A’s last minute persuasion during  the break for Friday 
prayers on election day made the difference (Gill, 1988: 37; Shamsul, 1988: 180). 
Other reports claimed that the Razaleigh team was already ahead in the early   145
stages of polling and that it was irregularities in vote counting that brought about 
Team B’s defeat (Mauzy, 1988: 215).  There is also a view that distrust between 
the Razaleigh and Musa factions within Team B contributed to its defeat 
(Malaysian Business, 1987b: 10).  
 
New political race began after the 1987 UMNO elections 
After the UMNO elections, another phase of competition between 
Mahathir and Razaleigh began. Razaleigh was predicted to challenge Mahathir 
again in the upcoming party elections in 1990 (Malaysian Business, 1987b; 
Suhaini Aznam, 1987a). However, the challenge came much earlier, indicating 
that Mahathir’s 43-vote win was insufficient to discourage the challenger. The 
post-elections developments must be reviewed to show that the competition 
between Semangat 46’, organised by Team B, and Mahathir’s UMNO Baru was 
really an extension of the 1987 UMNO elections.  
The first major development was a court case. 11 Team B members sued 
UMNO in court to nullify the 1987 party elections results, claiming that 
unregistered (and therefore illegal) branches took part in the elections. 
Unexpectedly, the court outlawed UMNO itself under the Societies Act. While the 
court’s decision appeared straightforward, it was actually quite controversial. The 
disgruntled Team B members wanted the elections results invalidated so that they 
might have a fresh election. However, there were allegations that Mahathir 
deliberately created this situation to exclude Razaleigh supporters from UMNO 
and to re-constitute UMNO with only his own followers (Muzaffar, 1989: 62, 67).    146
Immediately after UMNO was declared unlawful by the courts, Team A, 
led by Mahathir, successfully registered a new party, UMNO Baru, outsmarting 
Team B members who wanted to use the UMNO name as well.
32 The UMNO 
name had symbolic importance as it would confer legitimacy on the new party and 
its leader as the successor of old UMNO.  
Shortly thereafter, Musa and his close followers, who had joined forces 
with Team B, defected to Mahathir’s UMNO Baru. Although Musa and Razaleigh 
had joined forces to challenge Mahathir, there was speculation that their rivalry 
had not ended as they had bitter contests in 1981 and 1984. It was rumoured that 
there was further division within Team B between Musa’s and Razaleigh’s 
factions at the grassroots level in the 1987 UMNO elections (Shamsul, 1988: 178). 
The cooperation between Razaleigh and Musa lasted until the victory of Shahrir 
Samad, Musa’s close ally and Team B member, in the Johor Baru by-elections in 
1988. In late 1988, when the enthusiasm of the challengers had subsided and 
UMNO Baru had recovered, Musa and his allies switched to Mahathir’s camp, 
arguing that, as the unity of the Malay community and UMNO came first, Musa 
would build unity from within UMNO Baru.
33  
In 1989, Team B members, led by Razaleigh, registered a political party 
called Semangat 46’. The competing factions in the 1987 dispute, that is, 
Mahathir’s Team A and Razaleigh’s Team B were reorganised into UMNO Baru 
and Semangat 46’ respectively. Hence, the competition in UMNO between Team 
A and Team B was extended to one between UMNO Baru and Semangat 46’. 
UMNO Baru, under Mahathir’s leadership, included his supporters and excluded 
the elites and grassroots members involved with Team B. Meanwhile, Semangat   147
46’ included all the prominent members of Team B, excluding a few defectors 
such as Musa Hitam and Shahrir Samad. For the first time, two secular Malay 
nationalist political parties, with the same origins, were to compete for the 
mandate of the Malay community in Malaysia. 
 
Mahathir’s legitimacy damaged? 
Mahathir’s legitimacy was badly damaged during the 1987 dispute and the 
aftermath, thereby fuelling the protracted contest over Malay mandate and 
struggle to rebuild legitimacy. Mahathir had legally retained his position in the 
party elections but his legitimacy as an UMNO and Malay community leader was 
damaged. No UMNO president before Mahathir had ever faced a challenge of 
such magnitude. In addition, Mahathir managed to keep his position with only an 
extremely narrow margin: 43 votes or less than 3 per cent of the votes cast.  
When Mahathir announced that he would still be the President of UMNO, 
even if he had won the election by only one vote, he was technically correct. 
However, whether Mahathir had also managed to keep his legitimacy and the 
Malay community’s confidence was a different matter. A. B. Shamsul observed: 
‘[Team B] had not lost the “moral battle”. Razaleigh received 48.55 per cent of 
the total votes cast, a more-than-respectable figure… Mahathir received only a 
half mandate to run UMNO and the country, hardly a confidence boosting 
prospect’ (Shamsul, 1988: 181). Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister, was 
more upfront: ‘If the leadership of the day is showing questionable traits and 
thereby no longer enjoys the confidence of the people, it is high time that he fades   148
away respectfully for the sake of the good name of the party’ (Tasker & Suhaini 
Azman, 1988: 12).    
With his legitimacy in UMNO shaken, Mahathir had to face a strong 
challenge from his political opponents, especially Semangat 46’ in the upcoming 
1990 general elections. Both parties were led by UMNO heavy weights—
Mahathir and Razaleigh—who had received almost similar support in the 1987 
party elections. The two groups shared a similar outlook as secular Malay 
nationalist parties claiming to be legitimate successors of the original UMNO. For 
these two groups, the Malay community’s mandate was the top priority. For 
Mahathir, losing the support of the Malay community was like losing the war 
despite winning the battle, that is, the 1987 party elections. For Razaleigh, it was a 
matter of his political survival as lukewarm support from the Malay community 
could mean his political death.  
Therefore, in the post-1987 UMNO elections period, the issues were who 
the supreme leader of the Malay community was and who deserved the Malay 
mandate rather than who won more votes from UMNO delegates. Before 
Mahathir, UMNO Presidents had enjoyed unquestioned legitimacy and mandate 
as leaders of the Malay community. After the 1987 elections and the UMNO split, 
however, Mahathir’s legitimacy was badly hurt and there began a contest between 
Mahathir’s UMNO Baru and Razaleigh’s Semangat 46’ to win the Malay political 
mandate.  
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3.4.2. Mahathir’s  ethnocultural nationalist strategy and 
recovery 
This section explores how Mahathir won the support of the Malay 
community, outmanoeuvring his opponents as shown in the results of the 1990 
general elections. When Mahathir faced a challenge from Razaleigh’s Semangat 
46’, he quickly adopted strong ethnocultural Malay nationalist rhetoric. As argued 
in the previous section, the competition between Mahathir and Razaleigh over the 
support of the Malay community was different from an inner UMNO dispute. 
Mahathir, to obtain the support of Malay community and thus strengthen his 
political legitimacy in the eyes of the Malay community, needed to mobilise the 
wider Malay community to support him. For that, he had to redefine himself as an 
ardent champion of Malay nationalism and interests and portray his opponent as a 
threat to the unity and interests of the Malay community. Considering the civic 
nationalist vision Mahathir adopted shortly after he secured the support of the 
Malay community in the 1990s election, this reorientation was only tactical and 
temporary. Nevertheless, Mahathir effectively manipulated ethnocultural Malay 
nationalist ideologies and rhetoric to win the Malay mandate for himself and his 
party, thereby winning the 1990 general elections.  
 
Mahathir employed Malay nationalism 
In the competition with Razaleigh’s Semangat 46’, Mahathir employed the 
language of Malay nationalism, along with other tactics, to discredit his opponents 
and to get the Malay community behind him
34 Until the elections, Mahathir was 
on the defensive, largely justifying and defending his economic policies, which   150
had been accused of being less pro-Malay by his challengers.
35 Mahathir did not 
merely reconfigure his policies in an ethnocultural Malay nationalist direction. 
During the elections, to win a majority of the votes from the UMNO General 
Assembly delegates at the 1987 party elections, he used money politics, passive 
defence of his policies, his incumbent position, and key elites who could influence 
votes in his favour without using the emotional language of Malay nationalism. 
After the 1987 party elections, however, the extended conflict between 
Mahathir and Razaleigh changed the nature of the competition, forcing Mahathir 
to resort to the emotional language of Malay nationalism to win over the larger 
Malay community and not just UMNO delegates. First, Mahathir maintained that 
Team B had betrayed the Malay community by bringing suit against UMNO, 
thereby damaging the party that was an embodiment of Malay nationalism. In his 
presidential speech before the 1988 UMNO General Assembly, Mahathir asserted: 
When UMNO was infiltrated by individuals who had personal interests, 
who were not loyal to the party, and who had no Malay spirit and feelings, 
the saga of dragging UMNO into the courts commenced. They decided to 
turn their backs on the party to serve their own personal political interests. 
The fact that their action caused havoc in the party, made it weak, and 
resulted in its being ruled illegal by the court is of no concern to them. 
They see this havoc as their golden opportunity to seize power, which 
was the main concern of this small group. (Mahathir, 1988) 
To win over the Malay community, Mahathir launched a grassroots 
campaign called Semarak ( Semarak is acronym of Setia Bersama Rakayt or 
Loyalty with People). He travelled around the peninsula, met with Malays at the 
grassroots level and explained what happened in UMNO and why UMNO and 
Malay political dominance were in danger. Mahathir certainly  wanted to remind   151
the Malay community that UMNO was its protector and the embodiment of Malay 
nationalism and, by implication, to ‘[discredit] Team B as obstacles to Malay 
unity and national development’ (K. S. Nathan, 1989: 133). The campaign also 
included the organising of huge mass rallies. Through repeated exposure of the 
mass rallies in the mainstream media, the Malay community was led to believe 
that the UMNO Baru and Mahathir were the ultimate holder of power and of the 
Malay people’s mandate. 
Second, in late 1987, Mahathir also mobilised the Malay community by 
deliberately exploiting the volatile ethnic situation. In 1987, Chinese educationists 
and such political parties as MCA, Gerakan and DAP strongly opposed the 
promotion of non-Mandarin educated headmasters to Chinese schools. UMNO 
Youth regarded this opposition as a challenge to Malay cultural dominance and 
staged huge demonstrations. The two groups went as far as engaging in a physical 
clash in October 1987. Finally, the government arrested a hundred politicians, 
religious leaders and social activists in the name of national security. Capitalising 
on the opportunity, Mahathir attempted to mobilise the Malay community by 
stoking its fears of the non-Malay community. Mahathir’s criticism of the Chinese 
opposition, the DAP, was strongly worded to dramatise the ethnic tensions and to 
maximise the effect of his rhetoric. In his presidential speech before the 1988 
UMNO General Assembly, Mahathir criticised the DAP as follows:  
The DAP has never been happy with the racial balance sought by the 
Malays and the New Economic Policy. It is forever criticising 
Government plans, and UMNO particularly. It also has and practices 
deep chauvinistic sentiments and policies… In short, the DAP is the arch 
enemy of Malay leadership and UMNO. It upholds the concept of a   152
“Malaysian Malaysia” which seeks to relegate the interests of the Malays. 
(Mahathir, 1988) 
Mahathir also attacked the Semangat 46’ and other parties that made up 
the two opposition coalitions. Before the general elections in 1990, Semangat 46’ 
formed two loose coalitions to contest the BN on a one-to-one basis. One was 
called Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU; Muslim Unity Force) and was formed 
with PAS and a small Malay party, Berjasa (Barisan Jemaah Islamiah Se-
Malaysia; Malaysian Islamic Assembly Front). At the same time, Semangat 46’ 
formed another coalition with the DAP called Gagasan Rakyat Malaysia 
(Gagasan; Malaysian People’s Initiative). Mahathir focussed on the issue that 
Razaleigh would compromise Malay political dominance and interests to the non-
Malays by forming a coalition with the DAP, which he described as a Chinese-
chauvinist party.
36  Mahathir stressed in his speech before the 1988 UMNO 
General Assembly:  
If in the past they [the Team B] only moved among the Malays to 
discredit the Malay leaders so that they could replace them, they have 
now openly joined the opposition in opposing the Barisan Nasional. They 
have crossed the floor in the Dewan Rakyat [parliament] and in one or 
two State Assemblies. They may also vote together with the Opposition 
whenever there is a need to do so in these assemblies. In this context, if 
there is to be an election, the UMNO votes will be split. In fact, in some 
areas UMNO will lose, and they will also lose. Only the Opposition will 
win. Inevitably, the DAP and Pas have a good chance to win more seats 
by virtue of the destructive forces of this group. (Mahathir, 1988)  
Mahathir’s lean on ethnocultural Malay nationalist rhetoric continued until 
the 1990 general election. UMNO strategy in the election campaign faced a 
sudden and unfavourable development when PBS, a coalition partner strong in   153
Sabah, pulled out of the BN five days before the polling date. PBS, whose main 
support base was Christian Kadazans in Sabah, had flourished on the basis of its 
anti-federal rhetoric in Sabah. Entering general election, the party had 36 Sabah 
state assembly seats out of 48. The pulling out shocked the BN leaders and 
Mahathir called the development a ‘stab in the back’. With this development, 
UMNO leaders and Mahathir adopted stronger ethnic discourse to tarnish the PBS 
and to make sure Malays vote for the BN. Particularly, Mahathir stressed that the 
PBS is based on the Christian population in the Sabah. He argued that if Malay 
voters give their vote to the opposition, it would make the voice of the Christians 
stronger and that Malay should vote for UMNO and BN to guarantee Muslim 
rights. In addition, when Razaleigh – his Semangat 46’ made coalition with other 
opposition parties including PBS – visited Sabah for election campaing and wore 
Kadazan tradition headgear, which had Christian cross-like symbol on it, a picture 
of Razaleigh wearing the headgear appeared on the frontpages of major 
newspapers and was shown on television repeatedly to discredit the opposition 
parties, especially Razaleigh-led Semangat 46’. With the picture, UMNO leaders 
criticised Razaleigh of being used by the Christian in his bid to power, selling out 
Malay Muslim interest to Christians.    
This part surveyed Mahathir’s rhetoric in the protracted dispute against 
Razaleigh’s faction to show that Mahathir’s shift towards ethnocultural nationalist 
rhetoric contributed to his triumph against Razaleigh after the 1987 party elections. 
The charges made to Razaleigh’s faction and the DAP as well as the way he 
utilised ethnic tension showed that Mahathir attempted to maximise the ethnic fear 
of the Malay community. More importantly, in his rhetoric, the main focus was   154
the identity and interests of the Malay community. Of course, the rhetoric went 
somewhat against the nationalist direction of Mahathir in the 1980s. Nevertheless, 
this tactical shift towards ethnocultural rhetoric helped Mahathir to ultimately win 
the race against the challenging faction, as shown in the following section. In 
addition, Mahathir’s victory using ethnocultural nationalist appeal proved that, 
despite his civic attempts throughout 1980s, ethnic agitation worked and ethnic 
tension still existed. Hence, the national integration efforts had achieved little 
change in Malaysia.  
 
Mahathir triumphant in by-elections and the 1990 elections 
The by-elections results from 1988 to 1989 indicated that Mahathir’s 
UMNO Baru regained the Malay community’s endorsement after the devastating 
party elections and split. The by-elections before then indicated that the BN, led 
by Mahathir’s UMNO Baru, had trouble keeping the support of the Malay 
community. In March 1988, UMNO was nearly defeated at Tanjung Puteri by 
Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM; Malaysian People’s Socialist Party), 
winning the seat by only a margin of 31 votes out of 20,331 votes cast. Before 
March 1988, the PSRM was neither a match for UMNO nor had a seat in 
Parliament or the State Assemblies. In April 1988, an UMNO candidate was 
defeated by a wide margin at the hands of Shahrir Abdul Samad, a Team B 
member, in the Johor Baru elections. Shahrir won 64 percent of the total votes, 
boosting Team B’s spirit. In October 1988, UMNO won the Parit Raja seat in a 
contest against a candidate from Team B but the margin was very slim (413 votes 
out of 14,111 casts).    155
Subsequently, the performance of Mahathir’s faction improved. In January 
1989, in the Ampang Jaya elections, the Mahathir-led BN’s candidate (from 
MCA) won the seat against Team B’s Harun Idris, gaining 54 per cent of the votes. 
Four months later, another MCA candidate delivered the Bentong seat to the BN, 
winning the seat with 60 per cent of the votes. In Telok Pasu in May 1989 and in 
Tambatan in June 1989, UMNO candidates defeated opponents from PAS and 
Semangat 46’ respectively.  
The 1990 elections was the final chapter in the recovery of Mahathir’s 
UMNO Baru against Team B’s Semangat 46’. The results of the 1990 elections 
eventually improved the standing of Mahathir and of UMNO Baru (See Table 3.3). 
Although it was not without effort, UMNO Baru won substantially more seats 
than Semangat 46’ and its coalition partners. Barisan Nasional returned to 
government with more than a two-thirds majority. In the 1990 elections, UMNO’s 
share of parliament seats decreased from 83 (from the 1986 elections) to 71. 
Nevertheless, UMNO could still readily overwhelm the other Malay based parties 
-- Semangat 46’ (eight seats) and PAS (seven seats) -- and DAP (20 seats) as well. 
The BN secured only 127 seats (reduced from 148 seats from the 1986 elections) 
but the 127 seats accounted for more than 70 percent of the seats, thus forming 
more than a two-thirds majority.    156
Table 3-3. 1990 Malaysian General Elections Results (Parliament) 
Barisan Nasional  Opposition 
Parties  Seats  Votes (%)  Parties  Seats  Votes (%) 
UMNO 71  PAS  7 
MCA 18  DAP 20 
MIC 6  Semangat  46’  8 
Gerakan 5  PBS** 14 
Others* 27 
 
Independent 4 
 
Total 127  54.2  Total  53  45.8 
Source: (based on Khong, 1991a; Khong, 1991b; von der Mehden, 1991)  * Others 
includes SNAP, SUPP, USNO, PBB and PBDS (Parti Bangsa Dayak Sarawak; Sarawak 
Dayak Party)  ** Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United Party)  
Razaleigh and his faction, in the 1987 UMNO elections and in subsequent 
political developments, threatened Mahathir’s political dominance and legitimacy. 
This strong challenge made Mahathir resort to an ethnocultural Malay nationalist 
position to defeat his opponents and to mobilise the Malay community to support 
him. As shown in the recovery of the BN’s performance in several by-elections 
and in the BN’s victory with a two-thirds majority in parliament in the 1990 
elections, Mahathir could claim that he had the mandate of the Malay community, 
defeating his Malay rivals—PAS and Semangat 46’.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter argued that the competing arguments regarding economic 
policies in the 1987 UMNO factional dispute reflected two distinctive nationalist 
positions of contesting UMNO elites. Of course, that this research focused on 
nationalist ideologies does not mean that existing studies that explained 1987 
dispute through a clash of different personalities, policy disagreement, power 
struggle and so on were wrong. Rather this research attempted to show that there 
could be another dimension in the dispute. The two competing policy arguments   157
were relaxing the pro-Malay policies on behalf of economic growth (through 
which Mahathir sought political legitimacy) and defending the pro-Malay policies 
(through Razaleigh who claimed that his position served the Malay community 
better). These arguments have nationalist implications because the NEP’s pro-
Malay policies, as examined in Chapter 2, enshrined the ethnocultural Malay 
nationalist argument. According to the argument, the Malay community should be 
elevated to the economically dominant position in Malaysia, congruent with its 
political and cultural dominance.  
Mahathir’s reorientation of the NEP’s emphasis in the 1980s was 
significant from the perspective of Malay nationalism. When Mahathir became 
party president and Prime Minister in 1981, he attempted to reshape the economic 
policies that were geared towards ethnic re-distribution in the 1970s. Mahathir, 
further propelled by an economic crisis in the mid 1980s, emphasised economic 
growth rather than ethnic redistribution and pro-Malay policies. This resulted in 
the deregulation of NEP rules and the principles of ethnic redistribution and 
brought about privatisation which involved the sale of state enterprises and 
projects to private parties. Consequently, the expansion of the Malay share of the 
economy slowed down and the government’s active role in economy receded. 
Also, the benefits that the Malay community received from government policies 
were reduced.  
Razaleigh’s nationalist position was a reaction to Mahathir’s direction and 
was prompted by the debates on the imminent termination of the NEP in 1990. 
Razaleigh’s argument was clearly more ethnocultural Malay nationalist than that 
of Mahathir’s. Razaleigh’s position was, first, the goals of the NEP had not been   158
met and thus, the NEP should be extended beyond 1990. Second, Razaleigh 
criticised Mahathir’s economic policy that, according to him, had turned its back 
on the pro-Malay policies of the 1970s. In Razaleigh’s opinion, Mahathir’s 
redirection of economic policy made the efforts to enhance Malay economic share 
and to eradicate poverty sluggish and resulted in the disappointment of rural 
Malays, a growing economic gap and an outflow of national wealth with 
economic deregulation that favoured foreign capital.  
  Although Mahathir won the party elections, the victory fell short of 
quelling further challenge. In the party elections and split, Mahathir’s political 
legitimacy and support were bruised, which fuelled Razaleigh’s further challenge. 
Against this, Mahathir had to quickly recover his diminishing legitimacy and 
mandate. Mahathir, who was defensive until the party elections, came out actively 
championing a Malay nationalist position to mobilise the Malay community by 
demonstrating his commitment in ethnocultural Malay nationalism as an attempt 
to discredit his rival. Mahathir emphasised the unity of the Malay community, 
Malay tradition and reminded the Malay people of fragile ethnic stability and 
Malay dominance vis-à-vis non-Malay. By the 1990 elections, it appeared that 
Mahathir had a clear upper hand over his rival, Razaleigh.   
Thus, the nationalist ideological arguments used in UMNO factional 
struggles are important and should not be dismissed as merely a camouflage. The 
competing nationalist ideologies involved the strategic construction of nationalist 
vision of the Prime Minister and a challenger, responsing to Malay community 
which made the wide constituency politically mobilised, affected by the factional 
dispute. Furthermore, the 1987 dispute followed the pattern set in the 1969   159
dispute—a clash of competing nationalisms, that is, the Prime Minister’s changing 
nationalist position from ethnocultural nationalism towards civic or multicultural 
direction and the challenger’s stronger ethnocultural Malay nationalism. 
                                                 
1 In my Introduction, I reviewed some of the major studies on the 1987 dispute and 
concluded that the existing research did not pay sufficient attention to the nationalist 
discourses in the dispute, which, I believe, can shed new light on UMNO factionalism 
and Malaysian politics. This chapter intends to remedy this shortcoming by examining the 
dispute from a different angle. Other than the studies focusing on the personal rivalries in 
the 1987 dispute, there are some studies with slightly different focuses. For example, 
Funston maintained that the changing nature of UMNO in the 1980s might have had an 
impact on UMNO dynamics. He observed that UMNO, which began as a party of ‘rural 
interests, particularly primary school teachers from rural area’ had become a party of ‘a 
more critical and competitive group of professionals and businessmen.’ (Funston, 1988: 
365). Diane K. Mauzy noted that during the 1987 UMNO elections, a decline of the 
“Malay way” could be observed. She considered whether UMNO, despite its Western 
democratic institutional features, had been ruled by the “Malay way” which included such 
characteristics as avoidance of confrontation, courtesy and good manners, consultation 
and compromise (Mauzy, 1988). A journalistic study by Ranjit Gill provides us with a 
detailed account of the developments before and after the 1987 party elections, as well as 
the competing policy arguments which focused primarily on economic management and 
democracy (Gill, 1988). Gill’s work is useful as a source of valuable information about 
the 1987 dispute.  
2 UMNO holds a general assembly annually and elections of the party leadership every 
three years. The posts of president, deputy president, the three vice presidents, and 
supreme council members are filled during the elections. In the Youth and Women 
Wings’ meetings just before the general assembly, the wing members elect their own 
leadership. The delegates voting in the general assembly elections are the representatives 
of individual divisions. Each division can send one delegate for every 500 members it has 
and the total number of delegates from one division cannot exceed seven, excluding the 
division chief, deputy chief, vice chief, Youth Wing chief and Women’s Wing chief who 
are included in the division delegation. At the general assembly, 10 delegates each from 
the Youth Wing and the Women’s Wing are represented. Among the vice presidents and 
supreme council members, the hierarchy is decided by the number of the votes that a 
candidate gets. Thus, the vice president who obtains the biggest number of votes is 
regarded as the strongest candidate for the deputy president post, if it becomes vacant. 
   
UMNO Supreme Council (48 members) 
Post Number Remarks 
President   1  Elected  
Deputy President  1  Elected 
Vice Presidents  3  Elected 
Supreme Council 
members 
25 Elected 
Appointed  members  15  Appointed by the president, including 
Secretary-General, Treasurer, Information 
Chief   160
                                                                                                                                      
Youth and Women’s 
Wing Chiefs 
2 each  Elected by the respective wings and hold 
ex-officio Vice President posts 
Puteri Chief  1  Elected by Puteri wing 
 
3  It has been and still is said to be an unwritten rule in UMNO that the Deputy 
President succeeds the outgoing President. Abdul Razak succeeded Abdul Rahman and 
Hussein Onn did the same when Abdul Razak suddenly died in 1976. Thus, there was 
hardly any question about Mahathir’s succession of Hussein Onn at the 1981 UMNO 
General Assembly, although Hussein Onn’s choice of Mahathir in 1976 was a little 
controversial, considering Mahathir’s ultra Malay nationalist image in the 1960s and 
UMNO’s seniority rule in promoting members. At the time of writing, Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi, Deputy President elected in 2000, succeeded Mahathir, who resigned from the 
post of President in October 2003.   
4 For a factual account, see (Selvaratnam, 1982; von der Mehden, 1982). Also, A. 
Ghani Ismail provides a detailed account of the 1981 competition between Musa and 
Razaleigh, explaining what made the vital 205 vote difference between them (A. Ghani 
Ismail, 1983).  
5 A. Ismail Ghani provided a comprehensive explanation of the political developments 
between Musa and Razaleigh between the 1981 and 1984 party elections (A. Ghani 
Ismail, 1983). Also, Pathmanathan observed a new trend in the 1984 UMNO factional 
dispute. He argued that, as the growing Malay entrepreneurial and business class, thanks 
to the implementation of the NEP, began to exercise significant influence in UMNO 
politics in the 1980s in search for political patronage and power, consequently, there 
emerged a trend of money politics in UMNO politics (Pathmanathan, 1985).  
6 For the details regarding Musa’s resignation and the political dynamics surrounding 
these developments, notably the uneasy relationship between Mahathir and Musa, see 
(Das, 1986).  
7 According to Das and Fan, Musa was uneasy with Mahathir’s tactic of divide and 
rule between Razaleigh and himself (Das, 1986; Fan, 1989: 91-95). As long as Razaleigh 
was in the cabinet, he was a potential threat to Musa being appointed to the top party 
position. But, Mahathir did not discard Razaleigh on behalf of Musa, probably, to check 
Musa. There were two situations that strained the Mahathir-Musa relationship. The first 
was Musa’s handling of the Sabah affair in 1985, while Mahathir was away. When the 
formation of the Sabah state government was deadlocked, Musa ruled that the opposition 
party, Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United Party; PBS) had the right to be sworn in as it 
was majority, to the disappointment of the USNO that had long collaborated with the BN. 
In the Memali incident in 1985, Mahathir was also reportedly unhappy with Musa’s 
handling of the incident. For a discussion of the Memali incident, see Chapter 4 and for 
details of the Mahathir-Musa tension, see (Das, 1986; Fan, 1989: 91-95).  
8 The factions in the 1987 elections were readily evident because the UMNO elites 
were forced to show their support in the context of the party elections, in which the 
choice was either Mahathir’s Team A or Razaleigh’s Team B. Furthermore, the factional 
affiliations were evident when Team B members defected from UMNO after the party 
elections. During this election, the Mahathir faction included Ghafar Baba (Deputy Prime 
Minister), Daim Zainuddin (Finance Minister), Anwar Ibrahim (Education Minister) and 
all Menteri Besar (State Chief Ministers), notably, Wan Mokhtar (Trengganu), Rahim 
Tamby Chik (Malacca), Muhyiddin Yassin (Johor) and Najib Razak (Pahang). Team B 
supporters included Musa Hitam (Deputy President), Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Defence 
Minister), Rais Yatim (Foreign Minister), Radzi Sheikh Ahmad (Deputy Primary Industry 
Minister), Paduka Hajah Rahmah (Deputy Transport Minster), Zainal Abidin (Deputy   161
                                                                                                                                      
Energy Minister), Harun Idris (former Selangor Menteri Besar), Abdul Kadir Sheikh 
Fadzir (Deputy Foreign Minister) and Shahrir Abdul Samad (Welfare Service Minister). 
These names are drawn from (Gill, 1990) and various issues of Far Eastern Economic 
Review and Malaysian Business. 
9 In the election, Mahathir beat Razaleigh (761:718 votes) while Ghafar beat Musa 
(739:699 votes). In the vice president elections, Wan Mokhtar Ahmad (935, neutral), 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (879, Team B) and Anwar Ibrahim (850, Team A) were elected, 
beating Rais Yatim (690, Team B), Ramli Ngah Taib (667) and Harun Idris (398, Team 
B). At the vice president level, Team A and B were equally matched as Abdullah Badawi 
was a Team B supporter, Anwar Ibrahim was in Team A, and Wan Mokhtar Ahmad was 
a neutral candidate. In the supreme council elections, among 25 elected councillors, 16 
were from Team A and one elected (Ahmad Rithaudeen) was neutral, while the 
remaining eight were from Team B. The supreme council members from Team B 
included: Kadir Sheikh Fadzir, Rahmanah Othman, Shahrir Samad, Zainal Abidin Zin, 
Radzir Sheikh Ahmad, Marina Yusoff, Abdul Rahim Bakar and Ajib Ahmad. (Malaysian 
Business, 1987c: 13). 
10 Michael Leigh, on the other hand, argued that the redirection of economic priorities, 
as shown by policies supporting deregulation and privatisation, should be viewed from 
the perspective of the changing relationships between the bureaucratic, political and 
business elites. While the bureaucratic elites, who favoured state intervention in the 
economy, were weakened, the relationship between the political and business elites 
became close and mutually beneficial. Thus, economic reform, which created a 
favourable business environment, was a reward for the business elites from the political 
elites in return for their political support (Leigh, 1992).  
11 Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981. That was also when the Fourth Malaysia 
Plan was revealed. Although the plan was announced by the preceding Prime Minister, 
Hussein Onn, as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry, Mahathir 
must have had a role in conceptualising the plan. 
12 The Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975 required that business licenses to 
manufacturers would be issued on condition that there was 30 per cent Bumiputera equity, 
30 per cent Bumiputera membership on the board of directors and 30 per cent Bumiputera 
workforce (Chan & Horii, 1986: 46). 
13 The FIC, established in 1974, was assigned the task of monitoring the takeover of 
Malaysian companies by foreign capital. However, the committee monitored not only 
foreign capital but domestic capital as well when they acquired assets valued more than 
RM$1 million, effectively keeping an eye on the expansion of Chinese capital. (see Searle, 
1999: 44) 
14 The CIC’s regulations required all companies to have 30 percent Bumiputera equity 
before they could change their equity structure or list publicly (Chan & Horii, 1986: 48).  
15 Nevertheless, some non-Malay and foreign capital survived by adapting themselves 
to the new environment. They became the main beneficiaries of Mahathir’s new approach 
that included private and foreign capital. Heng Pek Koon observed that ‘Although the 
NEP was conceived to advance Malay business interests, it has offered a framework 
within which these [Chinese business] men could significantly expand their fortunes. By 
adapting to the new rules established by the NEP, especially by forging close links to the 
centers of Malay power, these tycoons have achieved success far beyond that of Chinese 
businessmen who have remained within the traditional ghetto or Chinatown economy 
characterized by small-scale trading and manufacturing activities, and service industries 
such as small hotels and restaurants’ (Heng, 1992: 129). Also see (B. T. Khoo, 2001: 186-
188) on the survival of foreign and Chinese capital.    162
                                                                                                                                      
16 In the case of the data for 1990, the sum of Malay, non-Malay and foreign capital 
does not add up to 100 per cent. This was because the government created a new category 
called ‘nominee companies’ that was part of the non-Malay category. In 1990, nominee 
companies accounted for 8.5 per cent of total share ownership. If the nominee companies’ 
8.5 per cent portion were included in the non-Malay category, total non-Malay ownership 
would become 55.3 per cent, which meant that non-Malay ownership increased, not 
decreased. However, it has been argued that the nominee companies should be included 
in the Malay portion and not the non-Malay portion, which would significantly change 
the structure of ethnic ownership. Some Chinese groups, including Gerakan, had argued 
that, were the nominee companies’ share to be included in the Malay category, the NEP’s 
original 30 per cent Bumiputera target had almost been realised by 1990 (Parti Gerakan 
Rakyat Malaysia, 1984).  
17 There is disagreement as to the number of entities and projects privatised. In 1987, 
the Ministry of Finance announced that 71 government entities had been privatised but 
Economic Planning Unit reported that, ‘nine projects have been privatised, 10 have been 
approved while 35 to 40 are in the pipeline’ (Chee, 1987: 94; Economic Planning Unit, 
1991a). 
18 It is ironical that Mahathir, before he became Prime Minister, expressed reservations 
regarding the privatisation of certain sectors. Although he did not oppose the general 
concept of privatisation, he was of the opinion that ‘certain types of industries should be 
State managed. Now these industries for example communications not mass media, but 
telephones, etc. should not be allowed to be managed by private enterprise. Railways, 
airlines these are essential for the country, we cannot think of them entirely in terms of 
profits’ (Malaysian Business, 1976: 15). However, in reality, under Mahathir’s 
privatisation policy, the national airline, Malaysia Air System, railways and Telekom 
Malaysia were all privatised.  
19 Regarding the beneficiaries of the privatisation policy, a major issue was whether 
sufficient Malay or Bumiputera capitalists, with capacity to operate the projects and 
enterprises, were available at the time of privatisation, although the government had 
indicated that there was an increasing number of Bumiputeras with such capacity (Chee, 
1987: 96). If the government was wrong, then the main beneficiaries of the privatisation 
policy were the non-Malays who were awarded privatisation projects and politically 
connected Malay companies or, actually, UMNO’s trustee businessmen and companies.  
20 Those who benefited from the privatisation policy included: Halim Saad of Renong, 
Tajudin Ramli of Malaysian Air System, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, Samsudin Abu 
Hassan, as well as Mahathir’s three sons—Mukhriz Mahathir, Mokhazani Mahathir and 
Mirzan Mahathir. They are often regarded as “crony capitalists,” groomed by Mahathir.  
21 The privatisation of state enterprises continued into the late 1980s and 1990s. Non-
Malay entrepreneurs were never excluded. In the late 1980s and 1990s, Vincent Tan of 
the Berjaya Group was awarded the KL Linear City project. Another prominent Chinese 
businessman, Francis Yeoh, was awarded the Express Rail Link project and a few 
independent power supply projects all over the peninsula. In 1994, the controversial 
Bakun Hydraulic Dam project was contracted out to a Chinese businessman, Ting Pek 
Khiing. Ananda Krishnan secured a few lottery enterprises that the government was 
running. In fact, quite a number of non-Malay names can be found on the list of 
privatised projects that Mahathir produced at the 1998 UMNO General Assembly to 
counter charges of cronyism. 
(This list is available at http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/98/0703/nat_3_list.html, 
accessed 6 March 2003).    163
                                                                                                                                      
22  Khoo Boo Teik described the nature of the state enterprises under the NEP 
economic regime as follows: ‘the public enterprises were widely regarded by their 
officers as “social enterprises” which “are called upon to achieve legitimate social goals, 
not readily measured in terms of pecuniary values” and which “may appear unprofitable 
when viewed by the criteria appropriately used to measure private sector efficiency”. The 
government also allowed the public enterprises’ deficits, debts, and losses to be 
overlooked or absorbed by the state as the price of providing experience, employment, 
and skills to the Malays in order to achieve the NEP’s objectives’ (B. T. Khoo, 1995: 
130). In other words, as state enterprises were viewed as social welfare organisations (to 
help the Malays) instead of profit-oriented business organisations, it was difficult for 
them to avoid incurring substantial loss and debt. 
23 Between the Second Malaysia Plan (1971–75) and the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981–
85), the growth of the budget allocation for state enterprises was substantial, as shown in 
Table A below. In addition, since many state enterprises were supposed to be more like 
‘social enterprises’ to help the Malays rather than business operations, many of them 
were “off-budget” enterprises, which meant that they were funded by the government but 
not under the auditor-general’s supervision. Their debts skyrocketed in a decade (Table 
B). The Chairman of Permodalan Nasional (National Equity Corporation; PNB), Khalid 
Ibrahim said in 1986, ‘Out of 825 government owned corporations, at least 50 per cent 
are struggling to survive’ (Malaysian Business, 1986a: 7). 
 
Table A. The Increase of Budget Allocation for Selected State Enterprises 
Public 
allocation  
(in RM million) 
Second 
Malaysia 
Plan, 1971–75 
Third Malaysia  
Plan, 1976–80 
Fourth Malaysia 
Plan, 1981–85 
Pernas 150.0  382.0  233.9 
SEDCs 200.0  493.0  525.3 
PNB -  500.0 2,922.9 
MARA 252.2  231.9  303.9 
UDA 169.0  300.0  691.4 
HICOM -  -  330.6 
Source: (Jesudason, 1989: 85) 
 
Table B. Debts by the Government to Selected State Enterprises 
Debts to the 
government 
(in USD million) 
1970 1982 
Felda* 266  2,548 
MARA 30  440 
UDA -  903 
Pernas 5  441 
MISC** 12  444 
Source: (Ozay Mehmet, 1988: 134) 
* Federal Land Development Authority 
** Malaysian International Shipping Corporation 
24 Razaleigh’s speeches, used here to elaborate his 1987 position, were made between 
1991 and 1993 when Razaleigh was the president of Semangat 46’. While the latter 
arguments were not the same as those made during the 1987 UMNO dispute, there is 
good reason to use this material to show Team B’s arguments. The speeches were 
Razaleigh’s attempts to differentiate himself and his party, composed of former UMNO   164
                                                                                                                                      
members who joined in Team B in 1987, from Mahathir’s position. In fact, as I have 
already indicated, the competition between Semangat 46’ and UMNO Baru was a de 
facto extension of the 1987 inner party squabble. The competing factions in the party 
elections did not have sufficient time to develop their ideological arguments in the few 
months leading up to the elections. It was only after the elections that the competing 
factions’ positions were clearly articulated, as we can see in the competition to gain the 
Malay community’s support when the factions’ leaders formed two separate Malay 
parties. 
25 An assertion by Abdullah Ahmad, a Member of Parliament, captured the thinking of 
the pro-redistribution group, which supported the extension of the NEP, very well. He 
maintained, ‘Let’s face it. The NEP is simply not just some document of economic 
reform. To the Malays it has become a political, economic and an emotional thing now. 
After Islam and the national language I can’t think of anything more important. It has 
become one of the means to sustain Malay political power…the NEP must sustain Malay 
dominance in the political system in line with the social contract of 1957… Even after 
1990 there must be mechanism for its preservation, protection and expansion in an 
evolving system.’ (Malaysian Business, 1986b: 8) 
26 Jomo similarly observed, ‘The difference between the two has since emerged more 
clearly as Razaleigh continued to call for continuation of the NEP… Although Mahathir 
has been anxious to get on with his own new economic policy priorities… Razaleigh is 
keen to reaffirm the NEP’s original philosophy and objectives while criticizing defects in 
its implementations, especially since Mahathir became chief steward. This stance may 
well prove popular with a generation of Malays brought up in and dependent on the NEP’ 
(Jomo, 1996: 102-103). 
27 Interview on 5 May 2003 in Kuala Lumpur with a former minister in the 1980s and 
currently a member of the UMNO Supreme Council. The interviewee, who was 
extensively involved with Team B, explained the continuity of the Tun Razak era and the 
end of said era in terms of the ups and downs of UMNO leaders as well. According to 
him, new elites such as Mahathir, Musa Hitam, Razaleigh Hamzah, Abdullah Badawi, 
Shahrir Samad and others were reinstated or rapidly promoted under Abdul Razak in the 
1970s to carry out the NEP. However, when Mahathir became Prime Minister and shifted 
away from Razak’s idea, the remaining elites introduced by Abdul Razak resisted 
Mahathir’s new approach. They included, according to the interviewee, Musa Hitam, 
Razaleigh Hamzah, Abdullah Badawi and Shahrir Samad who were in Team B against 
Mahathir.  
28 Interview on 5 May 2003 in Kuala Lumpur with a former minister in the 1980s and 
currently a member of the UMNO Supreme Council. 
29 Interview on 5 May 2003 in Kuala Lumpur with a former minister in the 1980s and 
currently a member of the UMNO Supreme Council. The interviewee viewed the Abdul 
Razak era as not coming to an end in 1976 when Abdul Razak died but continuing until 
the 1980s. However, in the 1980s, when Mahathir became Prime Minister, the direction 
of his policies slowly changed. It was only after 1987, when Mahathir retained UMNO 
power and expelled challengers, that Mahathir had the autonomy to push his own policy 
direction forcefully. Mahathir’s era began in earnest in 1987, rather than in 1981 when he 
became Prime Minister. 
30  Also, later in 1993, Razaleigh, in a similar vein, argued, ‘Subsidy for Malay 
peasants in rural area decreased. It was said that (the government) did not want the Malay 
having subsidy mentality. They forgot Japanese, American and European governments 
keep providing subsidy to their peasants. On the contrary, the government subsidises big 
projects such as Perwaja, Proton and Kedah Cement. Today, new policy replaces NEP. It   165
                                                                                                                                      
is called NDP [New Development Policy]. The core of the policy is how to develop 
economy, especially in industrial sector without thinking which class will get the benefit. 
We do not reject industrialisation, but we think that a country will be strong if a balance 
between industrial development and agriculture is achieved’
 (Razaleigh, 1993). 
31 In the 1980s, there were indeed a few well-known scandals. A subsidiary of Bank 
Bumiputera, Bumiputera Malaysia Finance (BMF), had invested a substantial amount of 
money, through Hong Kong-based Carrian Group, in the Hong Kong property market. In 
1982, when the Hong Kong economy crashed, the Carrian Group declared bankruptcy 
and the BMF could not recover its investment in the Carrian Group. It was rumoured that 
the decision to invest in the little known Carrian Group were made at the top levels of the 
government and UMNO to finance the construction of UMNO headquarters. Eventually, 
the government-owned oil company, Petronas, was forced to provide funds to Bank 
Bumiputera to save the bank that was in financial crisis because of the loss incurred by 
the BMF. This scandal ended up with US$1 billion loss (see Means, 1991: 121-123). In 
1982, when faced with falling commodity prices, the Malaysian government attempted to 
sustain the price of tin through speculative activities. The government, through a state 
enterprise Maminco, purchased futures and a huge amount of tin to bolster the price. 
However, the project failed, leaving reportedly RM 250 million loss to the government. 
(see Bartholomew, 1986) 
32 It was Mahathir who won the race to use the UMNO name. Abdul Rahman, the first 
Prime Minister and a Team B sympathiser moved first. He tried to register UMNO 
(Malaysia). Soon after Abdul Rahman’s attempt, in early 1988, Mahathir tried to register 
UMNO 88. Both applications were rejected by the Registrar of Societies because the old 
UMNO had not yet been deregistered. Shortly after that, Mahathir announced that his 
new application for UMNO (Baru) had been accepted. Since the UMNO name was 
already registered by Mahathir, Team B could not use that name anymore.  
33 Speculation that there was tension between Musa and Razaleigh was based on their 
bitter contests in 1981 and 1984. As Shamsul observed, although there was a united front 
at the elite level, there was still a division between the Musa and Razaleigh factions 
(Shamsul, 1988: 178). For example, after the elections, it was alleged that Razaleigh 
supporters were responsible for the spilt votes (41 votes), which would have changed the 
results at the Deputy President elections. Razaleigh supporters were allegedly reluctant to 
vote for Musa in the Deputy President election and some of them supported neither Musa 
nor Ghafar, thereby creating the split vote situation (Malaysian Business, 1987b: 10). 
Until 1988, especially when Shahrir Samad, a close ally of Musa, won the Johor Baru by-
elections, a seat that he gave up in protest to Mahathir, the united front amongst Team B 
members was maintained. After the Samad victory, however, Musa was ambiguous 
towards both Team A and Team B. Finally, in late 1988, Musa and his allies switched to 
Mahathir’s camp altogether.  
34 Mahathir attempted to regain Malay support by making reconciliatory gestures to 
the Team B leaders to demonstrate that he was not power hungry and that he was 
prepared to accommodate on behalf of Malay unity. In November 1988, Mahathir invited 
Musa Hitam and Razaleigh Hamzah to join the new party on behalf of Malay unity. 
Shortly afterwards, the Johor Unity and Reconciliation meeting was convened between 
Musa and his allies on one hand and Muhyiddin Yassin, representing UMNO Baru, on 
the other. The Team B members who participated in the meeting demanded amendments 
to the UMNO Baru constitution that were more in line with the former UMNO 
constitution and automatic inclusion of all former UMNO members into UMNO Baru 
(Asiaweek, 1989: 23). Soon after the meeting, Musa joined UMNO Baru in February 
1989, thereby delivering a blow to Team B. In addition, patronage power contributed to   166
                                                                                                                                      
the eventual victory of Mahathir. UMNO Baru became successor in interest to the old 
UMNO’s large economic assets by amending related laws, taking advantage of BN’s 
numerical power in the parliament. In 1988, when the old UMNO was deregistered, its 
assets were frozen by order of the court. To recover the assets, Mahathir amended the 
Societies Act. According to the new regulations, a political party can take over the assets 
of a deregistered party when the new party included more than half the members of the 
deregistered party. Furthermore, Mahathir used bureaucratic muscle to threaten those who 
were in Team B. Suddenly, Team B members, who had business interests, found their 
businesses in trouble because of sudden calls on their loans from banks or because of 
shortage of liquid funds. Many of them had no choice but to cross over to Mahathir’s side 
(Crouch, 1992: 33). 
35 In addition, Mahathir tried to blame Team B leaders for the economic policies and 
their consequences because they were Deputy Prime Minister (Musa Hitam) and Finance 
Minister (Razaleigh). 
36 In an interview, Mahathir clearly noted that it was Razaleigh rather than Musa who 
killed UMNO by taking UMNO to court. He said, ‘they decided to take the party to court. 
This was done by Tengku Razaleigh [Hamzah], not Datuk Musa [Hitam]. In fact, Musa 
was accepted in the party and appointed head of his old division… I rejected only those 
who were instrumental in causing the party to be deregistered, and Musa was not 
involved there’ (Abdoolcarim & Shameen, 1988: 29).    167
4.  Unravelling Mahathir’s Nationalism in the 1990s: 
Collectivist Civic Nationalism and Authoritarian 
Politics 
What was Mahathir’s nationalist ideological position leading up to the 
1998 dispute and why were the discourses of nationalism in the 1998 dispute 
different from those of previous disputes? Mahathir’s nationalist position deserves 
closer examination because, as one of the two competing nationalist views in the 
dispute, his views are crucial to understanding the 1998 dispute. 
The prevalence of Mahathir’s civic nationalism significantly reshaped the 
nationalist ideological tensions in the 1998 dispute. Mahathir’s Prime 
Ministership in the 1990s—in fact, in the 1980s as well, although there was a 
short break right after the 1987 UMNO dispute—can be described as collectivist-
authoritarian civic nationalism. 
1 Mahathir’s civic nationalism, which envisioned 
an economically affluent Malaysian nation, was relatively successful compared to 
the nationalist visions of former Prime Ministers. Mahathir’s nationalist vision 
substantially reduced the tension between ethnic identities and national identity. 
Mahathir’s vision of civic Malaysia, however, had collectivist-authoritarian 
characteristics, which justified not only the suppression of alternative views but 
also the indoctrination of the populace to accept his view. Mahathir’s rhetoric of 
internal and external threats to the Malaysian nation, based on his collectivist view 
of the nation, facilitated the spread of his nationalism and its success.  
These developments reconfigured the nationalist tension in Malaysian 
politics. The success of Mahathir’s collectivist civic nationalism ameliorated the 
question regarding the relationship between ethnic loyalties and national identity   168
and thus reduced the tension between multicultural or civic nationalism on one 
hand and ethnocultural Malay nationalism on the other. Mahathir’s collectivist 
nationalist views, however, initiated tension regarding another unresolved 
question, the relationship between an individual and the community, which 
became the substance of ideological arguments in the 1998 dispute. 
The three sections of this chapter present three arguments. First, Mahathir 
developed a vision of a civic Malaysian nation in the early 1990s. Mahathir was 
successful in persuading the Malaysian people to accept his vision, thereby easing 
tension related to the question of ambiguous national identity. Second, Mahathir’s 
nationalist view was collectivist nationalism. Mahathir’s authoritarian politics, 
which contributed to the success of his civic nationalism, is a reflection of his 
collectivist nationalism. Third, another feature of Mahathir’s collectivist 
nationalist view, rhetoric of threats to the national community from the West and 
from within Malaysia such as Islamic extremism and Chinese chauvinism was 
further harnessed to reinforce his nationalist vision and legitimacy and to silence 
any opposition to his idea.  
  
4.1. Mahathir’s civic nationalism and its success 
In the early 1990s, Mahathir’s nationalist vision and policy adjustments 
clearly indicated a civic direction. Mahathir’s vision involved the development of 
an integrated Malaysian nation where a Malaysian identity would replace ethnic 
identities as the primary identity of the Malaysian people. To realise this vision, 
Mahathir unveiled economic and cultural policies to increase optimism in the 
civic Malaysian nation. These policies moved away from the ethnocultural   169
nationalism that prevailed since the 1970s. Mahathir attempted to incorporate the 
Malay community into his civic vision by using the Melayu Baru (New Malay) 
concept as a model for the Malay community to emulate. The “Melayu Baru” was 
a more confident and competent Malay who could thrive in the civic Malaysian 
nation without state assistance. As Mahathir’s civic vision persuaded people to 
accept a civic Malaysian national identity and overpowered ethnocultural Malay 
nationalism, garnering Mahathir substantial support in the 1995 elections, it was 
not a small success.  
 
4.1.1.  Mahathir’s civic nationalist vision: Bangsa Malaysia and 
Wawasan 2020 
Mahathir’s civic nationalist vision in the 1990s was epitomised by Bangsa 
Malaysia (Malaysian Nation) and Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020).
2  Bangsa 
Malaysia was a vision for a new Malaysian national identity in which all 
Malaysians, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds, identified themselves as 
Malaysians first. It was an attempt to resolve the question of ambiguous national 
identity which had caused ethnic tension and conflict between different nationalist 
ideologies in Malaysia. Wawasan 2020 was an economic vision that projected a 
very optimistic future for the Malaysian people in the new civic Malaysian nation. 
Such optimism would encourage Malaysians’ identification with the civic 
Malaysian nation.  
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Revival of civic vision in the 1990s 
It should be noted first that Mahathir’s civic vision was not entirely a new 
development in the 1990s. Mahathir had tried to defeat Razaleigh by championing 
Malay nationalism after the 1987 UMNO factional dispute. However, considering 
Mahathir’s economic policy shift, as shown in the deregulation of the NEP and 
privatisation in the 1980s, the movement away from the stronger ethnocultural 
Malay nationalist NEP was already well in place in the early 1980s. As Khoo Boo 
Teik argued, ‘Perhaps one should really see Vision 2020 not so much as the 
launching of a new Mahathirist project which its association with the post-1990 
National Development Policy but as the culmination of Mahathirism, as an 
ideological “summing up”, as it were’ (B. T. Khoo, 1995: 329). Hence, 
Mahathir’s civic vision in the 1990s was more a revival of what he was already 
pursuing in the 1980s, with a brief suspension in the late 1980s.  
Two factors enabled Mahathir to return to a civic direction in the early 
1990s. First, after winning the 1990 General Elections, Mahathir reconsolidated 
his political power. Throughout the elections, it was clear that Mahathir’s UMNO 
Baru had the support of a clear majority of the Malay community and the UMNO-
led BN was still firmly in charge of Malaysian politics. This political strength 
enabled Mahathir to reintroduce the vision and measures that he had shelved 
temporarily when he faced an ethnocultural nationalist challenge in the late 1980s. 
Second, a quick recovery of the Malaysian economy expedited the reintroduction 
of Mahathir’s civic vision. The economic crisis in the mid-1980s had provided 
support for the opponents of Mahathir’s civic direction. The Malaysian economy, 
however, rebounded in 1987, and was almost fully recovered by 1989.   171
Undoubtedly, the economic recovery and the reassertion of political dominance 
boosted Mahathir’s confidence, enabling him to reassert his civic direction once 
again in the 1990s.  
 
Civic Malaysian national identity: Bangsa Malaysia 
Mahathir’s vision of an integrated national identity by the name of 
“Bangsa Malaysia” was made public in 1991 as part of Wawasan 2020. It was a 
significant development that Mahathir, once an arch-ethnocultural Malay 
nationalist, announced a concept of nation in which all the ethnic groups in 
Malaysia were supposedly blended. Although the term, Bangsa Malaysia, was 
new, Mahathir seemed to have had a picture of what an integrated civic Malaysia 
was like long before the concept was announced. For example, as early as 1981, 
Mahathir disclosed a perception of a nation and citizenship in quite civic terms. 
He stated: 
Nations are not biological creations. In the modern world they are not 
even geographical creations. Nations are political entities that stay 
together… They may appear artificial at times, but they are nevertheless 
very real. Malaysia has chosen to be one of these political nations. 
Ethnicity or geographical contiguity is not as important to Malaysia as its 
political unity and integrity. We have decided that the people who have 
made Malaysia their home and who have given their loyalty to Malaysia 
should be nationals of Malaysia. They and they only should be accorded 
the privileges of citizenship. (Mahathir, 1981a)    
Two years, later in 1983, Mahathir, in a speech to Malaysian social 
scientists, mentioned his ‘vision of future Malaysian nation’. He asserted: 
The modern Malaysian nation is one which shares common values, 
identity and loyalty in line with our basic socio-economic and cultural   172
policies. Ours will be a diligent, responsible, and active people whose 
potentials will be channelled for productive purposes so that there will be 
greater opportunities for all Malaysians in all aspects of Malaysian life. 
Ours will also be a disciplined and moral society, progressive and 
prosperous, united and living in harmony. (Mahathir, 1983c, emphasis 
added) 
Based on the idea that Mahathir already had since the 1980s, Mahathir 
coined the term, Bangsa Malaysia, in a 1991 speech. He elaborated the concept of 
Bangsa Malaysia as follows: 
The first  of these is the challenge of establishing a united Malaysian 
nation with a sense of common and shared destiny. This must be a nation 
at peace with itself, territorially, and ethnically integrated, living in 
harmony and full and fair partnership, made up of one ‘Bangsa Malaysia’ 
with  political loyalty and dedication to the nation. (Mahathir, 1991a, 
emphasis added) 
Here, the concept of nation transcended the Malay community which 
ethnocultural Malay nationalist arguments referred to. It included all Malaysians 
united through a ‘common and shared destiny’. Compared to the former Prime 
Ministers’ visions for national integration, this concept was a significant 
development in the sense that it spelled out a new national identity. Among the 
former leaders, Onn Jaafar was only able to attempt to open UMNO’s door to 
non-Malays when he tried to change its name to United Malayan National 
Organization. His successor, Abdul Rahman, visualised a nation based on 
multiculturalism, in which individual ethnic groups would co-exist peacefully.  
Mahathir was no different from his predecessors in that he shared their 
imperatives of ethnic integration and accommodation. As Prime Minister, 
Mahathir had to guarantee the co-existence of and, more ambitiously, the   173
integration of the major ethnic groups, a matter on which the legitimacy of the 
position of Prime Minister, not that of UMNO President, rested. This was what 
made Mahathir, formerly a leading ethnocultural Malay nationalist, adopt a civic 
nationalist position. Mahathir’s Bangsa Malaysia, however, was a more ambitious 
and bolder vision because it aimed to make people of diverse ethnic backgrounds 
identify themselves as Malaysian first and place their loyalty in the Malaysian 
nation rather than their individual ethnic groups.  
 
Wawasan 2020: optimism in a new nation through development 
Wawasan 2020 was an economic vision that instilled optimism amongst 
the Malaysian people regarding their future in the new Malaysian nation. 
“Malaysia: The Way Forward”, the paper in which Mahathir announced Wawasan 
2020 and Bangsa Malaysia, was the most elaborate account of what he had 
pursued in 1980s and what he planned to pursue in the following decade. 
Mahathir’s main theme was that, by 2020, Malaysia would be a ‘fully developed 
country’ by which he meant: 
a nation that is fully developed along all the dimensions: economically, 
politically, socially, spiritually, psychologically and culturally. We must 
be fully developed in terms of national unity and social-cohesion, in 
terms of our economy, in terms of social justice, political stability, system 
of government, quality of life, social and spiritual values, national pride 
and confidence. (Mahathir, 1991a) 
Mahathir proposed a concrete goal: doubling real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) every decade between 1990 and 2020. Mahathir hoped that the Malaysian 
GDP would grow seven per cent annually for 30 years. Considering the progress 
the Malaysian economy had made in previous decades, Mahathir argued that such   174
a goal was realistic. Together with the National Development Policy (NDP), 
Wawasan 2020 was a blueprint for the economic growth of Malaysia.  
It was noteworthy that Mahathir’s vision of an integrated nation was 
revealed as part of his ambitious economic development plan. This indicated that, 
for Mahathir, economic growth and affluence were closely related to the 
realisation of Bangsa Malaysia. Thomas Williamson summarised Mahathir’s plan 
of building an integrated nation through economic development as follows: 
The Malaysian state’s long-standing emphasis on economic growth has 
aimed at completely reshaping a society split by ethnic divisions into one 
integrated through an imagined national economy… In Malaysia, 
growing affluence provides the parameters for conceiving a Malaysian 
nation. Economic growth, once the means toward a national culture, 
language, and kinlike ties—the ground for Malaysian nationalism—is 
becoming the primary model of Malaysian nationalism. (Williamson, 
2002: 403) 
This Mahathir strategy, ‘facilitated by economic development’, intended to 
instil ‘forward-looking optimism’ into the population, (Brown, 2000: 38-39). 
Where the Malays were concerned, ethnic competition with non-Malays over 
limited economic resources had been a major reason for ethnic tension and 
conflict. The economic disadvantage of the Malay community had been the 
starting point for ethnocultural Malay nationalist arguments. For example, the 
ethnocultural Malay nationalists interpreted the 1969 ethnic riots as an expression 
of the economic discontent of the Malays whose political dominance had not been 
translated into commensurate economic power.  
In Mahathir’s economic vision, the population’s optimism, brought about 
by rapid economic growth and affluence, was supposed to reduce the stark ethnic   175
division, tension and competition over limited economic resource. In a 1992 
speech, Mahathir asked, ‘By the year 2020 we would have had about two 
generations of independent Malaysians. Will we be a united “Bangsa Malaysia” or 
“Malaysian Nation” by then?’ He claimed that there were a few conditions for the 
building of an integrated nation. Mahathir explained the economic conditions for 
building an integrated nation as follows:  
Managing our nation-building well will also entail that we redress the 
socio-economic imbalances among the various ethnic groups and the 
various regions in the country. Grow we no doubt must. If we do not 
grow we will not have the resources to redress anything. But redress we 
must too. If we do not redress we will self-destruct, which will reduce to 
naught all our growth. It is for this reason that Malaysia needs a policy of 
sustainable growth with equity in order to build a sound and resilient base 
for national unity… If we are indeed able to achieve this without unduly 
sacrificing growth and without undermining the legitimate rights of 
everyone, I would say we would have overcome the greatest single 
obstacle to national unity in this country. (Mahathir, 1992) 
Mahathir believed that to build a genuinely integrated Malaysian nation, it 
was vital to address the problem of economic imbalance. The economy must be 
expanded first so that Malaysia had sufficient economic resources to solve the 
imbalance without resorting to depriving wealth from one group to distribute to 
another. Once the economy had been expanded and the problem of economic 
imbalance solved, it would then be possible for the population to place their 
Malaysian identity above their ethnic identities in anticipation of the benefits that 
the civic Malaysian nation would deliver. These developments would ultimately 
lead to the construction of a genuinely integrated Malaysian nation, according to 
Mahathir.   176
4.1.2. Policy  adjustments  supporting the civic vision 
Further economic deregulation: the NDP 
Mahathir initiated a significant change in his economic policies as a 
concrete step towards achieving his vision of a civic Malaysian nation: the further 
deregulation of the NEP’s ethnic redistribution rule, while maintaining its pro-
Malay orientation. This change aimed to expedite economic growth by providing 
additional economic opportunities for the non-Malay community. Mahathir 
believed that the economic growth thus attained would contribute to the 
attainment of his Wawasan 2020 goals.  
The new direction of the economy was enshrined in a new economic plan, 
the National Development Policy (NDP), which differed from its predecessor, the 
NEP, in that ‘while effort will continue to be made under the NDP to increase 
Bumiputera ownership, no specific time frame has been set for the attainment of 
the equity target of at least 30 per cent’ (Malaysia, 1991). In other words, while 
the NEP’s goal of 30 per cent Bumiputera ownership, which was supposed to 
have been achieved by 1990, was still intact, without a timeframe for its 
achievement, it was weakened. Instead of the restructuring emphasised in the NEP, 
more weight was placed on economic growth in the NDP. Geoffrey Stafford 
summarised two major differences between the NDP and the NEP, ‘growth has 
replaced restructuring as the primary goal of economic development 
policy…[and] the private sector is now seen as being instrumental to the goals of 
current economic policy,’ both of which were favourable to the non-Malays 
dominant in the private sector (Stafford, 1997: 567).   177
The new policy did contribute to the significant economic growth in the 
first half of the 1990s. After the difficulties in 1985–86, the Malaysian economy 
recovered in 1987 and by 1989, the Malaysian economy was undergoing 
significant growth. Between 1988 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the 
Malaysian GDP grew more than 8 per cent, which exceeded the goals set forth in 
Mahathir’s Wawasan 2002.  In the 1990s, the national economy was structured 
differently from the 1970s, which was then based on agriculture and commodities. 
Agriculture’s and mining’s share of the GDP decreased from 18.7 per cent and 9.7 
per cent in 1990 to 8.6 per cent and 6.6 per cent in 2000. On the other hand, 
sectors of the economy specified in the Wawasan 2020, such as manufacturing, 
contributed far more to the national economy. The GDP share of the 
manufacturing sector increased from 27.0 per cent to 33.4 per cent between 1990 
and 2000 (Economic Planning Unit, 1991b;2001). In 1991, the unemployment 
rate was 5.6 per cent nationwide. Practically, however, Malaysia was near full 
employment and had to rely on workers from other countries. Foreign investment 
increased from the late 1980s (von der Mehden, 1992: 111-112). The proportion 
of the population living beneath the poverty line decreased from 16.5 per cent to 
8.9 per cent between 1990 and 1995 (Malaysia, 1996: 72).  
While the pro-Malay aspects of Mahathir’s economic policies were 
weakened, they were not dismantled. Mahathir reaffirmed the government’s 
commitment to enhancing the Malay community’s economic power. Mahathir 
emphasised that although a civic nation, Bangsa Malaysia, was Malaysia’s 
eventual destination, it was also equally important to lift the status and increase 
the economic power of an ethnic group that was relatively less advanced as the   178
first step towards becoming a fully integrated nation. Mahathir asserted, ‘We must 
aspire by the year 2020 to reach a stage where no one can say that a particular 
ethnic group is inherently economically backward and another is economically 
advanced’ (Mahathir, 1991a). To build this parity, Mahathir contended:  
[W]e must not neglect the challenge of economic social justice today. 
Those who are backward must be helped. No one must be left behind. We 
must all advance together. We must all reap the benefits of rapid growth 
and advancing modernity... [I]f we ever forget our struggle for economic 
social justice, we do so at our own peril. (Mahathir, 1997d, emphasis 
added)  
The government’s performance in economic restructuring proved that its 
pro-Malay policies were pursued simultaneously with its emphasis on economic 
growth. During the Sixth Malaysia Plan, the government pursued a policy to 
produce a “Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community” (BCIC).
3 The 
Seventh Malaysia Plan reported that in 1995, 38 per cent of the executives and 
managers of some 290 Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) listed companies 
and 845 of their subsidiaries were Bumiputera (Malaysia, 1996: 81). In 1990, 
while the percentage of Bumiputeras employed in the agricultural sector (33.4 per 
cent) was still larger than that of Bumiputeras in the manufacturing sector (17.5 
per cent), in 1995, the situation was reversed, that is, 25 per cent in manufacturing 
and 21.4 per cent in agriculture (Malaysia, 1996: 77). The number of registered 
Bumiputera professionals increased from 29 per cent in 1990 to 33.1 per cent in 
1995 (Malaysia, 1996: 84). In addition, the percentage of shares owned by 
Bumiputeras increased from 19.3 per cent to 20.5 per cent between 1990 and 1995, 
whereas overall non-Bumiputera share ownership decreased from 46.8 per cent to 
43.4 per cent in the same period (Malaysia, 1996: 86).   179
In sum, the new emphasis on economic growth in the NDP worked very 
well, as demonstrated by the performance of the Malaysian economy in the early 
1990s. The rapid economic growth would provide the basis of the population’s 
optimism in Mahathir’s vision of a civic Malaysia. The retention of some pro-
Malay policies made the Malay community more competent and confident, 
thereby making it easier for the Malay community to accept Mahathir’s vision of a 
civic Malaysia.  
 
Moving away from ethnocultural cultural policies  
In the cultural realm, Mahathir enacted changes that reflected his shift 
towards civic nationalism. Together with economics, education and language have 
always been at the centre of ethnic tensions in Malaysia (Muhammad Ikmal Said, 
1996; C. B. Tan, 1984). In the early 1990s, the government adopted more flexible 
policies regarding education and language. These initiatives included promoting 
teaching in the English language, amending the Education Act, permitting foreign 
universities to establish twining programmes and the establishing of private 
colleges. These policy changes enabled the non-Malay communities to pursue 
primary school education in the non-Malay vernacular languages with fewer 
restrictions and also provided them more opportunities for tertiary education.  
Since 1971, the medium of instruction in Malaysian universities has been 
Malay and this was regarded as a disadvantage by non-Malay students (Kua, 
1987b: Ch. 4). When policies promoting teaching in English were enacted, some 
courses in Malaysian universities were taught in English. Teaching in English was 
also encouraged in other educational institutions. The Education Act was also   180
amended to make it more favourable to the non-Malay communities. The act 
allowed Education Minister to convert Chinese and Tamil schools to national 
schools, where the teaching language was Malay, if necessary. The Chinese 
educationists had complained bitterly about this specific regulation of the 
Education Act. This specific clause was repealed when the Education Act was 
amended (Liak, 1996: 226-228). Non-Malay students who were unable to obtain 
places in the government-run universities because of a quota system which 
favoured Malay students were able to pursue tertiary education in twinning 
programs and private colleges (M. N. N. Lee, 1999). 
Like the NDP, the easing of restrictive cultural policies persuaded the non-
Malay communities to accept Mahathir’s prime ministership as well as his 
nationalist vision. The new policies showed a Malaysian state that was more 
inclusive and accommodating for the non-Malay communities. In the 1970s, the 
state was predominantly ethnocultural Malay nationalist. As the state became 
more ethnic-neutral, congruent with the civic Malaysian nation as envisioned by 
Mahathir, the non-Malay communities had strong incentives to increasingly 
identity themselves as Malaysian first. Empirically, the non-Malays’ acceptance 
of Mahathir’s new direction was demonstrated in the massive non-Malay support 
for the ruling BN, particularly in the 1995 General Elections. 
 
4.1.3.  Melayu Baru and Mahathir’s civic Malaysia 
Mahathir attempted to include the Malay community, led by the newly 
rising Malay middle class, in his civic vision. Since the 1980s, the Malay middle 
class had grown significantly, largely due to the implementation of the NEP. To   181
capture the growing Malay middle class, that was believed to be more affluent, 
competent and confident, Mahathir used the concept of Melayu Baru, supposed to 
be viable in civic Malaysia. By putting Melayu Baru forward as a model for the 
Malay community to follow, Mahathir attempted to lead the entire Malay 
community beyond the state-protected niche of Malay favouritism and to accept 
his civic vision.  
 
The growth of a confident Malay middle class 
The new Malay middle class that emerged in the 1980s was different from 
its predecessor. As they were more affluent and independent, they were less 
dependent on the state and were more competitive with their non-Malay 
counterparts. Of course, it does not mean that they were completely independent 
from the state’s assistance. For example, when Mahathir retired in 2003, he still 
lamented that the Malay was not fully independent from the state despite his 20 
years effort.
4 Observations of the newly rising Malay middle and entrepreneurial 
class were made as early as the mid-1980s.
5  Shamsul and Khoo Kay Jin, for 
example, found definite signs of the changing composition of Malay society in 
general and of UMNO grassroots members in particular. Shamsul argued that 
because of the NEP, there was an ‘almost phenomenal, expansion of the Malay 
middle class’ (Shamsul, 1988: 173). Likewise, Khoo Kay Jin noted that a ‘social 
structure resulting from the NEP was the creation of a more differentiated Malay 
community, in particular the rise of a differentiated capitalist stratum’, which was 
further divided into ‘large capitalists’ and ‘small and medium capitalists’ (K. J. 
Khoo, 1992: 62-63).    182
Shamsul provided us with an insightful description of the new Malay 
middle class (Shamsul, 1999). He categorised two distinctive Malay groups—
Orang Kaya Baru (New Rich People) and Melayu Baru. According to Shamsul, 
the  Orang Kaya Baru was the state-dependent middle class of the 1970s and 
1980s. They were ‘old, manually oriented’ and based in rural areas, with mostly 
primary secondary school qualifications, which they had acquired before the 
implementation of the NEP. Through their influence at the grassroots level, they 
had political connections through which they secured development projects—
from which they built their wealth—provided by the government under the NEP.
6 
On the other hand, the Melayu Baru had different qualifications, base and 
background and was from a different generation. The Melayu Baru is the ‘new, 
non-manual and mentally oriented middle class (for example, professionals and 
bureaucrats)’ (Shamsul, 1999: 100). These new Malays were primarily the 
product of the educational opportunities provided by the NEP in the 1970s and 
1980s. Many Malay students, chosen from all over the peninsula and from 
different classes, received government scholarships to study at universities in the 
United Kingdom, United States and Australia. With degrees in business, science 
and technology, these new Malays had the practical knowledge and skills required 
in their jobs. The professional knowledge and skills made the Melayu Baru more 
competitive and more confident than their predecessors, the Orang Kaya Baru, in 
a competitive capitalist economic system and, more important, in the competition 
with their non-Malay counterparts. They were based in the urban areas, where 
their jobs were located. Their economic fortune and future were less dependent on 
state assistance or development projects of the 1970s and 1980s. These   183
characteristics of the Melayu Baru meant that they were more independent of the 
government and UMNO than the Orang Kaya Baru. 
 
Melayu Baru as a model for the Malay community in a civic nation 
Mahathir attempted to capture this new Malay middle class with the term 
Melayu Baru and to project this new class as the model for the entire Malay 
community to follow. This was part of Mahathir’s civic nationalist project to lead 
the Malay community into his civic nation vision. Mahathir’s civic vision, Bangsa 
Malaysia, required the elimination of favouritism for any particular ethnic group 
before the Malaysian identity would replace ethnic identity as the primary identity 
of Malaysian people. Mahathir believed that the characteristics of the new 
Malay—the capacity to survive independently without state assistance—were 
required for the Malays to carry on and thrive in the civic Malaysian nation.  
Mahathir had long deplored what he believed to be a fundamental problem 
in the Malay community that had made this community non-competitive vis-à-vis 
the non-Malay communities. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mahathir denounced the 
‘syndrome of lazy Malays’ (Mahathir, 1970: Ch. 3).
7  Furthermore, after the 
implementation of the NEP, Mahathir found that state assistance, which was 
supposed to provide merely a head-start for the Malay community, had produced 
instead a complacent Malay community, continuously dependent on the state’s 
patronage.
8  
The rising new Malay middle class, given its characteristics as described 
previously, would be ideal for Mahathir to put forward as a model for the Malay   184
community to emulate. Mahathir’s Melayu Baru concept was first announced in 
his 1991 UMNO general assembly address. Mahathir said: 
We must increase our efforts to turn ourselves into people who are able to 
take their appropriate place in this modern world. For this, we need new 
Malays and Bumiputeras who have culture appropriate to the current 
trend, who are able to face all challenges, who can compete without 
assistance and who are well educated, sophisticated, honest, disciplined, 
trustworthy and efficient. (Mahathir, 1991b, my translation) 
Mahathir praised the Melayu Baru’s competence, confidence and 
independence from state assistance and favouritism. The Melayu Baru were 
described as being relatively comfortable when competing with non-Malays on a 
level playing field and were thought to be able to compete on an international 
stage without state patronage. They had the correct knowledge, skill and attitude 
to stand on their own feet when the envisioned civic Malaysian state substantially 
reduced assistance to them. 
In 1993, Mahathir boasted of the achievements of the Melayu Baru who, 
equipped with the required knowledge and skills, were successful in modern 
economic sectors. Mahathir, in his presidential speech before the 1993 UMNO 
General Assembly, said: 
Today, we have Malays and bumiputera as heads of department, 
scientists, actuaries, nuclear physicists, surgeons, experts of medicine and 
aviation, bankers and well-known corporate leaders. In fact, there are 
some who manage companies with assets worth billions of ringgit and 
who are brave enough to buy big companies and well-known in the open 
market with ‘mergers’ and ‘acquisitions’ which are sophisticated and 
complex. (Mahathir, 1993a, my translation) 
These Melayu Baru were no longer the peasants the Malay community 
used to be identified with. They were well-educated professionals who competed   185
equally with non-Malays, without the government’s help, in the fields where non-
Malays used to be dominant and where the Malay community was not properly 
represented. Mahathir further noted:  
This is one of the successes that the Malays and Bumiputeras achieved. 
This success proves that Malays and Bumiputeras have ability and talent 
for progress and success in every area, if they really have the interest and 
if they are given a chance and sufficient training. (Mahathir, 1993a, my 
translation) 
Constructing the positive model of Melayu Baru was, for Mahathir, an 
alternative strategy to his exhortations to the Malay community to be independent 
from state assistance. To obtain Malay support for his civic vision and his policy 
shift towards civic direction, it was a prerequisite for Mahathir to make the Malay 
community grow beyond favouritism and state patronage. Otherwise, Mahathir’s 
move towards a civic direction might be rejected by the Malay community or 
might be vulnerable to an ethnocultural nationalist challenge by political rivals. 
When Mahathir praised the Melayu Baru as a model for the Malay community 
and when Mahathir encouraged the Malay community to emulate the Melayu 
Baru, it was Mahathir’s attempt to facilitate his selling of his civic vision to the 
Malay community. 
 
4.1.4.  The success of Mahathir’s effort: The Malaysian people 
supports his vision 
By the mid 1990s, as the Malaysian people began identifying themselves 
with the Malaysian nation instead of their ethnic backgrounds, Mahathir’s civic 
nationalist project appeared to be successful. In the Malay community, especially, 
the formerly very inflammable ethnocultural Malay nationalism weakened as the   186
euphoria of the civic Malaysian nation spread. Such development resulted in a 
resounding endorsement of Mahathir’s leadership during the 1995 elections.  
 
Recession of ethnic identity and emerging Malaysian identity 
Mahathir’s policies resulted in significant recession of ethnicity in 
Malaysian society in the 1990s, which has been studied by scholars of Malaysian 
politics and society. Thomas Williamson contended, ‘economic aims remain on 
center stage; the political consequences, like the political decisions about language, 
public assembly, and ethnic preferences that bring them about, receded from 
view’ (Williamson, 2002: 412). In other words, the prospect of and aspiration 
towards economic affluence overwhelmed the emotional attachments to ethnic 
symbols in the booming economy, which was specifically identified with 
Mahathir’s vision of a civic Malaysian nation. Abdul Rahman Embong similarly 
observed that increasingly development and growth replaced the concern about 
ethnicity. He argued: 
[E]conomic growth, market expansion, and the growth of the new middle 
classes have impacted on personal values and practices… 
“[D]evelopmentalist” ideology has taken hold among these classes… 
[T]his ideology has one important unintended consequence: it de-
emphasizes ethnicity while highlighting development and growth. (Abdul 
Rahman Embong, 2001b: 62, emphasis added) 
The population’s optimism, which had brought about the recession of 
ethnicity and growing inter-ethnic communication, appeared to be redirected more 
and more to the civic Malaysian nation. The population increasingly identified 
themselves as Malaysians first rather than with their various ethnic backgrounds.
9 
Halim Salleh observed that people became “proud to be Malaysian”. ‘This was   187
new unifying factor which took most Malaysian by surprise’ (Halim Salleh, 1999: 
190). They hoped that the civic nation would provide more benefits than what 
they would get in return for being loyal to their ethnic identities. Thus, as Khoo 
Boo Teik observed, ‘Somehow Malaysians were inspired…to discover their 
ability to imagine themselves as a community, and to do so with a sense of the 
“ineradicable Goodness of the nation”’ (B. T. Khoo, 2003: 22, emphasis 
added).
10  
 
Civic nationalism overwhelmed ethnocultural Malay nationalism 
There was a significant change in the Malay community as well. The 
practical benefits of the civic Malaysian nation seemed to have overcome 
potential ethnocultural Malay nationalist backlashes against Mahathir’s policies 
towards Bangsa Malaysia, especially in the cultural area. Ethnocultural Malay 
nationalists used to defend Malay culture and language as the cultural foundation 
of Malaysia. They argued that the cultural characteristics of Malaysia as a Malay 
nation should be based on Malay cultural symbols. Before the 1990s, the 
ethnocultural Malay nationalist considered the Malay language as the prime 
symbol of Malay identity and culture that should form the basis of Malaysian 
national identity. This was why the Language Bill issue in 1967 was controversial 
and also why the government, after the 1969 ethnic riots, introduced the 
Education Act, which legislated that Malay would be sole teaching medium in 
Malaysian schools.  
Mahathir, in the 1990s, without much resistance, took a few bold measures 
in cultural policies towards the realisation of civic Malaysian nation. Under   188
Mahathir, in the first half of the 1990s, the government promoted the use of 
English as a teaching medium in schools and universities. There was resistance 
from Malay linguistic nationalists—dubbed as the ‘Malay lobby’—to the wider 
use of English as a teaching medium. But, as T. N. Harper observed, ‘the furore 
over language has not reached the pitch that it had in the past’ (Harper, 1996: 246). 
What prevented an ethnocultural nationalist backlash was not just Mahathir’s 
effective campaign to promote the use of English but the lack of widespread 
Malay enthusiasm to defend the extensive use of the Malay language. All over the 
peninsula, the use of English was widely accepted without mass uproar, unlike the 
1960s when the Malays were reportedly unhappy with English or Chinese 
signboards displayed at non-Malay shops (see Von Vorys, 1975: 200-210). The 
upwardly mobile Malay middle class, in particular, did not want to be left behind 
or to lose its competitive edge by rejecting the use of English. A Far Eastern 
Economic Review article observed, ‘jingoism about the national language annoys 
liberal-minded Malays, who say the one who will lose out [when they do not keep 
up with the change] will be the Malays themselves’ (Jayasankaran, 1995a: 24). 
Similar developments occurred in the field of education. There were 
reportedly 35,000 non-Chinese students attending Chinese schools in 1995. The 
phenomena were not confined to such ethnically mixed areas as Kuala Lumpur or 
Johor Baru but also such predominantly Malay areas as Kelantan (Hiebert, 1995). 
Harper described this development as ‘bourgeois ambitions… overcom[ing] 
ethnic scruples’ (Harper, 1996: 247). Malay parents—primarily the New 
Malays—were sending their children to Chinese schools, where Chinese was the 
teaching medium, for practical reasons.
11 Shamsul once maintained that ethnic   189
groups in Malaysia may have to ‘sacrifice their traditions and ethnic identities’ 
because of Mahathir’s attempt to initiate a new national identity (Shamsul, 1998: 
149-150). In Malay communities in the early 1990s, where the ‘sacrifice’ seemed 
to be made voluntarily, it was a victory of the practical appeal of the civic 
nationalist vision and policies over ethnocultural Malay nationalism. 
 
Mahathir’s leadership was endorsed in the 1995 elections 
In the first half of the 1990s, the political situation in Malaysia was stable, 
the economy was booming and the population’s economic needs seemed to have 
been met. Mahathir’s vision, Wawasan 2020, that is, Malaysia becoming a fully 
developed country by 2020, was well received and appeared achievable, if the 
momentum of growth was maintained. A more difficult task suggested by 
Mahathir, Bangsa Malaysia, did not seem impossible to realise. The majority of 
the Malays, led by the Melayu Baru, accepted the nationalist direction of the 
incumbent government, as long as the government could sustain economic growth 
and deliver material affluence. For the non-Malays, of course, Mahathir’s 
government in the 1990s was a better option than the strict NEP regime in the 
1970s. The Malaysian people, by supporting Mahathir’s leadership that brought 
about the benefits, growth and stability, seemed to accept the civic nationalist 
vision of Mahathir. 
The results of the 1995 Malaysian general elections confirmed the soaring 
support for Mahathir’s government from all ethnic communities. It is widely 
acknowledged that substantial increase of non-Malay support for the BN brought 
about the coalition’s historic victory in the 1995 elections (Gomez, 1996a: 31-39;   190
Liak, 1996: 226-228).
12 In the elections, the UMNO-led BN achieved its largest 
electoral victory since the 1969 elections. The BN won 162 of the 192 contested 
parliament seats (84.3 per cent) and 338 of the 394 state assembly seats (85.8 per 
cent) that were contested (Gomez, 1996a: 25). Regarding the popular vote, the BN 
won 65 per cent of the votes, the strongest win in the entire Alliance-BN’s history 
(Liak, 1996: 223). Although PAS retained the same number of parliament seats it 
secured in the 1990 elections (seven seats) and slightly increased its popular vote, 
the BN humiliated the DAP (20 seats to nine) and Semangat 46’ (eight seats to 
six).  
In addition to the strong support of the non-Malay communities for the BN, 
there was an increase of Malay support for the BN, especially UMNO.
13 UMNO 
increased its share of the parliament seats from 71 in 1990 to 89 in 1995—the 
highest number of seats until then. In the state assembly elections, UMNO’s share 
increased from 196 in 1990 to 230 in 1995. In terms of the popular vote, UMNO’s 
rival for the Malay vote, PAS actually increased its share slightly by 0.73 per cent 
(parliamentary elections) and 1.3 per cent (state assembly elections). Apparently, 
UMNO increased its share of the Malay votes at the expense of Semangat 46’, 
which share of the popular vote decreased by 4.3 per cent between 1990 and 1995 
(Liak, 1996: 223-226).  
In predominantly Malay constituencies, BN increased its share of the 
popular vote from 54.86 per cent to 59.25 per cent (Hwang, 2003: 329, Table 7.5). 
In Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, the BN gained an additional one or 
two more parliamentary seats, compared to its performance in the 1990 elections. 
The increase of Malay support for the BN and UMNO was marginal, compared to   191
the increase of Chinese support in the 1995 elections. This was because of the 
already high level of support from the Malay community for UMNO and BN. 
However, the trend of increasing Malay endorsement of BN’s rule under Mahathir 
cannot be doubted.  
 
4.2. Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalist view  
The other characteristic of Mahathir’s nationalist position that completes 
the picture is its collectivist view of the national community. Mahathir’s 
authoritarian politics reflect the collectivist aspect of his nationalist ideology. 
Mahathir’s collectivist nationalist view revolved around the collective 
community’s supremacy over individual rights and freedom and the political 
elites’ role as interpreter of the community’s common will and interests.  In the 
name of the nation’s collective interests, Mahathir’s authoritarian control of the 
community attempted to suppress any ideological disagreement or opposition and 
to indoctrinate the audience, thereby contributing to the prevalence of his civic 
nationalist ideology.  
This section will explore Mahathir’s collectivist nationalist view and its 
political reflection, authoritarianism. In this section, two main points will be 
developed. Firstly, Mahathir’s collectivist nationalist view revolved around the 
collective community’s supremacy over individual rights and freedom, and 
political elites’ pre-eminence as interpreter of community’s common will and 
interests. Secondly, reflecting this ideological view, authoritarianism was 
deliberately used in attempts to suppress opposition to Mahathir’s nationalist ideas 
and to indoctrinate the populace with his collectivist civic nationalist vision.    192
To be fair with Mahathir’s rule over 20 years, a note is needed before I 
explain the authoritarian aspect of his rule. To show Mahathir’s collectivist 
nationalism, this section exclusively discusses Mahathir’s suppression of 
opposing nationalist vision, indoctirination attempts and demonisation of 
opposing views and political forces. His rule, however, is not totally authoritarian. 
Perhaps, that is why many observers of Malaysian politics hesitate to call 
Malaysian politics authoritarian, inventing new appellation such as semi-
democracy, semi-authoriarianism (Case, 1992;1993;1997), pseudo-democracy 
(Case, 2001b), neither authoritarian nor democratic (Crouch, 1992;1993), quasi-
democracy (Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 1989).
14  Obviously, the UMNO-led BN has 
taken power through reasonably fair elections. Actual application of suppression 
is hardly regarded full authoritarianism and has been done in carefully selective 
manner. Perhaps because of political cost, a harsh treatment such as imprisonment 
of opponents is used not frequently, but sparingly.  Ruling political elites, together 
with threatening, demonisation and suppression, attempt to persuade electorate to 
support them.  
 
4.2.1.  Mahathir’s collectivist nationalism 
Mahathir’s collectivist view of community 
Mahathir had never equivocated when arguing that individual freedom and 
right should be limited for the good of the entire community. Mahathir’s 
collectivist view was related to his Hobbesian view of human society. He asserted: 
Man joined his fellow men in a group for his own purpose, in answer to 
his own needs. He gains safety in numbers but he loses to a certain extent 
his individual freedom. He was willing to do this when, in the primitive   193
setting, he was threatened with all kinds of dangers. But the modern man 
has no experience of the dangers of individual isolation. He, therefore, 
tends to see the restraint on his individual freedom as irksome and he 
rebels against it. He has forgotten that there is a price to pay in order to 
get all those things that society provides him. It is the lack of 
understanding and appreciation of the limits of individual independence 
in society that has resulted in the instability of human societies in many 
parts of the world. (Mahathir, 1985) 
Mahathir went so far as to link the promotion of individual freedom and 
rights with the destruction of society and warned of the danger of ‘the 
empowering of a vocal minority of political activists over the silent majority of 
ordinary citizens’ (Mahathir & Ishihara, 1995: 82-83). He asserted that 
unrestrained individual freedom and rights hurt the entire community’s interests. 
Mahathir maintained, ‘Individual freedom knows no limit. In the name of 
individual freedom anything can be done, even if it hurts the community’ 
(Mahathir, 1994).   
The same logic of constraining individual liberty and rights applied to 
ethnic groups, according to Mahathir’s view. Mahathir, in a speech made in 1983, 
argued: 
We have to be conscious as well as concerned with the ethnic dimension 
of our Malaysian life… While we can blame history for it, it is a reality 
that we have to accept and live with… I am sure all of us realise that this 
is not an easy task, and it is made no easier by the pressures for open 
discussions insisted upon by the so-called “democrats.”… It is obvious 
that we are not going to achieve full unity, nor can we remove ethnic 
conflict completely. Any course that we set for ourselves will result in 
unhappiness for someone or others. If we are to favour one particular 
ethnic group, we will make them happy, but the rest very unhappy indeed. 
If we favour anyone of the other groups we are going to get the same 
result. So, since we cannot make everyone happy and satisfied, nor can   194
we favour just one of the groups, the only choice left to us is to make 
everyone equally unhappy. (Mahathir, 1983c) 
Mahathir blamed the “so-called democrats” who advocated for the liberty 
and rights of various ethnic groups, especially the minorities in a nation-state. 
According to Mahathir, they made it more difficult to cope with the situation of 
various ethnic groups coexisting in a nation-state. Mahathir maintained that as the 
government cannot meet all the demands of all the ethnic groups in Malaysia, the 
claims of  all ethnic groups, whether they were in the majority or minority, had to 
be limited occasionally, in the interest of the  nation’s stability and prosperity.   
Instead of advocating on behalf of individual liberty and rights, Mahathir 
emphasised the need for strict ‘law and order’ in order to safeguard the peace, 
security and interests of the society as a whole. He maintained: 
A healthy society cannot exist and continue to do so without law and 
order. Law and order mean limits on individual freedom. Freedom is 
limited because one individual’s freedom may affect the rights of others 
or the peace and security of the society itself… To enable each member 
of a society to attain his rights without affecting the rights of others and 
the collective right of the society itself, rules are set up to control freedom 
in the ‘methods’ of demanding rights. (Mahathir & Ishihara, 1995: 96-97) 
Mahathir continued, ‘The very survival of a society depends on its 
organization and on the readiness of the members to obey the “dos” and “don’ts” 
laid down by the society’ (Mahathir & Ishihara, 1995: 137). Furthermore, 
according to this view, even if individual liberty and rights had to be limited for 
the sake of the community, it will eventually benefit individuals in the long term, 
if the community as a whole turned out to be successful. Mahathir argued:   195
Discipline… means limiting individual desires and interests to give 
priority to the interests of society. Interpretations of what constitutes the 
interests of the individual and the interests of society may differ from one 
society to another. But whatever the interpretation or evaluation, the aim 
of limiting the interests of the individual is the preservation of society.  
For each member of society, the limitations placed on him as an 
individual may in the short term be frustrating, but the social security thus 
achieved will ultimately benefit him. (Mahathir, 1986: 136-137) 
The Asian Values discourse reflected Mahathir’s collectivist view of the 
community. Mahathir was a pioneer and ardent advocate of the Asian Values 
discourse (Lily Zubaidah Rahim, 1998). As Emmerson argued, according to the 
Asian Values discourse, ‘community interest ought to override the interest of the 
individual when these conflict, especially when the security of the community is 
in jeopardy’ (Emmerson, 1995: 237). Mahathir, emphasising the need to impose 
limits on the individual for the sake of the community, summarised Asian Values 
as follows: ‘We speak of Asian values, meaning hard work, respect for authority, 
discipline, submission to the interest and the good of the majority and filial piety’ 
(Mahathir, 1996). 
 
Political elites as interpreter of the common will of the community 
For Mahathir, the common will of the community, to which individual 
rights and liberty were subordinated, must be a vision developed by political elites 
as the sole authority to interpret the community’s common will. This position 
constituted another pillar of Mahathir’s collectivist view on national community. 
Mahathir’s view on leadership provided political elites with the ideological   196
justification to indoctrinate the population with the vision developed by them as 
interpreter of the common will. Mahathir once told UMNO Youth members: 
Leaders emerge because they have more ability than others. This ability 
is certainly based on the fact that they are more knowledgeable. They are 
then in a position to evaluate an issue more accurately and rationally… 
[T]he evaluation made must be conveyed to his followers for their 
guidance. (The New Straits Times, 1977) 
Mahathir did not change his view when he became Prime Minister. He 
noted, ‘Leadership? For me, at least, it is the ability to provide guidance. And 
your guidance should be something superior to what your people can do by 
themselves and ideas that are not common’ (Rehman Rashid, 1986b).
15 In other 
words, political leaders have the ability to interpret the will of the community as a 
whole and have the capacity to determine what is good and bad for the community. 
Ordinary people do not have such capacity. This paternalistic view of leadership is 
consistent with the understanding of leadership in the collectivist nationalist view. 
Mahathir’s views on political leadership are far removed from the idea of 
the democratic representation of a population through their democratically elected 
political leader. Mahathir believed in the unconstrained power of an elected 
political leader, which K. Das had dubbed as ‘mandatism’. According to K. Das,  
the mandatism of Mahathir meant that once a political leader had been elected by 
popular vote, he or she had the unreserved power and right of decision-making 
during his or her tenure, regardless of what the voters thought (Das, 1986).
16 
Mahathir used this view to justify the suppression of any ideas that opposed or 
varied from the political elites’ vision for the community. According to this view, 
the vision of the elites should not be distracted by sectional or individual views   197
and interests as it will eventually benefit the community. Mahathir said, ‘if 
everyone is allowed to have his own way, nothing can be achieved’ (Malaysian 
Business, 1976: 8).  
Hence, there was no room for civil society to debate the nationalist goal or 
common will and come up with alternatives. In Malaysia, civil society is seriously 
curtailed, or, at best, is subjected to state power (see Jesudason, 1995). As Lily 
Zubaidah contended, ‘[in] Asian way political model…the importance of a vibrant 
civil society and political opposition to ensure accountability and transparency is 
criticised for impeding the process of “good government” and undermining high 
levels of economic growth’ (Lily Zubaidah Rahim, 1998: 57). The characteristics 
of Malaysian semi-democracy—regular and relatively fair elections and the non-
existence of civil liberties—that William Case observed, is a logical consequence 
in Malaysian politics under Mahathir (see Case, 1993). 
In sum, Mahathir’s view was collectivist in the sense that a national 
community as a whole took precedence over individual liberty and rights, 
including ethnic liberty and rights as well. In addition, the population’s view must 
be shaped in accordance with the vision of political elites as the authoritative 
interpreter of the common will of the community. Therefore, individual liberty 
and rights and any ideas that might distract from the achievement of the common 
must be limited and suppressed for the benefit of the entire community. This 
collectivist view of a community justified the suppression of other ideas on the 
nature and goals of the national community that were different from the ruling 
elites and rationalised the elite’s monopoly on defining the national community 
and its goals.    198
4.2.2.  Collectivist nature of Mahathir’s nationalism reflected in 
authoritarian politics  
Mahathir’s collectivist view is reflected in his authoritarian suppression 
and manipulation of those viewed as opposing his nationalist vision. Mahathir’s 
nationalist vision and ideas had been challenged by opposition parties, Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), critical mass media and ethnic elites as well 
as individuals. According to the collectivist nationalist view, as ideological 
challenges to the elites’ nationalist vision are considered challenges to the 
common will of the entire community, they must be suppressed in the interest of 
the entire community. Furthermore, the elites attempted to indoctrinate society to 
accept their vision, which they viewed as the right answer for the community. 
Hence, Mahathir’s authoritarian politics, as demonstrated in how he suppressed 
challenges to his civic nationalist vision with legal devices and how he 
manipulated mass media to facilitate acceptance of his nationalist vision, warrants 
further exploration.  
 
Authoritarian suppression of potential challengers to Mahathir’s 
vision 
Malaysia, especially under Mahathir’s administration, has been viewed as 
a semi-democracy. According to William Case, its politics is closer to 
authoritarian politics than to democratic politics (Case, 1993;1997). Although 
opposition parties are permitted in Malaysia, Mahathir never regarded opposition 
as a necessary component in Malaysian politics. He once maintained in an 
interview, ‘opposition is…not absolutely necessary. There are places, which as 
you know, have no opposition at all and I think they progressed fairly rapidly’   199
(Asiaweek, 1982).
17  The targets of Mahathir’s suppression included not only 
opposition parties but also social organisations and NGOs which were critical of 
Mahathir. Regarding pressure groups, that is NGOs and other critics of the 
government, Mahathir said: 
The activities of pressure groups in our country must be monitored by the 
Government… If pressure groups are allowed to go so far as to set aside 
laws and the machinery of governmental power and to bring about a state 
of anarchy, the entire population will suffer. From anarchy there is no 
return to a life of peace and order. One power struggle after another will 
take place. When this happens, it will be rather late to dream of the old 
tranquillity. (Mahathir, 1986: 120) 
The suppression of opposition parties, NGOs and other political forces 
was systematically and institutionally supported by various laws at Mahathir’s 
disposal.
18  The Internal Security Act, (ISA)
19  which allows the government to 
detain people without trial, was frequently used to crackdown on opposition 
parties and NGOs critical of the government. In 1987, for example, more than a 
hundred members of opposition parties, social and religious activists were 
detained under the ISA. The government also uses the Sedition Act and the 
Official Secrets Act
20 frequently to harass individual opposition politicians when 
they make controversial comments or reveals government wrongdoings.  
The government also uses the Societies Act, which requires NGOs 
involved in political activities to register as political organisations, to monitor 
NGO activities closely. In accordance with the Societies Act, social organisations 
carrying out lobbying or advocating particular political issues, or merely issuing 
statements of a political nature, are deemed political organisations and must be 
registered accordingly. The Registrar of Societies is also authorised to deregister   200
organisations challenging (1) the government, (2) Islam or any other religion, (3) 
the National Language, (4) the special position of the Bumiputeras, or (5) the 
legitimate interests of the country’s other communities. In addition, under the 
Police Act, opposition and NGO activities and gatherings require permission from 
the police, even if they are held on private premises. 
The government also intervenes directly to ensure that the mass media 
reports only views favourable to the ruling elites or to prevent the dissemination 
of alternative and competing views. The most well known case involved the 
shutting down of the Star, Sin Chew Jit Poh and Watan during Operation Lalang 
in 1987. Before being shut down in 1987, the Star regularly published articles 
critical of the Mahathir government by the first Prime Minister, Abdul Rahman 
and a former opposition politician, Tan Chee Koon. Watan, owned by Khir Johari, 
a former minister and a close ally of Abdul Rahman, took a similar critical stance 
towards Mahathir and his government (Means, 1991: 213). In 1987, the 
government, without explanation, withdrew the licenses of the three publications. 
The Star resumed publication in 1988, only after a major shake-up of its editorial 
board.
21  
Such suppressive measures effectively constrain the activities of 
opposition parties, NGOs and individuals in airing their critical and alternative 
views and prevent them from disseminating their alternative views. Thus, 
Malaysian civil society is unable to construct and formulate effective alternative 
visions that can compete against the vision constructed by the state elites. The 
extensive indoctrination and the suppression of civil society consolidate 
Mahathir’s civic nationalist vision.    201
Indoctrinating the community with Mahathir’s vision 
Mahathir used the mass media as an effective indoctrination tool. This 
strategy, while ensuring that Mahathir’s views were accepted, prevented, in even 
any indirect way, the disseminating of alternative ideas and visions among the 
Malaysian people. The Mahathir government exercised its control of the mass 
media primarily through the ownership of the media by the component parties in 
the ruling coalition. Through its trustee companies, the ruling coalition owns 
nearly all the mainstream mass media. Through its investing arm, Renong, 
UMNO owns the New Straits Times Press, which publishes such major Malay 
and English newspapers as The New Straits Times, Sunday Times, Business Times, 
The Malay Mail, Sunday Mail, Berita Harian, and Berita Minggu (Gomez, 1994: 
74-76).  In 1994, UMNO also obtained a major stake in Utusan Melayu, which 
publishes Utusan Malaysia, a mass circulation Malay newspaper (Gomez & Jomo, 
1997: 123). Furthermore, other than the government-owned TV station, Radio 
Televisyen Malaysia (RTM), UMNO, directly and indirectly, owns or exerts 
influence on the private broadcasting stations, TV3 and Metrovision.
22 The 
government’s dominance of the Malaysian mass media does not stop here.  The 
major political parties in the ruling coalition, MCA and MIC own such English, 
Chinese and Tamil newspapers as The Star, Nanyang Siangpao, Tamil Malar and 
so on.
23 
The government uses the mass media under its control to ‘construct its 
own version of the Malaysian social reality for its own political ends’ as Mustafa 
Anuar summarised (Mustafa K. Anuar, 1990: 84). The coverage of mainstream   202
newspapers and TV stations is significantly biased towards the ruling party and its 
leadership, Mahathir.
24 Mustafa K. Anuar maintained: 
The majority of these mainstream media are owned or controlled by 
individuals or groups who are closely aligned to the powers-that-be. And 
this means that generally the mainstream media have an ideological bent 
or a political preference that is collectively similar, i.e. fervently 
supportive of the government. This fervour can be felt especially in the 
run-up to general elections. (Mustafa K. Anuar, 2001: 8)  
Such coverage maximises the exposure of the government’s propaganda or 
carries out “popular persuasion,” as termed by UMNO (Hilley, 2001: 157).
25 The 
mainstream mass media is viewed as another arm of the ruling party. Muzaffar 
Tate described the behaviour of mass media as follow: 
 The coverage of the news by TV, the radio and the Press remains as 
selective as ever. TV and Radio still carry on with their brainwashing, 
reporting the opinions of ministers as statements of fact, identifying 
patriotism with the ruling party, and toeing the party lines the hallmark of 
democracy. The Press remains as sycophantic as ever to the people in 
power; it gives detailed coverage of mundane happenings around the 
country but provides the barest attention to matters of real import such as 
the epic trial of a former deputy prime minister. (Muzaffar Tate, 2000: 
11) 
Francis Loh and Mustafa Anuar argued that the government justified the 
mass media’s subservient attitude of following the government line as 
‘responsible development journalism’ (K. W. F. Loh & Mustafa K. Anuar, 1996: 
100). Every issue was depoliticised, so as not to criticise government activities, 
unless, of course, the issue would contribute to the popularity of the ruling elites, 
especially Mahathir. The issues were oriented towards the form of economic 
development that was the core basis of Mahathir’s civic nationalist vision. Thus,   203
the mass media promoted ‘a sense of “naturalised” affinity between the Barisan 
[Nasional] and the electorate through images of ethnic harmony, nation-building 
and other Vision emotionalism’ (Hilley, 2001: 123). According to Hilley: 
The promotion of such, through a populist ideology of growth, has helped 
cast UMNO as beneficent provider, while concealing the contradictions 
and weaknesses of the development process itself. Thus the Malaysian 
media is constantly awash with photo opportunities, messages, slogans, 
soundbites, nationalist songs and jingles, editorials and corporate 
advertising all extolling the common challenge of onward industrial 
development. The messages are both overt and subliminal, whether it be 
Mahathir’s almost daily appearances on the front page of the New Straits 
Times, Star, or Utusan Malaysia opening another industrial plant, or the 
Telefakta information adverts (TV2) displaying (over catchy music) 
simplified statistics of improved industrial output. (Hilley, 2001: 122-
123) 
Suppression and indoctrination were mobilised to advance Mahathir’s 
civic nationalist view, while preventing any potential ideological challenge. These 
authoritarian aspects of Mahathir’s rule show another side of the success of his 
civic nationalist vision.  
 
4.3. Mahathir’s rhetoric of threats to the civic Malaysian 
nation 
Mahathir’s rhetoric of external and internal threats to the nation 
contributed to the prevalence of his civic nationalist vision. Inculcating a siege 
mentality justified Mahathir’s authoritarian politics, strengthened Mahathir’s 
nationalist legitimacy and mobilised the Malaysian people towards his civic 
nationalist vision. This strategy characteristically reflects Mahathir’s collectivist-
authoritarian nationalism. This section then explores Mahathir’s demonisation of   204
the West, which, according to Mahathir, was an external threat that encroached on 
the independence and interests of Malaysia and Chinese chauvinism and Islamic 
extremism, the internal threats to harmonious and peaceful ethnic relationships 
within Malaysia.  
 
4.3.1.  Case of external threats: demonising the West 
Mahathir’s strident criticism of cultural, political and economic aspects of 
the West was an attempt to prop up his legitimacy as a protector of the national 
community. The heart of Mahathir’s criticism of the culture of western 
civilisations is that their declining culture, if emulated, would have a devastating 
impact on Malaysia. Mahathir observed that western culture had lost ‘respect for 
marriage, family values, elder, and important customs, conventions, and 
traditions’ and was ‘riddled with single-parent families, which foster incest, with 
homosexuality, with cohabitation, with unrestrained avarice, with disrespect for 
others and, of course, with rejection of religious teachings and values’ (Mahathir 
& Ishihara, 1995: 80). Declining western culture posed a threat to Malaysian 
society because western culture was copied ‘indiscriminately, without weighing 
whether what is copied is good or bad’ (Mahathir, 1986: 44-45). And Mahathir 
warned that the consequence might be disastrous. He argued:  
Today, Malay values are changing without systematic study and without 
guidance. Anybody can attack the current system and set up new values. 
This results in senseless conflict and confusion. It is time the Malays 
realized this and thought out the right steps to ensure that such a vital and 
potent tool as a system of values was properly used for the good of the 
Malay community. (Mahathir, 1986: 103)   205
The economically powerful West threatened Malaysia’s small but 
prosperous economy, according to Mahathir.
26 At the peak of the 1998 economic 
crisis, when Mahathir earned international attention with his accusations of 
unregulated capitalism and unruly globalisation, he made his point clear: 
There should be globalization. There should be movement of funds. But 
movement of funds must be regulated so that we get the best and not 
destroy [the country]. We still go around asking people to invest in 
Malaysia. But when you come in to push up share prices and then dump 
share prices, that’s not contributing. That’s creating a lot of problems for 
us. That’s the kind [of investment] we can do without. (Chanda, Biers, & 
Hiebert, 1998)  
Mahathir went so far as to suggest that the more developed (primarily 
western) countries deliberately attempted to undermine the newly found wealth 
and prosperity of such developing countries as Malaysia. In a speech at a 1997 
World Bank meeting, Mahathir explained why the Asian economic crisis 
happened. His argument was that the strength of the developed countries’ 
economies, or even of a handful of major international funds, which cannot accept 
the realities of a prospering Asia, could undermine a developing country’s 
prosperity. He contended: 
We dismissed the rumor that Malaysia would go the way of Mexico… 
We did not realize how close we were to a manipulated economic 
crisis… We know why it was suggested that Malaysia would go the way 
of Mexico. We know now that even as Mexico’s economic crash was 
manipulated and made to crash, the economies of other developing 
countries too can be suddenly manipulated and forced to bow to the great 
fund managers who have now come to be the people to decide who 
should prosper and who shouldn’t… [Q]uite a few people who are in the 
media and in control of the big money seem to want to see these 
Southeast Asian countries, and in particular Malaysia, stop trying to   206
catch up with their superiors and to know their place. (Mahathir, 1997c, 
emphasis added)
27 
When addressing a Malaysian audience, Mahathir was more upfront, 
raising the issues of recolonisation and foreign dominance in his diagnosis of the 
cause of the Asian crisis. Mahathir’s reasoning was that with such international 
economic regimes, ‘only by making the targeted countries poor to the extent of 
having to beg for help, colonisation can be achieved’ (Mahathir, 2000b). Raising 
the spectre of colonisation, Mahathir asserted: 
We have seen how companies and banks in the neighbouring countries 
have been crippled and forced to be sold off to the Westerners. If we 
allow these multinationals to cross our borders, can we avoid the same 
fate from befalling us? We will become only workers in foreign 
firms…There will no longer be national industries. There will be no more 
NEP. There will be no more privileges for Bumiputeras in the economic 
field…even if we are paid higher salary, our status will be nothing more 
than slaves to them. Actually we will be colonised. (Mahathir, 2000b) 
In addition, Mahathir argued that the West attempted to destabilise the 
already weak social fabric of Malaysia by spreading such Western (and hence 
unsuitable in the Malaysian context) concepts as democracy and human rights. He 
maintained that such political ideology was rooted in the West’s arrogance, even 
racism. He argued: 
[The west] will not be satisfied until they have forced other countries to 
adopt their ways as well. Everyone must be democratic, but only 
according to the Western concept of democracy; no one can violate 
human rights, again according to their self-righteous interpretation of 
human rights. Westerners cannot seem to understand diversity, or that 
even in their own civilization differed over time… It comes from the 
perception that white people are better than colored people. It is a racial 
cultural phenomenon. (Mahathir & Ishihara, 1995: 75-76)   207
An example of how the Mahathir government dealt with so-called external 
political threats is the accusation it made against the former United States Vice 
President Al Gore, of meddling in Malaysian internal affairs. At the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Council (APEC) summit meeting in November 1998, Al Gore 
expressed his sympathy for Anwar, who had been sacked two months before the 
meeting, and for the Reformasi movement.
28  Al Gore’s comment, instead of 
embarrassing the Malaysian government, incurred strong criticism instead.
29 Then 
Mahathir’s deputy, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, criticised Al Gore’s remark, 
reflecting Mahathir’s views. In an interview with Asiaweek, Badawi said, “The 
Americans are inciting illegal political forces to overthrow a democratically 
elected government through violent means. Their aim is to destabilize our 
government” (Asiaweek, 1998).  
The demonisation of purported external enemies united the population to 
rally behind the current political leadership. Abdul Rahman Embong observed that 
Mahathir’s rhetoric of Western conspiracy during the 1997–98 economic crisis 
transformed the population’s favourable and friendly perceptions of the West 
before the economic crisis to a hostile one (Abdul Rahman Embong, 2001a: 96-
97).
30  Indeed, Mahathir’s attempts brought about an intended consequence—
political mobilisation in support of the incumbent leadership. Christine Chin 
observed: 
During the early phase of the crisis, expressions of particularized 
identities and interests were subordinated to the larger and more patriotic 
concerns of defending the currency and the economy…Key social forces 
rallied to the defence of the Prime Minister. Wanita (women) MCA’s 
campaigns for women to come together and demonstrate their national 
love and pride had seen the participation of between 5000 and 10,000   208
women in each state, while Wanita UMNO’s Eshan Wanita Campaign 
encouraged women to save for the country. Malay and non-Malay 
middle-class women especially pledged to save as much as they could, to 
donate their jewellery as a way to increase the country’s reserves and, 
when possible, to buy only Malaysian-made products. (C. B. N. Chin, 
2000: 1049-1050) 
Mahathir’s anti-Western arguments created a siege mentality in part of the 
population. He claimed that culturally, Malaysia was threatened by the declining 
and decaying Western culture and that the small but prosperous Malaysian 
economy was vulnerable to manipulation by the superpowers in the international 
arena or even by a handful of multinational capitalists. Politically, the West 
attempted to forcefully impose their political system and ideologies which, 
according to Mahathir, did not fit into the multiethnic and thus fragile Malaysia. 
Mahathir adopted such anti-West arguments as an important element to support 
his nationalist legitimacy as a protector of the community who would speak up on 
behalf of Malaysia’s interests. 
 
4.3.2.  Ethnocultural threat from Chinese chauvinism 
Mahathir also attempted to strengthen the support for his civic nationalist 
vision by identifying ethnocultural threats from the Chinese community, which he 
dubbed as ‘Chinese chauvinism’. In UMNO politics, demonising non-Malays has 
not only been a common tactic,
31 it has also been effective in securing power 
within the party and guaranteeing general support from Malay society.
32 Mahathir, 
as Prime Minister, effectively used this tactic too.  
There is, however, a difference between the earlier ethnocultural Malay 
nationalists’ and Mahathir’s rhetoric. Mahathir’s demonisation of the non-Malay   209
community was sufficiently sophisticated to avoid extensive alienation of non-
Malays as his civic nationalist vision must be accepted by the non-Malay 
community as well. Mahathir did not rebuke the entire non-Malay community. He 
only criticised small and carefully chosen sectors of said community which he 
considered as groups who attempted to impose their minority view on the majority 
view or who appealed to non-Malay ethnocultural nationalism, thereby 
destabilising a harmonious civic Malaysian society. Mahathir, in 1981, warned: 
The dissenting minority, if they are true citizens, must accept what the 
majority wills or tolerates. Of course they may express their opposition 
and they may try by legal means to change things in their favour. But 
their test of loyalty as citizens is their willingness to accept and live with 
what they cannot change. Unfortunately, there are minorities who seek to 
revolt or to migrate the moment conditions within their own country are 
not as they wish them to be. They vociferously declare their loyalty but to 
them loyalty means simply having thing their way. (Mahathir, 1981a) 
Mahathir implied that a substantial majority of the non-Malays, other than 
the chauvinists, were contented with his civic nationalist vision, supporting whole 
-heartedly the incumbent BN government. His criticism was carefully structured; 
he used the term ‘minority’ instead of ‘non-Malay’ to avoid offending the whole 
non-Malay community, while still targeting the small group intended. 
The best known example  of Mahathir’s action against the Chinese-
chauvinists was Operation Lalang in 1987, during which the police arrested more 
than a hundred critics of the government, including opposition politicians, social 
activists, educationists, in the tensions between the Malay community (led by 
UMNO youth) and the Chinese community (led by DAP, MCA and Gerakan).
33 
According to Mahathir, it was one section of the Chinese community, specifically   210
the DAP, that had been chauvinistic, playing with racial rhetoric that had caused 
the ethnic tensions in 1987. In a speech to Parliament immediately after the mass 
arrests, Mahathir maintained: 
The police found that a few opposition party members and their 
associates have purposely blown up issues relating to race. The DAP in 
particular has often been playing up issues relating to the Chinese and the 
Indian openly. They have been giving the picture that the government is 
oppressing these races. They held public meetings, rallies, demonstrations 
and other activities to inflame these people against the government and 
the Malays. (Mahathir, 1987b)
34  
Furthermore, Mahathir freed from blame the other Chinese parties in the 
ruling BN coalition that had aligned with the DAP. In the same speech, Mahathir 
contended, ‘[DAP] also challenged the Chinese and Indian political parties in the 
government and accuse them of not championing the rights of their people. The 
latter, thus challenged, have therefore tried to compete in playing up similar 
issues’ (Mahathir, 1987b). Hence, Mahathir’s argument was other sections of the 
non-Malay community, which truly agreed with his civic vision and did not intent 
to play up racial issues, did so only at the DAP’s instigation. By placing the blame 
squarely on the DAP and its supporters, Mahathir’s “divide and rule” tactic 
avoided offending the majority of non-Malays. His argument portrayed the 
majority of the non-Malays, who were innocent victims of the DAP’s 
manipulation, as pro-government, whereas the DAP, which was ethnocultural 
nationalist, was against his civic vision. 
Mahathir also took the opportunity to showcase his commitment to 
maintaining an environment conducive to the building of a civic Malaysian nation. 
While blaming the ethnocultural nationalist or ‘chauvinist’, Mahathir, in the same   211
speech, stated, ‘our country has a multi-racial population that believes in different 
religions. Therefore, it is not only difficult to achieve unity but we are also 
susceptible to divisions and tensions because of the sensitivity of racial, religious 
and cultural issues’. He pledged unequivocally that his government would take all 
necessary actions to overcome such ethnocultural nationalist challenges: ‘The 
government will not hesitate to take strict measures to curb those with intention to 
cause disorder and stand in the way of the government’s responsibility and effort 
to ensure peace and stability in the country for the prosperity of the people’ 
(Mahathir, 1987b). 
By demonising a small group of non-Malays as ethnic chauvinist, 
Mahathir attempted to tap the population’s fear of instability to bolster support for 
his civic nationalist vision. Mahathir used the possibility of ethnic conflict as a 
constant threat to the stability of multi-ethnic Malaysian nation to justify his 
collectivist-authoritarian nationalist view. Using this fear factor, Mahathir was 
able to consolidate support from a section of society that already agreed with his 
vision, while undermining those who supported other nationalist positions.  
 
4.3.3.  Ethnocultural threat from Islamic extremism 
Where the Malay community was concerned, Mahathir adopted a similar 
approach of rebuking and demonising a small group of ethnocultural Malay 
nationalists, that is, the Islamic extremists, to strengthen his civic nationalist 
position while undermining ideas different from his vision of Malaysian nation. It 
was, however, more complicated in the Malay community. Errors made while 
handling any issue related to Islam would alienate the entire Malay community.   212
Although there had been a substantial boost of support from the non-Malays in the 
early 1990s, Mahathir had to maintain majority support from the Malay 
community for his political legitimacy.
35 Accordingly, Mahathir’s approach with 
regards to the Malay community involved promoting a version of ‘progressive 
Islam’ that fitted into his civic vision, while reproaching and suppressing Islamic 
extremism as a threat to civic Malaysian nation.  
 
Mahathir’s progressive and tolerant Islam as alternative to 
extremism 
Mahathir’s “progressive Islam” was characterised by an emphasis on the 
modernising and tolerant aspects of Islam. Mahathir warned that a rigid 
interpretation of Islam would jeopardise economic development, one of the 
foundations of his civic nationalist vision. He emphasised instead some elements 
in Islam that would justify the stress he placed on economic development. 
Mahathir argued: 
the challenge for those who would try to seek out ways of Islamising the 
discipline of management by reference to old practices and books, is 
made more difficult by the neo-conservative approach of some Muslims 
who demand a total reintroduction of a hotch-potch of ossified ancient 
laws and regulations devised to deal with situations which have long 
since disappeared. (Mahathir, 1987a) 
Mindful of the glorious past of Islamic civilisation, Mahathir asserted that 
Islamic teaching and culture, in fact, promoted the development of knowledge, 
skill and economy. He argued that, in its time, Islamic civilisation was a leading 
and ‘modernising’ force in the development of human society. He said, 
‘Remember always that Islam, when it came, was a modernising force that   213
brought greatness to the early followers of the faith; greatness in the field of 
economy, industry, the sciences, the arts and military prowess’ (Mahathir, 1984c).  
At the same time, Mahathir promoted a version of Islam that emphasised 
tolerance and justice, for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. As Mahathir must 
avoid alienating the non-Malays, he kept a delicate balance between fostering 
Malay Islamic identity while respecting the non-Malays’ fear of Islam. Mahathir 
had to assure non-Malays, who were primarily non-Muslim, that there was a place 
for them in Malaysia and that his moderate Islamic vision would not affect the 
non-Malay secular way of life. Mahathir contended: 
In multireligious Malaysia, the government, which is led by Muslims, has 
to show to all quarters, Muslim and non-Muslim, that its administration 
based on the concept and principles of Islamic justice is truly fair… It is 
important that the administration in Malaysia led by Muslims, prove that 
their rule is fair to all, is non-partisan and non-oppressive. (Mahathir, 
1993b)  
He emphasised that the Malaysian government, led by Muslim, was 
tolerant. He stressed: 
Although Malaysia is governed by a predominantly Malay Muslim 
government, there has been no attempt to oppress non-Muslims. The 
Malaysian government is very tolerant and shows respect for the religious 
observances of the different religious groups. No one can say that by 
being so is not Islamic… Though Islam has been accepted as the official 
religion of Malaysia, other religions are allowed to be practised… [I]n 
Malaysia where Islam is the religion of only 60 per cent of the people, not 
only is freedom to practise other religions meaningful and important but 
it implies an acceptance of tolerance and accommodation on the part of 
the Muslim majority. (Mahathir, 1999b) 
Mahathir portrayed his version of Islam as being secular, development-
oriented and tolerant of other religious beliefs or cultures, which was acceptable   214
by a majority of Malay Muslims and which did not alienate the non-Muslim non-
Malay population. Mahathir’s version of Islam was probably the best compromise 
he could make while still committing himself to his civic nationalist vision.  
 
Demonising Islamic extremism 
While developing a version of Islam as an alternative to more extremist 
interpretations, Mahathir suppressed extremist Islamic groups to distance the 
Malay community from them. Mahathir depicted the extremist Islamic groups as a 
small, ethnocultural and fanatical section of the Malay community that threatened 
the future of the Malaysian people. By highlighting how extremism posed a threat 
to the comfortable and prosperous life of the Malaysian people, Mahathir could 
amass support for his civic nationalist vision, in which moderate Malay Muslims 
and non-Malays could co-exist.
36  
Mahathir did crack down on militant or extremist Islamic groups: there 
was the Memali incident in 1984,
37 the banning of Al-Arqam in 1994
38 and more 
recently the Al-Ma’unah case in July 2000. A group of Al-Ma’unah members 
raided an army camp in Grik, Perak and escaped with firearms in an incident 
widely known as the ‘Grik Arms Heist’.
39 The group was stopped by the military 
and police at a village called Sauk. Those involved in the heist were detained 
under the ISA.  
Mahathir used the Al-Maunah incident to warn of the threat of extremism 
and the vulnerability of ethnic harmony, Mahathir specifically identified his 
government with promoting racial harmony and Al-Ma’unah—and by implication   215
any Islamic extremists—with threatening the stability of the nation. In an 
interview published immediately after the incident, Mahathir contended: 
non-Muslims are now feeling uncertain, they fear that there is a move by 
the Muslims to victimise and kill them. This is a very unhealthy 
development in a multi-racial society like Malaysia. The Government has 
implemented programmes to instil muhibbah [literally, unity of nations] 
and promote good relationships between the people of various races. This 
has been successful, but these people do not even value the racial unity in 
the country. They set out to do something which they know will create 
distrust among the people, the perception that the Muslims are out to 
victimise the non-Muslims. (The Star, 2000b)  
Mahathir also linked Islamic extremist groups with PAS. In the Al-
Ma’unah case, Mahathir claimed, ‘[Al-Ma’unah members] make up the extremist 
group among PAS supporters. Although the Al-Ma’unah is not PAS-owned, the 
members are people influenced by anti-government campaign carried put by PAS’ 
(Wan Hamidi Hamid, 2000).
40 For Mahathir, PAS represented a threat to his civic 
vision as well as to his political power. While Mahathir attempted to keep the 
Islamic identity of Malay within moderate boundaries, PAS embraced a stronger 
version of Islam, aiming to establish an Islamic State. In addition, after more 
religious leaders were recruited, grassroots support for the PAS had grown 
substantially since the 1980s.
41 As Mahathir viewed these developments as threats 
to his political power and the success of his vision, he attempted to cast an 
extremist mould on PAS to marginalise it and to keep the majority of the Malays 
within his vision of Islam.  
Mahathir’s tactic of demonising Islamic extremism strengthened his civic 
nationalist argument. By exploiting the non-Malays’ fear of extremist Islam, 
Mahathir attempted to capture their support. By developing his own moderate and   216
progressive version of Islam, he attempted to capture the Malay community. 
Mahathir tried to marginalise all other Islamic forces, including independent and 
dissenting Islamic groups and the Islamic party, PAS. The Malaysian people, 
convinced by Mahathir’s rhetoric of the ethnocultural threat, were meant to be the 
base for his civic nationalist vision.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
In the 1990s, Mahathir’s nationalism was civic and it eased tensions 
regarding the relationship between ethnic identities and national identity. At the 
same time, Mahathir’s nationalism was collectivist-authoritarian. It was 
collectivist in that individual liberty and rights were subordinated to the 
community’s collective interests and will, as defined by political elites. Such a 
view justified the political elites’ authoritarian control to facilitate the 
implementation of the political elites’ nationalist vision.  
Mahathir attempted to resolve the issue of ambiguous national identity 
through his proposition of Bangsa Malaysia, in which the population identified 
themselves as Malaysian first. Mahathir’s economic vision, Wawasan 2020, and 
economic growth were strong incentives for the population to support Mahathir’s 
nationalist vision, which was supplemented by required changes in economic and 
cultural policies. Mahathir was especially keen to capture the new confident and 
competent Malay middle class with the concept of Melayu Baru and set it as a 
model for the larger Malay community to emulate. Mahathir believed that when 
the entire Malay community was confident and competent, they would accept his 
civic Malaysian vision. By the mid-1990s, Mahathir’s civic attempt had gained   217
some success in resolving the national identity question. Mahathir gained the 
population’s endorsement in the 1995 elections. 
At the same time, Mahathir’s nationalism was collectivist. He effectively 
employed the coercive legal apparatus to suppress any potential challengers to his 
civic nationalist vision and manipulated the mass media to indoctrinate the 
population to accept his vision. Another aspect of Mahathir’s collectivist 
nationalism is his rhetoric of threats to the national community. Mahathir’s 
demonisation of the western threat propped up his nationalist legitimacy as the 
protector of the Malaysian nation. Also, Mahathir’s rhetoric of ethnocultural 
nationalist threats to the nation from Chinese chauvinists and Islamic extremists, 
sophisticated enough not to be merely another ethnocultural nationalist argument, 
was intended to further garner the population’s support for his civic nationalist 
vision.   
This exploration of Mahathir’s nationalism and its success in the 1990s is 
crucial in understanding the 1998 UMNO factional dispute as it helps clarify why 
different nationalist languages were used in the 1998 dispute. The success of 
Mahathir’s civic vision explains why the dispute did not develop into an 
ideological conflict between Mahathir’s civic nationalism and his challengers’ 
exploitation of ethnocultural Malay nationalism. At least, as a significant portion 
of the Malay community was not opposing the civic nationalist vision, it reduced 
the appeal of ethnocultural Malay nationalism, which was once very explosive, as 
I explained in the examination of the 1969 and the 1987 disputes. In other words, 
Mahathir’s attempt to resolve the national identity issue was, to a certain degree, 
successful as it substantially reduced the advantage of championing ethnocultural   218
Malay nationalism and the chance of ethnocultural Malay nationalism gaining 
enough support from the Malay community.  
As an aspect of a problem becomes less urgent, the other aspect of the 
problem unresolved may rise on the surface of debate. An unresolved nationalist 
issue regarding the relationship between individual and community, then, became 
increasingly central in the issue of nationalist identity after the 1990s. The 
relationship between the individual and the community was rarely debated in the 
community as it had been imposed by political elites. As the tension between 
ethnic identities and national identity decreased, the question of the relationship 
between the individual and the community became increasingly important.  
Although Mahathir successfully combined civic nationalism, collectivist 
nationalism reflected in his authoritarian control of society and very rapid 
economic growth in the first half of 1990s, it was not guaranteed that he would be 
able to maintain this particular combination. The growth of a more independent 
and confident Malay community produced not only strong supporters of civic 
vision among the Malays but also a demand for more liberal politics, which was 
potentially critical of Mahathir’s authoritarian nationalist control of society.
42 
While the criticism of Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalism did not 
mean that Mahathir was bound to fail, it formed the beginnings of a potential 
challenge to his civic nationalism. Such a challenge would mature if the 
incumbent elites failed to maintain economic growth and if the challenging elites 
were successful in developing and spreading an alternative view.  
                                                 
1 Mahathir was Prime Minister of Malaysia for 22 years; this accounted for nearly half 
of Malaysia’s post-independence history. Many scholars considered the three defining   219
                                                                                                                                      
characteristics of the Mahathir administration to be economic development, authoritarian 
politics and the management of ethnic tensions. There has been substantial research on 
issues related to economic development in Malaysia. Several studies examined the 
commitment of the Malaysian political leadership, especially the Mahathir administration, 
to capitalist economic development (see Funston, 1998; Gomez & Jomo, 1997: Ch. 5; B. 
T. Khoo, 1995: Ch. 4; Searle, 1999). Many scholars considered Malaysian politics, 
especially the Mahathir administration, to be authoritarian in nature (Case, 
1992;1993;1997; Crouch, 1992;1993;1996a; B. T. Khoo, 1997a; Munro-Kua, 1996). Ho 
Khai Leong focused on how Mahathir monopolised political power (Ho, 2001). Hari 
Singh argued similarly, ‘Political power among the ruling elite was no longer pluralistic 
but had become concentrated in one man. The prime minister was no longer the “first 
among equals”: he was the first, and brooked no equals. Suffice it to say that the 
traditional ground rules no longer applied. A different ideology was needed to legitimize 
a challenge to authority’ (H. Singh, 2001: 540). In a similar vein, Wang Gungwu 
described Mahathir’s style as “presidential”. He observed, ‘[Mahathir had] a tendency to 
centralize all constitutional power in his own hands, he prefer[ed] a cabinet loyal and 
accountable only to him, and he [was] determined to stamp his strong ideological values 
directly on the Malaysian people’ (Wang, 1986: 115). Saravanamuttu and Simon Tan 
studied the relationship between Mahathir’s authoritarianism and capitalist economic 
development (Saravanamuttu, 1987; S. Tan, 1990). Scholars of Malaysian politics 
observed that by the first half of the 1990s, there was growing emphasis on the Malaysian 
nation, beyond loyalty to individual ethnic backgrounds (see Abdul Rahman Embong, 
2001b; Halim Salleh, 1999; Hilley, 2001: Ch. 2; B. T. Khoo, 2003: Ch. 2; S. Khoo, 1999; 
Williamson, 2002). In particular, Shamsul and Abdul Rahman Embong (Abdul Rahman 
Embong, 2001c; Shamsul, 1998) observed the growing ambiguity of Malay identity, in 
the context of the growing Malaysian identity. This chapter argued that the growing sense 
of the Malaysian nation or the recession of ethnic loyalties was a sign of success of 
Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian civic nationalism. This vision was based on 
economic growth as the main incentive for the population to accept the civic vision. In 
addition, Mahathir utilised authoritarian politics as a reflection of collectivist-
authoritarian nationalism to suppress any ideological challenges to Mahathir’s civic 
vision.  
2 These two concepts, Bangsa Malaysia and Wawasan 2020 were first announced in 
Mahathir’s speech, titled “Malaysia: The Way Forward” on 2 March 1991. See (Mahathir, 
1991a). 
3 In fact, creating a Bumiputera entrepreneurial class has been one of the foci of the 
NEP since its implementation in the 1970s. And, given Mahathir’s emphasis on private 
sector-led economic development since the 1980s, more emphasis was placed on the 
promotion of the Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC). In the 
1990s, creating the BCIC was a major element of economic planning in Malaysia. During 
the first half of the 1990s, the government implemented several programmes to create and 
promote the BCIC. They included the vendor development programme, the franchise 
development programme, the venture capital scheme, the upgrading of management and 
technical capabilities of Bumiputera businesses, and expanding entrepreneurial culture 
programmes to involve Bumiputera youth. See, (Malaysia, 1996: 74-77). 
4  In an interview with the Star in 2003, Mahathir said, “As I said, one of my 
disappointment is that I cannot change the culture of the Malays, in particular, and the 
indigenous people. I want them to learn how to look after themselves and not be 
dependent on the Government. I want them to work hard; I want them to be honest and 
not try and get rich quickly. All these things I keep on hammering. I scolded, I praised, I   220
                                                                                                                                      
did everything but I'm afraid, as I have said before, there is improvement only to a little 
extent…” (The Star, 2003) 
5 For a comprehensive review of studies of the Malaysian middle class, see (Abdul 
Rahman Embong, 1999). Another Abdul Rahman essay surveyed the newly rising Malay 
middle class, Melayu Baru or the new Malay extensively. See (Abdul Rahman Embong, 
2001c). For statistical evidence of the significant growth of the Malay middle class, see 
(Jomo, 1999). 
6 A. B. Shamsul discussed extensively how the development fund was misused at the 
local level and how politics intervened in the allocation of the development funds before 
and after the NEP. See (Shamsul, 1983;1986).  
7 Mahathir pointed out that Malay settlers were not provided any incentives to strive 
for a better life or economic wealth. This was called the ‘syndrome of lazy Malays’ 
(Mahathir, 1970: Ch. 3; Syed Hussein Alatas, 1977). In the same book, he also examined 
how the Malay ethical and value system prevented them from getting fully involved in a 
capitalist economy and in the competition with immigrant ethnic groups. He argued that 
the Malays were captivated by ‘religion’, ‘formality’, ‘ritual’, and ‘fatalism’ rather than 
pursuing ‘worldly things’, ‘innovation’, ‘success’ or ‘effort to change’ (Mahathir, 1970: 
155-159). 
8   When Mahathir became prime minister, he pointed out a negative aspect or 
consequence of the NEP that perpetuated the old Malay value system rather than changed 
the Malay mindset. A consequence of promoting Malay entrepreneurs under the NEP in 
the 1970s was ‘a “dole”, “subsidy”, or “get-rich-quick” mentality among the Malays’ (B. 
T. Khoo, 1995: 127). Mahathir believed that the assistance provided by the NEP to the 
Malays aggravated already existing shortcomings and deepened their weaknesses, 
producing a middle class heavily dependent on the government’s assistance. Mahathir, in 
an interview, argued: ‘To say that the NEP has succeeded is to be optimistic. You say it 
has succeeded in creating this middle-class of Malay professionals. It has not. What has 
happened is simply the government makes it possible for them to survive. The economy 
is still basically the same. All these people depend on the government—the Malay 
contractors, the Malay lawyers, the businessmen’ (Jayasankaran, 1988: 9).  
9  While empirical research on this development is hardly available in Malaysia, a 
recent survey shed light on this topic. Heng Pek Koon surveyed Malaysian university and 
college students (from University Malaya, University Kebangsaan Malaysia, HELP 
Institute and TAR College) in 1999-2000 (Heng, 2003). When asked to gauge the relative 
weight of ethnic identities and national identity, regardless of ethnic group, more than 50 
per cent of the students answered that their national identity as Malaysian was more 
important than their ethnic identities. Also, quite a number of students responded that 
their national identity and ethnic identity were equally important. About 20 per cent of the 
students surveyed stated that their ethnic identity was more important than their national 
identity. This survey indicated that, as a significant majority of young Malaysians placed 
their identity as Malaysians before their ethnic identity, it might be possible that future 
generations in Malaysia might prioritise their national identities. When asked the reason 
for being patriotic or for being proud to be Malaysian, regardless of ethnic backgrounds, 
the respondents chose “multiracial harmony and cooperation” (41 per cent) as the most 
important reason, followed by “social/political stability”. In all ethnic groups, “multiracial 
harmony and cooperation” topped the list (48 per cent in Chinese, 55 per cent in Malay 
and 50 per cent in Indian students).  
10  Related to this change in Malaysian society, A. B. Shamsul’s article (Shamsul, 
2001) noted that, despite significant changes and transformation in the Malaysian 
political landscape, many researchers were still locked in the old framework of ethnicity   221
                                                                                                                                      
and communality in their interpretation of Malaysian politics. In particular, noting the rise 
of the Reformasi movement, Shamsul argued that a new politics, which he described as 
‘“interest-based” politics, largely non-communal and non-ethnic in nature’ had emerged. 
And he asserted that it was time to ‘shift away from the colonially generated categories of 
race, ethnicity, and region’ (Shamsul, 2001: 223). 
11 A report in the Far Easter Economic Review quoted a Malay mother whose son was 
attending a Chinese school: ‘Mandarin is so widely spoken in Asia… Much business is 
done in Chinese. I’m helping him for a future career’ (Hiebert, 1995). So much so, the 
cultural deregulation was welcome by parts of the Malay community for highly practical 
reasons, which overcame the emotional and symbolic ethnocultural Malay nationalism of 
the 1960s.   
12 Gomez showed a substantial increase of support for the BN in constituencies where 
more than 33 per cent of the voters were Chinese. In 49 out of 58 such constituencies, the 
BN obtained more than 50 per cent of the total votes (Gomez, 1996a: 32-33, Table 8). 
Furthermore, except in one constituency, the BN’s share in the 1995 elections increased 
in all the other constituencies by up to 27 per cent points, compared to the 1990 elections. 
In addition, according to statistics compiled by Maznah Mohamad, in ethnically mixed 
states such as Melaka, Selangor and Negri Sembilan, UMNO’s share increased more than 
10 per cent compared to the 1990 elections (Maznah Mohamad, 2003: 73 Table 4.1). 
13 The evidence provided here is indirect. In general, Malaysian elections statistics 
does not reveal voting pattern by ethnic groups. It is also difficult to obtain data regarding 
the performance of individual parties in the BN. Even the number of seats in parliament 
held by the individual parties is not officially announced in the case of BN component 
parties. Because of these reasons, conclusions regarding elections results can only be 
inferred.  
14 For more, see section 1.2.2 in chapter 1. 
15 Although Mahathir used this argument effectively, he was not the first Malaysian 
leader who emphasised the crucial role of political leadership. There had always been a 
strong tendency to consider the elites superior to  the population in Malaysian politics, 
who were supposed to be in ‘need of strong government and a sense of “guidance”’ 
(Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 1989: 371). Hence, it is not surprising that political leadership in 
Malaysia has been described as paternalistic. David Martin Jones argued that paternalism 
has been one of the core elements of political culture in Asia. Especially in Southeast 
Asia, he discussed, ‘[people regard] [Zaman] Mas [golden era] created by the man of 
prowess…was a time of order, wealth and harmony. Conversely, it follows that if the 
efficient managers of the state sustain high level of growth and prosperity, such rule is not 
only legitimate, but also virtuous’ (Jones, 1995: 74-75). Specifically, in the case of 
Malaysia, Zakaria Haji Ahmad contended that political leaders, especially the Prime 
Ministers since the first Prime Minister, Abdul Rahman, have been paternalistic (Zakaria 
Haji Ahmad, 1987: 125). Furthermore, Chandra Muzaffar effectively showed the links 
between the modern political elites’ paternalistic view with traditional Malay political 
culture and how the modern political elites of UMNO successfully appropriated the 
authority of traditional rulers by claiming themselves as ‘protectors’ (see, Muzaffar, 
1979). 
16 K. Das observed, ‘To him the voter gives his power away when he votes for a 
candidate. Once he elects an MP, the voter has no more to say. He has a voice once in 
five years or so and then he has no more to say than a prisoner in Pudu gaol. That is 
[Mahathir’s] perception of the “mandate”’ (Das, 1986: 2). 
17  Mahathir’s strategy disparaged the opposition and exploited the fear of the 
population. During the 1999 elections, the ruling coalition’s media advertisements had   222
                                                                                                                                      
such headlines as “Vote Opposition and You Vote the Country Into Chaos,” “Vote 
Opposition and You Vote Away Your Religious Freedom,” “Vote Opposition and You 
Vote Away Your Cultural Freedom,” “Don’t Gamble Our Future,” etc. (see, Mustafa K. 
Anuar, 1999). 
18  In fact, Mahathir was not personally responsible for many of the authoritarian 
enactments. When Mahathir became Prime Minister, the Internal Security Act, Sedition 
Act, Society Act and Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance and so on were already in 
existence as they had been used by his predecessors to overpower political challenges.  
Mahathir used these laws extremely effectively to suppress his political and ideological 
opponents, thereby strengthening the trend towards authoritarianism in Malaysia. For a 
study of the fluctuations  between democracy and authoritarianism in Malaysia since the 
independence, see (B. T. Khoo, 1997a). A report by Tommy Thomas listed 14 statutes, 
which “cause severe inroads, and, for practical purposes abrogate constitutionally 
protected fundamental rights”. Not surprisingly, these statutes were all introduced by the 
executive. The list included: Public Order (Preservation) Act, 1958, Prevention of Crime 
Act, 1959, Trade Union Act, 1959, Immigration Act, 1959, Internal Security Act, 1960, 
Societies Act, 1966, Police Act, 1967, Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of 
Crime) Ordinance, 1969, Universities and University Colleges Act, 1971, Official Secrets 
Act, 1972, Sedition Act, 1972, Essential (Security Cases) Regulations, 1975, Printing 
Presses and Publicity Act, 1984 and Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act, 
1975 (Thomas, 2001). A summary of this article was published on the Aliran Website at 
http://www.aliran.com/hr/tt3.html. (Accessed on 12 October 2004). 
   
19 The ISA was initially enacted to counter the threat from the communist insurgency 
in the 1960s but it has become a convenient tool to cope with any individual or 
organisation deemed to be a threat to the government. Under ISA, the police does not 
have to charge the detainees in court. Often called ‘detention without trial’, the ISA 
allows the government to detain any person deemed prejudicial to the national security 
initially for 60 days, which can then be extended by two years by the Home Minister. 
This detention can be extended indefinitely (Ramakrishnan, 2001: 4). 
20 The Official Secrets Act, first introduced in 1972, was amended in 1986, when 
Mahathir was Prime Minister. With the amendment, the government obtained more 
power to classify government information and documents as official secrets, which 
rendered them inaccessible to the public. Officials were required to report to the police 
anyone who sought the classified information  (Means, 1991: 139; Suaram, 1998: 230). 
21 Another example of the government’s ability to control the mass media was the 
crackdown of Harakah, PAS’s official organ, in 1999, right after a general election in 
November that year. After the sacking of then Deputy Prime Minister Anwar, the public, 
increasingly disillusioned with mainstream mass media which loyally delivered the 
government’s point of view, turned to such alternative media as Harakah, Malaysiakini, 
online discussion groups and Reformasi websites. The Harakah’s readership jumped from 
65,000 before Anwar’s sacking to 360,000 immediately after the 1999 general elections; 
its website had more than 140,000 visitors a day. Similarly, Malaysiakini, an on-line 
newspaper critical of the government, claimed that they had at least 100,000 visitors a 
day. For Mahathir, these thriving alternative sources of information were threatening. 
Immediately after the 1999 elections, the government raided the Harakah and arrested its 
editor, Zulkifli Sulong, and the owner of the printing firm that published Harakah, Chea 
Lim Thye. Furthermore, a few other critical publications such as Detik,  Eksklusif, 
Tamadun and Wasilah were served with government warnings (Netto, 1999: 4). Although 
the  Harakah was eventually permitted to publish, its frequency of publication was   223
                                                                                                                                      
reduced from twice a week to twice a month and its circulation was strictly limited to 
PAS members. 
22 TV3 was privatised in 1993. The company that was awarded the broadcasting 
license, however, was none other than the Fleet Group, which was wholly owned by 
Renong, an UMNO company (Gomez, 1994: 80-83). When Metro Vision, another 
commercial TV station, was privatised in 1994, the Utusan Group, owned by UMNO, 
was involved in the ownership of this new private TV station (Hilley, 2001: 121). 
23 MCA owns the English daily with the highest circulation in Malaysia, The Star, 
through its holding company, Huaren Holdings. In 2001, MCA also owned a controlling 
share of the Nanyang Press, which published a Chinese daily, Nanyang Siangpao, and an 
English daily, China Press. It was widely believed that critical coverage regarding the 
leadership of the MCA, Lim Liong Sik (MCA Team A), in favour of his political rival, 
Lim Ah Lek (MCA Team B), prompted the MCA’s takeover of the publication (F. Loh, 
2001). Also, MIC owns a Tamil daily, Tamil Malar.  
24 Mahathir had never supported press freedom. He explained, ‘Nowadays, you say the 
press is free, but it is not really free. The press must be under the control of someone—the 
editor, the reporter, the owner or sometimes even the advertisers. So it is not free’ 
(Crovitz, 1994: 20). As Mahathir was Prime Minister and President of UMNO and as the 
government and UMNO collectively owned a majority of the newspapers and TV stations, 
Mahathir’s statement was, in effect, an admission that Malaysian mass media reflected 
his views and those of his government.  
25 Mustafa K. Anuar, in a column posted at Malaysiakini, criticised the politicians’ 
(especially those associated with the ruling coalition) ‘patronising’ attitudes towards the 
public which were often expressed in the mass media. He argued, ‘Certain Barisan 
National politicians, in their desperate attempt to justify the unjustifiable, can be quite 
patronising towards the ordinary people. They would, with a straight face, insist that the 
Rakyat are not yet ready for open debate and a higher degree of press freedom because, 
so goes the insinuation, the latter are intellectually unrefined, emotional and politically 
naïve. These politicians have over time acquired the knack of ridiculing the intelligence 
of the people, including the so-called orang kampung. The multiethnic and multicultural 
nature of a society such as ours also comes in handy. It provides an “excellent” and 
convenient excuse for the ruling elite to restrict press freedom and curb certain civil 
liberties.’ (Mustafa K. Anuar, 2002) 
26  Mahathir, of course, had been the most ardent champion of capitalist economic 
development amongst UMNO leaders. However, he distinguished between capitalism ‘as 
a way of earning a living,’ and capitalism as it existed in the West, which had become, in 
his opinion, an ideological justification of greediness (Mahathir, 1986: 57). 
27   Mahathir’s reference to Mexico arose because Mexico experienced a similar 
economic crisis a few years before the Asian Economic Crisis. The initial symptoms of 
both crises -- sudden devaluation of currency and capital outflow -- were similar. 
28 Al Gore said, ‘Democracy confers a stamp of legitimacy that reforms must have in 
order to be effective… And so, among nationals suffering economic crises, we continue 
to hear calls for democracy, call for reform, in many languages—People Power, Doi Moi, 
reformasi. We hear them today—right here, right now—among the brave people of 
Malaysia’ (Reyes & Healy, 1998).  
29 It is true that Al Gore’s criticism did not help the Reformasi movement much. An 
opposition leader, Syed Husin Ali, president of PRM (Parti Rakyat Malaysia or 
Malaysian People’s Party), a BA (Barisan Alternatif; Alternative Front) coalition party, 
said, ‘We consider Al Gore’s speech as not being well-advised. It can be effectively used   224
                                                                                                                                      
by Dr. Mahathir as an opportunity to strengthen his position by whipping up the people’s 
patriotism’ (Reyes & Healy, 1998). 
30 Abdul Rahman Embong noted that, after the economic crisis, only 49.6 per cent of 
the new middle class viewed major powers, for example, the United States as ‘economic 
friends’. Before the economic crisis, as much as two-thirds of the new middle class 
regarded the major powers as economically friendly. Also, only a third of the new middle 
class saw the major powers as political friends. Likewise, before the economic crisis, as 
much as 48 percent of respondents regarded the major powers as politically friendly.  
31 Ethnocultural nationalists in the party had claimed that the presence of non-Malays 
was a major threat to the survival and prosperity of the Malay community. Mahathir, as 
one of the young ultras in the 1969 dispute, subscribed to such a view. The challengers in 
the 1987 dispute were no exception, although they were indirect in their criticisms of the 
non-Malays. In 1987, Team B’s argument in support of the NEP being extended meant 
that Team B still viewed the non-Malays as an economic threat to the Malay community. 
32 It was ironical that it was Mahathir who pinpointed the ‘fear factor’ in collectivist-
authoritarian nationalism. In an interview with a journalist, he argued, ‘you only cling to 
your race when you feel a sense of fear. If the Malays learn that there really is nothing to 
fear, that they have the ability to compete and succeed, I think the emphasis on seeking 
protection in their own community will disappear’ (Rehman Rashid, 1986a). He 
acknowledged that a sense of fear made one adhere to one’s own community. In 
Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalism, his rhetoric of threat and enemies to the 
community actually played the role of making people cling to their own communities and 
support those who claimed they could protect them. Indeed, it was UMNO which, for a 
long time, claimed it was the protector of the Malays. In light of Mahathir’s argument 
above, UMNO’s rhetoric of being protector of the Malays contradicted its attempts to 
enhance Malay economic power through the NEP, as one made the Malays more 
dependent, while the other tried to make them independent.  
33 For details regarding Operation Lalang, please see the previous section. 
34 The ethnic tensions were primarily between the Chinese (an opposition party, DAP, 
and components in the ruling coalition, MCA and Gerakan, as well) and UMNO. 
However, while 16 members of DAP were arrested, only three from UMNO were 
arrested (Suhaini Aznam, 1987b: 13). 
35 In the 1990 elections, when Mahathir’s UMNO Baru faced a formidable challenge 
from the opposition, notably, Razaleigh’s Semangat 46’, a splinter group from UMNO, 
non-Malay support for the BN was decisive in saving the ruling coalition. The new trend 
of non-Malays supporting the ruling coalition was even more pronounced during the 1995 
elections. Despite the surge in support from the non-Malay community for the ruling BN, 
non-Malay support could not replace Malay support, as far as UMNO was concerned. 
Being a Malay-based party, UMNO needed strong Malay support, at all cost. Compared 
to Malay support, non-Malay support was only of secondary importance. For example, 
the 1999 elections were disastrous because the party had lost the majority support of the 
Malay community, even though the ruling coalition maintained its 2/3 majority, with 
substantial support from the non-Malay community.  
36 In his article, Malhi pointed out that Mahathir used a simple formula to persuade the 
Malaysian people (Malhi, 2003). The formula involved Mahathir describing his own 
version of Islam as modernist and progressive and PAS’s version as “traditional”, 
“backward-looking” and “obscurantist” (Malhi, 2003: 236-238). In a similar context, 
Martinez claimed that Islam in Malaysia has been subjected to subjective interpretations 
to serve the political agenda of the interpreters. She argued, ‘UMNO, PAS and even non-
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behalf of constituencies whose views are essentially assumed and defined for them, rather 
than as a reflection of widespread listening and polling of what most Malaysians want or 
think. These claims are written largely in swathes of generalizations, rendering 
Malaysians into groups and categories that perpetuate schisms and stereotypes’ (Martinez, 
2001: 467).  
37 In November 1984, a group of villagers in Memali, Baling, Kedah confronted the 
police. The group, led by former PAS member, Ibrahim Mahmood, who was widely 
known as Ibrahim Libya, was attacked by the police. As a result, 14 people were killed. 
Ibrahim Mahmood, a graduate from the prestigious Al-Azhar University, helped Anwar 
Ibrahim organised peasant demonstrations in Baling in the early 1980s. He ran for a 
parliament seat in the general elections as a PAS candidate but was unsuccessful. 
Subsequently, the government attempted to arrest Ibrahim Mahmood and his followers 
under the ISA, charging them with practicising a deviant form of Islam. Ibrahim 
Mahmood and his followers resisted arrest in Memali, resulting in the clash with the 
police. 
38 Established in 1968, Al-Arqam began as an inconspicuous religious movement but 
by the 1990s, it had developed into a much larger movement, with networks in such 
neighbouring countries as Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines. Alarmed by the growth of 
the group, the Malaysian government banned Al-Arqam in 1994 and arrested key figures, 
including its leader, Ashaari Muhammad, under the ISA. Although the government 
claimed that it had kept Al-Arqam under surveillance for years and that the group was 
practising a deviant form of Islam, there was suspicion that the government’s sudden 
crackdown was a political measure rather than a religious one (Abdul Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 
2000: 36-38).    
39 Al-Ma’unah, meaning ‘inner power’, was established in 1998 near Klang in 
Malaysia.  It has more than 1,000 members in Malaysia and overseas members in Brunei, 
Singapore and Egypt. They practice the traditional Malay martial arts, Silat, and 
membership is confined to Muslims. (From Al-Ma’unah website at 
http://members.tripod.com/~al_maunah/intro.htm) (accessed on 2 August 2000) 
40 Some participants in the arms heist incident were former PAS members who were 
expelled when they became involved in Al-Ma’unah. PAS denied any relationship with 
the Al-Ma’unah (The Star, 2000a).
  
41 In the early 1980s, PAS changed its leadership from nationalist leaders to religious 
ones such as Nik Aziz Nik Mat, Fadzil Noor and Abdul Hadi Awang, who had graduated 
from Islamic universities in the Middle East or from the Dakwah (Islamic missionary) 
movement (Hussin Mutalib, 1993: 37-39). The resurgence of Islam in PAS was part of 
the growing influence of Islamic revivalism, Dakwah, in the 1980s. If Malays were 
persuaded by PAS, it meant, for Mahathir, a loss of political legitimacy and a grave threat 
to his civic nationalist vision. The resurgence of Islam among Malays had strong 
ethnocultural Malay nationalist implications. PAS’s performance in the 1999 elections, 
when it captured the Kelantan and Trengganu state governments and increased its 
parliament seats from seven to 27, was particularly stunning.   
42 The political role of the developing middle class in Southeast Asia, and in Malaysia 
specifically, is a highly contentious issue. The majority view, where Malaysian politics is 
concerned, is that the developing middle class is highly supportive of the authoritarian 
state to protect the economic affluence that they enjoy (Brown & Jones, 1995; Crouch, 
1992;1993; Jesudason, 1996; Kahn, 1996; Kahn & Loh, 1992; K. W. F. Loh, 2000). 
There are only a few studies that have concluded that the middle class is a force for 
democratisation in Malaysia (Saravanamuttu, 1989; H. Singh, 1991). On the other hand, 
Abdul Rahman Embong and others have argued that the middle class is not homogeneous   226
                                                                                                                                      
but fragmented (Abdul Rahman Embong, 1999). Given the rapid growth of the Malaysian 
middle class in the past couple of decades, which caused unequal development, these 
scholars believed it was problematic to view the Malaysian middle class as a homogenous 
class. However, even those who had downplayed the importance of the middle class as an 
agent of political change still acknowledged there could be situations where the 
Malaysian middle class could be critical of the state (Crouch, 1992; Jesudason, 1996; 
Kahn, 1996; K. W. F. Loh, 2000).   
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5.  Conflict between Collectivist-Authoritarian and 
Individualistic-libertarian Nationalism: The 1998 
UMNO Dispute and Political Crisis  
UMNO experienced another devastating factional conflict in 1998. 
Differences between Mahathir and his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, resulted in 
Anwar’s dismissal from his cabinet post (Deputy Prime Minister) and party post 
(Deputy President) in September 1998 but that was, by no means, the end of the 
dispute. A political reform movement (Reformasi) emerged, expanding the 
UMNO factional dispute into a political conflict between the Mahathir-led BN 
and the opposition coalition, which succeeded Anwar and the Reformasi 
movement. In the end, the most of Malaysian society was polarised into two 
competing groups, making the 1998 UMNO factional dispute one of the most 
significant political developments in Malaysian history. 
Observers have drawn parallels between Abdul Rahman’s fate in 1969 and 
Mahathir’s situation in 1998. One such observer, Cheah Boon Kheng, 
commented: 
[Mahathir’s] “give and take” policies, or policies of accommodation and 
compromise, of appeasing one race and then another, that he was now 
practicing were reminiscent of those of Tunku Abdul Rahman’s policies 
that ironically Dr Mahathir himself used to criticize… [In 1969,] he had 
expressed strong pro-Malay nationalist sentiments and “anti-Chinese” 
views. In that same year he was expelled from UMNO for his “hate” 
letter to Malaysia’s Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, whom he had 
accused of being “pro-Chinese”. Ironically, thirty years later, as 
Malaysian Prime Minister, in the country’s tenth general elections in 
November 1999, Dr Mahathir found that like the Tunku, more than half 
of the Malay voters had turned their backs on him. “Must Prime Minister  
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Mahathir Mohamed’s fate be like that of the predecessor he so 
mercilessly tormented 30 years ago, Tunku Abdul Rahman?” (Cheah, 
2002: 187-188, 194) 
As the quote indicated, there was no doubt that Mahathir’s position in the 
1990s was similar to Abdul Rahman’s in the 1960s, in the sense that their 
nationalist vision was moving away from ethnocultural nationalism.
1 Mahathir 
also faced a political challenge, as did Abdul Rahman. There was, however, an 
important difference: Mahathir’s civic nationalist project was more successful 
than Abdul Rahman’s multicultural nationalism, which substantially reduced the 
potential threat from ethnocultural Malay nationalists to Mahathir’s nationalist 
legitimacy. A potential challenger to Mahathir, therefore, might have needed a 
more effective ideological argument than ethnocultural nationalism.  
On the surface, the dispute between Mahathir and Anwar looks simple. As 
in existing studies, it can be another squabble of clashing political pragmatism and 
opportunism – a clash between will to hold on power and will to get it newly, a 
conflict between two competing patronage networks, a fight between two different 
political styles and so on. Or it can be explained as a struggle between Mahathir’s 
more authoritarian politics and Anwar’s more liberal politics in relative terms, of 
course.
2  They are not wrong, but this thesis is looking at the dispute from a 
different angle. What this reaseach, in explaning the dispute, aims is to focus on 
different assumptions on national community, underlying the clashing political 
practices and outlooks – authoritarianism and liberalism. As I explained in chapter 
1, we can explain different political outlooks and practices by different ways of 
defnining national community. The different ways require different political 
outlooks and consequence different political practices. Thus, it becomes matter of  
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nationalism. What we can see on the surface is clashing political outlooks and 
practices, but they are essentially related to different perceptions on the 
characteristics of national community.  
The competing nationalisms in the 1998 dispute -- Mahathir’s collectivist-
authoritarian nationalism and Anwar’s individualistic-libertarian nationalism – 
were different from those in the 1969 and 1987 disputes. The two competing 
arguments in the 1998 dispute had different assumptions regarding the 
relationship between the individual and national community. Mahathir’s rhetoric 
of threats, the demonisation and authoritarian suppression of his political 
opponents reflected his collectivist nationalist view. Mahathir’s assumptions 
rationalised the subordination of individual liberty and rights to the vision and 
interests of the nation as defined by incumbent political elites, which were to be 
upheld and defended at all costs, including authoritarian suppression. Anwar’s 
reform agenda, which demanded democratic politics, civil society and tolerance of 
different voices, assumed that individuals had rights and it should be less 
constrained by the community’s interests and vision than the individuals in 
collectivist view.  
The first section in this chapter briefly reviews the Mahathir-Anwar 
relationship to understand the differences that led to the 1998 dispute. The second 
section explores Anwar’s nationalist ideological perspective, contrasting it with 
Mahathir’s. The 1998 dispute was more than a personal power struggle between 
Anwar and Mahathir and involved significant differences in their nationalist 
ideological position. The third section will demonstrate how Anwar utilised his 
nationalist position to mobilise the Reformasi movement after his sacking and  
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how Mahathir responded with authoritarian strategies that reflected his collectivist 
nationalist position. The fourth section investigates how the dispute deepened 
when it was transformed into an electoral competition between Mahathir’s BN 
and Anwar’s opposition coalition in the 1999 elections. The final section will 
examine the aftermath of the dispute, the main theme being how Mahathir was 
able to mobilise support by using a garrison-under-siege strategy that amplified 
fear, through the manipulation of internal and external developments in the post-
Reformasi period.  
 
5.1. The Mahathir-Anwar relationship and tensions in the 
1990s 
Anwar first came to national prominence in the late 1960s as a student 
movement activist critical of the government. As Education Minister in 1974, 
Mahathir was responsible for monitoring and, if necessary, cracking down on 
student movements. In the early 1980s, Anwar led a coalition of NGOs that 
opposed Mahathir government’s attempt to amend the Societies Act (B. T. Khoo, 
2003: 86-89). At that time, Anwar’s ideological position as a critic of the 
government was indirectly opposed to Mahathir, who was then at the centre of the 
government first as cabinet minister, then Deputy Prime Minister and finally 
Prime Minister. Anwar then championed social justice, eradication of poverty, 
opposition to oppressive government, Islamic issues and so on. The issues Anwar 
raised and the ideological assumptions underlying his student activism were 
consistent with his stance in the Reformasi movement.  
The relationship between Anwar and Mahathir changed dramatically in 
1982 when Anwar was co-opted into UMNO by Mahathir. After Anwar joined  
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UMNO, the ‘fierce and charismatic youth leader’ was promoted very rapidly, 
thanks to Mahathir’s patronage. Anwar gained experience in several cabinet 
positions as well as party posts.
3 At first, it seemed that both Anwar and Mahathir 
gained from cooperating with each other. While Mahathir supported Anwar’s rise, 
Anwar repaid Mahathir by providing strong support during such political turmoil 
as the 1983 constitutional crisis, the 1987 UMNO dispute
4 and  Mahathir’s 
confrontation with the Sultans in 1993. Anwar’s support at the grassroots level 
was instrumental in resolving the 1987 dispute in Mahathir’s favour and Anwar 
was said to be Mahathir’s most important weapon against Team B. A Malaysian 
Business article reported, ‘[Anwar] is enormously popular with the grassroots. 
Indeed, some analysts go so far as to suggest that the education minister [Anwar] 
is Mahathir’s biggest asset’ (Jayasankaran, 1987a: 6). Also, Mahathir and his 
government needed Anwar’s Islamic credentials
5 to deal with PAS and the rising 
force of the Dakwah movement. A close ally of Anwar asked, ‘Do you know of 
anyone else who can face PAS men at a public forum and debate openly on 
religious matters? …Whatever other leaders might say of Anwar, grass-root 
UMNO members know that they can’t afford to sacrifice him. Otherwise, UMNO 
will face a major problem with PAS’ (Pillai, 1987: 14). 
In the 1990s, the relationship between Anwar and Mahathir became more 
complicated when Anwar fought for and won the Deputy President of UMNO 
post. In the 1993 UMNO elections, the ‘Wawasan Team’ (Vision Team),
 led by 
Anwar Ibrahim and powered by young politicians, won most of the party’s top 
posts, including deputy president (Anwar himself) and all three vice presidents 
(Najib Razak, Muhammad Taib, Muhyiddin Yassin), heralding the advent of a  
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new generation. In 1993, the members of the ‘Wawasan Team’ were in their 40s, 
while Mahathir and his deputy, Ghafar Baba, were close to their 70s. Anwar’s 
team also surprised many by its well-organised campaign, its strategic use of 
economic patronage (Vatikiotis, 1993a: 15) and its effective use of mass media, 
virtually blocking the coverage of opponent candidates, especially Ghafar Baba, 
who was then the incumbent deputy president (Vatikiotis, 1993c: 16-17). 
Although Mahathir was initially opposed to Anwar’s challenge to Ghafar, 
Mahathir could not stop Anwar, realising his substantial support within the party 
(Vatikiotis, 1993b: 27). When the party elections were over, rumours surfaced of 
Anwar’s impending challenge to Mahathir.  
Shortly after assuming the post of Deputy Prime Minister in 1994, Anwar 
began articulating his own nationalist ideological position, which was often 
opposed to Mahathir’s. Hari Singh noted that Anwar needed to differentiate 
himself from Mahathir ideologically (H. Singh, 2001: 540). His attempts to 
ideologically distance himself from Mahathir, as I will show in later sections of 
this chapter, were reflected in his speeches from this time around. The expression 
of his differentiated ideological stance from that of Mahathir, of course, became 
crystal clear after his sacking in 1998. Along with the ideological differentiation, 
Anwar became identified as the leader of a new generation in UMNO. Considered 
UMNO’s flag-bearer of the Melayu Baru or Anwar’s Wawasan Team, this new 
generation of elites strongly supported Anwar as its leader, according to Ho Khai 
Leong (Ho, 1994).  
If the 1993 elections were marked by the successes of Anwar’s faction, 
then the 1996 party elections were known for Mahathir’s attempts to check  
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Anwar’s political and patronage base and to prevent his further advancement (B. 
T. Khoo, 1998).
6 Mahathir first strengthened his own grassroots support at the 
UMNO branch level and alienated Anwar’s supporters from such influential 
positions as UMNO branch and division heads (B. T. Khoo, 1997b: 163).
7 
Mahathir then banned all electoral campaigns for the party elections, fearing such 
campaigns would destabilise UMNO or undermined his own position 
(Jayasankaran, 1996: 24). Any challenge to the top two UMNO posts was 
prohibited as well. Overall, the 1996 elections were a setback for Anwar and his 
faction, as Mahathir’s faction regained all three UMNO Vice President positions 
(Kulkarni, Hiebert, & Jayasankaran, 1996: 22-23).
8  Although Anwar’s faction 
won a couple of such high level positions as Chiefs of the Youth and Women’s 
Wings, Mahathir’s political manoeuvring effectively, albeit temporarily, 
considering what subsequently transpired in 1998, neutralised the political 
pressures from Anwar’s faction (J. Chin, 1997a; B. T. Khoo, 1997b).  
Until 1997, although it seemed that there was tension over power and 
ideological differences between Mahathir and Anwar, they worked together as a 
team. According to John Funston, who follows Malaysian politics closely, ‘When 
and how Anwar succeeds Mahathir remain unknowable. But the parallel and 
intersecting aspects of their careers, and the tactical skills which both have 
demonstrated, make it likely that they will manage the change without a 
destructive contest’ (Funston, 1998: 31). Funston’s observation remained correct 
until 1997. From that point on, the division between the two leaders became 
increasingly apparent as the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis undermined  
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Mahathir’s efforts to maintain his blend of civic and collectivist-authoritarian 
nationalism. 
 
5.2. Anwar’s individualistic-libertarian nationalism 
Anwar’s agenda for political reform was based on assumptions regarding 
the relationship between the individual and the community that were different 
from those underlying Mahathir’s collectivist view. Three aspects of Anwar’s 
view will be examined: 1) the relationship between the individual and the 
community; 2) the need for democratic politics and civil society as a reflection of 
the individualistic-libertarian relationship between individual and community; and 
3) the individualistic-libertarian rejection of the collectivist-authoritarian rhetoric 
of threats to the community. This exploration of Anwar’s ideological assumptions 
will facilitate our understanding of the different ideological positions of the 
competing elites in the 1998 dispute. 
 
5.2.1. The individualistic view of the individual-community 
relationship 
The ideological underpinnings of Anwar’s nationalist position and his 
agenda for political reform in Malaysia can be traced to the pre-Reformasi period 
when Anwar was still in UMNO and the government. Anwar deemed individual 
liberty and rights important because of ‘the inviolability of human life and 
property’. In a 1995 speech, Anwar, drawing from two different traditions, 
observed:  
In the case of the Muslims, those who seek to exonerate tyrants and 
violators of human rights would do well to remember the Last Sermon of  
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the Prophet, in which he declared that the life of man and his property is 
inviolable and sacred till the end of the world. 
Life and property are the foundations of liberty. When John Locke 
launched a revolution in political thought in the 17th century to 
emancipate man from political tyranny, at the core of his thought, as 
contained in his Second Treaties on Civil Government, is also the idea of 
the inviolability of human life and property. (Anwar, 1995a) 
Having clarified the central importance of ‘the inviolability of human life 
and property’, Anwar considered developments in Asia and Malaysia. He 
observed that although various Asian countries had recently achieved significant 
economic development, individual rights and freedoms were still being ignored. 
On the contrary, economic success was widely used as an excuse for the further 
sacrifice of individual rights and freedom. He discussed:   
So enamoured are they of their own success that they have proffered the 
so-called East Asian Miracle theory as a vindication of their self-styled 
Asian way… The basic proposition of this view is that in Asia society 
takes precedence over the individual. Democracy, and the dominant 
features of modern political systems, are said to be fundamentally 
incompatible with the Asian way of life. It has also been claimed that the 
notion of freedom, individual liberty and human rights is alien to the 
Asian psyche. Such a view although well articulated by a few should not 
be portrayed as the dominant and representative view of Asia. (Anwar, 
1996c, emphasis added) 
Significantly, Mahathir was one of the Asian political leaders who 
justified the subordination of “freedom, individual liberty and human rights” to 
the community’s (economic) development. Mahathir, together with then Prime 
Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, was one of the most ardent defenders of 
Asian Values. Thus, Anwar’s arguments on behalf of individual rights and liberty  
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could be construed as a rejection of what Mahathir stood for. Anwar further 
elaborated this point in his book, Asian Renaissance:  
It is altogether shameful, if ingenious, to cite Asian values as an excuse 
for autocratic practices and denial of basic rights and civil liberties. To 
say that freedom is Western or unAsian is to offend our own traditions as 
well as our forefathers who gave their lives in the struggle against 
tyranny and injustice… No Asian tradition can be cited to support the 
proposition that in Asia, the individual must melt into a faceless 
community. (Anwar, 1996a: 28, emphasis added) 
Contrary to those who espoused ‘less-than-liberal’ Asian Values to 
guarantee the community’s prosperity, Anwar asserted that economic growth and 
political liberalism were not contradictory but compatible. He contended: 
some may have entertained the idea that authoritarianism is the most 
efficacious means for economic success. To them, democracy is may be 
too cumbersome for orderly development. It may even be inimical to 
political stability, which is a pre-condition for rapid economic growth and 
social well-being. Even Asian, especially Confucian, values have now 
come to be invoked in support of that proposition. [However,] [p]olitical 
liberality is not incompatible with strong economic performance… As for 
Asian values, they had produced great civilizations in the past. However, 
if these values are to contribute towards a renaissance of Asia, they must 
serve as a source of liberation. (Anwar, 1994a) 
For Anwar’s ideological rhetoric against Mahathir’s position, economic 
development was not the final goal; democracy and civil society, as expressions of 
individual liberty and rights, were to be built also. Anwar argued, ‘increasing 
wealth should be the occasion for the extension of freedoms to all spheres, these 
being the legitimate expectations of a civil society’ (Anwar, 1996a: 52). When 
Anwar developed his countering ideological position in the mid-1990s, he 
developed a vision for Malaysia which would have democratic politics and a  
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vibrant civil society based on economic affluence. It should be again noted that 
the ideological position of Anwar unravelled here does not necessary mean that 
Anwar had genuine belief what he constructed. One might be suspicious, with 
reasonable ground, of Anwar’s ideological path since his involvement in politics, 
of Anwar’s ideological rhetoric. The explanation here, however, does not intend 
to find Anwar’s true belief and intention, but the fact that Anwar attempted to 
develop a constrasting ideological vision in his contest against Mahathir’s 
ideological position.  
 
5.2.2.  Need of civil society and democratic politics 
Anwar’s support for individual liberty and rights and his criticism of those 
who suppressed them were translated into such concrete political practices as 
support for civil society, tolerance of dissidents and opposition figures, and the 
need to build a democratic political regime.
9  In  individualistic-libertarian 
nationalism, the nationalist vision and common goal were to be achieved through 
active participation and lively debates amongst the members of the community. In 
that sense, Anwar’s emphasis on civil society and participation was an important 
criterion that distinguished Anwar’s individualistic-libertarian nationalism from 
Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalism.
10  
Anwar claimed that he had always championed such notions as 
‘democracy, civil society and tolerance of dissent’ (Businessweek, 1998). Indeed, 
as articulated in his book, The Asian Renaissance (Anwar, 1996a). Anwar’s 
positions on democracy, civil society and the need for dissent were distinctively 
different from Mahathir’s. Anwar assumed that the role of ‘institutions of civil  
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society [was] to ensure order and stability, as well as protect the individual from 
the unwarranted denial of his rights’ (Anwar, 1994c). Anwar argued: 
The civil society we envisage is one based on moral principles, where 
governance is by rule of law not human caprice, where the growth of 
civic organizations is nurtured not suppressed, where dissent is not stifled, 
and where the pursuit of excellence and the cultivation of good taste takes 
the place of mediocrity and philistinism. For that, we have to retrieve, 
revive and reinvigorate the spirit of liberty, individualism, humanism and 
tolerance. (Anwar, 1996a: 51) 
Unlike Anwar, Mahathir had never been a champion of civil society. On 
the contrary, Mahathir believed that civil society hindered rapid economic 
development, hence delaying the achievement of his nationalist goals. Mahathir 
was also of the opinion that individual liberties might undermine the fragile ethnic 
fabric of Malaysia. A strong state had to overpower individuals and a state could 
not afford to foster a civil society, which might engender opposition to the 
leader’s vision. Anwar rejected such arguments.  
Mahathir’s call for unity of the community was frequently translated into 
the suppression of internal dissent or opposition, going against democratic norms. 
Thus, not surprisingly, Mahathir, who embraced collectivist nationalism, argued 
that countries like Malaysia could not have unfettered democracy as it might 
destroy the fragile ethnic harmony and economic growth. Anwar rejected such an 
argument: ‘Democracy is not a luxury that Asians cannot afford, as some would 
have us believe. On the contrary, it is a basic necessity for responsible and ethical 
governance’ (Anwar, 1996a: 52). Furthermore, Anwar went beyond mere 
tolerance of dissent; he argued for ‘fostering’ a sound opposition. In a 1996 
address, Anwar asserted:   
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A case can be easily made, not for mere tolerance, but rather the active 
nurturing of alternative views. This would necessarily include lending a 
receptive ear to the voices of the politically oppressed, the socially 
marginalized and the economically disadvantaged. (Anwar, 1996b) 
Anwar’s encouragement of liberal political practices also applied to 
Malaysia’s ethnic situation. Anwar’s views on multiethnicity were distant from 
ethnocultural nationalism. Anwar believed that a multicultural society could 
prosper if there was tolerance among the different groups. Such tolerance was 
available when justice, especially for the minority communities, prevailed. He 
argued: 
…tolerance and mutual respect can only come about in multicultural and 
multireligious community if there is justice in dealings, [and] if 
minorities are not marginalized on account of their faith, race and culture. 
Thus, social justice is a crucial element in sustaining solidarity in a 
multicultural community. (Anwar, 1996d) 
 Anwar went on to show that open politics with a healthy civil society, 
democracy and the tolerance of difference was the key for prospering multiethnic 
society which all ethnic groups and cultures can participate in and contribute to. 
He discussed: 
I believe that for multiculturalism to thrive it must be predicated upon an 
open civic culture. A political environment has to be evolved to enable 
full participation and open interaction of all the diverse elements of the 
society. There must not be the feeling of alienation among any sector, 
much less acts of suppression or denial of participation. In this regard, we 
must be more open towards the institutions, practices, and standards of 
the modern political culture which have been evolved and tested, and 
found to be efficacious in preventing injustices towards individuals and 
minorities. This is so pertinent because virtually all Asian nation-states  
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have minorities—ethnic, linguistic or religious, and in many cases, the 
task of nation-building has yet to be completed. (Anwar, 1994b) 
Anwar’s position of individualistic, non-ethnocultural nationalism was, to 
a degree, shaped by his base of support in Malaysian society. Anwar represented a 
new generation of Malays and a new generation of UMNO leaders. Anwar once 
claimed, ‘I represent a more liberal tradition within the party, a different 
generation’ (Mitton, 1997). In a broader context, Anwar represented a sector of 
Malay society with the following characteristics: ‘Firmly urban, many of them 
professionals, they move comfortably in the booming Malaysia corporate scene 
and have their sights fixed on the prime minister’s oft-stated goal of transforming 
Malaysia into a fully industrialised country by the year 2020’ (Vatikiotis & 
Tsuruoka, 1993). This sector of Malay society was also what Mahathir called 
Melayu Baru who, in Mahathir’s nationalist project, was supposed to lead the 
Malay community into a civic Malaysian nation.  
Anwar had observed that narrow ethnocultural nationalism thrived 
amongst people who could not adjust themselves into a new and rapidly changing 
environment and thus felt threatened. He commented:
  
In times of accelerated change those unable to relate themselves to new 
situations often withdraw to find security and comfort within their ethnic 
milieu. The potential mobilization of these sentiments into narrow 
nationalistic and tribalistic political forces cannot be underestimated… 
Asians in the new century must avoid this danger by transcending their 
particularities to forge a new civilization upon what they already have in 
common and upon what they can make universal from their own specific 
experiences. (Anwar, 1994b) 
Given the success and confidence of the new generation of Malays, which 
had identified Anwar as its leader, it was less vulnerable to narrow ethnocultural  
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nationalism. This partly explained why Anwar’s nationalist vision, when he 
challenged Mahathir, did not develop into a form of ethnocultural Malay 
nationalism.  
 
5.2.3.  Rejecting the rhetoric of threat to the community 
As Anwar was committed to individualistic-libertarian nationalism, his 
attitude towards what Mahathir had identified as threats to the Malaysian nation -- 
the West, Islamic extremism and Chinese chauvinism – was different. Anwar 
would cooperate with the West to advance Malaysian society, while Mahathir 
viewed the West as a threat that attempted to recolonise the East. Anwar criticised 
Asian leaders who had given a false picture of the West. Dubbing views such as 
Mahathir’s as ‘protracted miscomprehension’, Anwar said:  
Asian spokesmen, in their eagerness to fend off criticism, often indulge in 
stereotyping the West. Generally, the West is viewed as a morally 
decadent civilization. In the West, the institution of the family, regarded 
all over Asia as the very, foundation of a civil society, is in ruins. 
Religion and morality, being matters strictly within the individual domain, 
have ceased to have any bearing on societal mores. It is said that 
overindulgence in personal liberties has bred licentiousness to a degree 
which renders people no different from animals in the pursuit of wanton 
and depraved lifestyles. In short, the West is seen to be nothing more than 
a moral wasteland, a lost society of aimless wandering souls. (Anwar, 
1996a: 38-40) 
It was not difficult to infer that Mahathir was one of the ‘Asian 
spokesmen’ engaged in ‘stereotyping the West’ that Anwar criticised. Anwar 
believed that the West was an entity to ‘engage with’ and he argued for 
‘symbiosis between East and West’ (Anwar, 1996a: 33: 45). According to Anwar,  
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the way to ‘engage with’ the West was to initiate a dialogue to shape ‘a common 
vision of the future’ and to ‘share the burden of reshaping the world’. To do this, 
the East must ‘transcend the pain and bitterness following their earlier encounters’ 
such as their colonial experiences with their newly found prosperity as ‘a 
confidence booster’ (Anwar, 1996a: 41: 43: 45).   
Likewise, Anwar had a subtle but significant difference with Mahathir 
regarding the multi-ethnic reality of Malaysia. It should be noted that the audience 
of Anwar’s ideological argument in the Reformasi movement was not the Malay 
community exclusively, unlike the challengers’ in the 1969 and 1987 factional 
disputes. As indicated in the Permatang Pauh declaration, which was addressed to 
‘the citizens of Malaysia of all culture and religious backgrounds’, Anwar clearly 
recognised all of Malaysians and not merely the Malay community as his 
audience, (Anwar, 1998a, emphasis added). How Anwar defined his audience was 
a stark contrast to the exclusively Malay audiences of Mahathir’s The Malay 
Dilemma, or of Razaleigh’s “Menentang Kemungakaran Politik dan Ekonomi” 
(Fighting against Blasphemous Politics and Economy), which were the 
equivalents of the Permatang Pauh Declaration in the 1969 and the 1987 disputes 
respectively. In addition, one of the agenda items in the Permatang Pauh 
Declaration was ‘to reinforce a dynamic cultural identity, where faith in our noble 
cultural traditions is intact, but there is openness to all that is good in all 
traditions’. Hence, Anwar was clearly different from the previous challengers in 
the 1969 and the 1987 disputes in that he did not appeal to ethnocultural Malay 
nationalism.   
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Like Mahathir, Anwar did not defend extremisms. He cautioned against 
religious fundamentalism or ethnic extremism from either the majority or 
minority.
11 Anwar, however, emphasised the “positive aspects” of multi-ethnic 
reality and constructive ways to build a nation out of multi-ethnic reality instead 
of demonising the extremist elements like Mahathir did. Anwar recognised that 
ethnic diversity posed problems to nation building. Nevertheless, he interpreted 
the ethnic diversity in positive ways and argued that the diversity need not be a 
weakness but can be a blessing instead. Regarding the multi-cultural and multi-
ethnic realities of Malaysia, Anwar argued: 
Although we still face many challenges to maintain national unity and 
harmony, nevertheless we have found the situation far more enriching 
than had Malaysia been overwhelmingly a single community… [N]ations 
can actually grow and prosper by accepting the fact of cultural diversity, 
strengthening ourselves by learning about our differences as well as by 
reinforcing the values we share in common. (Anwar, 1994b)  
To make multi-ethnicity strength for Malaysia, Anwar argued that ethnic 
groups should make efforts to know each other and this was, for him, a way to 
integrate the various ethnic groups. He argued, quoting the Quran, ‘Humanity has 
been created to form tribes, races and nations, whose differences in physical 
characteristics, languages and modes of thought are but the means for the purpose 
of lita’arafu—“getting to know each another”’ (Anwar, 1994c). In fact, Anwar 
himself displayed keen enthusiasm in ‘getting to know each another’. He was the 
patron of inter-civilisation dialogue and he quoted and referred to not only the 
Quran but also the Chinese philosophers, Western thinkers, great Asian 
nationalists and so on.
12 The best example of such a speech was the one Anwar 
delivered at the opening of the “International Seminar on Islam and  
244
Confucianism: A Civilizational Dialogue” in Kuala Lumpur on 13 March 1995. In 
the speech, Anwar argued, ‘this seminar on Islam and Confucianism is merely a 
starting point of the quest for mutual understanding, which will pave the way for 
discourses on the other major Asian traditions such as Buddhism, Hinduism and 
Taoism’. 
Despite wide recognition of Anwar as strong believer of Islam, his 
nationalist position, shown throughout the 1990s and especially during the 
Reformasi period, could reconcile with individualistic nationalist position. On the 
surface, Anwar’s individualistic nationalism and his Islamic credential do not 
match well, because tenets of Islam especially one related to the identity of a 
community is highly collectivist and communitarian. Anwar, in the 1970s, is 
characterised by his activities in Islamic organisations, championing religious 
causes and his concern with socio-economic reform, fighting for poverty issue, 
social justice, economic inequality and so on (B. T. Khoo, 2003: 87-88).  
If we ovserve Anwar’s Islamic discourses in the 1990s carefully, Anwar’s 
advocacy of Islam itself – i.e. Islam as an end goal – is hardly found. An exteme 
expression of collectivist Islam might be an Islamic state. To apply the extreme 
Islamic tenet regarding a national identity in Malaysian context, Malaysia should 
be an Islamic state, dominated and led only by Muslim Malays. As I have shown 
earlier, Anwar’s view on Malaysia’s multiethnicity, of course, rejects this 
collectivist view and its political consequence. What Islamic Anwar in the 1970s 
left to Anwar in the 1990s, instead, were more universal –not a particular religion 
specific – values such as justice, equitable distribution of wealth, fundamental 
rights and liberties. He contended in his book, the Asian Renaissance:   
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By being moderate and pragmatic, Southeast Asian Muslims are neither 
compromising the teachings and ideals of Islam nor pandering to the 
whims and fancies of the times. On the contrary, such an approach is 
necessary to realize the societal ideals of Islam such as justice, equitable 
distribution of wealth, fundamental rights and liberties. This approach is 
sanctioned in a saying of the Prophet of Islam, to the effect that “the best 
way to conduct your affairs is to choose the middle path.” (Anwar, 
1996a: 113) 
In the Reformasi, Anwar’s Islamic credential earned support from Islamic 
organisations and from wider Malay community. Of course, Anwar’s image as a 
champion of Islamic causes might have struck a chord. Anwar, however, did not 
openly attempt to appeal to Islam in the Reformasi movement. From his speeches 
and statements after his sacking, his emphasis on Islamic tenets, excluding 
abovementioned universal values, is hardly found. Anwar needed to incorporate 
as many people from various ethnic and religious backgrounds as he could into 
his support base. Thus, instead of Islam, he talked about justice, democracy, 
freedom and multiethnicity of Malaysia.  
Given Anwar’s Islam in the 1990s, it could now reconcile with his 
individualistic nationalist view. Islam was used as one of the valuable sources of 
the idea for political reform he sought after. In other words, Islam was not the end 
goal for Anwar in the 1990s, but was a valuable source of ideas and justification 
for political reform that he, as a Muslim, advocated. Therefore, Islam in such 
context has position as one of the valuable components of national identity, not as 
the central and absolute reference of national identity, having relatively liberal 
connotation. This also corresponds to his view on multiethnic situation of 
Malaysia I explained earlier.   
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In sum, Anwar’s ideas on nationalism differed from Mahathir’s. While 
Mahathir, as explained in the previous chapter, placed the community above the 
individual, which justified the sacrifice of individual liberty and rights, Anwar 
viewed the individual as important as the community. Anwar’s advocacy of civil 
society, as an autonomous space in which individuals can make their voices heard, 
was a political expression of his different nationalist ideology. Anwar also 
rejected the political elites’ exploitation of the rhetoric of threat by which 
collectivist-authoritarian political leaders, especially Mahathir, garnered political 
support and nationalist legitimacy. In the political conflict in 1998, these 
conflicting ideological points became justifications for their proponents’ political 
manoeuvring.  
 
5.3.  The 1998 UMNO dispute and competing nationalist 
views: from the 1997 economic crisis to the Reformasi 
movement 
The 1998 factional dispute ranged from the onset of the 1997 economic 
crisis to the 1999 elections. Initially, the dispute was between Anwar and his 
supporters, who later became the Reformasi movement’s support base, and 
Mahathir who suppressed them. Subsequently, the contest became an electoral 
one—Mahathir’s UMNO-led BN was competing against the opposition coalition 
that supported Anwar. Thus, for the convenience of analysis, this study divides 
this dispute into two periods: from the 1997 economic crisis to the beginning of 
Reformasi and from Reformasi to the 1999 elections.  
The underlying tensions between Anwar and Mahathir emerged when the 
Malaysia entered into an economic crisis in 1997 as the two leaders disagreed as  
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to how they wanted to cope with the economic crisis. As far as Mahathir was 
concerned, his deputy’s disagreement could be interpreted as a veiled challenge to 
his authority and power when tested by the sudden economic crisis. However, it is 
not just Mahathir’s and Anwar’s political manoeuvrings that warrant close 
examination. More important, the different nationalist ideological assumptions of 
the two competing elites which shaped their arguments and manoeuvring in the 
dispute should also be examined. The different nationalist ideologies—Anwar’s 
individualistic nationalism and Mahathir’s collectivist nationalism—were 
revealed in the different responses and remedies proposed in the economic crisis, 
Mahathir’s suppression of the Reformasi movement and Anwar’s agenda for 
political reform.    
  
5.3.1.  Economic crisis, legitimacy and Mahathir’s response 
The economic crisis in 1997 threatened Mahathir’s political popularity 
which he had developed in the first half of the 1990s. More important, Mahathir’s 
entire nationalist vision, which projected that the Malaysian people would be 
integrated into the Malaysian nation (Bangsa Malaysia) in the optimism of a 
bright economic future (Wawasan 2020), was in jeopardy. When faced with this 
crisis, Mahathir accused multinational speculative funds and the economic 
superpowers of deliberately causing the crisis. Mahathir’s garrison-under-siege 
strategy, one of typical and practical strategy of collectivist nationalism, involved 
using his collectivist nationalism to defend the nation against these enemies, 
therefore justifying his political legitimacy.  
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Economic crisis as a threat to Mahathir’s legitimacy 
The Malaysian economy recorded 7.7 per cent GDP growth in 1997 which 
soon contracted by 7.5 per cent points, recording only 0.2 per cent growth in 1998 
(Mahani Zainal Abidin, 2000b: 2). In 1998, the manufacturing sector recorded –
2.5 per cent growth, while the agriculture and construction sectors contracted 4.4 
and 3.2 per cents respectively (National Economic Action Council, 2002: Ch. 2). 
The devaluation of the Malaysian ringgit was an additional difficulty. Before the 
crisis, the exchange rate was RM 2.50 to 1 U.S. dollar. In January 1998, the 
Malaysian ringgit was devalued to RM 4.88 per U.S. dollar. Eventually, the 
exchange rate was fixed at RM 3.8 per U.S. dollar when Mahathir introduced the 
Ringgit peg in September 1998 (Mahani Zainal Abidin, 2000b: 2). The collapse of 
the stock market was devastating for the Malaysian economy. In the 6 months 
between July and December 1997, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
Composite Index fell by 44.9 per cent and, in September 1998, the Index recorded 
262.70 points, an 11 year low. In slightly more than a year from July 1997 to 
September 1998, the market capitalisation of the KLSE fell by 76 per cent 
(Mohamed Ariff & Syarisa Yanti Abubakar, 1999: 418). Market value decreased 
from RM 917 billion in February 1997 to RM 182 billion in September 1998 
(Mahani Zainal Abidin, 2000b: 3). In 1998, the inflation rate was 5.3 per cent, 
which was twice that in 1997 and the unemployment rate increased sharply from 
2.7 per cent in 1997 to 6.4 per cent in 1998.  
At the onset of the economic crisis, concern with maintaining a 
comfortable lifestyle suddenly replaced the positive outlook of the Malaysian 
middle class in the first half of 1990s (Abdul Rahman Embong, 2001a: 92). Those  
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operating small and medium businesses, especially from the Malay middle class, 
suffered when the government reduced its spending,
13 which deprived them of 
relatively secure and attainable business opportunities. The economic slowdown 
increased job insecurity, regardless of class backgrounds. Workers who were 
retrenched had to find jobs with lower status and pay. Many also suddenly found 
themselves living below the poverty line (Ishak Shari, 2003; Ragaya Hj Mat Zin, 
2002: 15-17).  
Furthermore, along with the economic difficulties, concern was expressed 
regarding widespread corruption, cronyism and nepotism,
14 issues which only a 
handful of NGOs and opposition politicians were concerned about during the 
period of rapid economic growth in the early 1990s. An opposition figure 
commented on these issues as follows: 
Of course, people like me, ordinary people, they are not dreaming of 
being given to run multi-billion projects. But, when you see, it is national 
aircraft, North-South Highway, this project, that project, always are 
revolving around Halim Saad, Tajudin Ramli, Wan Azmi. Massive 
Private Power Supplier (project are) also revolving around these people. 
It’s all this people. So, not that you think that you can run, why cannot 
other people. There are definitely other people. Rather than five we 
should have about 200 for example.
15 
The economic crisis and the discontent that followed threatened the 
success of Mahathir’s entire nationalist project. Before the economic crisis, the 
impressive growth rate (7 to 8 per cent growth annually for nearly a decade) kept 
pace with the growth rate specified in Mahathir’s Wawasan 2020 for a developed 
Malaysia by the year 2020. This impressive growth rate bolstered the Malaysian 
people’s optimism in their future, which led to strong support for Mahathir in the  
250
1995 elections. Even Mahathir admitted that, due to the economic crisis,   
‘Malaysia’s growth…has been put back 15 years’ which meant that the growth 
accumulated in the 1990s had been nullified, making the prospect for the success 
of Wawasan 2020 bleak (Mahathir, 1997b). As the economic crisis had such a 
drastic impact, popular support for Mahathir, which was based on optimism about 
the economy, was potentially in doubt. For instance, a survey by a local scholar 
indicated that those surveyed, by a wide margin, considered Anwar a better leader 
than Mahathir to tackle the economic crisis.
16  
More important, the economic crisis and the accompanying discontent 
challenged the basic assumptions of Mahathir’s nationalist vision. As economic 
optimism and civic nationalist vision were part and parcel of Mahathir’s vision, 
the population expected that they would benefit from the growing economy if they 
participated in Mahathir’s civic Malaysia. However, as Alagappa observed, 
legitimacy based on performance was volatile, as performance was bound to 
change (Alagappa, 1995: 41-43). When the Malaysian economy was hit by 
economic crisis in 1997–98, the economic incentive for people to accept 
Mahathir’s nationalist vision was substantially reduced. Before there was a deep-
rooted ideological belief in the civic Malaysian nation, the performance-based 
legitimacy of Mahathir was already running out.  
 
Mahathir’s response: rhetoric of external threat to Malaysia 
When the economic crisis threatened the basic assumptions of Mahathir’s 
nationalist vision, Mahathir tried to bolster it with rhetoric of threat to Malaysia 
that reflected his collectivist position. As soon as the Malaysian economy felt the  
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impact of the economic crisis, Mahathir was quick to point an accusing finger at 
multinational currency speculators. Mahathir, in December 1997, claimed: 
It is the operations of the currency traders which had caused the 
devaluation of the currencies of Southeast Asian countries. There may be 
some inherent or fundamental weaknesses in their economies, but these 
have had only a minimal effect on the value of the currencies… It is clear 
that with the huge resources at their disposal, the currency traders can 
attack any country no matter how strong their economy may be. 
(Mahathir, 1997a) 
While blaming international currency speculators as the culprits of the 
Asian Financial Crisis, Mahathir went even further to exonerate his government 
and himself from responsibility and to find external scapegoats. In 1998, Mahathir 
observed:  
We are told that all these things are happening because our governments 
are corrupt and our countries are badly managed. Considering that we 
have been able to develop and prosper our countries remarkably well, this 
accusation seems strange. If we were badly managed, surely we would 
not have prospered, surely we would have suffered devaluation long 
ago… We are told [that] [n]ow market forces have come to discipline us, 
to teach how to manage our countries properly. Who are market forces? 
Certainly there are not locals. These market forces are foreign, located in 
some countries where they cannot be seen. Taking advantage of their 
ability to breach borders with their capital, they are able to devalue 
currencies at will. And when our currencies are devalued, we will suffer. 
(Mahathir, 1998b) 
On the other hand, during the crisis, Mahathir attempted to mobilise 
popular support by instilling fear of the crisis among the population. In his speech 
at the UMNO General Assembly, Mahathir asserted that the economic crisis 
caused by the currency attack was a work of ‘colonialist in a new way’. He 
reasoned that the weak ringgit and shares market would weaken local companies,  
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which in turn would reduce the government’s revenue. When the government 
could not make ends meet, it would collapse (Mahathir, 1998a). Mahathir kept 
painting a grim picture of what would happen if Malaysia surrendered to the new 
colonialism. He asserted that there would be ‘attempts to replace the incumbent 
leaders’, ‘local companies would be dominated by foreigners’ and ‘Bumiputera 
would be degraded to the status of slave again’. Mahathir advised the Malaysian 
people not to ‘believe the Western lies’ and claimed that only ‘UMNO could 
defend the nation’ against the attempts to recolonise Malaysia (Mahathir, 1998a, 
my translation).   
Mahathir’s argument can be summarised as follows: the economic crisis 
happened primarily because of such external factors as currency speculation; the 
government did not do anything wrong; the weakening of the Malaysian economy 
is part of the West’s broader plan to exert influence on or to recolonise Malaysia 
and other Southeast Asian countries affected by the economic crisis; and by 
implication, the Malaysian people should be united behind the incumbent 
government, which would  defend the nation resolutely. Mahathir’s argument 
reflected his collectivist-authoritarian nationalist views as it attempted to mobilise 
popular support for the incumbent leadership by identifying external threats. 
When Mahathir’s nationalist vision was challenged by the economic crisis, he 
especially needed this collectivist-authoritarian rhetoric to prop up popular 
support for him.  
  
253
5.3.2.  Anwar differed from Mahathir during the economic crisis 
While Mahathir identified external factors as culprits of the economic 
crisis, Anwar’s stance was different. Anwar placed more weight on internal 
factors, criticising those who blamed external factors as avoiding responsibility 
for such problems as corruption and not taking concrete steps to remedy said 
problems. Like Mahathir, Anwar protested such external factors as the anarchy of 
the international financial markets that caused a mass exodus of foreign capital 
from Malaysia.
17 However, Anwar differed from Mahathir in that he was equally 
critical of such internal problems as corruption and lack of transparency. In his 
speech before the Council of Foreign Relations in 1998, Anwar argued: 
We must attempt to recreate as best we can the positive conditions which 
brought about the so-called East Asian Miracle. In the course of this 
turmoil, much of the good has been destroyed along with the bad and 
ugly. But we should not try to restore the status quo ante. Not only would 
it be an exercise in futility but it would also constitute an act of denial. 
(Anwar, 1998c, emphasis added) 
 Instead of harkening to the past, Anwar asserted that the crisis should be a 
chance to fix what was wrong and to prepare for future progress. In the same 
speech, Anwar argued: 
To be sure, this is a crisis of nightmarish proportions, but it is no 
phantasmagoria. The consequences are severe, its effects are hard hitting, 
and the toll heavy. But the sooner we come to terms with it by trying to 
understand its real causes and deriving lessons from it, the sooner we will 
be on the road to recovery. Indeed, we must seize the moment to put into 
place the much needed reforms which can purge our system of its 
excesses and abuses. The gale which has swept through Asia is indeed an 
agent of creative destruction. (Anwar, 1998c)  
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Anwar implicitly criticised Mahathir’s position which manipulated 
purported external threats to shore up popular support. Anwar warned, ‘There are 
those who would pull up the drawbridge and man the ramparts of nationalism in 
response to the wrenching pain inflicted by globalization. Those who advocate 
such moves, however, are pandering to populist tendencies, refusing to believe in 
our ability to compete internationally’ (Anwar, 1998d). And Anwar announced, 
‘there is no room for the rancid rhetoric of misplaced nationalistic sentiments and 
protectionists’ (Anwar, 1998c).  
Indeed, in terms of concrete policy measures, Anwar was more concerned 
with eradicating corruption in the government and corporate sector. An ally of 
Anwar described Anwar’s position against cronyism under Mahathir as follows: 
[Anwar used to argue,] ‘Our economic system has to be transparent. 
Corporate governance has to be transparent’. This is of course run 
counter the favouritism given by Mahathir to his cronies. Anwar did not 
question policies helping Bumiputera. But the manner [it] was carried out 
raised serious criticism. For example,…all privatisation is run [by only 
handful of people]. And when economic crisis came, [they] were 
demanding the government to save them. Anwar Ibrahim said ‘No, We 
can’t’ [to them]. The most important [thing is] to maintain the 
macroeconomic stability and to reform corporate sector. But Mahathir 
was against [Anwar’s view]. Anwar also said very strongly against the 
implementation of the Mega Project[s] which was not under the Ministry 
of Finance [of Anwar] but a lot to do with Economic Planning Unit under 
the Prime Minister.
18 
In 1997, Anwar had already begun his own campaign to differentiate 
himself from Mahathir’s policies and ideological positions. When Anwar was in 
charge of the government as acting Prime Minister, he showed his commitment to 
eradicating corruption in the government. Between April and June 1997, a  
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Menteri Besar, a Deputy Minister, two state executive councillors and one senator 
were dismissed on charges of corruption (Jayasankaran, 1997). Anwar’s actions 
received positive response from opposition politicians.
19 Anwar also questioned 
and opposed such bailouts initiated by Mahathir and Daim as United Engineering 
Malaysia’s bailout of Renong, an UMNO company
20  and Petronas’ bailout of 
Konsortium Perkapalan
21 (Prasso, Clifford, & Bamathan, 1998).  
When the Malaysian economy began feeling the impact of the economic 
crisis in the first half of 1998, Anwar adopted policies resembling ‘IMF-style 
austerity’,  while closely working with International Monetary Fund (IMF), one of 
the targets of Mahathir’s criticism of ‘unruly’ international capital. According to 
Nesadurai, from the beginning of economic crisis to the end of 1998, there were 
roughly three phases of economic policy change (Nesadurai, 2000). In the first 
phase (from July to December 1997), while Mahathir was still in steering sit, 
emphasising growth, Anwar had his say as Finance Minister. In this period, 
modest fine-tunings of economic policy in the face of economic crisis were made. 
When economic crisis deepened, economic policy changed significantly in the 
second phase from the end of 1997 to May 1998. Nesadurai argued that the 
change in this period was a reflection of Anwar’s IMF-style austerity. After 
Anwar sacking in September 1998, Malaysian economic policy experienced 
another substantial change from austerity to ‘Mahathir-style’ rekindling growth by 
government spending. Notably, Mahathir, in this period, announced capital 
control and currency peg to provide shelter for Malaysian economy from the 
influence abroad (for detaied policy change see talbe 5-1).   
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Table 5-1 Major Economic Policy Change from in 1997-98* 
Phase 1 
(Jul. – Dec. 97) 
Phase 2 
(Dec. 97-Aug. 98) 
Phase 3 
(Sep. 98 - ) 
- Lage infrastructure 
project yet-to-begin 
deferred
22 
- Large insfrastructure projects 
including some on-goings 
deferred 
- outward investment deferred 
- Stock market restriction 
for new listing, imposed in 
December 1997, lifted to 
help capitalization of 
corporations 
- Surplus budget (2% 
of GNP) 
- Corporate tax 
reduction (30% to 
28%) 
- Public expenditure 
cut (2%) 
- Public expenditure cut by 20% 
- Paycuts: Cabinet ministers by 
10%, senior civil servants by 
5% 
- Freeze on salary increase for 
middle-level civil servants 
- Ban on overseas trip for civil 
servants 
- Development expenditure 
increase by RM 7 billion 
- Infrastructure fund 
established (RM 5 bil.) 
- Interest Rate held 
steady (8.2%) 
- Interest rate to be determined 
by market (expected to rise) 
- Restraint on credit to non-
productive sector and for 
consumption 
- Monetary policy eased: 
reducing bank’s statutory 
reserve requirement from 
13.5% to 8% 
- Interest rate to be 
maintained  
* Based on (Nesadurai, 2000). 
Although Mahathir and Anwar shared the view that the international 
financial system was flawed, Anwar’s view on internal problems was analytically 
significant. First, Anwar did not fully agree with Mahathir’s diagnosis. In UMNO, 
where the president had the final say, any minor disagreement could be interpreted 
as a challenge to Mahathir’s political supremacy. Second, Anwar’s differing 
views might be understood as a denial of Mahathir’s past performance and track 
record in managing the Malaysian economy. Furthermore, Anwar’s measures to 
combat corruption actually threatened Mahathir’s associates. The disagreements 
between Anwar and Mahathir exposed by the economic crisis was, on one hand, a 
serious challenge to Mahathir and, on the other, a display of Anwar’s and 
Mahathir’s different ideological assumptions. 
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5.3.3. Anwar’s  challenge  (Reformasi) and Mahathir’s response  
After Anwar was dismissed from the Deputy Prime Minister position in 
September 1998, Mahathir attempted to suppress Anwar’s Reformasi movement, 
while Anwar attempted to challenge Mahathir by organising grassroots support. 
The two elite factions attempted to mobilise the wider population with arguments 
and political manoeuvring that reflected their nationalist positions.  Hence, the 
impact of the dispute was made more extensive than it would have been if it was 
merely a personal power struggle between Anwar and Mahathir.  
Mahathir’s authoritarian persecution of Anwar and suppression of the 
Reformasi movement reflected his collectivist nationalist position. As was the 
case with the economic crisis, Mahathir used rhetoric of threat to the community. 
Mahathir justified his authoritarian suppression as being in the interest of the 
entire nation, which according to him, was jeopardised by Anwar and the 
Reformasi movement. Anwar, however, whose arguments were shaped by his 
individualistic nationalist commitments, offered a liberal alternative to Mahathir’s 
rule, which included promises of political reform, social and economic justice, 
participatory democracy and accountability. Significantly, Malaysians, regardless 
of their ethnic backgrounds, who were disillusioned with Mahathir’s authoritarian 
rule, supported Anwar’s reform cause.  
  
The UMNO dispute and the beginning of Anwar’s Reformasi 
movement 
When it became apparent that Mahathir and Anwar had different views on 
the economic crisis, the relationship between the two became visibly tense. The  
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1998 UMNO general assembly, held in June 1998, was a critical turning point in 
the relationship between Mahathir and Anwar. Before the assembly, a book titled, 
“50 Dalil Mengapa Anwar Tak Boleh Jadi PM” (50 Reasons why Anwar can’t be 
Prime Minister) was distributed to the general assembly delegates. The book 
contained various contentions regarding Anwar, including an allegation that he 
engaged in sodomy. It was believed that it would have been impossible to 
distribute the book to the delegates without Mahathir’s knowledge and consent 
(Case, 1999: 4-5). At the general assembly, Anwar’s close ally, Ahmad Zahid 
Hamidi, then UMNO Youth chief, mounted a veiled attack on Mahathir, with his 
criticism of corruption, cronyism and nepotism related to people in power. In an 
address before the 1998 UMNO general assembly, Hamidi asserted, ‘Nepotism 
will bring Malaysia to its knees’ (Hiebert, 1998).   
The next day, Mahathir arrived at the general assembly with lists of the 
names of people who had received the government’s special allocations of 
corporate shares and who had benefited from the government’s privatisation 
policies. On the lists were the names of Anwar’s close allies, including Ahmad 
Zahid Hamidi, and family members.
23 The lists were Mahathir’s counterattack to 
Anwar’s criticism of high-level corruption under Mahathir’s leadership. It was 
speculated that, after the 1998 UMNO General Assembly, Anwar could still count 
on being deputy prime minister, but his position as heir-apparent to Mahathir was 
uncertain (Jayasankaran, 1998a).
24 Finally, on the last day of August 1998, Anwar 
received an ultimatum from Mahathir: ‘resign or be sacked with grave 
consequences’. When Anwar refused to resign, Mahathir dismissed Anwar from 
his government posts on 2 September 1998 and Anwar was expelled from UMNO.  
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Anwar’s dismissal began a new phase of the 1998 UMNO dispute. Upon 
his sacking, Anwar was deprived of the means to confront Mahathir within the 
system. Instead, to challenge Mahathir, Anwar mobilised grassroots support with 
his promise of socio-political and economic reforms. Anwar’s Reformasi rallies 
were held in Penang, Kedah, Malacca, Pahang, Trengganu, Kelantan, Johor and 
Kuala Lumpur. It was reported that at various rallies, between 20,000 to 100,000 
people gathered in support of Anwar (Funston, 1999: 172). Throughout 1998, the 
momentum of Reformasi was maintained, even after Anwar’s arrest. Political 
commentators and ordinary people alike were surprised to see the magnitude of 
the Reformasi movement (Oorjitham & Ranawana, 1998). Even more significant, 
the  Reformasi movement crossed ethnic lines, probably for the first time in 
Malaysian history. Although there were a few earlier instances of cross-ethnic 
alliances among some NGOs, the breakdown of ethnic lines in a massive anti-
government movement was unprecedented. Ooi Kee Beng observed:  
Over the years, the race-based discourse has defined the Malaysian 
identity to a large degree. It was hoped, both when the National 
Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced in 1971 after the racial riots of 
May 13, [1969] and in Mahathir’s promotion of economic nationalism, 
that increasing wealth would somehow make the contradiction irrelevant. 
When the financial crisis that hit in mid-1997 worsened, political battles 
that culminated in the destruction of Anwar Ibrahim were strikingly non-
racial. (Ooi, 2001: 101, emphasis added) 
Anwar’s ideological justifications for his political actions reflected his 
individualistic-libertarian  nationalist position. Describing Mahathir’s regime as 
unjust, undemocratic, and irresponsible, Anwar promised extensive reform, 
positioning himself as opposite to what Mahathir did. Anwar’s arguments against  
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Mahathir during the Reformasi period was most evident in his Permatang Pauh 
declaration, announced on 12 September 1998 in his electoral district, Permatang 
Pauh, Penang, upon launching the nation-wide Reformasi movement.  
In the declaration, before defining his reform agenda, Anwar clearly 
mentioned the inviolability of the individual, which was the fundamental 
assumption of individualistic nationalism. At the beginning of the declaration, 
Anwar defined his reform movement as follows: ‘A reform movement shining 
with a light radiating from aspiring and pure hearts; from the awareness that man 
is truly noble and free, with rights and responsibilities, that it is a sacrilege to 
abuse and denigrate any man or woman…’ (Anwar, 1998a). In more concrete 
terms, together with such reform agenda as ‘justice for all’, ‘economic justice’ and 
the eradication of ‘graft and abuse of power’, the declaration clearly indicated the 
need for democratic politics in Malaysia. In the declaration, Anwar argued for 
‘[A] reform movement to sanctify the power of the people through democratic 
means, for democracy is an imperative: man’s instinct for justice makes 
democracy a possibility, but the existence of tendencies to oppress makes it a 
necessity’ (Anwar, 1998a).  
 
Mahathir’s authoritarian suppression of the Reformasi movement 
When faced with the political challenge from Anwar’s Reformasi 
movement, Mahathir tried to suppress it in a coercive manner. He also attempted 
to scare people away from the Reformasi movement by raising the foreign threat 
and painting a dire picture of political instability. In less than three weeks after 
Anwar was dismissed, he was arrested, initially under the ISA, but later charged  
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with sodomy and power abuse. On the day Anwar was arrested, heavily armed 
and masked police special units raided Anwar’s house, smashing down an open 
door. The manner of Anwar’s arrest, which happened in front of his children no 
less, was not well received by the general population who was already troubled 
with Anwar’s unceremonious sacking. Furthermore, the UMNO-controlled mass 
media sensationalised Anwar’s sodomy charge, which offended Malay sentiment. 
Last but not least, the public was shocked by Anwar’s black eye, incurred through 
police brutality.
25 
In the unprecedented street demonstrations before and after Anwar was 
imprisoned, the Mahathir government used harsh authoritarian measures to stifle 
the anti-government protests. At every demonstration, the demonstrators faced 
heavily armed riot police and members of the Federal Reserve Units, who often 
outnumbered the demonstrators. Numerous people were arrested at these 
demonstrations and the number of those arrested at a single demonstration was 
frequently more than a hundred. University students who participated in the 
demonstrations faced such disciplinary action as suspension. Government servants 
who supported the opposition and the Reformasi movement were identified and 
pressured to resign.    
Mahathir justified the authoritarian suppression in the interests of 
Malaysia, claiming that the Reformasi demonstrations would endanger the welfare 
of the majority of people. In 1998, Mahathir attempted to demonise the Reformasi 
demonstrators and warned of their dangers: 
There are some parties who seem to prefer demonstrations… it is as if 
they do not believe in democracy and the social justice system. They 
prefer to solve problems by resorting to mob rule or street justice. If we  
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move in this direction, I am afraid that the people will suffer as what is 
done by one party can also be done by the other party. This will create 
clashes… And today, it is clear that there are some parties that like to 
instigate chaos. For them, it is only a demonstration, but for the people it 
will affect their income. For them, it is easy…just [to] go out and 
demonstrate. For the majority of Malaysians, they face losses… That is 
why we need a law which can put a stop to such demonstrations. (The 
Sun, 1998) 
Mahathir also alleged that the demonstrations were funded by foreign 
forces attempting to undermine the incumbent Malaysian government. More 
specifically, Mahathir alleged that Anwar endangered the stability of Malaysia at 
the instigation of the foreign forces. He asserted: 
When Dato Seri Anwar was sidelined, he began to endanger stability of 
the nation. What he wished was the fall of Malaysian government like the 
governments in other countries which toppled. People were instigated to 
stage street demonstration and riot. This is clearly supported by foreign 
media and people including leaders of countries that made speech in our 
country so that people riot to topple the government that was elected by 
the people democratically. (Mahathir, 1999a, my translation)  
Mahathir’s response to the Reformasi movement reflected his collectivist-
authoritarian nationalist view. Because the incumbent political leaders were 
supposed to define the vision and the interests of the community best, any dissent 
or criticism of the incumbent leaders was against the community’s interests, from 
the perspective of the collectivist-authoritarian nationalists, and, hence, should be 
suppressed at all costs. At the same time, Mahathir demonised the opposition and 
Anwar’s Reformasi movement as enemies of the Malaysian nation, who aligned 
with foreign forces that wanted to destabilise Malaysian politics and economy.  
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The Grassroots Factor: Disillusionment with Mahathir’s rule 
The significant participation of ordinary Malaysians in Reformasi 
demonstrations and Internet activities in support of Anwar extended the 1998 
UMNO factional dispute beyond a quarrel between the two elites or an inner 
UMNO affair. In addition to posing a serious challenge to Mahathir and his 
political legitimacy, the grassroots support for Anwar reflected the widespread 
disillusionment with Mahathir’s authoritarian rule, based on his collectivist-
authoritarian nationalist view.  
Anwar’s sacking meant that he was deprived of any opportunity to 
compete against Mahathir within the system.
26 Anwar immediately held political 
rallies at the grassroots level to mobilise political support, claiming that there was 
a conspiracy against him.
27  After Anwar was sacked, only a handful of high-
profile UMNO members openly supported him.
28  Anwar, however, for a long 
time, had cultivated an extensive network, linking himself with the grassroots 
through his former connections with ABIM (Angakatan Belia Islam Malaysia; 
Malaysian Islamic Youth Council).
29 One of his close allies told me: 
He, Anwar Ibrahim, was clearly grass-root man… He is loved by 
people… Anwar Ibrahim is much more active on the ground campaigning 
to the people [and] mobilising the masses [than Mahathir was]. So, 
people listen to him. They have access to him. He is the one, a leader who 
really goes to the ground. So, he has a lot of influence in the grass-root, 
much more than Mahathir.
30 
The mass mobilisation did not mean that all Malaysians turned their backs 
on Mahathir. While there were still steadfast supporters of Mahathir, the extent of 
the grassroots support for Anwar and his Reformasi movement was unprecedented. 
There had never been any demonstration from the Malay or non-Malay  
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communities against the incumbent Prime Minister comparable in size to those 
organized by the Reformasi movement. Hence, while empirical measurements of 
popular discontent with Mahathir were unavailable before the 1999 elections, the 
demonstrations a few months after Anwar’s sacking were analytically significant, 
indicating the success of Anwar’s mass mobilisation and the decrease in support 
for Mahathir.  
There have been various explanations for the success of Anwar’s mass 
mobilisation, such as Mahathir’s violation of Malay sentiments and Anwar’s 
Islamic appeal. In the Malay community, to the extent it was still relevant, 
Mahathir’s treatment of Anwar was against Malay tradition. As set forth in the 
Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals)—‘[the ruler] shall never put their subjects to 
shame and… those subjects however gravely they offend shall never be bound or 
hanged or disgraced with evil words’ (Muzaffar, 1979: 4). Hilley observed that 
the fact that Anwar was within the establishment (UMNO) for a substantial period 
of time ‘was being offset by a distaste for the mercenary way in which he and his 
family had been persecuted, contrary to Malay mores of how to treat “one of their 
own”. Even many middle- and low-ranking Malay policemen now felt a sense of 
shame at Anwar’s treatment’ (Hilley, 2001: 206). Also, Anwar’s Islamic 
credentials garnered him the support of a few prominent and influential Islamic 
organisations such as ABIM and JIM (Jamaah Islam Malaysia) (for details, see 
Farish A. Noor, 1999).  
Although these explanations were convincing, they did not take into 
consideration the impact of Anwar’s agenda for reform, probably because the 
ideological aspects of the dispute were ignored. It should be emphasised that, in  
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addition to those factors, Mahathir’s authoritarian rule was exposed during the 
Reformasi movement and Anwar’s promise for political reform played an 
important role in the mobilisation of the Malaysian people. An opposition 
politician noted that the Reformasi movement was more than just support for a 
popular politician, Anwar; it was a demand for more democratic politics. As 
explained to me:  
When [Anwar] was sacked by Dr Mahathir, when he was in jail, and 
when he was beaten up by the police chief, we looked at it from a 
different perspective…He became a victim. He became a brutal victim of 
Dr Mahathir. He became someone who has to be given full support not 
just by PAS but by the whole Malaysian society because if this can 
happen to Anwar, it can happen to any [one] in Malaysia. He was former 
Deputy Prime Minister. He was No. 2 man in Malaysia. Yet, he can be 
beaten up in police lock-up by the chief police of Malaysia. So we stood 
up not just to defend Anwar, but stood up for issues of human rights, 
issues of freedom, and issues of democratic process and reform.
31 
Viewed from the perspective of competing nationalist positions in the 
1998 dispute, this development can be considered the result of growing political 
awareness in civic Malaysian society. When Mahathir increased his authoritarian 
suppression, disillusionment with his collectivist-authoritarian view grew because 
such a view was no longer compatible with the growing politically liberal and 
critical orientation in Malaysian society.
32   Observing the growing political 
awareness, Clive Kessler noted: 
The entire purpose and effect of the pro-Malay affirmative action policies 
since 1970, and especially under Dr Mahathir since 1981, had been to 
diversify Malaysia’s Malay community in all dimensions: economically, 
socially, culturally. The hope that this diversification would not find 
expression politically was vain… (Kessler, 2001: 25)  
266
The sudden and explosive political mobilisation against Mahathir’s rule 
indicated that tension existed between the increasingly confident civic Malaysian 
society and Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian control of said society. Anwar’s 
unceremonious sacking, his ill-treatment by the government and the authoritarian 
crackdown of the Reformasi movement showed the authoritarian aspects of 
Mahathir’s rule. It was this exposure of Mahathir’s authoritarianism that ignited 
the underlying tension.   
Francis Loh once assumed that ‘mass consumerism promotes persons 
becoming individualistic’ and observed that, in Malaysia, after substantial 
economic growth, ‘one consumes consciously as an individual, not as groups or as 
communities’. However, according to Loh, what was missing was ‘individuality, 
by which is meant expression of one’s own autonomy, freedom and identity’ (K. 
W. F. Loh, 2000: 84). After investigating the rising demand for liberal politics and 
political reform in the Reformasi movement, Francis Loh’s missing ‘individuality’ 
seemed to have been found. In other words, the uncomfortable relationship 
between the increasingly confident, Malaysian society and Mahathir’s collectivist-
authoritarian control was finally shattered by the Reformasi movement and 
Mahathir’s authoritarian suppression. The disillusioned Malaysian society was 
captured instead by Anwar’s alternative ideological position of individualistic-
libertarian nationalist view.  
 
5.4.  Institutionalisation of Reformasi and competition 
between the two ideological positions 
This section argues that the Reformasi movement was institutionalised into 
an opposition coalition in anticipation of the 1999 elections and that Mahathir lost  
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significant support during the political crisis due to Anwar’s successful 
ideological mobilisation of the Malaysian people. Although the loss of support did 
not result in Mahathir being displaced as Prime Minister, the loss of support, 
especially of Malay support, for UMNO was a significant development, 
considering the unquestioned and stable Malay support UMNO had enjoyed since 
the 1969 elections. The opposition coalition formed to compete against 
Mahathir’s BN successfully organised various Reformasi groups into a viable 
political force. Furthermore, the coalition was not just an electoral alliance; to a 
certain degree, it also reflected Anwar’s individualistic nationalist position. The 
opposition coalition’s mobilisation resulted in the withdrawal of Malay support 
for Mahathir and the BN coalition, which was empirically proven during the 1999 
elections.  
 
5.4.1. The  opposition  coalition and its ideology  
The Institutionalisation of the Reformasi movement  
In 1999, the intermittent Reformasi demonstrations became 
institutionalised as an opposition coalition which included established opposition 
parties as well as nongovernmental organisations critical of the government. 
Despite Mahathir’s suppression of Reformasi, mass rallies and demonstrations, 
protesting against Mahathir and his treatment of Anwar, continued throughout the 
rest of 1998 and early 1999. Until April 1999, Reformasi was organised around 
such organisations as ABIM; Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial (Social Justice 
Movement) led by Anwar’s wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail; Gagasan Demokrasi 
Rakyat (People’s Initiative for Democracy), a loose organisation formed around  
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the DAP; and Majilis Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Movement 
Council) which main force was PAS (Weiss, 2001: 83). These organisations 
transformed the initial enthusiasm for Reformasi into a coherent political action by 
providing political and ideological alternatives and a symbol to unite and organise 
Reformasi supporters.  
Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party; widely known as 
Keadilan), a party identified with Anwar, was formally launched in April 1999 a 
few days before a verdict was rendered on Anwar’s corruption charge. The 
founding members of Keadilan chose a multiethnic leadership: Wan Azizah Wan 
Ismail as President; a renowned critic of the government and social scientist, 
Chandra Muzaffar, an ethnic Indian, as Deputy President and a Chinese labour 
activist, Tian Chua, as one of three vice presidents. The first party supreme 
council was multiethnic as well. Although the council members were 
predominantly Malay, there were Chinese councillors. The party leadership 
clarified that ‘despite its Malay background, Keadilan’s leadership is opening its 
doors to all communities, and its ideals and issues are multi-ethnic in nature’ (The 
Star, 1999). With Anwar as the central icon of the Reformasi movement, Keadilan 
would be the bridge for the culturally, ethnically, religiously and ideologically 
diverse opposition groups to form the opposition coalition.  
After Anwar was sentenced on the corruption charge on 14 April 1999, 
there was another surge of anti-Mahathir protests. Around this time, the 
components of the Reformasi movement began discussing organising a united 
front against the Barisan Nasional coalition. Opposition parties such as PAS and 
DAP had already come out in support of Anwar’s cause and had organised  
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effective mass demonstrations, even before the idea of forming a opposition 
coalition was proposed. In addition to their common political position against 
Mahathir’s UMNO and BN, the parties had their own personal connections with 
Anwar. When Anwar was an ABIM leader, before he joined UMNO, he 
developed close relationships with the PAS leadership and even campaigned for 
the party in the 1978 elections. Even after Anwar joined UMNO, he maintained 
his ties with the Islamic opposition, especially former PAS president, Fadzil Noor, 
who served as acting president of ABIM when its president Anwar was detained 
under ISA in 1974. Before his dismissal, Anwar had expressed his sympathies for 
Lim Guan Eng, a DAP Member of Parliament, who was detained after he 
disclosed a scandal connected with a high-ranking UMNO member (Aliran, 
1998a: 40).
33  
The opposition parties, including PAS, DAP, Keadilan and PRM (Parti 
Rakyat Malaysia or Malaysian People’s party), were aware that without a united 
front against the BN, it was impossible to challenge the BN in the elections.
34 As 
Mahathir was expected to call snap general elections (which were due by April 
2000) they began a series of talks in mid-1999 to discuss a potential electoral pact. 
It was not an easy task, given the opposition parties’ different ethnic backgrounds 
and ideological differences which had divided them for decades, weakening their 
electoral power vis-à-vis the BN. As Husin Ali, PRM president asserted, ‘[BA] 
political leaders themselves should go beyond party interest’, which included 
individual party’s ethnic backgrounds (Shahanaaz Sher Habib, 1999).  
Eventually, the four parties worked out a coalition framework, the Barisan 
Alternatif (BA or Alternative Front), and issued a joint statement on 20 September  
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1999. In the statement, the BA clearly stated that it was presenting itself as an 
‘alternative government’ to the BN coalition. It proposed Anwar as ‘its candidate 
for Prime Ministership’ on the condition that ‘a judicial inquiry will be held into 
the political conspiracy which has led to Anwar’s imprisonment’ if the BA won in 
the coming elections (reprinted in Aliran, 1998b: 6). It also pledged far-reaching 
political reforms, should it take power. Although the BA was not legally 
recognised, unlike the BN, the coalition was still effective in avoiding electoral 
competition among the opposition parties. Last but not least, it provided political 
support for Malaysians who opposed Mahathir’s BN. 
 
BA ideology: temporarily resolving differences in the name of 
democratic reform  
To tap the extensive popular support for Anwar’s causes, the opposition 
coalition defined itself as a flag bearer for Anwar’s causes. The opposition parties 
played down their ethnic, cultural and religious differences and conceded their 
differences to avoid being ethnocultural nationalists. They highlighted instead 
their commitment to political reform, which reflected an individualistic-libertarian 
nationalist view. These developments were readily apparent in the BA’s electoral 
platform, “Toward a Just Malaysia” in the 1999 elections (Barisan Alternatif, 
1999). Anwar’s support for democracy, civil society and tolerance of dissidents, 
that is, the political practices of individualistic nationalism, were translated into 
criticism of the oppressive and authoritarian legal and institutional features of the 
Mahathir government and into policy and institutional reform programs.   
The BA’s manifesto set forth its position on the repressive laws, misuse of 
the mass media by the government, human right issues and its proposed remedies.  
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First, the manifesto identified the laws it considered repressive: the ISA, detention 
without trial, Official Secrets Act, Sedition Act, Police Act, University and 
University Colleges Act, Printing Presses and Publications Act. The coalition 
pledged that, should it take power, these laws would be reviewed and whatever 
‘violates basic human rights’ would be repealed. The BA also promised to ‘sign 
and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, which the 
Mahathir government had refused to do. In the same vein, the BA manifesto 
assured that the Human Right Commission (Suhakam) would be able to act free 
from political interference. The Commission would also provide human rights 
education for government officials and all levels of educational institutions. 
Like Anwar, the BA rejected Mahathir’s collectivist nationalism and its 
authoritarian tactic – mobilising through the rhetoric of threats. The BA’s election 
manifesto clearly recognised, denounced and rejected the BN’s authoritarianism:  
the BN government has attempted to frighten the people by threatening 
that such dissent will result in racial conflict. They threaten that chaos 
will result should the strong position of the BN government be questioned. 
They have mobilised the mainstream mass media which is completely 
under their control, and have used it to vilify the dissent, spreading lies 
and fear. Their sole aim is to cause fear and disunity. They hope their 
campaign of lies and fear-mongering will prevent the people from 
coming together for change towards a just and democratic nation.  
To deflect popular discontent, the BN government attempts to manipulate 
racial sentiments. They foster mutual suspicion between the racial groups 
and create antagonisms between one group and another. The BN 
highlights racial strife in other countries where the situation is utterly 
different and of no relevance to us. The BN leadership also slanders the 
Alternative Front parties as agents of foreign powers and interests—while  
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claiming that foreign investors have no confidence in the alternative 
parties and will run away if the BN is not massively returned to power. 
But they also try to scapegoat foreign powers for their own failure in 
managing the country’s economy. The people are no longer so easily 
fooled by those who have for a long time collaborated with foreign 
powers from both West and East. This mischievous game of divide-and-
rule is increasingly ineffective. (Barisan Alternatif, 1999, emphasis 
added) 
The BA pointed out that the BN’s strategy of controlling people was based 
on ‘foster[ing] mutual suspicion between the racial groups and creat[ing] 
antagonism between one group and another’ and by ‘scapegoat[ing] foreign 
power[s]’. The BA’s Common Manifesto condemned the BN’s collectivist 
nationalist and authoritarian methods of mobilising the population through 
inculcating a ‘siege-mentality’.   
At the same time, given the composition of the opposition coalition, the 
BA was not immune to the BN’s politics of fear. Among the constituent parties in 
the BA were PAS, which advocated for an Islamic State and had been dubbed 
‘Islamic extremists’ by Mahathir, and the DAP, which advocated for a Malaysian 
Malaysia and had been dubbed ‘Chinese Chauvinists’ by Mahathir. To avoid the 
BN’s attack, it was crucial to demonstrate that PAS and DAP could work together 
despite their different religious and ideological positions.
35  When drafting the 
Common Manifesto, the component parties took pains to compromise: while PAS 
would not force its goal of an Islamic State in the manifesto, the DAP would 
recognise the ‘special position’ of the Malays. The election manifesto recognised: 
The position of Islam as the religion of the Federation, coupled with the 
principle of the freedom of worship;   
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The position of Bahasa Melayu as the national language, the language of 
knowledge and the official language, whilst safeguarding the right to use 
and learn other languages;  
The special position of the Malays and the Bumiputera of Sabah and 
Sarawak, and the legitimate rights of other races; and  
And the BA Common Manifesto confirmed that the BA would: 
create a favourable atmosphere—through the provision of infrastructure, 
education and legislation—towards affirmation of Islam as a way of life 
(ad-deen) among Muslims, while ensuring the rights of non-Muslims to 
practice their respective religions or beliefs. (Barisan Alternatif, 1999) 
By resolving issues of ethnic and religious differences among the BA’s 
component parties, the BA presented itself as a reliable alternative to the BN. The 
component parties, despite their potential ethnocultural nationalist characteristics, 
strongly upheld Anwar’s individualistic nationalist position and attempted to 
present themselves as a coalition for liberal politics rather than ethno-religious 
champions. 
 
5.4.2.  The 1999 elections: collectivist-authoritarian nationalism 
discredited 
The 1999 general elections could be viewed as a showdown between the 
two nationalist ideological positions—Mahathir’s collectivist nationalism and 
authoritarian politics, and Anwar’s individualistic nationalism and liberal politics 
—represented by the BN and the BA respectively. An analysis of the 1999 
elections, in particular the electoral support for UMNO and BN, will demonstrate 
the impact on Mahathir’s legitimacy of his authoritarian response to the Reformasi 
movement and Anwar’s ideological mobilisation of the grassroots. Through the  
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analysis of the significant reduction of support for UMNO and the BN in the 1999 
elections, the erosion of Mahathir’s political legitimacy and support will be 
proven empirically. 
On 11 November 1999, Mahathir dissolved parliament and polling date 
was set for 29 November 1999. Both the BN and the BA were awaiting the 
elections, but for different reasons. The BA wanted to mobilise the Reformasi 
movement, deny the BN a two-thirds majority and, if possible, gain a simple 
majority. The BN wanted to regain political ground lost after Anwar’s sacking and 
the emergence of Reformasi movement. The 10th general elections to elect 193 
Members of Parliament and 394 State Assemblymen had its share of controversies 
from the beginning. There were complaints from the opposition parties of 
gerrymandering,
36 fraudulent postal voting and so on. The most contentious issue, 
however, involved some 680,000 potential voters who were not registered to vote, 
although the Election Commission had adequate time to put them on the electoral 
rolls. As most of these potential voters were young, the opposition claimed they 
would have been more likely to vote for the opposition.
37 Last but not least, the 
period to campaign was only nine days, the shortest in Malaysian history.
38  
The election results showed that the BN achieved their two-thirds majority 
by winning 148 seats in the parliament, which was reduced from 162 seats in the 
1995 elections. The opposition parties made a substantial gain, increasing its share 
of parliament seats from 30 to 45. In terms of popular vote, the BN’s share was 
reduced by 9 percentage points from 64 per cent in 1995 to 56 per cent in 1999. 
The opposition parties, however, increased its share of popular vote from 34 per 
cent in the 1995 elections to 44 per cent in the 1999 elections.   
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Of particular interest was UMNO’s performance, especially Malay support 
for UMNO versus the newly formed opposition coalition. There was general 
consensus among observers of Malaysian politics that UMNO’s loss in the 1999 
elections was significant. The performance of UMNO was described as a 
‘disaster’ (Kessler, 2001: 22), ‘setback’ (B. T. Khoo, 2000: 309) or ‘blow to 
UMNO’ (Abbott, 2001: 300). William Case said, after examining the election 
results, ‘UMNO had been greatly weakened’ (Case, 2001a: 49). Funston described 
the elections results as ‘the worst electoral setback UMNO has experienced since 
the first post-independence elections in 1959’ (Funston, 2000, 51). Furthermore, 
he observed, ‘leading Malay politicians and commentators reacted as if UMNO 
had lost [the election]’ (Funston, 2000: 51).  
UMNO’s share of popular vote decreased by seven percentage points from 
36.5 per cent in the 1995 elections to 29.5 per cent of the 1999 elections (B. T. 
Khoo, 2000: 120). This seven percentage point drop might not have been that 
serious in other countries. In Malaysia, however, UMNO’s electoral might and 
Malay support for UMNO had been very stable and strong. Thus, the 7 percentage 
point drop was very significant in that it indicated that UMNO might be in serious 
trouble.
39  In addition, the party’s share of parliament seats decreased from 89 
seats (1995) to 72 seats (1999)—the biggest drop in a single election since the 
formation of the BN in 1974. Because of this drop, UMNO’s share in the BN 
became less than 50 per cent (48 per cent in the 1999 elections) for the first 
time—it meant that the BN maintained its two-third majority only because of the 
non-Malay components in the coalition, especially the Chinese parties. It was also 
embarrassing for UMNO that some major figures in UMNO lost or almost lost  
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their seats. For example, Mustapha Mohamad, second Finance Minister; Megat 
Junid Megat Ayub, Domestic and Consumer Affairs Minister; Annuar Musa, 
Rural Development Minister; and Hamid Othman, Minister in the Prime 
Minister’s Department, in addition to six Deputy Ministers, lost their seats. Najib 
Razak, an UMNO vice president, who became Deputy Prime Minister in 2004, 
was almost defeated, securing his seat with only a 241 vote majority (K. S Nathan, 
2000: 26-27). 
Table 5-2 Major Parties’ Performance in Recent Elections: Parliament Seats 
Barisan Nasional  Barisan Alternatif & opposition 
Parties  1990 1995 1999 Parties  1990  1995 1999 
UMNO  71 89 72 PAS 7 7 27 
MCA  18 30 28  Keadilan  -  -  5 
MIC  6 7 7  DAP  20  9  10 
Gerakan  5 7 7 PBS  14  8 3 
Total*  127 162 148 Total 53 30  45 
Source: (based on Gomez, 1996a; Khong, 1991b; Liak, 1996; The New Straits Times, 
1995). * Total number of seats included the share of smaller parties. Therefore, the sum 
of the number of the seats in the table does not tally with the total number of seats.  
It is noteworthy that the reason for UMNO’s poor performance was the 
withdrawal of Malay support. As shown in Table 5–2, UMNO, leading the BN, 
performed well in such ethnically mixed states as Johor, Selangor and Negri 
Sembilan. In these three states, UMNO, assisted by its coalition partners, soundly 
defeated opposition candidates. This was in marked contrast to the electoral 
results in the ‘Malay Belt’. In Trengganu, all BN candidates—almost all BN 
candidates in Trengganu, Kelantan and Kedah were UMNO candidates while 
there were sizeable non-UMNO BN candidates in the states where the BN fared 
well—were defeated by the opposition. In Kelantan, another Malay concentrated 
state, only one candidate, Razaleigh Hamzah, was returned. Also, in Kedah, the  
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BN won seven seats, while the opposition won eight seats. In the state assembly 
elections, a similar trend was observed.
40 
Furthermore, in the 60 parliamentary electoral districts on the peninsula 
where UMNO was successful, the margins were substantially smaller than those 
from the 1995 elections. UMNO increased its margin only in two districts. In 35 
districts out of these 60 districts, the winning margins of UMNO candidates were 
half those from the 1995 elections (Kamarudin Jaafar, 2000: 24-25, Table 1). An 
UMNO official reportedly admitted, ‘[in] 41 parliamentary constituencies with an 
80 per cent predominance of Malays, UMNO won only 45.3 per cent of the 
popular vote’ (Stewart, 2003: 188). This meant that opposition parties, including a 
Chinese party in the opposition coalition, won more Malay votes than UMNO did. 
Such a performance hurt UMNO’s pride and legitimacy as a Malay nationalist 
party.
41 Reflecting on the substantial decrease of Malay support for UMNO and 
for the BN, Maznah Mohamad argued, ‘[f]or a party that has been so used to 
getting almost undivided Malay allegiance and loyalty, this is a signal that it can 
no longer take its premier status in the league of Malay parties for granted’ 
(Maznah Mohamad, 1999: 5).  
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Table 5-3 Parliament elections results of selected states/ selected parties 
Parliament  State Assembly 
 
UMNO  MCA/MIC Keadilan PAS  DAP  BN BA 
Kedah  5  2   8   24  12 
Kelantan 1    3  10    2  41 
Trengganu     1  7    4  28 
Selangor  8  9     42  6 
KL 3  1      4  -  - 
N.Sembilan  4  3     32   
Johor  13  7     40   
Source:  The Star Online at http://polls.thestar.com.my/results/results/html and UMNO 
homepage at http://www.umno.org.my/putus.html (Accessed on 1 December 1999)  
The opposition parties did not achieve their professed goal of denying the 
BN a two-thirds majority in the parliament. Nevertheless, the performance of the 
opposition BA was still impressive.
42 The coalition garnered 10 per cent point 
more votes than the opposition parties did in the 1995 elections. Given the 
constraints and electoral irregularities, the 10 percentage point increase was 
substantial. Opposition parties were denied access to the mass media which was 
controlled by the ruling coalition and the government. The electoral districts were 
delineated unfavourably for the opposition parties. Outdoor rallies, which the 
opposition parties were strong at, were banned. Furthermore, the opposition 
coalition was only a couple of month old when it began campaigning and one of 
its component parties, Keadilan, was established only 6 months before the 
elections. On the other hand, the ruling coalition had full access to the national 
mass media and could also use the government machinery for its campaigning. 
Because of this unlevel playing field, opposition parties had never achieved a 10 
percentage point increase in the popular vote in a single election in Malaysia.  
At the centre of the opposition’s impressive performance was PAS’s 
increase in its share of parliament seats from merely seven seats in 1995 to 27  
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seats in 1999. In terms of the popular vote, PAS obtained 17.4 per cent of the 
votes in the 1999 elections, compared to seven per cent in the 1995 elections 
(Gomez, 1996a: 30; B. T. Khoo, 2000: 120). PAS also increased its share of state 
assembly seats from 33 in the 1995 elections to 98 in the 1999 elections. In 
Trengganu and Kelantan, UMNO parliament seat candidates were soundly 
defeated by the cooperation of PAS and Keadilan. In addition, in Kedah, PAS and 
Keadilan won eight parliament seats out of 15 contested. Furthermore, PAS 
captured the Trengganu state government in the 1999 elections, adding one more 
state government under its control. As Kelantan and Trengganu are states with 
predominantly Malay populations, they have symbolic importance for any party 
which claim to represent the Malay community. For PAS, capturing the state 
governments of Trengganu and Kelantan was a great boost in its competition with 
UMNO as to which party represented the Malay community.   
If PAS undercut Malay support for UMNO in states with predominantly 
Malay population, Keadilan channelled Malay discontent with Mahathir in the 
more ethnically mixed regions in southern part of the peninsula. Keadilan won 
five seats, including one by Wan Azizah Wan Ismail in Anwar’s constituency, 
Permatang Pauh. In terms of popular votes, the party only obtained 11.2 per cent 
of the popular vote cast (Funston, 2000: 52). The performance might appear to be 
poorer than expected.  
To assess Keadilan’s performance fairly, however, it must be noted that 
Keadilan contested primarily in ethnically mixed, urban areas such as the Klang 
valley around Kuala Lumpur and in the southern states. Keadilan went into the 
heartland of the BN, instead of contesting for safer seats in the northern states,  
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where there was more support for the opposition coalition because of PAS’s 
influence. In southern states such as Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Melaka, Johor and 
Federal Territory, Keadilan fielded 21 candidates, including Chandra Muzzafar, 
Tian Chua, Ezam Nor, Zainur Zakaria, Khalid Jaafar and Marina Yusoff. In all 21 
constituencies, Keadilan candidates failed to be elected. Nevertheless, the margins 
between the BA and the BN were reduced by an average of 20 percentage points 
in those districts, compared to the 1995 elections.
43 The  problem  Keadilan 
candidates faced in those states was that significant numbers of non-Malay voters 
were holding the decisive votes in those ethnically mixed states. In other words, 
the support of Malay voters was not enough for Keadilan candidates to defeat BN 
candidates who had overwhelming non-Malay support. Overall, Keadilan’s 
performance was not an insignificant  achievement for a six months old political 
party against the more than 50 years old UMNO, supported by its efficient party 
machinery and the 30 years old BN coalition.  
In addition, in terms of the popular vote, Keadilan’s performance cannot 
be compared with that of Semangat 46’, without considering the differences 
between the two parties. Unlike Semangat 46’, which contested in constituencies 
favourable to the opposition and had such well-known candidates who had left 
UMNO as Razaleigh and Rais Yatim, Keadilan did not have such advantages. 
With the exception of Anwar, Keadilan members who left UMNO were not so 
well known. Furthermore, unlike the Malay nationalist Semangat 46’, Keadilan 
defined itself as a multiethnic political party—a tactic that has been seldom 
successful in the Malaysian political terrain so far. The party tried to capitalise on 
its multiethnic characteristic by fielding candidates in ethnically mixed  
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constituencies. In sum, the popular vote of Keadilan, unlike that of Semangat 46’ 
had to be built almost from scratch.  
The 1999 elections results indicated significant erosion of support for 
Mahathir and UMNO. In the eyes of the Malay community, especially after 
Anwar’s sacking and the establishment of the Reformasi movement, Mahathir and 
UMNO lost much of their political legitimacy. Nathan argued, ‘UMNO has 
emerged a weakened party after this election, which raises doubt as to Dr. 
Mahathir’s ability to provide strong and credible leadership for the Malays in 
particular, and the country in general’ (K. S Nathan, 2000: 26). Regarding UMNO, 
Abbott maintained that the election results were ‘a blow to UMNO’s traditional 
role as the historical guarantor of Malay rights and privileges’ (Abbott, 2001: 300). 
It meant that the serious erosion of Malay support for UMNO in the election 
undermined the traditional legitimacy of UMNO. Even Khoo Boo Teik cautiously 
predicted that the election results signal ‘the end of UMNO’s hegemonic stability’ 
(B. T. Khoo, 2003: 121-131). Mahathir’s loss of support indicated the magnitude 
of disenchantment with Mahathir’s authoritarian rule displayed in the sacking of 
Anwar and in the suppression of the Reformasi movement.  
 
5.5. Mahathir mobilises people with a collectivist “garrison-
under-siege” strategy  
After the 1999 elections, the most important issue Mahathir and UMNO 
faced was how to regain lost political support. In October 2003, when Mahathir 
stepped down from being Prime Minister and UMNO president, he seemed to 
have recovered the political ground he lost in the 1998-99 political crisis (see for 
example, Jayasankaran, 2001; Kessler, 2001). Hence, it will be significant to  
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examine Mahathir’s strategies in the post-1999 election period to recover the lost 
support from the perspective of nationalist ideology.  
In terms of nationalist vision, after the 1999 elections, Mahathir re-
asserted his commitment to civic Malaysia and attempted even harder to promote 
his vision to the Malaysian people. Mahathir reemphasised his commitment to the 
integration of different ethnic groups into Malaysian national identity, instead of 
the assimilation of minorities into a majority culture.
44 The assurance Mahathir 
provided as to his civic nationalist commitment served to consolidate non-Malay 
support. As Mahathir and UMNO lost substantial Malay support in the election, 
the BN was victorious primarily because of non-Malay support. When Malay 
support could no longer be guaranteed, Mahathir had to first consolidate existing 
non-Malay support as a safety net.  
In addition, since 1998, as measured by various economic indicators, the 
Malaysian economy was recovering.
45 The quick recovery enabled Mahathir to 
take credit for managing the economic crisis. In particular, he emphasised that his 
controversial capital control
46 was the right tactic to lead the Malaysian economy 
out of the crisis. He asserted:  
The [capital] controls have apparently succeeded in bringing about the 
recovery of the Malaysian economy. Although many still condemn 
capital controls other now say that controls can resolve the problem 
brought about by the rapid devaluation of the currency by currency 
traders. Some even recommended that other countries open to attacks by 
currency speculators should adopt currency controls. (Mahathir, 2002a: 
44) 
Other than silencing Mahathir’s critics, the economic recovery had another 
implication as far as Mahathir’s nationalist legitimacy was concerned. As I  
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already argued in the previous chapter, in the mid 1990s, Mahathir’s civic 
nationalism was successful because of the economic optimism Mahathir induced 
in the population. The economic rebounded after the economic crisis enabled 
Mahathir to argue, with confidence, that his vision was correct. For Mahathir, 
reviving the formula which had provided him with the strongest support from all 
ethnic communities was crucial in regaining his legitimacy. Therefore, the quick 
economic recovery became the platform from which Mahathir tried to persuade 
the population to support him again.  
What was decisive to Mahathir’s recovery of his political support, 
however, was his strategy of garrison-under-siege. Using a rhetoric of threat to the 
national community, manipulating related political developments, notably the 
resurgence of fundamentalist of Islam in Malaysia and the September 11, 2001 
attacks in the US, Mahathir effectively recovered the lost support. This strategy 
was not new but was part of Mahathir’s nationalist position and strategy. In the 
post-1999 election period, the intensity of the rhetoric was much stronger. To 
regain the support, Mahathir instigated fear of Islamic extremism (including PAS), 
of ethnocultural nationalists from both Malay and non-Malay ethnic groups and of 
a political opposition allegedly linked to the West bent on undermining Malaysia. 
Mahathir depicted them as threats to a stable and prosperous Malaysian nation. 
Judging from anecdotal evidence and the BN’s performance in several by-
elections, Mahathir’s strategy was successful in persuading most, if not all, of the 
Malaysian people.  
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Rhetoric of threats from Islamic extremism and 911 incidence 
Arguably, the most frequently chastised enemies of Malaysia by Mahathir 
after the 1999 elections were Islamic extremism and PAS. Mahathir attempted to 
alienate Malaysian people, especially moderate Muslim Malays and non-Malays, 
from Islamic groups and PAS by maximising their fears. This is understandable in 
two ways. First, in the 1999 elections, PAS seriously challenged UMNO’s 
supremacy in the Malay community. Second, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001 in the United States provided Mahathir with a good opportunity to promote 
his version of moderate Islam and to tarnish PAS and what Mahathir dubbed as 
“Islamic extremism” as well.  
After the 1999 elections, Mahathir depicted PAS and such Islamic groups 
as Al-Ma’unah and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM; Malaysian Mujahidin 
Group) as extremist. As an alternative, Mahathir argued for acceptance of his 
version of Islam which he considered more progressive and moderate and one 
which would permit the coexistence of Malay Muslims and non-Malays. In 
August 2001, the government arrested 10 members of the Kumpulan Mujahidin 
Malaysia (Malaysian Mujahidin Group or KMM)
47   under the ISA. The 
government alleged that the group was involved in a bank robbery, a church 
bombing and the assassination of a local politician. The detainees included a son 
of PAS leader, Nik Aziz Nik Mat. Soon after, on 11 September 2001, there were 
terrorist attacks in the United States. Mahathir took the opportunity to increase his 
rhetoric regarding the threat posed by such “fundamentalist” Islamic organisations 
as KMM. A few months later, in January 2002, the government arrested 31 
additional members of the KMM group (Aliran, 2002: 30). After the arrests,  
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Mahathir asserted, ‘There is one party which is supported by militants and does 
not believe in democracy’, thereby linking PAS with Islamic extremism (Tong, 
2001). He continued, ‘[PAS] will accuse the West of being anti-Islam in an effort 
to whip up support for themselves. They have split the Malays and Muslims here 
and will do anything to gain an advantage’ (The Star, 2001).  
In addition to linking PAS with Islamic extremism, Mahathir also depicted 
the form of Islam associated with PAS as regressive and anachronistic, contrasting 
it with his version of progressive and moderate Islam. Mahathir asserted, 
‘Malaysia under PAS rule is not going to be politically stable and will not develop. 
Malaysia will probably retrogress’ (C. Tan, 2000). In a speech before the 2002 
UMNO General Assembly, Mahathir contended: 
In order to improve their lot then…[Muslims] must be more skilled and 
successful in administering and developing their countries; acquire all 
knowledge and skill necessary for this purpose. What is…unfortunate is 
that as soon as the government of a Muslim country tries to develop the 
country…by acquiring knowledge in science and technology, there will 
emerge groups which would oppose such attempts because according to 
them it is secular and unIslamic and the Government must be 
overthrown… Although they call themselves…Islamic Party, they do not 
hesitate to ignore the teachings of Islam by declaring the governments are 
not Muslim and they are prepared to kill the government leaders and 
other Muslims in order to prevent the progress which they declare to be 
secular. (Mahathir, 2002b) 
11
 September 2001 was a decisive day in Mahathir’s journey towards 
political recovery. Mahathir capitalised on the terrorist attacks in the United States 
to demonise Islamic extremism and to gain the upper hand in the competition with 
PAS. Mahathir tried to demonise the Islamic opposition during Reformasi. 
However opposition to his authoritarian politics drowned out his rhetoric of the  
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Islamic extremist threat, leading people to support the opposition coalition instead. 
After 911, however, the fear factor promoted by Mahathir loomed large, 
overpowering the possibility of democratic political reform invested in the 
opposition, including PAS. Hence, 911 had a significant impact on the 
competition between Mahathir’s BN and the opposition coalition.   
September 11 helped Mahathir in two different ways to capture both the 
Malay-Muslim and the non-Malay community. First, immediately after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, Mahathir denounced what had happened. His 
firm stance against Islamic extremism and terrorism was psychologically 
comforting for the non-Malays in Malaysia, who were, after all, living in a 
country with a Muslim majority population.
48 Mahathir said, ‘we will fight to the 
end these factions which oppose Islamic teachings because we don’t want the 
people in our country to be oppressed like the people in Afghanistan’ (Utusan 
Malaysia, 2001a). He also argued, ‘There is no justification in the act of terrorism 
although it was said to be for a noble cause’ (Utusan Malaysia, 2001c).
49  
Second, Mahathir strongly criticised the United States-led invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq to tap the Malay Muslims’ antipathy towards the invasions. 
He contended: 
[Afghanistan] was attacked with weapons which recognise no one. Many 
innocent people, civilians, old and young women, children, the sick, were 
killed or wounded and millions of the people of this unfortunate country 
fled to neighbouring countries where they live in miserable conditions… 
But terrorism has not been stopped… Defeating Afghanistan has not 
given any effect in the fight against terrorism…We are sure that the 
principal case of the terrorism by Muslims is their anger…[regarding] the 
oppression of Muslim countries and Muslims all over the world. If 
terrorism is to be stopped then the injustice and the oppression of Israel  
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against Palestine and its people must be stopped quickly first. (Mahathir, 
2002b) 
Mahathir’s condemnation of the invasions and the ensuing repression in 
Afghanistan and Iraq rejuvenated his image as a strong and outspoken leader of a 
Muslim country among the Malay Muslims. Mahathir did not stop there: he 
appealed to Malay Muslims to unite under his progressive vision of Islam to avoid 
the fate of Muslim countries that were being oppressed by the West. He asserted 
in 2003:  
They want to oppress us. Look at what happened to Afghanistan, Iraq and 
the threat to Syria. Do not think for one minute that only the Arab 
countries are facing such pressures. If we are weak, the superpower will 
do the same to us. But, if we are willing to master new knowledge and 
pray to god, Insyaallah… our prayer will be answered. (reprinted in 
Ainon Mohd, Sajahan Waheed, & Ahmad Fairuz Othman, 2003) 
Mahathir demonised Islamic extremism, including PAS, primarily to 
counter the surging popularity of PAS after the Reformasi movement and the 1999 
elections and to regain the support of the Malay people. This rhetoric was a 
typical garrison-under-siege strategy of collectivist nationalism. However, it 
received much more play after the 1999 elections which seriously threatened 
Mahathir’s political hegemony. September 11 demonstrated graphically what 
Mahathir warned regarding the dangers of Islamic extremism. Mahathir’s vocal 
condemnation of the terrorism and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq appealed 
to the non-Malay community and enabled the Malay Muslims to vent their anger 
against the invasion, thereby increasing Mahathir’s stature as an articulate leader 
of the Muslim world.  
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Discrediting the ethnocultural nationalist elements  
Mahathir also used a strategy of demonising what he called ‘small 
extremist groups’ within both the Malay and non-Malay communities. His 
rhetoric reminded the Malays of the dangers posed by non-Malay groups to Malay 
special rights and privileges. At the same time, Mahathir would warn the non-
Malays of the threat from Malay ethnocultural nationalists to their presence and 
interests in Malaysia. By generating fears of ethnic instability, Mahathir intended 
to emphasise the continuing threats to ethnic harmony and coexistence in 
Malaysia. In this context, Mahathir attempted to show that as he did not overlook 
such threats in Malaysia, he was still the best option for multiethnic Malaysia.  
Mahathir assumed that the vast majority of Malaysians accepted his vision 
of a civic Malaysian nation. He praised them for accepting “Malaysian” culture 
and their ethnic tolerance. In 2000, Mahathir said: 
Only those who cannot accept Malaysian culture feel that the integration 
of the Malay, Indian and Chinese cultures has been mixed up and it was 
something which was not good… Just now, we saw Chinese children 
wearing Malay traditional costumes. Indian children also wear Malay 
costumes. These are the true Malaysians… the ordinary Malaysians… 
This is very good and cannot be found in most other countries. We should 
be thankful for it. (S. Singh & Chow, 2000)  
However, when Mahathir faced any opposition to his initiatives, he did not 
spare any harsh remarks and would dub his opposition “extremists”. When 
Mahathir pushed his plan for Vision Schools
50 and the teaching of science and 
mathematics in English, there was opposition from the Chinese community, 
especially from a Chinese educationist group called the Dong Jiao Zong (a united 
body of the Chinese School Committees Association of Malaysia and the Chinese  
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School Teacher Association of Malaysia) which was concerned about the impact 
the schemes would have on the right of the Chinese community for Chinese 
education and Chinese medium schools (Koh, 2002). Mahathir strongly criticised 
these Chinese educationists, arguing: 
As if they (the educationist group) do not admit to being Malaysians or 
that they have to be close with other races. They want everything to be 
separated… Chinese schools to be separated from other schools until they 
become foreign schools… Any attempt to isolate the Chinese from other 
races will obstruct unity among the various races. My criticism is directed 
towards this small group. Its number is not big, but it is acting as if to 
intimidate or threaten the Government. This is why I consider them as 
extremists and I will criticise extremists whether they are Malays, 
Chinese or Indians. There is no place for extremists in Malaysia. (P. 
Singh, 2000)  
However, Mahathir was careful enough to describe the Chinese extremists 
as a ‘small group’, to avoid offending the majority of the Chinese community who 
had supported the government in the 1999 elections. A few days after Mahathir 
made the above remark, he clarified his criticism and even apologised to the 
Chinese community, which he described as moderate (J. Tan, 2000).  
When it came to the language issue, that is, the growing emphasis on 
English as a teaching medium, there was opposition from the Malay community 
as well. Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Language and Literature Council) and PAS 
spearheaded the Malay community’s criticism of the government’s attempt to 
expand the use of English (Yi, 2002). Mahathir responded to the criticism, saying 
‘Mastering English will not make us any less Malay or Islamic. Actually the 
growth of the Malay language is not at the expense of rejecting other languages,  
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but rather through the mastery of other languages’ (Mahathir, 2001). Mahathir 
went so far as to redefine Malay linguistic nationalism. He contended: 
Malay students themselves think that if they learn English, they are not 
being nationalistic, they are not supporting the Bahasa… We believe that 
a nationalist is someone who has mastered all the knowledge and all the 
skills and is capable of contesting against the rest of the world. That is the 
true nationalist. But they think that just being able to speak Malay makes 
you a nationalist, and that is wrong. (Mahathir, 2000a)  
Mahathir also reprimanded a small group within UMNO that called for the 
defence of Malay special rights. In 2001, the group, called Barisan Bertindak 
Melayu (BBM) or Malay Action Front (MAF), organised a rally in Kuala Lumpur. 
They alleged their purpose was to unite the Malays and invigorate Malay 
dominance,
51 which contradicted Mahathir’s civic nationalist vision. Mahathir did 
not welcome this kind of Malay nationalist group and clearly distanced himself, 
saying ‘we don’t want to make it seem as if we were going to fight the Chinese or 
something like that’ (Utusan Malaysia, 2001b). He cut all UMNO support to this 
group to silence the ethnocultural Malay nationalist rhetoric (Holland, 2001: 18).   
These episodes demonstrated how Mahathir tried to show he was resolute 
in tackling potentially destabilising issues in multi-ethnic Malaysia. Mahathir 
highlighted the ethnocultural nationalist or chauvinist threat to instil fear. By 
doing that, Mahathir attempted to show he was still relevant and a better option 
compared to the untested opposition coalition because only he could guarantee the 
peaceful coexistence of the various ethnic communities in Malaysia.   
 
 
  
291
Opposition as a threat to Malaysian nation and authoritarian 
suppression justified 
Mahathir also linked the political opposition, especially Keadilan and the 
Reformasi movement, to the foreign threat trying to undermine Malaysia’s 
independence. This rhetoric instilled a sense of fear so that the population 
withdrew their support for the opposition. In addition, Mahathir justified 
authoritarian measures to suppress the opposition in the interests of the entire 
national community. Such logic was typical of Mahathir’s collectivist nationalist 
view.  
After the 1999 elections, the first major crackdown of the opposition 
coalition occurred on ‘Black 14’, the anniversary of Anwar’s being sentenced to 
six years imprisonment on charges of corruption on 14 April, 1999. At the Black 
14 demonstration in 2001, the police arrested several Reformasi activists and 
Keadilan leaders under the ISA.
52  They were also accused of attempting to 
overthrow the government by force. A week before the arrests, Mahathir raised 
the foreign threat, claiming that ‘foreign sympathisers’, at the instigation of a 
foreign power, were trying to topple the government (Jegathesan, 2001). A few 
months later, Mahathir asserted: 
Pressure on the government can be imposed by anyone, including 
foreigners. As a result not only economic recovery becomes impossible, 
but, independence which once was a source of pride is now almost non-
existent. This is the result of “reformasi” and street demonstrations. Do 
we want to see all these brought to our country by this “reformasi” 
group? … They [the foreign force] only used the opposition as a tool to achieve 
their evil intentions. If there are certain people that they wish to promote to 
mobilise the people and influence the world into believing the bad practices of 
the Government which they detest, then the seemingly misfortune of that     
person will be capitalised. (Mahathir, 2001)  
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According to Mahathir, foreign forces intent on undermining Malaysia’s 
stability and prosperity used opposition parties and Reformasi to achieve their 
aims. Hence, Mahathir believed he was justified not only to suppress the 
opposition but also to use such authoritarian measures as the ISA. Mahathir who 
was in Washington justified the use of the ISA to detain opposition politicians on 
Black 14 in 2001. He denied that he had been undemocratic and said, ‘If we 
wanted to really paralyse the opposition, we would have to arrest their leaders, not 
some of these people who are minor “lights” in their own party… They say things 
that stir people up, so we have to take action against them’ (Yap, 2002). After the 
terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, Mahathir found new 
grounds to rationalise the use of detention without trial. He asserted: 
…there are terrorists in this country. That is why we have the ISA. When 
we used the ISA to stop terrorists, we were blamed as being undemocratic, 
unjust and all that but now they are doing exactly what we have been 
doing, they are learning from us. (Firdaus Abdullah, 2001) 
Mahathir intended to alienate the opposition parties which had seriously 
threatened his political supremacy in the 1999 elections. The fear that Mahathir 
instilled was expected to encourage Malaysians to support Mahathir instead. 
Mahathir used authoritarian measures, which also warned the population not to 
support the opposition if they did not want to experience the same fate as the 
arrested opposition leaders. These authoritarian measures, which reflected 
Mahathir’s collectivist nationalism, were justified by the interests of the national 
community.  
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Mahathir’s recovery as shown in by-elections results 
Mahathir’s attempts to recover political support did change Malaysia’s 
political landscape. In an interview I conducted in 2003, an UMNO Youth 
Supreme Council member stated that the concerns of the population, especially 
the Malay community, were then quite different from those during the Reformasi 
movement’s heyday. He contended: 
[during Reformasi period] emotions were high. There was the Black eye 
[of Anwar] and that sort of things. So of course, there was slight shift in 
strategic outlook of Malay community. But, today, issues of long-term 
prosperity, issues of challenging globalisation and issues of Malay 
economic participation [are] back on agenda [of Malay community].
53  
The changing attitude of Malaysians towards UMNO was partly reflected 
in the results of a series of by-elections following the 1999 elections. Table 5–3 
shows the by-elections results. There had been nine by-elections and the Sarawak 
state assembly elections since the 1999 general elections. The by-elections results, 
before and after 2001, when Mahathir began regaining his dominance in UMNO, 
show a marked difference. Also, the results of the Sarawak state assembly 
elections, which were held a week after the 911 incidents and after Mahathir’s 
escalated rhetoric of the threat from Islamic extremists, show an even more 
marked difference. In the by-elections held before 2001, the opposition coalition 
significantly reduced the BN’s majority earned in the 1999 general elections. The 
BA coalition even achieved an astonishing victory in the Lunas state assembly 
seat in Kedah, Mahathir’s hometown, thereby denying the BN a two-thirds 
majority in the state assembly (Saiful Azhar Abdullah, 2000). However, an 
examination of the post-2001 by-elections results indicates that, first of all, in  
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Likas, the BA was humiliatingly defeated. Although the BN had a clear upper 
hand in East Malaysia, the margin that increased from its performance in the 1999 
elections was substantial.
54   After the 911 terrorist attacks, the electoral 
performance of the BN improved even more substantially. Other than the BN’s 
clean sweep of the Sarawak state elections, the BA also lost the parliamentary seat 
(Pendang) held by the late PAS president, Fadzil Noor, and almost lost the state 
assembly seat, wining it only with a margin of 508 votes. Except for the Bukit 
Anak state assembly seat, in all other contests, component parties of the BN won 
their seats with a substantially increased majority from that of the 1999 elections 
(Syed Arabi Idid, Abdul Rashid Moten, & Saodah, 2003).   
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Table 5-4 By-elections from 1999 General elections until the end of 2002 
Date District State  By-elections  1999  election 
April 2000  Sanggang  Pahang  BN won by 1,963  BN won by 4,970 
June 2000  Teluk 
Kemang  N. Sembilan  BN won by 5,972  BN won by 9,942 
November 
2000  Lunas  Kedah  Keadilan won by 530  BN won by 4,700 
July 2001  Likas  Sabah   BN won by 7,500  BN won by 4,962* 
September 
2001 
Sarawak 
State 
BN swept all 62 seats in the election, while DAP and 
independent won 3 and 2 seats in 1996 state election 
January 
2002 
Indera 
Kayangan  Perlis   BN won by 2,592  BN won by 1,974 
March 
2002  Kethari  Pahang  BN won by 2,204  BN won by 231 
July 2002  Anak 
Bukit  Kedah  PAS won by 508  PAS won by 1,840 
July 2002  Pendang   Kedah  BN won by 283  PAS won by 2,939 
October 
2002  Gaya  Sabah  BN won by 11,932  BN won by 4,117* 
Source: Based on Election Commission Website (http://www.spr.gov.my) and various 
issues of newspapers * 1999 March state elections results 
 
5.6. Conclusion  
In the 1998 UMNO factional dispute between Mahathir and Anwar, the 
discourses used to justify their positions and political manoeuvres were based on 
different ideas of national community. While this research does not reject the 
importance of other variable such as personal rivalry, patronage clash, power 
struggle, policy difference and so on, that they put forwarded different politics 
resulted from different perspectives of nationalism was also important to 
understand the dispute. While Mahathir and Anwar did not disagree much on the 
civic nationalist direction, their differences were clearly evident in their views on 
the relationship between the individual and the national community, differences 
which would result in different political consequences: authoritarian rule and 
democratic politics.   
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Mahathir’s concept of the national community was collectivist. In the 
dispute, Mahathir’s view was expressed in the authoritarian suppression and 
demonisation of political opponents in the interest of the Malaysian nation. On the 
other hand, Anwar’s agenda for political reform, which was an ideological 
alternative to Mahathir’s views, reflected the individualistic assumptions 
regarding the national community. As the individualistic view was typically 
expressed in demands for democratic reform, fostering civil society, and tolerance 
of political opponents, Anwar’s ideological position was clearly in opposition to 
Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalism. Anwar’s individualistic 
nationalism can be summarised in the following three aspects: the importance of 
individual rights and liberty against the community’s suppression of individuals; 
political democracy and fostering of civil society as a reflection of individual 
rights and liberty; and opposition to the collectivist-authoritarian rhetoric of threat 
to the community.  
The 1997 economic crisis that hit Malaysia was a serious challenge to 
Mahathir’s nationalist legitimacy which was based in part on the population’s 
optimism in a prosperous economic future. To maintain his support and 
legitimacy, Mahathir demonised external factors, accusing international 
speculative funds and economic superpowers. This was a typically collectivist-
authoritarian nationalist response. On the contrary, Anwar had different remedies 
for the economic crisis, which increased the tension between Mahathir and him. 
The rising tension eventually brought about Anwar’s sudden dismissal in 1998, 
which was the beginning of the Reformasi movement demanding economic and 
political reform. Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalist position was  
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clearly revealed in his treatment of Anwar and his authoritarian crackdown of the 
Reformasi movement.  
After Anwar’s imprisonment, the Reformasi movement was succeeded by 
the opposition coalition, BA, which articulated concrete reform measures, 
reflecting individualistic nationalism in its common election manifesto. Despite 
the ethnocultural nationalist characteristics of the BA’s component parties, their 
shared individualistic-libertarian nationalist position for political reform bound 
them into a coalition. The competing positions were tested in the 1999 elections 
and the elections results showed that Mahathir lost substantial political ground to 
the challenge mounted by the individualistic-libertarian nationalist position.  
After the elections, Mahathir attempted to recover lost ground, leaning on 
the strategy of garrison-under-siege, that is, a rhetoric of threat to the national 
community. Mahathir reasserted his commitment to a civic nationalist direction to 
consolidate non-Malay support. The quick economic recovery emboldened 
Mahathir to recover the lost support. Mahathir’s rhetoric of the threat from Islamic 
extremism, the dangers posed by ethnocultural nationalist extremists and the 
perils of an opposition backed by foreign forces to undermine Malaysia’s stability 
and prosperity resonated with the fear and chaos caused by the 911 incidents. 
Indeed, as demonstrated by the results of several by-elections held after the 1999 
elections, Mahathir regained substantial although not all of the support that he had 
lost in the 1999 elections, thereby demonstrating the resilience of Mahathir’s 
nationalist ideology and rhetoric in Malaysian politics.  
The pattern of nationalist ideological conflicts identified in the 1969 and 
1987 disputes was repeated in the 1998 dispute, but with a major twist. There was  
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a similarity. The 1998 dispute was a challenge from Anwar (with a new 
nationalist assumption reflecting the community’s discontent with the Prime 
Minister’s nationalist vision) to the Prime Minister’s collectivist-authoritarian 
nationalist position. The difference arose from the fact that the nationalist question 
that had dominated the previous disputes had been, to a certain degree, addressed 
and a new nationalist question had emerged. Accordingly, the 1998 dispute 
revolved around a conflict between collectivist-authoritarian nationalism and 
individualistic-libertarian nationalism. Finally, if the previous pattern can be a 
guide, it is likely that the new competing nationalist positions will shape UMNO 
factional dispute in the future, if any, until the question is resolved. 
                                                 
1 Mahathir’s own remarks confirmed that the direction in which he attempted to lead 
Malaysia was not much different from Abdul Rahman’s, who he criticised strongly in 
1969. Mahathir once said, ‘I am sure that the Tengku [Abdul Rahman] is satisfied with 
the success of the formula he initiated, a formula which we are duty-bound to continue 
for the benefit of future generations… The formula is working wonderfully well in our 
diverse cultural setting. Today we have a great responsibility to sustain and enhance it… 
We should be grateful because we can co-exist. We are not asking for racial assimilation 
but for greater tolerance… This is a fact of life in Malaysia, something that we must learn 
to be grateful’ (Bingkasan & Ridu, 2003). Analytically, Abdul Rahman’s multicultural 
nationalism and Mahathir’s civic nationalism have been differentiated in this thesis. 
However, insofar as both leaders attempted to move away from ethnocultural Malay 
nationalism, they shared a similar nationalist direction, although their assumptions about 
national identities and institutional characteristics were different. Furthermore, in 
academic studies of national identity and the political elites’ attempts to develop national 
identity in Malaysia, multicultural and civic nationalisms were not truly differentiated, 
but generally referred to as “more accommodating” nationalism, “more inclusive” 
nationalism, or “Malayan or Malaysian nationalism” against “Malay nationalism”. 
2 Reflecting the significance of the 1998 dispute, there are a number of studies done. 
Hwang argued that the dispute is out of personal rivalry between Mahathir and Anwar 
(Hwang, 2003). Similarly, Stewart was of opinion that the dispute was out of personal 
rivalry between the two which was culminated during the economic crisis. He added that 
Mahathir permitted no challenge to him and this was why he took initiative in the rivalry 
by sacking Anwar (Stewart, 2003). Cheah observes that the personal rivalry between 
Mahathir and Anwar has been in the party and it became visible because of different 
remedies duing the economic crisis (Cheah, 2002). Muzaffar did not hesitate to conclude, 
quite simply, that the dispute was a power struggle between the two top leaders of 
UMNO (Muzaffar, 1998). Fundson had similar opinion that the dispute is about power 
struggle between Mahathir and Anwar and he added that when Anwar “outshine the 
Master” i.e. Mahathir (Funston, 1999). Case explained that the dispute was a complex of  
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patronage struggle and power struggle. Also, there was a bit of policy disagreement 
between Mahathir and Anwar regarding how to remedy Malaysian economy (Case, 1999). 
Hilley recognised that there was an ideological difference between Mahathir and Anwar. 
But, he said that the difference was not to a level of causing the dispute. Instead, what 
was decisive for the outbreak of the dispute was differing approach to economic crisis of 
Anwar from that of Mahathir and the very difference was regarded as undermining what 
Mahathir has done last 20 years to develop Malaysian economy (Hilley 2001). Lastly, 
Khoo argued that an analysis of Mahathir-Anwar dispute required a complex explanation. 
He maintained that the dispute was a complicated consequence coming from different 
economic policies, power struggle and ideologically, Anwar’s liberalism against 
Mahathir’s more authoritarian politics (B. T. Khoo, 2003).   
3  Anwar held different posts in the government. He was first appointed Deputy 
Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department (1982–83), after which he held such posts as 
Minister of Culture, Youth and Sport (1983–84), of Agriculture (1984–86), of Education 
(1986–1991) and was appointed Finance Minister in 1991. Also, in UMNO, he was 
elected Youth Chief (1982) for three terms until 1987, after which he was elected Vice 
President. 
4 According to a close ally of Anwar’s, when Mahathir did not appear to have a chance 
of winning in the 1987 party elections against Razaleigh, Anwar’s allies tried to persuade 
Anwar to switch to Razaleigh’s camp. In reply, Anwar reportedly said, ‘No way! No 
deals! I am behind Mahathir. And don’t you dare make a secret deal with them. If Team 
B wins, I will resign, even if I win the Vice Presidency. My loyalty is to Mahathir. I 
promised Mahathir my support and I will not go back on my promise’ (Aliran, 2003: 21). 
5 Anwar’s Islamic credentials have seldom been questioned. Anwar majored in Malay 
studies at the University of Malaya. During his university student days, Anwar was 
involved with the Malay Language Society of University Malaya. After graduation, 
Anwar was involved with many domestic and international Islamic organisations such as 
ABIM (Angakatan Belia Islam Malaysia; Malaysian Islamic Youth Council) (as president 
in 1974), World Assembly of Muslim Youth for Asia and Pacific Region (committee 
member, 1976-1982), International Islamic Federation of Student Organisation for Asia 
and Pacific Region (committee member, 1976-1982), International Islamic Thought 
(committee member, 1981-1982), International Islamic Council (committee member, 
1981-1984), International Islamic Charitable Foundation (committee member, 1982-) and 
Islamic Consultative Body Malaysia (member, 1982-). In addition, after Anwar joined 
UMNO, he implemented major Islamisation policies that Mahathir had initiated in the 
early 1980s. An example was the establishment of the International Islamic University in 
Malaysia. Anwar has been President of the University since 1988 (for the details of 
Islamisation policy, see Hussin Mutalib, 1990). Before Anwar joined UMNO, as student 
activist and ABIM leader, he worked closely with PAS. In a few general elections, he 
openly supported PAS and actively campaigned for PAS candidates. One of the main 
reasons why UMNO brought Anwar into the party in 1982 was to counter the growing 
Islamic rhetoric of the PAS and to co-opt the grassroots Dakwah movement. After 
Anwar’s dismissal in 1998, some even argued that Anwar could have set up an Islamic 
State in Malaysia, if he succeeded Mahathir as Prime Minister. Given that Islam is a 
central part of Malay identity, Anwar’s Reformasi movement could have taken an 
ethnocultural nationalist position. However, it seemed that, despite Anwar’s Islamic 
credentials, the religious aspect had not been highlighted much. Rather, it was the 
discourse of democracy, social justice and political reform that attracted most of 
Reformasi’s followers. In other words, although Anwar’s Islamic credentials contributed 
to the upsurge of the Malay community’s support for Anwar, it is hard to say that the  
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Reformasi movement had a strong religious component. If that was the case, the 
Reformasi movement would not have entered into a coalition with DAP and other non-
Islamic NGOs such as Suaram, a NGO advocating for human rights. Also, in an interview 
with me, a close ally of Anwar categorically rejected any insinuation that linked Anwar 
with an Islamic state or theocratic rule. The interviewee maintained, ‘There is no worry 
about Anwar’s Islamism or Islamicity. When he was in the government, I have not heard 
[any complaints]. This is probably a sort of backward projection of current [issue]. But he 
pronounced much more moderate, much more sensible [Islam than people think]. Anwar 
was in a way quite sophisticated intellectual, not very crude like PAS ulamas [religious 
teachers] or something like that’. (From a 19 May 2003 interview in Kuala Lumpur with 
a leader of Keadilan who was close to Anwar.) 
6  Prominent members of the Mahathir faction in 1996 included Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Najib Razak (Education Minister), Rafidah Aziz 
(Minister of Trade and Industry), Abdul Rahim Thamby Chik (UMNO Youth Chief), 
Hishamuddin Hussein (won Deputy Chief of UMNO Youth Wing post in 1996), 
Sabbaruddin Chik (Minister of Culture, Arts and Tourism) and Sanusi Junid (former 
Agricultural Minister and UMNO Secretary-General). Meanwhile, Anwar’s faction 
consisted of Muhyiddin Yassin (Johor Menteri Besar), Siti Zaharah Sulaiman (Deputy 
Health Minister), Ahmad Zahid Hamidi (UMNO Youth Information Chief), Osman Aroff 
(Kedah Menteri Besar), and Salleh Said Keruak (Sabah Chief Minister).  
7 The fact that, to a certain degree and to a certain level, the democratic electoral 
process, that is, popular voting is observed makes strength at the grassroots level 
important. A delegation, which votes in the general assembly elections, is composed of 
leaders from the grassroots level. An example was the proxy dispute between Mahathir 
and Anwar over the post of the Kedah Menteri Besar post. In 1996, Mahathir wanted to 
replace Osman Aroff, an Anwar supporter, with Sanusi Junid, a staunch Mahathir 
supporter, causing rancour at the grassroots level, which was embarrassing for Mahathir 
(Jayasankaran, 1995b: 8). 
8   In the 1996 UMNO elections, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Najib Razak and 
Muhammad Taib (the latter two switched to Mahathir’s faction after the 1993 elections) 
were elected as Vice Presidents. Also, the Supreme Council positions were occupied by 
Mahathir loyalists. Anwar’s faction claimed victories only in the elections for UMNO 
Youth wing and Wanita (Women) wing, whose chiefs were Anwar loyalists.  
9 Khoo Su-ming described Anwar’s ideological background as follows: ‘Certainly, it is 
widely perceived that Mahathir’s chosen successor, Anwar Ibrahim, will bring a new 
phase to nationalism in Malaysia. His rise has been accompanied by the concomitant rise 
of other leaders in the mould of “new Asian intellectuals”. Speaking of civil society, 
Asian renaissance and a new era in politics (“era baru politik”), Anwar seems poised to 
redefine nationalism and modernization yet again when he moves into the position of 
power as Prime Minister. With impeccable Islamic as well as secular credentials and with 
a popular cultural pluralist platform…, a new phase in hegemony is approaching’ (S. 
Khoo, 1999: 145). 
10 It is interesting to note that, in addition to arguments on behalf of civil society, 
individual liberty and democracy, Anwar actually criticised a few concrete aspects of 
Mahathir’s government and Mahathir’s views, although he did not name Mahathir or his 
government specifically. First, Anwar criticised personal rule and power concentration, 
saying ‘For humane governance, it is essential that power be vested in a democratically 
constituted authority rather than in the hands of an individual’ (Anwar, 1996a: 52). One 
of the most distinct trends under the Mahathir government was the concentration of 
power in the hands of an executive dominated by Mahathir (Ho, 2001). In addition,  
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Anwar touched on press freedom arguing, ‘the usual contention is that since freedom 
cannot be absolute, the press must be restricted. This argument is fallacious… Those who 
contend that press freedom is luxury for developing countries, their societies being too 
fragile and not ready for the dissent and conflict generated by a free press, ignore 200 
years of Asian history’ (Anwar, 1996a: 46). Mahathir had always argued that there should 
be restrictions on the press for the sake of national interest and security. Anwar was also 
critical of the Malaysian judiciary, which was under the control of the government, 
describing it as ‘apologists for the executive’ (Anwar, 1996a: 64). And finally, Anwar 
advised caution regarding one of Mahathir’s central policies, privatisation. He discussed: 
‘Notwithstanding the virtues of privatisation, a caveat must be lodged at the outset. 
Privatized entities must be fully conscious of their social responsibility. Measures must be 
instituted and moral suasion exercised to ensure that privatized entities and beneficiaries 
of the policy are not driven solely by profit motives. Privatization has to be transparent 
and subject to a regulatory framework, lest the public fall prey to corporate Titans 
ganging up to form monopolies’ (Anwar, 1996a: 90-91). This aspect of social 
responsibility was not mentioned in the government’s privatisation plan, which 
emphasised only economic rationality. 
11 Anwar argued, ‘one must…guard against religious fanaticism and ethnocentricism, 
whose destructive consequences are self-evident enough’ (Anwar, 1995b). And he 
proposed fostering a ‘moderate majority’ as a way to counter the extremism. Regarding 
an approach Anwar called a ‘middle path between anarchy and absolutism’, he debated, 
‘In the multicultural, multi-religious, and multi-ethnic context that we live in, this 
approach takes on added significance. Each community will always have its extremist 
fringe, which if given free rein would whip up sentiments to plunge entire nations into 
turmoil and even bloodshed. It is crucial that we have a moderate majority, one that will 
be prepared to act firmly and decisively against extremist elements’ (Anwar, 1996a: 53). 
12 Even the Financial Times has noticed Anwar’s propensity for quoting from diverse 
sources: ‘Mr Anwar sprinkles his conversation with references to de Tocqueville. His last 
budget included quotations from the German thinker Reinhold Niebuhr, the Koran and 
little-known Neo-Confucian scholars’ (Kyunge & Montagnon, 1996). 
13  According to the government’s recovery package, revealed in December 1997, 
government spending was cut 18 per cent across the board and an additional 2 per cent in 
selected areas. In addition, credit growth was suppressed by government policy, creating 
capital shortage for already struggling small and medium businesses (Nesadurai, 2000: 
94).  
14 There were bailouts of politically connected companies at the peak of the economic 
crisis. United Engineering Malaysia, for example, bailed out Renong, an UMNO 
company.  This bailout caused financial loss for minority UEM shareholders.  Petronas, 
the national oil company, bailed out Konsortium Perkapalan which was owned by 
Mahathir’s son. Even before the economic crisis, there were alleged corruption and 
cronyism cases such as the awarding of the privatisation of the North-South highway 
project to UEM, owned by Renong. Because of the obscure bidding process, there were 
numerous allegations of corruption associated with the privatisation projects. Edmund 
Terence Gomez has conducted extensive research regarding UMNO’s business 
involvement and alleged corruption and cronyism cases. See (Gomez, 1990;1991;1994; 
Gomez & Jomo, 1997) 
15 From a 19 May 2003 interview in Kuala Lumpur with a leader of Keadilan who was 
close to Anwar.  
16 Opinion surveys regarding politically sensitive issues are not readily available in 
Malaysia. From the economic crisis to the Reformasi movement that followed, there were  
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no reliable opinion surveys, except some anecdotal observations regarding the 
population’s opinions on these developments.  
A survey published in Asiaweek, conducted by a Malaysian scholar, Rozhan Othman 
of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia) showed some 
interesting aspects of Malaysian opinion during the economic crisis (Suh, 1998). (It must 
be noted that the number of people surveyed -- primarily corporate sector employees, 
academics, entrepreneurs and bureaucrats with no significant political affiliations -- was 
not large enough.) When the respondents were asked to choose from Mahathir, Anwar 
and Daim Zaninuddin the best leader to deal with the economic crisis, Anwar received the 
highest score, followed by Daim, then Mahathir. Also, to a question asking who was the 
best leader to steer Malaysia through the economic crisis, 64.4 per cent answered, 
“Anwar”, followed by 16.7 per cent who answered, “Mahathir”. To a question asking if 
there were any policy differences between Mahathir and Anwar, 70 per cent answered 
that there were. To a question asking whether (as Mahathir claimed) the international 
speculative fund was solely responsible for the economic crisis, 88.6 per cent answered 
‘No’. To a question asking whether Malaysia needed “political” reform to survive the 
economic crisis, 65 per cent answered “Yes” while 21 per cent answered “No”. Although 
this survey showed a part of public opinion in Malaysia, it should be noted that the 
absolute majority of respondents were in favour of Anwar and political reform rather than 
of Mahathir’s rhetoric and his leadership.    
17 In a 1998 speech, Anwar argued, ‘It is unfair…simply to blame the governments of 
affected economies for the crisis… If the fundamental flaws in the global financial 
system…are not remedied soon, the world is headed for a series of financial convulsions 
of increasing severity’ (Anwar, 1998e). 
18 From a 19 May 2003 interview in Kuala Lumpur with a Keadilan leader who was 
close to Anwar.    
19 Lim Kit Siang, long-time critic of the government and then DAP secretary general, 
said, ‘For the first time in three decades, I’m beginning to dare to hope that the 
government might be prepared to embark on an all-out war against corruption’ 
(Jayasankaran, 1997). 
20 UEM is a subsidiary of Renong, which in turn is a business arm of UMNO. After 
being awarded the North-South Highway construction project in 1987, UEM became a 
cash cow for Renong. During the economic crisis, Renong had financial problems 
because of its heavy debt servicing. To solve the problem, cash-rich UEM bought its 
parent company, Renong, which resulted in a loss for UEM shareholders, as a result of 
the high premium paid to Renong. Anwar ordered an investigation of the deal and 
discovered irregularities but the punishment meted out was relatively light.  
21 In early 1998, Petronas, the cash-rich national oil company, took over $220 million 
assets of the $490 million debt-ridden Konsortium Perkapalan, owned by Mahathir’s son, 
Mirzan Mahathir. 
22 The projects deferred in October 1997 included the Bakun Dam, Kuala Lumpur 
Linear City project, North Region International Airport (planned to be built in Alor Star, 
Mahathir’s hometown and capital city of Kedah) and Phase 2 of Putrajaya and so on.  
23  The list, available at http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/98/0703/nat_3_list.html, 
includes the names of beneficiaries of privatisation projects, receivers of special share 
allocations from the government, government contractors, and beneficiaries of various 
transportation business licenses. (Accessed on 23 April 2001) 
24  From early 1998, Mahathir attempted to undermine Anwar’s power base. First, 
Mahathir appointed Daim (who was entrusted with the Malaysian economy in the 1980s) 
Chairman of the National Economic Action Council (NEAC). As the supreme economic  
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decision-making body, the NEAC increasingly overshadowed the Finance Ministry, 
which was then headed by Anwar. Also, at the 1998 UMNO general assembly, Anwar’s 
image was tarnished by the extensive distribution of anonymous letters against Anwar 
and of a book, 50 Dalil Mengapa Anwar Tak Boleh Jadi PM (50 Reasons Why Anwar 
Can’t Become Prime Minister) which could not have been possible without Mahathir’s 
knowledge and consent (Case, 1999: 5). Soon after, Mahathir removed Anwar’s close 
allies in the mass media, such as Johan Jaafar of Utusan Malaysia and Nazri Abdullah of 
Berita Harian, in an attempt to curb Anwar’s influence with the mass media 
(Jayasankaran, 1998b). After these political moves by Mahathir, it was clear Anwar was 
no longer Mahathir’s heir apparent, although he was still Vice President of UMNO. 
25 When Anwar first appeared in court, he had a black eye, an injury caused by police 
brutality. His black eye later became a symbol of government brutality and there were 
numerous demonstrations protesting how the police treated Anwar. Mahathir, who first 
claimed that the injury might have been self-inflicted, was forced to order an 
investigation. Subsequently, police chief, Rahim Noor, who admitted that he mistreated 
Anwar, was charged in court.  
26  Challenging an incumbent leader from outside UMNO has been always very 
difficult. As Hari Singh put it, ‘those who severed links with UMNO automatically signed 
their political death warrants’ (H. Singh, 1991: 716). Onn Jaafar’s challenge from the 
outside, forming another political party, failed miserably in a series of electoral defeats at 
the hands of Alliance coalition. Abdul Aziz Ishak’s confrontation with Abdul Rahman 
failed when he was expelled from the party (see Von Vorys, 1975: 171-183). More 
recently, Razaleigh’s defector party, Semangat 46’ again failed, even though the party, 
after failing in its multiethnic experiment with DAP, attempted to identity itself as a 
Malay nationalist party by inserting a word, “Melayu” in its name. 
27 Immediately after his dismissal, Anwar insisted that his dismissal was a political 
conspiracy by corrupt UMNO elites to undermine his commitment to reform. On 3 
September 1998, at a press conference immediately after his dismissal, Anwar said ‘[I] 
made it clear in no uncertain terms that I’m not prepared to submit to this conspiracy, a 
political conspiracy to undermine my position and defeat me through nasty schemes’ 
(Anwar, 1998b). Days later -- on the day he was arrested -- Anwar elaborated about the 
conspiracy, naming the individuals he believed to be involved in his sacking. He said, 
‘from the beginning, I have indeed emphasised that there is a political conspiracy at 
highest level. Of course, I was reluctant to involve a name, Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad, because I hoped that he has reasonable and rational consideration and 
sympathy. But, clearly all this has disappeared since he is power- and wealth-crazy, and 
wanted remaining years and power that in the end will be used fully to strengthen the 
interests of his family and his faction. Truly, Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad supported 
me and I also strongly supported him. Because at that time, I was confident about his 
principle of struggle although I accept that human being is not perfect. But eventually, 
[the conspirators] were not sure if I could protect their interests, their groups and their 
families. This is the reason why they launched a campaign that is so wicked to me’ 
(Anwar, 1998f, my translation).  
28  In the 1998 dispute, elite-level defections from UMNO were relatively few, 
compared to the significant grassroots mobilisation in support of Anwar. It was widely 
believed that Mahathir’s patronage prevented many of Anwar’s allies from following him 
when he left UMNO. An opposition politician I interviewed confirmed this. In his 
opinion, only a few of Anwar’s allies, who did not have substantial business interests, 
followed Anwar and defected from UMNO. For those who had substantial business 
interests, the stakes were too high. He observed that those who defected from UMNO,  
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such as Ezam Nor, Ruslan Kassim or Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, did not have substantial 
business interests (from a 2 April 2003 interview in Kuala Lumpur with a deputy 
president of an opposition party). 
29 From a 3 April 2003 interview in Kuala Lumpur with a former vice president of an 
opposition party. 
30 From a 19 May 2003 interview in Kuala Lumpur with a Keadilan leader who was 
close to Anwar. 
31 From an 18 May 2003 interview in Kuala Lumpur with a Member of Parliament 
from PAS. 
32  Rustam Sani also observed a similar political awakening of the community. He 
maintained that the BN’s feudal political control no longer worked in Malaysia. He 
argued, ‘They are no longer content to accept a mute politics of deference, disguised and 
often self-servingly promoted in the name of historic tradition under the high-sounding 
labels of respect [hormat] and loyalty [setia]’ (Rustam A. Sani, 2001: 95). On the same 
theme, UMNO insider, former Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam, said, ‘The Malays 
have become so well educated, mature and bold, bold in taking a stand on all kinds of 
issues, whether it is politics, administration, economy, education, etc. This is undoubtedly 
a result of UMNO’s own efforts. We should face this situation with pride and 
determination, but also adapt our thinking and action to it. If we only demand that they 
thank us continuously as before, they will regard us as being behind the times. So many 
Malay youths, when I’m exchanging views with them on current issues, complain to me 
that, “The trouble with the leadership is that whenever they try to explain issues to the 
public, they seem to insult our intelligence.” In other words, they are no longer prepared 
to accept a statement wholesale without thinking critically. We have lost credibility; their 
trust in us has been eroded.’ (Musa Hitam, 2000: 8). 
33 After Anwar’s imprisonment, the relationship between Anwar and Lim Guan Eng 
became close. Anwar paid his respects to Lim Guan Eng in a letter, saying, ‘Your sincere 
fight for the downtrodden, regardless of their ethnic origin, has woken Malaysians to the 
fact that a bigoted attitude only helps corrupt politicians to remain in power and retards 
any effort towards reform’ (Aliran, 1999a: 4). Lim Guan Eng responded: ‘Your role in 
translating the ideals and vision of Reformasi into truth, justice and a new Malaysian 
consciousness will be most critical. Many Malaysians share in your dream of “We are all 
in one family” and are willing to cross the bridge with you’ (Aliran, 1999b: 7).  
34 It has been said that a major weakness of the opposition parties in Malaysia is that 
they are divided on the basis of religion, ethnicity and so on (Crouch, 1996b: 116-117). 
Opposition parties, positioned at opposite ends of the ideological, cultural, religious and 
ethnic spectrum, often fought each other, thereby helping the BN during elections.  
35 Meredith Weiss observed the ethnic dimensions of the BA component parties as 
follows: ‘The BA…includes no race-based parties, though by dint of being open only to 
Muslims, PAS is, for all intents and purposes, a Malay party. The DAP is known as 
Chinese, but can count Malays and Indians among its top leaders and support base. 
Similarly, PRM has done its best to style itself as not just a Malay party, but as a party of 
the proletariat in general. Keadilan also has tried not to become too overwhelmingly 
Malay in membership and leadership’ (Weiss, 2001: 87). 
36  Traditionally, rural Malay and East Malaysian voters have been the strongest 
supporters of UMNO, whereas the urban areas where the Chinese are concentrated have 
been often closer to the Chinese opposition or ideological parties. Thus, the government 
has always maintained the election district bias for rural districts, that is, the 
overrepresentation of the rural population and under-representation of urban population 
(Jomo, 1996: 109) and this has been one of the most important factors that contributed to  
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the ruling coalition’s dominance of the parliament. For example, in the 1999 elections, 
the highest (Ampang Jaya-Selangor)/lowest (Hulu Rajang-Sarawak) population ratio in 
election districts was 6.1 times. While Selangor (including Kuala Lumpur) accounts for 
18.9 per cent of population, it only has 14 per cent of the seats. On the contrary, Sarawak, 
which accounts for 8.9 per cent of population, is allocated 14.5 per cent of the seats (K. S. 
Lim, 1999c). 
37  Before the elections, the election commission ruled that some 680,000 voters, 
mostly young voters, registered between April and May 1999, could not be registered in 
the 1999 general electoral rolls. This ruling was severely criticised by the opposition 
parties (K. S. Lim, 1999b). In the elections, the total number of registered voters was 
9,564,071 and out of this, 6,880,947 votes were cast (71 per cent). Hence, the 
unregistered 680,000 voters accounted for about 10 per cent of the total votes cast. In 
addition, the number was twice the number of mailed in votes, 234,926 votes. After the 
elections, the opposition claimed that, given the narrow margins in many districts, the 
680,000 voters barred from voting could have changed the outcome of the entire election. 
In terms of popular vote, the difference between the BN and the BA was 12 per cent, 
which meant that a 6 per cent swing towards the opposition could have made a significant 
difference in the elections result. Considering this, 680,000 unregistered voters, which 
was 10 per cent of the total votes cast, was substantial, especially when the opposition 
claimed that the unregistered voters were primarily pro-opposition.  
38 Until the 1969 elections, the campaigning period was about 30 days and the period 
between the dissolution of parliament and nomination day when official campaigning 
began, was between 17 to 23 days, making the period from dissolution of parliament to 
polling more than 50 days. However, after the 1969 ethnic riots, using the political 
tension and security issues as excuses, the government reduced not only the campaigning 
period (around 10 days) but also the period between dissolution to nomination (mostly 
less than 10 days) (K. S. Lim, 1999a). In 1999 elections, the campaigning period was 
only nine days and all outdoor rallies were banned. 
39 What was so striking was the fact that ‘the UMNO members were so absorbed in 
power’ that they could not admit even a small electoral setback especially after 
phenomenal electoral victory in previous election (From a 4 April 2003 interview in 
Kuala Lumpur with a former vice president of an opposition party). Also, see (Maznah 
Mohamad, 1999: 5).  
40 For example, the BN won all the state assembly seats in Johor (39 seats), Negri 
Sembilan (32 seats) and fared very well in Perak (44 seats out of 52), in Penang (30 seats 
out of 33) and in Selangor (42 seats out of 48). However, in Kelantan, the BN only won 
two seats out of the 43 contested and in Trengganu, four seats out of 32. Also, in Kedah, 
its two-thirds majority was threatened when the opposition won 12 seats out of the 36 
contested. Later, in 2001, the BN’s two-thirds majority in the Kedah state assembly was 
lost when the coalition lost in the Lunas by-elections. 
41 Official elections results do not reveal the share of votes and seats of individual 
parties in the BN coalition. (Legally, BN is deemed as a single party during elections.) 
These statistics must be obtained from anecdotal sources, newspapers or the calculations 
of other researchers. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to determine the extent of 
ethnic support for a particular party in BN. 
42 The DAP’s performance was unsatisfactory as it failed to recover its loss in the 
1995 elections. Furthermore, such major DAP figures as Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh 
were defeated in the contests for both their parliament and state assembly seats. Although 
the DAP’s performance fell short of expectations, it is hard to conclude that the DAP was 
disadvantaged by joining the opposition coalition. At least, the DAP secured more  
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popular votes than it did in the 1995 elections. As the DAP’s loss in 1995 has been 
described as ‘not a temporary phenomenon but… a permanent shift’, it can be argued that 
the DAP actually gained marginally in the 1999 elections (J. Chin, 2001: 299). A former 
opposition leader agreed with this argument to a certain degree. He argued that the BN 
government has already attempted to address such issues as Chinese education and the 
university entrance quota, which the Chinese community has raised and the DAP has 
championed in the past decade. Hence, the Chinese community generally did not see 
good reason to risk what it has by switching to an opposition which, in its opinion, does 
not have a proven track record (From a 4 April 2003 interview in Kuala Lumpur with a 
vice president of an opposition party).   
43 1999 elections results of selected Keadilan-contested seats in the southern states 
District State  No. of 
Voters 
1995 
margin 
1999 
margin 
Change  
(% 
points)* 
Shah  Alam  Selangor  93,468 40,715 1,440  42.0 
Kuala  Pilah  N.S.  44,363 20,600 2,818  40.1 
Sabek Bernam  Selangor  34,154 14,452 901  39.7 
Hulu  Langat  Selangor  71,276 30,812 3,761  38.0 
Wangsa  Maju  KL  75,356 27,890 5,718  29.4 
Selandar  Melaka  50,131 23,180 10,447 25.4 
Ampang  Jaya  Selangor  98,954 31,309 7,767  23.8 
Bandar Tun 
Razak  KL  59,416 14,735 1,224  22.7 
Lembah  Pantai  KL  52,879 13,361 1,417  22.6 
Batu  Berendam  Melaka  88,993 22,325 7,105  17.1 
Ledang  Johor  57,511 23,361 13,507 17.1 
Hulu  Selangor  Selangor  53,433 15,925 8,595  13.7 
Pagoh  Johor  40,604 17,599 12,805 11.8 
Source: (based on Kamarudin Jaafar, 2000; The New Straits Times, 1995)  * 1995 
margin (%) – 1999 margin (%) 
44 In a few situations following the 1999 elections, Mahathir emphasised ‘integration’ 
and rejected the idea of ‘assimilation’. In 2000, at the General Assembly of a Chinese 
coalition partner, Gerakan, Mahathir said, ‘There will be no assimilation of one race into 
another. In other countries, people of one race are assimilated into the main population 
but not here. We want integration… No other country in the world allows its migrants 
population to set up its own schools. Although we have no wish to assimilate them into 
the general population, we should at least integrate the races’ (Lau, 2000). 
45 Hitting rock bottom in 1998 with a 7.5 per cent drop in GDP, the Malaysian 
economy recovered in 1999, with a 6.1 per cent increase in GDP. In 2000, it recorded 8.3 
per cent growth, although it was down again in 2001 with 2.0 per cent growth. Since then, 
the increase in Malaysia’s GDP has been stabilised at 4-5 per cent a year. Given the sharp 
decline of the economy in 1997–98, the recovery was impressive. Consumer prices, 
which recorded 5.3 per cent growth in 1998, have stabilised at 1 or 2 per cent growth a 
year since 2000, while the unemployment rate is steady at 3 per cent (Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia, 2002: appendix vi). The Ringgit peg against the US Dollar is still in place, 
providing some predictability for business. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange has 
recovered as well. Total market valuation in the middle of the economic crisis was RM 
285.88 billion (1998 June). It increased to RM 572.31 billion in June 2000 (Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange, 2002: 2).   
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46   After Anwar was dismissed, Mahathir announced capital control measures, 
including a ringgit peg against the US dollar and banning short-term (one year) 
investments. When Mahathir first introduced these measures, they were widely described 
as “unorthodox” and “unconventional”, compared to the actions taken by other crisis-hit 
Asian countries which accepted the IMF bailout and prescriptions. Mahathir expected 
criticism when he said, ‘You might laugh at us if we tell you what we want to do’, two 
months before the introduction of capital controls, in replied to a question of what 
measures he had in mind (Chanda et al., 1998). With the exception of the Malaysian 
government, there was hardly any positive response to the capital control measures 
initially, in particular from the liberal economic schools represented by the World Bank 
and the IMF (for some of the risks they identified, see Athukorala, 1999). After the 
introduction of capital controls, the Malaysian economy soon recovered, enabling 
Mahathir to argue that they were the correct measures to take. Mahathir’s position was 
supported by the Bank Negara and some Malaysian academics (for example Mahani 
Zainal Abidin, 2000a). On the other hand, others were sceptical, noting that there was 
overall economic recovery in other crisis-hit Asian countries, some of which performed 
even better than Malaysia. The sceptics concluded that currency controls did not make 
any difference in the recovery of the Malaysian economy (Mohamed Ariff & Syarisa 
Yanti Abubakar, 1999). K.S. Jomo was sceptical about the measures, both in terms of 
their implementation and consequence. According to him, ‘Mahathir’s capital controls 
and recovery package were well designed and enforced, but too late, biased and 
unnecessary… the capital control had questionable practical value – except to prevent 
further ‘bleeding’ and perhaps to weather another crisis due to the huge Ringgit overhang 
in Singapore’ (Jomo, 2003: 34). Some other economists also differed. For example, 
internationally renowned economist, Joseph Stiglitz, admitted that the measure provided 
much needed stability to the Malaysian economy after the crisis and succeeded in 
attracting foreign investments (Stiglitz, 2002: 124-125). Meanwhile, the IMF, which was 
initially sceptical, changed its opinion. The positive economic growth led the IMF to re-
assess the measure, pointing out that the control gave the Malaysian economy “breathing 
space” in the crisis (The Edge, 1999; Zainul Arifin, 1999), although they were still unsure 
whether the measures actually contributed to the growth of the economy (Mustapha 
Kamil, 1999).   
47 According to the government, the group was first known as the KMM, Kumpulan 
Mujahidin Malaysia or Malaysian Mujahidin Group. For unknown reasons, the group 
increasingly came to be called Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (Malaysian Militant Group) 
by the government and mass media and was alleged to have links with Al-Qaeda. 
48   For non-Malays in a Muslim majority country, Mahathir, despite his 
authoritarianism, was a better option. For the non-Malays, it might be preferential to deal 
with Mahathir’s version of moderate Islam, rather than risking unknown options. 
Reflecting on this, an official of a Chinese party, Gerakan, said, ‘We are dealing with an 
extreme end of the spectrum versus a more moderate end. The onslaughter from the 
extreme end is coming on strongly. If we don’t work with the moderate, we would be 
overwhelmed. Sometimes, it is a matter of survival. We cannot have a purely secular state, 
so the only way is to work with the moderate Muslims. Only by working with them and 
making them feel comfortable that we are able to check extreme policies’ (Yap, 2003). 
49 Even before 911, Mahathir said, ‘We’ll preserve the sanctity of Islam by spreading 
true teachings of Islam. We’ll take on any attempts to spark off racial riots through 
extremist demands. We’ll protect the rights of all communities as enshrined in the 
country’s constitution’ (Utusan Malaysia, 2000).  
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50  The ‘Vision School’ plan would integrate national schools, where the teaching 
medium is Malay and which are primarily attended by Malay children, Chinese and 
Tamil schools, which are called national-type schools, so that school children from all 
ethnic groups mixed. This plan faced some opposition from both non-Malay and Malay 
communities. But, Mahathir argued, ‘If we love our children, if we love our brothers and 
sisters, do not use education as a political issue, don’t gamble with our children’s 
future… We want to do things together. If every race heads in a different direction, we 
can never be united’ (Firdaus Abdullah, 2002). 
51 They revived an old Malay nationalist slogan from the 1960s—‘Tak akan Melayu 
hilang di dunia’ (Malay will not perish from the earth). A speaker at the rally, Mazlan 
Harun, a former UMNO Youth leader, told reporters, ‘If the Malays do not realise the 
threat of these enemies [Chinese extremists] as similar to the extremists during the 
communist era and May 13, 1969, then we are in trouble’ (Loone, Ein Azmi, & Leong, 
2001). Another prominent participant, a former UMNO Youth Chief, said, ‘Malays are 
the tuan (boss) of this country. Don’t forget that’ (J. Tan, 2001). Given the slogan and the 
comments, it was clear that this group was ethnocultural Malay nationalist that reminded 
people of the Malay counter show-of-force in the 1969 ethnic riots. 
52 Those detainees included Ezam Noor, Keadilan Youth Chief and Anwar’s former 
secretary; N. Gopalakrishnan, Keadilan deputy Youth chief; Tian Chua, Keadilan vice 
president; Saari Sungib, Keadilan policymaking council member; Hishamuddin Rais, 
Reformasi activists and Malaysiakini columnist; Raja Petra Kamarudin, Reformasi 
activist and FreeAnwar campaign organiser; and Abdul Ghani Haroon. 
53 From a 9 May 2003 interview in Petaling Jaya with an UMNO Youth Supreme 
Council member. 
54 In Sabah and Sarawak, except for the strong presence of the PBS, which oscillates 
between the opposition and the ruling coalition, local BN parties, organised by local 
indigenous people, have been always dominant in elections. The PBS in Sabah is based 
on an indigenous ethnic group, Kadazandusun. The PBS began as an opposition party 
against the BN’s presence in Sabah and in every local election has shown a strong 
presence in Sabah politics. In the mid 1980s, mainly because of the federal BN 
government’s intervention, the PBS joined the ruling coalition. At that time, the federal 
government encouraged PBS members to defect from the party and threatened the party, 
detaining its leaders under the ISA. In the 1990 elections, at the very end of the election 
campaign, the PBS defected from the ruling coalition, upsetting Mahathir. After a few 
years in opposition, the PBS rejoined the ruling coalition in November 2001.   
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6. Conclusion   
This thesis argued that competing nationalist discourses had a real political 
importance in UMNO factionalism and it merits a due status in the analysis of the 
disputes. UMNO factionalism has often described as a conflict between clashing 
personalities, between competing patronage networks, or between power 
ambitions. These pragmatic and opportunistic variables are, of course, important 
and directly cause the dispute. The analysis of UMNO factionalism, however, is 
not complete without a proper look at the ideological clash. The ideological aspect 
can be a disguise of genuine political intention or can be out of real conviction. 
Whatever the case, the clashing nationalist ideologies were found important 
because of a few reasons. First, the ideological discourse constrained the political 
actors’ behaviours. Second, the discourses to a certain degree reflected the 
nationalist perception of wider community. Third, because of the ideological 
elements in the disputes, the impacts of elite level disputes spilt over to wider 
constituency, mobilising it, making divisions in it or exacerbating existing 
divisions. In addition, this research, by analysing nationalist discourse by elites 
over four decades, noted a change in the contents of competing nationalisms over 
time as a question of national identity is, to a certain degree, answered.  
Both UMNO factional disputes and nationalism have a central importance, 
not just in UMNO politics but also in Malaysian politics. The three cases of 
UMNO factional disputes examined here—the 1969, 1987 and 1998 disputes—
have been associated with major political developments in Malaysia. The 1969 
dispute happened right after the 1969 ethnic riots and is connected with the 
shifting focus and emphasis of the Malaysian state towards ethnocultural  
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nationalist direction the early 1970s. The 1987 dispute split UMNO into two 
competing secular Malay nationalist parties for the first time. The developments 
around the 1998 factional dispute, especially Anwar’s sacking, brought about 
unprecedented mass protests against the government, the Reformasi movement, 
which seriously threatened the political legitimacy of UMNO. 
The reason why nationalism occupies central stage in the ideological 
arguments of UMNO factional dispute is that the questions of national identity 
were not resolved. First, there is a question of the relationship between ethnic 
identities and national identity—Malay Malaysia or Malaysian Malaysia. At the 
beginning of multiethnic Malaysia, political elites were unable to define the 
national identity of Malaysia. Since then, national identity in Malaysia has been a 
contested one. Malaysian politics has been an arena of competing constructions of 
national identity. Second, there is a tension between collectivist and individualist 
definitions of national identity. In Malaysia, the collectivist nationalist view has 
justified the subjection of individuals to the collective interests and will of 
community defined by political elites. In this context, authoritarian politics has 
been justified with the imperative of imposing national identity and a vision of the 
collective national community defined by the political elites, thus providing a 
solution to the unresolved question of national identity. This elite imposed view 
could be challenged when the question of national identity is to a certain degree 
answered. These unresolved questions of national identity provide room for 
political elites to construct and manipulate nationalist ideologies. 
This research attempted to analyse the nationalist arguments of UMNO 
elites with two models of competing nationalisms. This framework is useful in  
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understanding the unresolved nationalist questions in Malaysia and, thus, in 
analysing the nationalist positions of competing UMNO elites. The first set of 
competing nationalisms consists of different ideas on the relationship between 
ethnic identities and national identity. This revolves around three competing 
ideological positions i.e. ‘Malaysia is Malay nation’; ‘Malay is a part of 
Malaysian nation’; and ‘there is no Malay (i.e. no ethnic denomination), but only 
Malaysian’. These arguments represent ethnocultural, multicultural and civic 
nationalisms respectively. The second question is the relationship between 
individual liberty and rights and the supremacy of community’s common will and 
interests. There are two competing ideological positions, that is, collectivist-
authoritarian nationalism and individualistic-libertarian nationalism that are 
practically reflected in authoritarian politics and in more liberal politics. 
This models or categorisations adopted in this research are ideal types or a 
guide to help understanding the elites’ construction and counter-construction of 
nationalism. The purpose of this thesis is not to fortify a theoretical model by 
analysing exemplar cases of nationalism categorisation or to fit particular cases 
into a black-white distinction. Therefore, when a case is described by a certain 
type of nationalism, it should be understood as a matter of tendency in relative 
term. Methodologically, this research focused on elite level ideological discourse. 
We should pay attention to two words – elite level and discourse. The analysis of 
elite discourses did not intend to reveal real political intention behind the 
ideological rhetoric. Regardless the discourses were merely disguises of real 
intentions or reflection of genuine conviction, still it has political importance as it 
has real political impacts, deserving an analysis as it is.  
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 Through this investigation of three UMNO factional disputes, a pattern of 
UMNO factional dispute in relation to the competing ideological arguments was 
found. UMNO factional disputes examined in this research are conflicts between 
the Prime Ministers, who are also UMNO presidents, and UMNO elites, who 
challenged the top leader. In general, the Prime Ministers attempted to capture the 
Malay community with their nationalist visions that were expected to resolve the 
question of national identity. The success of the attempts was expected to 
strengthen the Prime Minister’s nationalist legitimacy and to ease ethnic tension. 
On the other hand, the challengers disagreed with the vision proposed by the 
Prime Minister and attempted to put forward alternative nationalist ideologies, 
which, as they claimed, reflected the Malay community’s nationalist aspiration 
better.  
The three disputes examined all follow this pattern. The dispute in 1969 
was a clash between Abdul Rahman’s shift towards multicultural nationalism and 
newly rising elites’ ethnocultural Malay nationalism. For national integration, 
Abdul Rahman’s position moved from ethnocultural Malay nationalism towards a 
multicultural nationalist direction. Against this, some UMNO elites contended 
that the Malay community should be dominant politically, culturally and 
economically. The dispute reached its peak right after the 1969 ethnic riots when 
ethnocultural Malay nationalists openly demanded Abdul Rahman’s resignation. 
The 1987 dispute was between Mahathir’s move towards a civic nationalist 
direction and the challenger’s criticism. Mahathir’s economic policy in the 1980s 
indicated a significant move from ethnocultural nationalist policies from the 
1970s to more civic one. The critics of Mahathir demanded a return to the  
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ethnocultural Malay nationalist economic policy of 1970s—reinforcement and 
extension of the NEP to put Malay community above other communities 
economically. 
During the three disputes, the contents of the nationalist arguments held by 
the elites in each dispute changed. Initially, the question regarding the relationship 
between ethnic identities and national identity was dominant. When the question 
was to a certain degree resolved, another question regarding the relationship 
between the community and the individual became prominent. In the first half of 
the 1990s, Mahathir’s civic nationalist vision was successful, which meant that 
the unresolved question regarding the relationship between ethnic identities and 
national identity was tackled to a certain degree. Mahathir’s Bangsa Malaysia and 
economic vision, Wawasan 2020, projected a civic Malaysian nation vision in 
which people identified themselves as Malaysian, instead of members of their 
own ethnic groups.  
The 1998 dispute between Mahathir and Anwar, however, unfolded in a 
different way—a conflict between Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian 
nationalism and Anwar’s individualistic-libertarian nationalism. The two positions 
have different assumptions on the relationship between the individual and the 
community. In the former, an individual is subjected to the community’s interests 
and will, as defined by political elites, hence justifying Mahathir’s authoritarian 
control of the society. Anwar’s position opposed the authoritarian politics and 
demanded liberal political reform. This position recognises that individual rights 
and liberty are not constrained by the demands of the collective community.   
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In this concluding chapter, a brief discussion on the causes of UMNO 
factional disputes is appropriate. This research rather focused on the analysis of 
nationalist arguments of competing elite factions to shed a new light on UMNO 
factionalism. Nevertheless, from the analysis of this thesis, it can be inferred that 
the cause of UMNO factional dispute is neither pure power struggle nor 
completely an ideological dispute. In fact, the cause of UMNO factionalism might 
be a mix of both in varying degrees. 
In this regard, it would seem that the 1987 dispute is the least ideological 
one. The ideological position of the challenger in 1987 was constructed hastily 
before the dispute to contest Mahathir’s nationalist direction. On the contrary, the 
1969 and 1998 disputes appeared more ideological. In both disputes, the 
ideological positions of the competing political forces show a stark contrast and 
have been developed for a while before the disputes. The ideological assumptions 
of the challengers produced policy alternatives to the current direction of the 
Prime Minister (1969 dispute), and different approaches to economic crisis and 
political reform agenda (1998 dispute). These alternatives were perceived as 
serious personal challenges by the incumbent Prime Ministers, as policy and 
leadership are highly personalised in Malaysian politics. For example, Anwar’s 
economic remedy posed a serious threat to what Mahathir has achieved in the past 
20 years, giving him the popular title, “Father of Malaysian Development”. It 
shows how ideological disparity and the dispute that springs from it are easily 
translated as personal attacks. Therefore, the 1969 and 1998 disputes seemed to be 
personal power struggle, although there were clear-cut ideological differences 
underlying the disputes.   
315
The long-term consequences of the disputes are determined by the 
successful or unsuccessful mobilisation of the community by the factions. The 
immediate results of the disputes, such as the expulsion of ethnocultural 
nationalist challengers in 1969 and Mahathir’s win in the 1987 party elections do 
not really reflect the degree of mobilisation of the community. The immediate 
results were determined more at the elite level or by inner party political dynamics. 
A long-term consequence, which shapes UMNO and Malaysian politics in a more 
significant way, is different. In the 1969 dispute, the long-term consequence, that 
is, the advent of the ethnocultural Malay nationalist state in the 1970s illustrated 
the successful mobilisation of Malay community by the challengers. The 
mobilisation was shown in the Malay community’s protest against Abdul Rahman 
that undermined his authority and legitimacy. In the 1987 dispute, despite his 
victory in the party elections, without depending much on ethnocultural rhetoric, 
Mahathir had to quickly and tactically employ an ethnocultural nationalist 
position to mobilise the Malay community for a more extensive struggle against 
Razaleigh Hamzah over the Malay mandate and legitimacy.  
On the surface, it appeared that after the 1998 dispute, Mahathir was able 
to regain lost political ground by using a strategy of garrison-under-siege. 
Mahathir attempted to mobilise the Malaysian people by instilling fear of Islamic 
extremism, non-Malay threat to the Malay community and demonisation of the 
opposition parties. In particular, the 911 incidents worked for Mahathir in his 
attempt to make his point. A few by-elections results show the changing political 
support of Malaysian people. Despite some difficulties in the 1999 elections and 
by-elections right after the election, Mahathir’s UMNO and BN recovered  
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political support in later by-elections. Mahathir used internal and external 
developments effectively to regain lost support.  
Furthermore, this observation was strengthened by the 2004 elections 
results. UMNO and Barisan Nasional, under the new leadership of Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi, who succeeded Mahathir in October 2003, achieved an 
impressive victory over the weakened opposition parties. The coalition increased 
its popular vote by almost 10 percent and the BN’s share of parliament seats 
increased from 148 seats in the 1999 elections to 198 seats in the 2004 elections. 
The coalition, while retaining its strongholds in the southern states, managed to 
win back Trengganu with a big margin, winning 28 state seats out of 32 contested. 
Trengganu has been under PAS’s control since the 1999 elections.  
There are a few explanations for the BN’s impressive victory. One is that 
the victory was not the BN’s victory but rather the opposition’s loss.
1 In other 
words, voters were driven away from the opposition because of the following 
factors: PAS’s increasing Islamic state rhetoric which was rejected by moderate 
Muslims and non-Muslims; DAP’s return to support from only the Chinese 
community; Keadilan
2   in limbo swamped with internal problems; and the 
dwindling influence of Anwar. However, to a certain degree, these issues faced by 
the opposition were a result of Mahathir’s campaigning to tarnish and to corner 
the opposition parties. Some observers claimed that the new leader’s ‘low-key, 
collegial style’, which was different from Mahathir’s, made the difference (Lopez, 
2004). They also claimed that the voters were willing to give the new leader, 
Abdullah Badawi, a chance. However, even before the inauguration of Abdullah 
Badawi, as was shown in the results of a few by-elections, the performance of the  
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coalition was already improving, which was not much affected by the Abdullah 
Badawi factor. Therefore, it seems that Mahathir’s campaign to reassert his 
nationalist view after the 1999 elections, to a certain degree, contributed to the 
BN’s big win in the 2004 elections.  
Then, can it be concluded that the unresolved nationalist question raised in 
the 1998 UMNO dispute was resolved? This question should be answered, 
together with a discussion of the future prospects for ideological arguments in 
UMNO factional disputes. While there is no doubt that political support for the 
ruling coalition has recovered, does the recovery indicate a resolution of the 
fundamental issues raised by the Reformasi movement? Does it mean the 
demands of the individualistic-libertarian position have been addressed somehow? 
As seen in the Reformasi movement, a substantial number of Malaysians 
demanded political democratisation, economic reform, social justice, tolerance of 
dissidents and so on. What did Mahathir and Abdullah Badawi do regarding these 
issues? If these demands are not met, the rising political support for the BN 
cannot then be understood as a consequence of the resolution of the nationalist 
question raised.  
In fact, upon becoming Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi implemented 
some measures, particularly in economic reform, including fighting corruption, 
austere management of national budget, accountability of civil service, redirection 
of economic policy.
3 However, it remains to be seen whether Abdullah Badawi’s 
initiatives are just temporary or substantive, addressing at least some of the 
demands raised by supporters of the individualistic-libertarian view. The reason 
why one can doubt the efficacy of Abdullah Badawi’s reforms is that new leaders  
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often break from past practices to obtain political support. However, such reforms 
do not last long and do not address fundamental problems. For example, when 
Mahathir released ISA detainees when he became Prime Minister, he was 
described as a liberal political leader. However, this liberal image did not last long 
and now Mahathir is remembered as the most authoritarian of the four Prime 
Ministers Malaysia has had. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the fundamental 
issues are resolved.  
If the new Prime Minister manages to resolve the emerging nationalist 
question, then the ideological arguments in future UMNO factional disputes may 
take a different shape. But, investigation of this new configuration is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Instead, it can be said that the same nationalist tension as that 
of the 1998 dispute will play a major role, as an ideological element, in future 
UMNO factional disputes, if the new Prime Minister cannot address the 
nationalist tension emerged in the 1998 UMNO factional dispute. As argued in 
this research, the question regarding the relationship between ethnic identities and 
national identity has moulded the ideological arguments in the 1969 and 1987 
disputes. Only after Mahathir’s successful handling of the question in the first half 
of the 1990s did the contents of competing nationalist ideologies take a different 
configuration. And, if the same question keeps shaping the ideological arguments 
in future UMNO disputes, the competing positions are likely to be expressed in 
the form of justification of the status quo and demand for reform and political 
democratisation, as was the case with the 1998 dispute. 
                                                 
1 For example, see Raja Petra Kamaruddin’s analysis right after the elections (Raja 
Petra Kamaruddin, 2004). Raja Petra Kamaruddin argued that PAS could not see the  
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reality of Malaysian politics as they were mired in their own argument for an Islamic 
State, which estranged voters. He also pointed out that Keadilan’s leadership had to 
engage in soul searching regarding the ability of its leadership. Regarding the DAP, he 
maintained that the party, by demolishing the hard-built multi-ethnic opposition coalition, 
turned ‘the clock…back 30 years’. Similarly, Deputy President of Keadilan (the original 
Keadilan merged with PRM just before the 2004 elections, but retained its acronym, 
Keadilan, while its full name became Parti Keadilan Rakyat), Syed Husin reportedly 
pointed out the lack of discipline by which he meant “putting party interest above the 
coalition’s interests”. He mentioned in particular the problem of PAS leaders who 
behaved in an arrogant way because of PAS’s influence with Malay voters (see Yi, 2004). 
2 In 2003, Keadilan merged with another BA partner, PRM, under the name of Parti 
Keadilan Rakyat, retaining its acronym, Keadilan (Yi, 2003). Wan Azizah Wan Ismail 
was selected as President and Syed Husin Ali, former PRM president, was selected as 
Deputy President.  
3 After becoming Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi undertook a few bold policies and 
measures. Many of them involved issues that have been the rallying point of the 
opposition and NGOs during the Reformasi period and during the elections. Corruption 
has been one of the most widely debated issues in Malaysian politics. In fact, during the 
Reformasi movement, this issue was damaging to the government. Upon becoming Prime 
Minister, Abdullah Badawi pledged to tackle this problem at his first cabinet meeting (S. 
Singh, 2003). To Badawi’s credit, the Anti Corruption Agency (ACA) in the Prime 
Minister’s Office arrested two high-profile business leader and government minister. In 
February, Eric Chia, former Trengganu Steel managing director, was arrested with a 
charge of corruption. He was appointed managing director of the company by Mahathir in 
the mid 1980s to rationalise the management of the company. Shortly afterwards, Land 
and Cooperative Development Minister, Kasitah Gaddam, was arrested for corrupt 
practices (Malaysiakini, 2004; Yoon, 2004). In December 2003, Abdullah Badawi 
announced that the government would ‘postpone indefinitely’ a RM 14.5 billion railway 
double-tracking and electrification project. The company that secured the project was 
MMC-Gamuda, which was owned by Al-Bukhary, a close ally of Mahathir. He secured 
the contract when Mahathir was Prime Minister, although initially the contract was 
awarded to a consortium of Chinese and Indian national railway companies. The 
government explained that the government could not afford to implement such a major 
project, given the tight government budget (Diana Onn Abdullah, 2003). In January, 
Abdullah Badawi unveiled the National Integrity Plan, a guideline for public as well as 
private sector employees. The government also plans to set up a Public Ethics Institute 
that would carry out research, education, training and conference for the plan (Bernama, 
2004). In February, he announced a list of commissioners for a 16-member Royal 
Commission on the Police force to root out corruption and power abuse by the police. 
While the Commission on the Police force itself was already surprising, the list of 
commissioners surprised people even more. Abdullah Badawi appointed Salleh Abas, 
former Lord President, a supreme judge sacked in 1988 when Mahathir attempted to tame 
the judiciary and currently Executive Councillor of Trengganu government under PAS; 
Tengku Abdul Aziz Tengku Ibrahim, head of Transparency International Malaysia; and 
Kuthubul Zaman Bukhari, head of the Bar Council, a body frequently critical of the 
government (The New Straits Times, 2004).   
320
Bibliography 
A. Ghani Ismail. 1983. Razaleigh Lawan Musa: Pusingan Kedua 1984, Latar 
Belakang. Taiping: IJ Communications. 
Abbott, J. 2001. "Vanquishing Banquo's Ghost: The Anwar Ibrahim Affair and Its 
Impact on Malaysian Politics". Asian Studies Review, 25(3) pp. 285-308. 
Abdoolcarim, Z., & A. Shameen. 1988. "We Can Work Together (Interview with 
Mahathir)". Asiaweek, 11 November pp. 29-30.  
Abdul Aziz Bari. 2002. Cabinet Principles in Malaysia: The Law and Practice. 
Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press. 
Abdul Fauzi Abdul Hamid. 2000. "Political Dimension of Religious Conflict in 
Malaysia: State Response to an Islamic Movement". Indonesian and the 
Malay World, 28(80) pp. 32-65. 
Abdul Rahman. 1969. May 13: before and after. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu 
Press. 
Abdul Rahman. 1985. Challenging Times. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications. 
Abdul Rahman Embong. 1999. "Malay Middle Class Studies: A critical review". 
In K. S. Jomo Ed., Rethinking Malaysia. pp. 107-125. Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Abdul Rahman Embong. 2001a. "Beyond the Crisis: The Paradox of the 
Malaysian Middle Class". In Abdul Rahman Embong Ed., Southeast Asian 
Middle Classes: Prospects for Social Change and Democratisation. pp. 
80-102. Bangi, Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. 
Abdul Rahman Embong. 2001b. "The Culture and Practice of Pluralism in 
Postcolonial Malaysia". In R. W. Hefner Ed., The Politics of 
Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Indonesia. pp. 59-85. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Abdul Rahman Embong. 2001c. "Melayu Baru and Modernization of Malay 
Society". In C. Barlow Ed., Modern Malaysia in the Global Economy: 
Political and Social Change into the 21st Century. pp. 157-166. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Abdul Razak Abdul. 1984. "Joint-Venture between Malaysian Public 
Corporations & Foreign Enterprises: An Evaluation". In L. L. Lim & P. L. 
Chee Eds., The Malaysian Economy at the Crossroads: Policy adjustment  
321
or structural transformation. pp. 263-300. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian 
Economic Association. 
Abraham, C. E. R. 1983. "Racial and Ethnic Manipulation in Colonial Malaya". 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 6(1) pp. 18-32. 
Ahmad Atory Hussain. 1993. Dimensi Politik Melayu 1980-1990. Kuala Lumpur: 
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka. 
Ainon Mohd, Sajahan Waheed, & Ahmad Fairuz Othman. 2003. "Dr M slams 
selfish members". The New Straits Times, 12 May p. 4.  
Alagappa, M. 1995. "The Base of Legitimacy". In M. Alagappa Ed., Legitimacy in 
Southeast Asia: The quest for moral authority. pp. 31-53. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Aliran. 1998a. "Anwar Blacked out in Malaysian media". Aliran Monthly, 18(5) 
pp. 40. 
Aliran. 1998b. "Leadership And The Barisan Alternatif". Aliran Monthly, 19(8) 
pp. 6. 
Aliran. 1999a. "Anwar Writes to Guan Eng". Aliran Monthly, 19(2) pp. 4, 7. 
Aliran. 1999b. "Guan Eng Writes to Anwar". Aliran Monthly, 19(2) pp. 5-6. 
Aliran. 2002. "Aliran's ISA Watch". Aliran Monthly, 22(1) pp. 30. 
Aliran. 2003. "Thinking Allowed". Aliran Monthly, 23(3) pp. 19-22. 
Almeida, P. 1989. "Going Nowhere Fast". Malaysian Business, 1-15 September 
pp. 14-15.  
Alter, P. 1989. Nationalism. London: Edward Arnold. 
Andaya, B. W., & L. Y. Andaya. 1982. A History of Malaysia. London: 
Macmillan. 
Anwar, I. 1994a. Speech at "Democracy and the Challenges to Civil Society" 
conference. 20 September. Bangkok.   
Anwar, I. 1994b. Speech at the Kuala Lumpur Forum on Future Generations: 
"Emerging Thoughts and Philosophy of an Asian Century". 4 August. 
Kuala Lumpur.   
Anwar, I. 1994c. Speech titled "The Need for Civilizational Dialogue". 6 October. 
Washington D.C.    
322
Anwar, I. 1995a. Speech at the International Conference on Jose Rizal and the 
Asian Renaissance. 2 October. Kuala Lumpur.   
Anwar, I. 1995b. Speech at the Opening of the International Seminar on "Islam 
and Confucianism: A Civilization Dialogue". 13 March. Kuala Lumpur.   
Anwar, I. 1996a. The Asian Renaissance. Singapore: Times Books International. 
Anwar, I. 1996b. Speech at the 42nd Conference of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association. 19 August. Kuala Lumpur.   
Anwar, I. 1996c. Speech at The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 14 July. 
London.   
Anwar, I. 1996d. Speech titled "Asian Renaissance and The Reconstruction of 
Civilization" at University of Loyola Heights. 2 May. Quezon City, 
Philippines.   
Anwar, I. 1998a. Permatang Pauh Declaration. 12 September. Penang. available 
at 
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/3832/frame/Declare.htm 
Anwar, I. 1998b. Press Interview after Anwar's sacking on 3 September. 3 
September. Kuala Lumpur. available at 
www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/3832/frame/Qna.htm 
Anwar, I. 1998c. Speech at the Council of Foreign Relations. 15 April. New York.   
Anwar, I. 1998d. Speech at the Singapore International Chamber of Commerce. 9 
April. Singapore.   
Anwar, I. 1998e. Speech at the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
Meeting. 18 April. New York.   
Anwar, I. 1998f. Statement before Anwar was arrested on 20 September 1998. 20 
September. Kuala Lumpur. available at 
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/3832/frame/wasiat.html 
Ariffin Omar. 1993. Bangsa Melayu: Malay Concepts of Democracy and 
Community, 1945-1950. Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Asiaweek. 1982. "An Opposition Is Not Absolutely Necessary". Asiaweek, 7 May.  
Asiaweek. 1989. "A Step Towards Malay Unity". Asiaweek, 6 January p. 23.  
Asiaweek. 1998. "'Look At the Total Picture': Malaysia's Foreign Minister 
Answers the Critics". Asiaweek, 27 November.   
323
Athukorala, P.-c. 1999. "Swimming against the Tide: Crisis Management in 
Malaysia". In H. W. Arndt & H. Hill Eds., Southeast Asia's Economic 
Crisis: Origins, Lessons, and the way forward. pp. 28-40. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Aziz Zariza Ahmad. 1997. Mahathir's Paradigm Shift: the man behind the vision. 
Taiping, Perak, Malaysia: Firma Malaysia Publishing. 
Barisan Alternatif. 1999. Common Manifesto: Towards A Just Malaysia. 24 
October. available at www.malaysia.net/dap/ba-main.htm 
Bartholomew, J. 1986. "Buffing up the image". Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 
August pp. 45-46.  
Bass, J. R. 1973. Malaysian Politics, 1968-1970: Crisis and Response. 
Unpublished Ph. D. in Political Science, University of California, 
Berkeley, Berkeley. 
Beissinger, M. 1998. "Nationalisms that bark and nationalisms that bite: Ernest 
Gellner and the substantiation of nations". In J. A. Hall Ed., The State of 
the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism. pp. 169-190. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bernama. 2004. "Abdullah Launches National Integrity Plan". Bernama, 23 April. 
http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news.php?id=62773 
Bingkasan, J., & J. Ridu. 2003. "Protect Tengku's formula for racial tolerance-Dr 
M". The New Straits Times, 26 July. 
http://www.mmail.com.my/Current_News/NST/Saturday/National/200307
26085611/Article 
Bowie, A. 1994. "The Dynamics of Business-Government Relations in 
Industrialising Malaysia". In A. MacIntyre Ed., Business and Government 
in Industrialising Asia. pp. 167-194. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin. 
Breuilly, J. 1982. Nationalism and the state. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
Brown, D. 1994. The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia. London: 
Routledge. 
Brown, D. 2000. Contemporary Nationalism: civic, ethnocultural and 
multicultural politics. London: Routledge. 
Brown, D. 2001. Why Might Constructed Nationalist and Ethnic Ideologies Com 
into Confrontation with each other? (Working Paper Series No. 17). Hong 
Kong: Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong.  
324
Brown, D., & D. M. Jones. 1995. "Democratization and the Myth of the 
Liberalizing Middle Class". In D. A. Bell, D. Brown, K. Jayasuriya & D. 
M. Jones Eds., Toward Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia. pp. 78-106. 
London: St. Martin's Press. 
Businessweek. 1998. "A Fired Finance Chief Speaks Out". Businessweek, 21 
September p. 47.  
Butcher, J. G. 2001. "May 13: A Review of Some Controversies in Accounts of 
the Riots". In K. S. Jomo Ed., Reinventing Malaysia: Reflections on Its 
Past and Future. pp. 35-56. Bangi, Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia. 
Canovan, M. 1996. Nationhood and Political Theory. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Case, W. 1992. Semi-democracy in Malaysia: Pressures and Prospects for 
Change. Canberra: Political and Social Change Research School of Pacific 
Studies, Australian National University. 
Case, W. 1993. "Malaysia: The semi-democratic paradigm". Asia Studies Review, 
17(1) pp. 75-82. 
Case, W. 1995. "Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy". In M. 
Alagappa Ed., Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for 
Moral Authority. pp. 69-107. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Case, W. 1996. Elites and Regimes in Malaysia: Revisiting a Consociational 
Democracy. Clayton, Vic., Australia: Monash Asia Institute, Monash 
University. 
Case, W. 1997. "Malaysia: Still the semi-democratic paradigm". Asian Studies 
Review, 21(2-3) pp. 79-90. 
Case, W. 1999. "Politics Beyond Anwar: What's New". Asian Journal of Political 
Science, 7(1) pp. 1-19. 
Case, W. 2001a. "Malaysia's General Elections in 1999: A Consolidated and 
High-quality Semi-Democracy". Asian Studies Review, 25(1) pp. 35-55. 
Case, W. 2001b. "Malaysia's Resilient Pseudodemocracy". Journal of Democracy, 
12(1) pp. 43-57. 
Cham, B. N. 1975. "Class and Communal Conflict in Malaysia". Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 5(4) pp. 446-461. 
Chan, T. H. P., & K. Horii. 1986. Impact of The New Economic Policy on 
Malaysian Economy. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies.  
325
Chanda, N., D. Biers, & M. Hiebert. 1998. "Trust Me (Interview with Mahathir)". 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 July pp. 15-17.  
Cheah, B. K. 2002. Malaysia: The Making of a Nation. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
Chee, S. 1987. "The Political Economy of Privatization with Reference to 
Malaysia". Paper presented at the Conference on Issues and Challenges for 
National Development, Kuala Lumpur. 
Chin, C. B. N. 2000. "The state of the 'state' in globalization: social order and 
economic restructuring in Malaysia". Third World Quarterly, 21(6) pp. 
1035-1057. 
Chin, J. 1997a. "Malaysia in 1996: Mahathir-Anwar bouts, UMNO election and 
Sarawak surprise". Asian Survey, 37(2) pp. 181-187. 
Chin, J. 1997b. "Politics of Federal Intervention in Malaysia: With reference to 
Sarawak, Sabah and Kelantan". Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative 
Politics, 35(2) pp. 96-120. 
Chin, J. 2001. "A New Balance: the Chinese Vote in the 1999 Malaysian General 
Election". South East Asia Review, 8(3) pp. 281-299. 
Connor, W. 1994. Ethnonationalism: The quest for understanding. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Crouch, H. 1980. "The UMNO Crisis: 1975-1977". In H. Crouch, K. H. Lee & M. 
Ong Eds., Malaysian Politics and The 1978 Election. pp. 11-36. Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 
Crouch, H. 1992. "Authoritarian Trends, The UMNO Split and the Limits to State 
Power". In J. S. Kahn & K. W. Loh Eds., Fragmented Vision: Culture and 
Politics in Contemporary Malaysia. pp. 21-43. Sydney: Asian Studies 
Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin. 
Crouch, H. 1993. "Malaysia: Neither authoritarian nor democratic". In K. 
Hewison, R. Robison & G. Rodan Eds., Southeast Asia in the 1990s: 
authoritarianism, democracy and capitalism. pp. 133-158. St. Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin. 
Crouch, H. 1996a. Government and Society in Malaysia. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Crouch, H. 1996b. "Malaysia: Do elections make difference". In R. H. Taylor Ed., 
The Politics of Election in Southeast Asia. pp. 114-135. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
326
Crovitz, L. G. 1994. "Nobody Elects the Press (Interview with Mahathir)". Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 7 April pp. 20-21.  
Das, K. 1986. The Musa Dilemma: Reflections on the decision of Datuk Musa 
Hitam to quit the government of Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. 
Kuala Lumpur: K. Das. 
Das, K. Ed. 1987. Malay Dominance?: The Abdullah rubric. Kuala Lumpur: K. 
Das Ink. 
Department of Statistics Malaysia. 2001. Press statement: Population Distribution 
and Basic Demographic Characteristics Report of Population and 
Housing Census 2000. 6, November. Kuala Lumpur. available at 
http://www.statistics.gov.my/English/framesetCurrent.htm (accessed 27 
August 2003) 
Diana Onn Abdullah. 2003. "Austerity is new buzzword for M'sian govt". 
Business Times, Singapore, 15 December. http://busness-
times.asia1.com.sg/sub/news/story/0,4574,102625,00.html? 
Drummond, S., & D. Hawkins. 1970. "The Malaysian Election of 1969: An 
Analysis of the Campaign and the Results". Asian Survey, 10(4) pp. 320-
335. 
Economic Planning Unit. (1991a). Privatization Master Plan. Accessed on 23 
April, 2001, available at http://www.epu.jpm.my/epu-pub-pmp.html 
Economic Planning Unit. (1991b). The Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991-
2000. Accessed on 30 November, 2002, available at 
http://www.epu.jpm.my/Bi/dev_plan/opp2/t2-6.htm 
Economic Planning Unit. 2001. The Third Outline Perspective Plan 2001-2010. 
Kuala Lumpur: Economic Planning Unit, Malaysia. 
Emmerson, D. K. 1995. "Region and recalcitrance: rethinking democracy through 
Southeast Asia". The Pacific Review, 8(2) pp. 223-248. 
Faaland, J., J. R. Parkinson, & R. Saniman. 1990. Growth and Ethnic Inequality: 
Malaysia's new economic policy. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan 
Pustaka. 
Fan, Y. T. 1989. The UMNO Drama: Power struggles in Malaysia. Kuala 
Lumpur: Egret Publications. 
Farish A. Noor. 1999. "Looking for Reformasi: The discursive dynamics of the 
reformasi movement and its prospects as a political project". Indonesian 
and the Malay World, 27(77) pp. 5-18.  
327
Federation of Malaya. 1961. Second Five Year Plan 1961-1965. Kuala Lumpur: 
Government Printer. 
Firdaus Abdullah. 2001. "PM: Others now also using ISA". The New Straits Times, 
20 September p. 2.  
Firdaus Abdullah. 2002. "No discrimination, says PM". The New Straits Times, 10 
October p. 1.  
Funston, J. 1980. Malay Politics in Malaysia: A study of the United Malays 
National Organisation and Party Islam. Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann 
Educational Books (Asia). 
Funston, J. 1988. "Challenge and Response in Malaysia: The UMNO Crisis and 
the Mahathir Style". The Pacific Review, 1(4) pp. 363-373. 
Funston, J. 1998. Political Careers of Mahathir Mohamad and Anwar Ibrahim: 
Parallel, Intersecting and Conflicting Lives (IKMAS Working Paper No. 
15). Bangi Malaysia: Institut Kajian Malaysia dan Antarabangsa, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. 
Funston, J. 1999. "Malaysia: A fateful September". In D. Singh Ed., Southeast 
Asian Affairs 1999. pp. 165-184. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
Funston, J. 2000. "Malaysia's Tenth Elections: Status Quo, Reformasi or 
Islamization?" Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22(1) pp. 23-59. 
Gale, B. 1981. Politics and Public Enterprise in Malaysia. Singapore: Eastern 
University Press. 
Gale, B. 1982. Musa Hitam: A political biography. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: 
Eastern Universities Press (M). 
Gill, R. 1988. The UMNO Crisis. Singapore: Sterling Corporate Services. 
Gill, R. 1990. Of Political Bondage: An authorised biography of Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, Malaysia's first prime minister and his continuing participation 
in contemporary politics. Singapore: Sterling Corporate Services. 
Goh, C. T. 1971. The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia. Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 
Gomez, E. T. 1990. Politics in Business: UMNO's Corporate Investments. Kuala 
Lumpur: Forum. 
Gomez, E. T. 1991. Money Politics in the Barisan Nasional. Kuala Lumpur: 
Forum.  
328
Gomez, E. T. 1994. Political Business: Corporate involvement of Malaysian 
political parties. Townsville: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, James 
Cook University of North Queensland. 
Gomez, E. T. 1996a. The 1995 Malaysian General Elections: A report and 
commentary (Occasional Paper No. 93). Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies. 
Gomez, E. T. 1996b. "Electoral Fundings of General, State and Party Elections in 
Malaysia". Journal of Contemporary Asia, 26(1) pp. 81-99. 
Gomez, E. T. 1998. "Malaysia". In W. Sachsenroder & U. E. Frings Eds., 
Political Party System and Democratic Development in East and 
Southeast Asia. pp. 226-288. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Gomez, E. T., & K. S. Jomo. 1997. Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, 
patronage and profits. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Greenfeld, L. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Guibernau, M. 1996. Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the 
Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gullick, J. M. 1981. Malaysia: Economic expansion and national unity. London; 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 
Halim Salleh. 1999. "Development and the Politics of Social Stability in 
Malaysia". In D. Singh Ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 1999. pp. 185-203. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Hall, J. A. 1995. "Nationalisms, Classified and Explained". In S. Periwal Ed., 
Notions of Nationalism. pp. 8-33. Budapest: Central European University 
Press. 
Harper, T. N. 1996. "New Malays, New Malaysians: Nationalism, Society, and 
History". In D. Singh & T. K. Liak Eds., Southeast Asian Affairs 1996. pp. 
238-255. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Heng, P. K. 1992. "The Chinese Business Elite of Malaysia". In R. McVey Ed., 
Southeast Asian Capitalists. pp. 127-146. Ithaca: Cornell University Asia 
Program. 
Heng, P. K. 1997. "The New Economic Policy and The Chinese Community in 
Peninsular Malaysia". The Developing Economies, XXXV(3) pp. 262-292.  
329
Heng, P. K. 2003. "The Mahathir Generation and Nation Building in Malaysia: 
Political, Economic and Socio-Cultural Dynamics". Paper presented at the 
paper presented at IKMAS, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 7 August 
2003. Bangi. 
Hiebert, M. 1995. "Golden Tongue". Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July p. 22.  
Hiebert, M. 1998. "Tactical Victory". Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 July. 
http://www.feer.com/Restricted/98july_2/malaysia.html 
Hilley, J. 2001. Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition. 
London: Zed Books. 
Hing, A. Y. 1984. "Capitalist Development, Class and Race". In Syed Husin Ali 
Ed., Ethnicity, Class and Development Malaysia. pp. 296-328. Kuala 
Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia. 
Ho, K. L. 1994. "Malaysia: The emergence of a new generation of UMNO 
leadership". In D. Singh Ed., Southeast Asian Affairs, 1994. pp. 179-193. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Ho, K. L. 2001. "The Political and Administrative Frames: Challenges and 
Reforms under the Mahathir Administration". In K. L. Ho & J. Chin Eds., 
Mahathir's Administration: Performance and Crisis in Governance. pp. 7-
27. Singapore: Times Books International. 
Holland, L. 2001. "Shaking the Party Grip on Power". Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 1 March pp. 16-20.  
Hussin Mutalib. 1990. Islam and ethnicity in Malay politics. Singapore; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Hussin Mutalib. 1993. Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State. 
Singapore: Singapore University Press. 
Hutchinson, J. 1987. The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival 
and the Creation of the Irish Nation State. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Hwang, I.-W. 2003. Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State under Mahathir. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Ishak Shari. 2003. "The Financial Crisis and Its Social Implications". In C. 
Barlow & F. K. W. Loh Eds., Malaysian Economics and Politics in the 
New Century. pp. 62-74. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Jayasankaran, S. 1987a. "The Battle Is On..." Malaysian Business, 16 April pp. 5-
8.   
330
Jayasankaran, S. 1987b. "Clean-up Time". Malaysian Business, 16 May pp. 4-5.  
Jayasankaran, S. 1988. "Premier in Power (Interview with Mahathir)". Malaysian 
Business, 1 January pp. 5-11.  
Jayasankaran, S. 1989. "How the Cake is Cut". Malaysian Business, 1-15 August 
pp. 11-14.  
Jayasankaran, S. 1995a. "Language Problem". Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 
July p. 24.  
Jayasankaran, S. 1995b. "Scramble for Power". Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 
September p. 18.  
Jayasankaran, S. 1996. "Show Your Faces". Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 
August p. 24.  
Jayasankaran, S. 1997. "Credible Clean-Up". Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 
June. 
http://www.feer.com/Restricted/97june_19/region_Malaysia_23.html 
Jayasankaran, S. 1998a. "Heir Unapparent". Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 
August. http://www.feer.com/Restricted/98aug_27/malaysia_.html 
Jayasankaran, S. 1998b. "Press Pressure". Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 July. 
http://www.feer.com/Restricted/98july_30/malaysia_.html 
Jayasankaran, S. 2001. "Profiting from fear". Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 
October. http://www.feer.com/2001/0110_11/p032region.html 
Jegathesan, M. 2001. "Police confirm seven held under ISA, more sought". 
Malaysiakini, 11 April. www.malaysiakini.com 
Jesudason, J. 1989. Ethnicity and The Economy: The state, Chinese business, and 
multinationals in Malaysia. Singapore; New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Jesudason, J. 1995. "Statist Democracy and the Limits to Civil Society in 
Malaysia". Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 33(3) pp. 
335-356. 
Jesudason, J. 1996. "The Syncretic State and the Structuring of Oppositional 
Politics in Malaysia". In G. Rodan Ed., Political Oppositions in 
Industrialising Asia. pp. 128-160. London; New York: Routledge. 
Jomo, K. S. 1989. Beyond 1990: considerations for a New National Development 
Strategy. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Advanced Studies, University of 
Malaya.  
331
Jomo, K. S. 1996. "Election's Janus Face: Limitations and potential in Malaysia". 
In R. H. Taylor Ed., The Politics of Election in Southeast Asia. pp. 90-113. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Jomo, K. S. 1999. "A Malaysian Middle Class?: Some preliminary analytical 
considerations". In K. S. Jomo Ed., Rethinking Malaysia. pp. 126-148. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Jomo, K. S. 2003. "Mahathir's Economic Legacy". Aliran Monthly, 23(8) pp. 32-
40. 
Jomo, K. S., & Ishak Shari. 1981. "Income Distribution and  the Role of the State 
in Peninsular Malaysia: A Review". Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia,(3&4) pp. 
212-253. 
Jones, D. M. 1995. "Democracy and Identity: The Paradoxical Character of 
Political Development". In D. A. Bell, D. Brown, K. Jayasuriya & D. M. 
Jones Eds., Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia. pp. 41-77. 
London: St. Martin's Press. 
Kahn, J. S. 1996. "Growth, Economic Transformation, Culture and the Middle 
Class in Malaysia". In R. Robison & D. S. G. Goodman Eds., The New 
Rich in Asia: mobile phones, McDonalds and middle-class revolution. pp. 
49-78. London; New York: Routledge. 
Kahn, J. S., & K. W. Loh. 1992. "Introduction: Fragmented Vision". In J. S. Kahn 
& K. W. Loh Eds., Fragmented Vision: Culture and politics in 
contemporary Malaysia. pp. 1-17. Sydney: Asian Studies Association of 
Australia in association with Allen & Unwin. 
Kamarudin Jaafar. 2000. Pilihanraya 1999 dan Masa Depan Politik Malaysia. 
Kuala Lumpur: IKDAS Sdn. Bhd. 
Kedourie, E. 1960. Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Kellas, J. G. 1998. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. Houndmills: 
Macmillan. 
Kershaw, R. 1988. "Within the Family. The Limits of Doctrinal Differentiation in 
the Malaysian Ruling Party Election of 1987". Review of Indonesian and 
Malaysian Affairs, 23 pp. 125-193. 
Kessler, C. S. 1992. "Archaism and Modernity: Contemporary Malay Political 
Culture". In J. S. Kahn & K. W. Loh Eds., Fragmented Vision: Culture 
and politics in contemporary Malaysia. pp. 133-157. Sydney: Asian 
Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin.  
332
Kessler, C. S. 2001. "Malaysia Since 1999: Dr Mahathir Survives his Crises". 
Dialogue, 20(3) pp. 22-28. 
Khong, K. H. 1991a. "Malaysia 1990: The election show-down". In S. Siddique & 
C. Y. Ng Eds., Southeast Asian Affairs 1991. pp. 161-179. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Khong, K. H. 1991b. Malaysia's General Election 1990: Continuity, change, and 
ethnic politics. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Khoo, B. T. 1995. Paradoxes of Mahathirism: an intellectual biography of 
Mahathir Mohamad. Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Khoo, B. T. 1997a. "Democracy and Authoritarianism in Malaysia since 1957: 
Class, ethnicity and changing capitalism". In A. Laothamatas Ed., 
Democratization in Southeast and East Asia. pp. 46-76. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Khoo, B. T. 1997b. "Malaysia: Challenges and Upsets in Politics and the Other 
contestations". In D. Singh Ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 1997. pp. 163-184. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Khoo, B. T. 1998. "Reflection on the UMNO General Assembly: More than 
Mahathir's succession is at stake". Aliran Monthly, 8(8) pp. 
Khoo, B. T. 2000. "The Malaysian General Election of 29 November 1999". 
Australian Journal of Political Science, 35(2) pp. 305-311. 
Khoo, B. T. 2001. "The State and the Market in Malaysian Political Economy". In 
G. Rodan, K. Hewison & R. Robison Eds., The Political Economy of 
South-East Asia: Conflicts, Crises, and Change. pp. 178-205. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Khoo, B. T. 2003. Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and Its Discontents. 
London: Zed Books. 
Khoo, B. T. 2004. "Democracy, Elections and Domination in Malaysia". Paper 
presented at the Asian Political Science Forum, 25 June. Daejeon, South 
Korea. 
Khoo, K. J. 1992. "The Grand Vision: Mahathir and Modernisation". In J. S. Kahn 
& K. W. Loh Eds., Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in 
Contemporary Malaysia. pp. 44-76. Sydney: Asian Studies Association of 
Australia in association with Allen & Unwin. 
Khoo, S. 1999. "Envisioning the Malaysian Nation: Ethnic Nationalism or 
Corporate Capitalism?" In K. J. Brehony & N. Rassool Eds., Nationalisms 
Old and New. pp. 125-153. London: Macmillan.  
333
Koh, L. C. 2002. "Dong Jiao Zong: English proposal a disaster for Chinese 
schools". The New Straits Times, 12 November. 
http://www.emedia.com.my/Current_News/NST/Tuesday/Frontpage/2002
1112073654/Article 
Kua, K. S. 1987a. Defining Malaysian Culture. Petaling Jaya: K. Das Ink. 
Kua, K. S. Ed. 1987b. Polarisation in Malaysia: The Root Causes. Kuala Lumpur: 
Malaysian Chinese Research and Resource Centre, Selangor Chinese 
Assembly Hall. 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 2002. Market Review 2002. Kuala Lumpur: 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
Kulkarni, V. G., M. Hiebert, & S. Jayasankaran. 1996. "Succession Saga". Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 24 October pp. 22-23.  
Kunio, Y. 1988. The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Southeast Asia. Singapore: 
Oxford University Press. 
Kyunge, J., & P. Montagnon. 1996. "A Modern Man in the Wings: Anwar 
Ibrahim, once an Islamic radical, knows about rap music". Financial 
Times, 8 November p. 4.  
Lau, L. 2000. "Mahathir wants all races to integrate". The Straits Times, 24 
September.  
Lee, E. 1987. "Food for Thought". Malaysian Business, 16 April p. 15.  
Lee, H. G. 2001. Political Parties and the Politics of Citizenship and Ethnicity in 
Peninsular Malay(si)a, 1957-1968 (Working Paper on Social  and 
Cultural Issues No. 2/2001). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
Lee, M. N. N. 1999. "Public Policies on Private Education in Malaysia". In K. S. 
Jomo Ed., Rethinking Malaysia. pp. 70-83. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
Leete, R. 1996. Malaysia's Demographic Transition: Rapid Development, Culture, 
and Politics. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 
Leigh, M. 1992. "Politics, Bureaucracy, and Business in Malaysia: Realigning the 
Eternal Triangle". In A. J. MacIntyre & K. Jayasuriya Eds., The Dynamics 
of Economic Policy Reform in South-east Asian and the South-west Pacific. 
pp. 115-123. Singapore: Oxford University Press.  
334
Liak, T. K. 1996. "Malaysia: Mahathir's last hurrah?" In D. Singh & T. K. Liak 
Eds., Southeast Asian Affairs 1996. pp. 217-237. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
Lijphart, A. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Lily Zubaidah Rahim. 1998. "In search of the Asian Way: cultural nationalism in 
Singapore and Malaysia". Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 36(3) 
pp. 54-73. 
Lim, K. S. 1999a. Media Statement by Lim Kit Siang, distributed through Parti 
Keadilan online discussion list under the title, '9 hari - terpendek dalam 
sejarah!' (9 days - shortest in history!). 12 November. Petaling Jaya. 
available at distributed through parti-keadilan@egroups.com 
Lim, K. S. 1999b. Media Statement by Lim Kit Siang, titled "680,000 New Voters 
Unconstitutionally Denied Right To Vote on 29 November, distributed 
through Malaysia2000 online list. 19 November. Petaling Jaya. available 
at Malaysia2000@onelist.com 
Lim, K. S. 1999c. Press Statement titled, 'Unfair MP-voters ratio' (from Bunga-
Raya mailing list). 14 November. available at bungaraya@listserv.net-
gw.com 
Lim, M. H. 1981. Ownership and Control of the One Hundred Largest 
Corporations in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Loh, F. 2001. "The Nayang Takeover Crisis". Aliran Monthly, 21(5) pp. 2-8. 
Loh, K. W. F. 2000. "State-Societal Relations in a Rapidly Growing Economy: 
the Case of Malaysia, 1970-97". In R. B. Kleinberg & J. A. Clark Eds., 
Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the 
Developing World. pp. 65-87. London: Macmillan. 
Loh, K. W. F., & Mustafa K. Anuar. 1996. "The Press in Malaysia in the Early 
1990s: Corporatisation, Technological Innovation and the Middle Class". 
In Muhammad Ikmal Said & Zahid Emby Eds., Malaysia: Critical 
Perspective. pp. 96-131. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Social Science 
Association. 
Loone, S., Ein Azmi, & K. Y. Leong. 2001. "Mahathir must listen more to 
grassroots: MAF leader". Malaysiakini, 4 February. 
http://www.malaysiakini.com/News/2001/02/2001020403.php 
Lopez, L. 2004. "Abdullah Win Heralds New Stability in Malaysia". The Asian 
Wall Street Journal, 22 March.   
335
Mahani Zainal Abidin. 2000a. "Implications of the Malaysian Experience on 
Future International Financial Arrangements". ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 
17(2) pp. 135-147. 
Mahani Zainal Abidin. 2000b. "Malaysian Economic Recovery Measures: A 
response to crisis management and for long-term economic sustainability". 
Paper presented at the ASEAN University Network's Conference on 
Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia: Its Social, Political and Cultural 
Impacts, 17-19 February. Bangkok. 
Mahathir, M. 1970. The Malay Dilemma. Singapore: Asia Pacific Publication. 
Mahathir, M. 1981a. Opening speech at the Second World Telegu Conference. 14 
April. Petaling Jaya.   
Mahathir, M. 1981b. Speech at the ASEAN-US Economic Conference. 18 
November. Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1983a. "Mahathir on Mahathir's Policy (Mahathir's memorandum on 
Look East, Malaysia Inc. and Privatisation Policy sent to government 
officials)". Malaysian Business, September p. 41.  
Mahathir, M. 1983b. Speech at national seminar on "Framework for Malaysia 
Incorporated and Privatization Towards National Productivity" organised 
by the Institute of Management Consultants (IMC). 10-11 October. Kuala 
Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1983c. Speech on ethnic relations and nations building at a function 
organised by the Malaysian Social Science Association. 12 January. 
University Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1984a. Speech at the "Top Business Leaders' Conference on 
National Economic Development". 18 May. Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1984b. Speech at the Annual Conference of Bank and Financial 
Institution Association of Malaysia. 30 October. Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1984c. Speech at the opening of the Third International Seminar on 
Islamic Thought. 26 July. The Asia-Pacific Development Centre, Kuala 
Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1985. Speech at The World Press Convention. 18 September. Kuala 
Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1986. The Challenge. Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia: Pelanduk 
Publications.  
336
Mahathir, M. 1987a. Speech at the seminar on Islamic Management. 6 April. 
Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1987b. Speech in Malaysian Parliament. 30 October. Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1988. Speech at 1988 UMNO General Assembly. 28 October. Kuala 
Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1991a. "Malaysia: The Way Forward (Mahathir's speech reprinted 
in the New Straits Times)". The New Straits Times, 2 March pp. 10-11.  
Mahathir, M. 1991b. Speech at 1991 UMNO General Assembly. 8 November. 
Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1992. Speech at the "A United Malaysian Nation by the Year 2020" 
Dinner. 31 January. Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1993a. Speech at 1993 UMNO General Assembly. 4 November. 
Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1993b. Speech at the Conference on Islam and Justice. 3 June. 
Institute of Islamic Understanding, Malaysia (IKIM), Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1994. Speech at The First East Asian Young Leaders Congress, 
titled "East Asian Peace, Stability and Prosperity". 5 August. Kuala 
Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1996. Speech at the Third Pacific Dialogue titled, "Building a 
Single Global Commonwealth". 21 November. Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1997a. Paper delivered at the opening of the Meeting of the Finance 
Ministers of Asean and Asean+6 Conference on "Financial Initiatives for 
the 21st Century". 1 December. Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1997b. Speech at the Business Leaders Dialogue. 28 November. 
Tokyo.   
Mahathir, M. 1997c. Speech at the World Bank meeting. 20 September. Hong 
Kong.   
Mahathir, M. 1997d. Speech titled "Vision 2020: The Way Forward" at National 
Conference on Vision 2020. 29 April. Petaling Jaya.   
Mahathir, M. 1998a. Speech at 1998 UMNO General Assembly. 19 June. Kuala 
Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1998b. Speech at the 2nd Southern Africa International Dialogue 
(SAID) on Smart Partnership. 28 July. Swakopmund, Namibia.    
337
Mahathir, M. 1999a. Speech at 1999 UMNO General Assembly. 18 June. Kuala 
Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 1999b. Speech at the Internal Conference on Religious Studies 
Meeting. 30 December. Kuala Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 2000a. Mahathir's interview with Bernama. 29 December. Putra 
Jaya.   
Mahathir, M. 2000b. Speech at 2000 UMNO General Assembly. 11 May. Kuala 
Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 2001. Speech at 2001 UMNO General Assembly. 20 June. Kuala 
Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M. 2002a. Reflections on Asia. Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications. 
Mahathir, M. 2002b. Speech at 2002 UMNO General Assembly. 19 June. Kuala 
Lumpur.   
Mahathir, M., & S. Ishihara. 1995. The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the 
Coming Century (F. Baldwin, Trans.). Tokyo: Kodansha International. 
Malaysia. 1971. Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975. Kuala Lumpur: National 
Printing Dept. 
Malaysia. 1973. Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975. 
Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Dept. 
Malaysia. 1976. Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980. Kuala Lumpur: National 
Printing Dept. 
Malaysia. 1977. Rukunegara. Kuala Lumpur, Jabatan Penerangan. 
Malaysia. 1979. Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980. Kuala 
Lumpur: National Printing Dept. 
Malaysia. 1981. Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985. Kuala Lumpur: National 
Printing Dept. 
Malaysia. 1984. Mid-Term Reviews of the Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985. 
Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Dept. 
Malaysia. 1986. Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-1990. Kuala Lumpur: National 
Printing Dept.  
338
Malaysia. 1989. Mid-Term Reviews of the Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-1990. Kuala 
Lumpur: National Printing Dept. 
Malaysia. (1991). The New Development Policy. Accessed on 12 December, 2002, 
available at http://www.epu.jpm.my/Bi/dev_plan/opp2/bab101.htm 
Malaysia. 1996. Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996-2000. Kuala Lumpur: National 
Printing Dept. 
Malaysiakini. 2004. "Minister charged for corruption in RM24 mil share deal". 
Malaysiakini, 12 February. 
http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/2004021200114005.php 
Malaysian Business. 1976. "The New Deputy Prime Minister: What Manner of 
Man?" Malaysian Business, April pp. 7-16.  
Malaysian Business. 1986a. "Malaysia Waives the Rules". Malaysian Business, 
16 October pp. 5-8.  
Malaysian Business. 1986b. "Weathering Criticisms". Malaysian Business, 16 
October pp. 8-10.  
Malaysian Business. 1987a. "Ethics and Subtle Strategies". Malaysian Business, 1 
February p. 4.  
Malaysian Business. 1987b. "Last-minute gambits". Malaysian Business, 1 May 
pp. 9-11.  
Malaysian Business. 1987c. "The New Line-Up". Malaysian Business, 1 May p. 
13.  
Malhi, A. 2003. "The PAS-BN Conflict in the 1990s: Islamism and Modernity". 
In V. Hooker & N. Othman Eds., Malaysia: Islam, Society and Politics. pp. 
236-265. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Martinez, P. A. 2001. "The Islamic State or the State of Islam in Malaysia". 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 23(3) pp. 474-503. 
Mauzy, D. K. 1978. Consociationalism and Coalition Politics in Malaysia. 
Vancouver: University of British Columbia. 
Mauzy, D. K. 1983. Barisan Nasional: coalition government in Malaysia. Kuala 
Lumpur; Singapore: Marican. 
Mauzy, D. K. 1988. "Malaysia in 1987: decline of the Malay way". Asian Survey, 
28(2) pp. 213-222.  
339
Maznah Mohamad. 1999. "UMNO and its Partners in the New Malaysia". Aliran 
Monthly, 19(10) pp. 2-7. 
Maznah Mohamad. 2003. "The Contest for Malay Votes in 1999: UMNO's Most 
Historic Challenge?" In F. K. W. Loh & J. Saravanamuttu Eds., New 
Politics in Malaysia. pp. 66-86. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
Means, G. P. 1976. Malaysian Politics (2nd ed.). London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
Means, G. P. 1991. Malaysian Politics: the second generation. Singapore; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Clarendon press. 
Milne, R. S., & D. K. Mauzy. 1978. Politics and Government in Malaysia. 
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 
Milne, R. S., & D. K. Mauzy. 1999. Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir. London; 
New York: Routledge. 
Milner, A. C. 1991. "Inventing Politics: the case of Malaysia". Past & Present, 
(132) pp. 104-129. 
Ministry of Finance Malaysia. 2002. Economic Report 2002/03. Kuala Lumpur: 
Ministry of Finance, Malaysia. 
Mitton, R. 1997. "Deflecting Rumors". Asiaweek, 12 September. 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/97/0912/nat3.html 
Mohamed Ariff, & Syarisa Yanti Abubakar. 1999. "The Malaysian Financial 
Crisis: Economic Impact and Recovery Prospects". The Developing 
Economies, 37(4) pp. 417-438. 
Mohamed Noordin Sopiee. 1974. From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: 
political unification in the Malaysia region, 1945-65. Kuala Lumpur: 
Universiti Malaya. 
Moore, D. E. 1960. The United Malays National Organization and the 1959 
Malayan Election: A Study of a Political Party in Action in a Newly 
Independent Plural Society. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
California, Berkeley. 
Muhammad Ikmal Said. 1996. "Malay Nationalism and National Identity". In M. I. 
Said & Z. Emby Eds., Malaysia: Critical Perspective. pp. 34-73. Kuala 
Lumpur: Malaysian Social Science Association.  
340
Munro-Kua, A. 1996. Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan. 
Musa Hitam. 2000. "What Has Happened to UMNO?" Aliran Monthly, 20(2) pp. 
7-10. 
Mustafa K. Anuar. 1990. "The Malaysian General Election 1990: The role of the 
BN mass media". Kajian Malaysia, 8(2) pp. 82-102. 
Mustafa K. Anuar. 1999. "Doing the Limbo". Aliran Monthly, 19(10) pp. 23-25. 
Mustafa K. Anuar. 2001. "When Other Voices Are Muffled". Aliran Monthly, 
21(1) pp. 8-10. 
Mustafa K. Anuar. 2002. "Is press freedom a Martian construct?" Malaysiakini, 
15 October. www.malaysiakini.com 
Mustapha Kamil. 1999. "Capital control not main factor in recovery". Singapore 
Business Times, 30 September.  
Muzaffar, C. 1979. Protector?: An analysis of the concept and practice of loyalty 
in leader-led relationships within Malay society. Pulau Pinang: Aliran. 
Muzaffar, C. 1989. Challenges and Choices in Malaysian Politics and Society. 
Penang: Aliran Kesedaran Negara. 
Muzaffar, C. (1998). The Anwar Episode: An Analysis. Accessed on 8 June 1999, 
1999, available at 
http://www.apc.org.au/malaysia/democracy/articles/981004_article_02.ht
ml 
Muzaffar Tate. 2000. "The Last Chance?" Aliran Monthly, 20(2) pp. 11-12. 
Nair, C. V. D. Ed. 1969. Who lives if Malaysia dies? Petaling Jaya: Democratic 
Action Party. 
Nair, S. 1999. "Constructing Civil Society in Malaysia: nationalism, hegemony 
and resistance". In K. S. Jomo Ed., Rethinking Malaysia. pp. 107-125. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Nathan, K. S. 1989. "Malaysian in 1988". Asian Survey, 24(2) pp. 129-139. 
Nathan, K. S. 2000. "Outcome for the Barisan Nasional Coalition". In Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies Ed., Trends in Malaysia: Election Assessment. pp. 
25-29. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.  
341
National Economic Action Council. (2002). National Economic Recovery Plan 
Agenda for Action. Accessed on 15 September, 2003, available at 
http://www.neac.gov.my/start.cfm 
Nesadurai, H. E. S. 2000. "In Defence of National Economic Autonomy? 
Malaysia's response to the financial crisis". The Pacific Review, 13(1) pp. 
73-113. 
Netto, A. 1999. "A Y2K Crackdown". Aliran Monthly, 19(11/12) pp. 2-6. 
Ong, M. 1984. "Malaysia in 1983: On the road to greater Malaysia". In P. 
Thambipillai Ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 1984. pp. 197-230. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Ongkili, J. P. 1985. Nation-building in Malaysia, 1946-1974. Singapore; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Ooi, K. B. 2001. "New Crises and Old Problems in Malaysia". In K. L. Ho & J. 
Chin Eds., Mahathir's Administration: Performance and Crisis in 
Governance. pp. 100-119. Singapore: Times Books International. 
Oorjitham, S., & A. Ranawana. 1998. "Crackdown". Asiaweek, 02 October. 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/98/1002/nat1.html 
Osman-Rani, H. 1990. "Economic Development and Ethnic Integration: the 
Malaysian experience". Sojourn, 5(1) pp. 1-34. 
Ozay Mehmet. 1988. Development in Malaysia: Poverty, Wealth and Trusteeship. 
Kuala Lumpur: INSAN. 
Parmer, J. N. 1964. "Malaysia". In G. M. Kahin Ed., Governments and Politics of 
Southeast Asia. pp. 281-374. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia. 1984. National Economic Policy- 1990 and 
Beyond. Kuala Lumpur: Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia. 
Pathmanathan, M. 1985. "Malaysia in 1984: A Political and Economic Survey". In 
J. J. Lim Ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 1985. pp. 211-234. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Patten, A. 1999. "The autonomy argument for liberal nationalism". Nations and 
Nationalism, 5(1) pp. 1-17. 
Pillai, P. 1987. "Friends and Foes into the Fray". Malaysian Business, 16 April pp. 
13-15, 76.  
Prasso, S., M. Clifford, & J. Bamathan. 1998. "How a Blood Feud in Malaysia 
Spun Out of Control". BusinessWeek, 9 November p. 68.   
342
Pura, R., & S. Duthie. 1988. "Mahathir Forced to Salvage State Firm". Asian Wall 
Street Journal, 27 June pp. 1, 6.  
Puthucheary, M. 1984. "The Political Economy of Malaysian Public Enterprises". 
In L. L. Lim & P. L. Chee Eds., The Malaysian Economy at the 
Crossroads: Policy Adjustment or Structural Transformation. pp. 217-236. 
Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Economic Association. 
Ragaya Hj Mat Zin. 2002. The Asian Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Poverty 
and Inequality in Malaysia (Working Paper Series, No. 23). Bangi, 
Malaysia: Institut Kajian Malaysia Dan Antarabangsa (IKMAS), 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. 
Raja Petra Kamaruddin. (2004). The aftermath of Malaysia's 11th General 
Elections: Where to now BA? Accessed on 25, May, 2004, available at 
http://www.freeanwar.net/Mar2004/facnews220304.htm 
Rajah Rasiah. 1997. "Class, Ethnicity and Economic Development in Malaysia". 
In G. Rodan, K. Hewison & H. Crouch Eds., The Political Economy of 
South-East Asia: An introduction. pp. 121-147. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ramakrishnan, P. 2001. "Abuse of Power Under the ISA". Aliran Monthly, 
21(11/12) pp. 2-9. 
Ramlah Adam. 1995. "The Malay National Congress 1957: Protest against the 
Loss of Malay Political Power on the Verge of Malayan Independence". 
Kajian Malaysia, 13(2) pp. 47-82. 
Ratnam, K. J. 1965. Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya. 
Singapore: University Malaya. 
Razaleigh, H. 1987. Speech titled, "Menentang Kemungkaran Politik Dan 
Ekonomi" (Fighting Against Blasphemous Politics and Economy), before 
1987 UMNO General Assembly Election. 19 April. Kuala Lumpur.   
Razaleigh, H. 1991. Speech in Parliament when The Second Outline Perspective 
Plan was tabled in parliament. 19 June. Kuala Lumpur.   
Razaleigh, H. 1993. Speech at the 5th General Assembly of Semangat 46' in 1993. 
31 August. Kuala Lumpur.   
Rehman Rashid. 1986a. "Prime Minister Reveals His Hopes and Fears (Interview 
with Mahathir)". The New Straits Times, 6 July.  
Rehman Rashid. 1986b. "Why I took politics... (Interview with Mahathir)". The 
New Straits Times, 5 July.   
343
Reid, A. 1969. "The Kuala Lumpur Riots and the Malaysian Political System". 
Australian Outlook, 23(3) pp. 258-278. 
Reyes, A., & T. Healy. 1998. "Shattered Summit". Asiaweek, 27 November. 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/98/1127/nat1.html 
Roff, W. R. 1967. The Origins of Malay Nationalism. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Rustam A. Sani. 2001. "Malaysia's Economic and Political Crisis Since 
September 1998". In K. S. Jomo Ed., Rethinking Malaysia: Reflections on 
its Past and Future. pp. 84-99. Bangi, Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia. 
Saiful Azhar Abdullah. 2000. "BN cannot depend on development issues any 
more to win polls". The New Straits Times, 1 December.  
Saravanamuttu, J. 1987. "The State, Authoritarianism and Industrialization: 
reflections on the Malaysian case". Kajian Malaysia, 5(2) pp. 43-75. 
Saravanamuttu, J. 1989. "Kelas Menegah dalam Politik Malaysia: Tonjolan 
Perkauman atau Kepentingan Kelas (Middle class in Malaysian politics: a 
show of communalism or class interest)". Kajian Malaysia, VII(1 and 2) 
pp. 
Searle, P. 1999. The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism. St. Leonard, NSW: Allen & 
Unwin. 
Seaward, N. 1986. "New Equity Policy?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 
October pp. 129-130.  
Selvaratnam, V. 1982. "Malaysia in 1981: A Year of Political Transaction". In H. 
K. Khanh Ed., Southeast Asian Affairs, 1982. pp. 245-272. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Shahanaaz Sher Habib. 1999. "Opposition parties working on united front against 
BN". The Star, 26 April. 
http://www.thestar.com.my/current/2602szpa.html 
Shamsul, A. B. 1983. "The Politics of Poverty Eradication: The Implementation 
of Development Projects in a Malaysian District". Pacific Affairs, 56(3) pp. 
455-476. 
Shamsul, A. B. 1986. From British to Bumiputera Rule: Local Politics and Rural 
Development in Peninsular Malaysia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies.  
344
Shamsul, A. B. 1988. "The Battle Royal: the UMNO Elections of 1987". In A. 
Mohammed & C. Y. Ng Eds., Southeast Asian Affairs 1988. pp. 170-188. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Shamsul, A. B. 1997. "The Economic Dimension of Malay Nationalism: The 
Socio-Historical Roots of the New Economic Policy and Its Contemporary 
Implications". The Developing Economies, 35(3) pp. 240-261. 
Shamsul, A. B. 1998. "Bureaucratic Management of Identity in a Modern State: 
"Malayness" in Postwar Malaysia". In D. C. Gladney Ed., Making 
Majorities. pp. 135-150. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Shamsul, A. B. 1999. "From Orang Kaya Baru to Melayu Baru: Cultural 
Construction of the Malay 'New Rich'". In M. Pinches Ed., Culture and 
Privilege in Capitalist Asia. pp. 87-110. London: Routledge. 
Shamsul, A. B. 2001. "The Redefinition of Politics and the Transformation of 
Malaysian Pluralism". In R. W. Hefner Ed., The Politics of 
Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Indonesia. pp. 204-226. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Sieh, L. M. L., & K. L. Chew. 1985. "Redistribution of Malaysia's Corporate 
Ownership in the New Economic Policy". In J. J. Lim Ed., Southeast 
Asian Affairs 1985. pp. 235-258. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
Singh, H. 1991. "Political change in Malaysia: the role of Semangat 46". Asian 
Survey, 31(8) pp. 712-728. 
Singh, H. 2001. "Democratization or Oligarchic Restructuring? The Politics of 
Reform in Malaysia". Government and Opposition, 35(4) pp. 520-546. 
Singh, P. 2000. "No place for extremism in Malaysia, says Dr Mahathir". The 
New Straits Times, 5 December p. 1.  
Singh, S. 2003. "Fight corruption, cut red tape". The New Straits Times, 6 
November.  
Singh, S., & K. H. Chow. 2000. "Majority of the people are tolerant, says Dr 
Mahathir". The New Straits Times, 28 December p. 1.  
Smith, A. D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Smith, A. D. 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin Books. 
Smith, A. D. 1998. Nationalism and Modernism. London: Routledge.  
345
Smith, A. D. 2000. The Nation in History: Histographical Debates about 
Ethnicity and Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Snider, N. L. 1970. "Race, Leimotiv of the Malayan Election Drama". Asian 
Survey, 10(12) pp. 1070-1080. 
Snodgrass, D. R. 1980. Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia. Kuala 
Lumpur; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Stafford, D. G. S. D. 1997. "Malaysia's New Economic Policy and the Global 
Economy: The Evolution of Ethnic Accommodation". The Pacific Review, 
10(4) pp. 556-580. 
Stewart, I. 2003. The Mahathir Legacy: A Nation Divided, A Region At Risk. 
Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin. 
Stiglitz, J. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. London: Penguin Books. 
Suaram. 1998. Malaysian Human Right Report. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Suaram 
Komunikasi. 
Suh, S. 1998. "Speaking one's mind". Asiaweek, 03 July. 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/98/0703/nat_4_msurvey.html 
Suhaini Aznam. 1987a. "And here's to the next time..." Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 7 May pp. 12-13.  
Suhaini Aznam. 1987b. "The great crackdown". Far Eastern Economic Review, 
12 November pp. 12-14.  
Syed Arabi Idid, Abdul Rashid Moten, & W. Saodah. 2003. "July 2002 By-
elections in Kedah, Malaysia". Asian Profile, 31(4) pp. 307-315. 
Syed Hussein Alatas. 1977. The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of 
the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from 16th to the 20th Centuries. 
London: F. Cass. 
Tamir, Y. 1993. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Tan, C. 2000. "PM: Malaysia unstable under PAS". Malaysiakini, 8 October. 
http://www.malaysiakini.com/archives_news/2000/oct/oct7-8/news10.htm 
Tan, C. B. 1984. "Acculturation, Assimilation and Integration: The Case of the 
Chinese". In S. Husin Ali Ed., Kaum, Kelas, Dan Pembangunan Malaysia. 
pp. 198-211. Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia. 
Tan, J. 2000. "I'm Sorry, says Mahathir". The Straits Times, 12 December.   
346
Tan, J. 2001. "Rally for Malay Supremacy". The Straits Times, 5 February.  
Tan, L. E. 1988. The Rhetoric of Bangsa and Minzu: community and nation in 
tension, the Malay Peninsula, 1900-1955. Clayton, Victoria, Australia: 
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University. 
Tan, L.-H. 1981. "Economic Equity: A Critique of the Malaysian State's 
Conception". Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia, (3&4) pp. 188-211. 
Tan, S. 1990. "The Rise of State Authoritarianism in Malaysia". Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian Scholars, 22(3) pp. 32-42. 
Tasker, R., & Suhaini Azman. 1988. "Challenge of elders". Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 18 February pp. 12-13.  
The Edge. 1999. "Recovery Watch -- Malaysia's capital control success". The 
Edge, 13 September.  
The New Straits Times. 1977. "Mahathir's address as Deputy President of UMNO 
in UMNO Youth and Wanita General Assembly in 1977". The New Straits 
Times, 1 July.  
The New Straits Times. 1995. "General Election '95 Results". The New Straits 
Times, 26 April.  
The New Straits Times. 2004. "Surprises in line-up". The New Straits Times, 5 
February.  
The Star. 1999. "Party Keadilan aims to represent middle ground". The Star, 5 
April.  
The Star. 2000a. "Deviant was a PAS member". The Star, 12 July.  
The Star. 2000b. "Interview with the PM". The Star, July 20. 
http://www.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/200/7/20/nation/pmqa&s
ec=nation 
The Star. 2001. "PM: Effectiveness of ISA now widely accepted". The Star, 25 
October.  
The Star. 2003. " Exclusive media interview with Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad" (Interview conducted by June H.L. Wong, Mergawati Zulfakar, 
K. Parkaran and Wong Chun Wai). The Star, 5 October. 
http://thestar.com.my/special/drm/ 
The Sun. 1998. "Not yet time to abolish ISA, says PM". The Sun, 15 October.   
347
Thomas, T. 2001. "Human Rights in 21st Century Malaysia". The Journal of the 
Malaysian Bar, XXX(2) pp. 91-106. 
Toh, K. W., & K. S. Jomo. 1983. "The Nature of the Malaysian State and It's 
Implication for Development Planning". In K. S. Jomo & R. J. G. Wells 
Eds., The Fourth Malaysia Plan: Economic perspectives. pp. 23-44. Kuala 
Lumpur: Malaysian Economic Association. 
Tong, Y. S. 2001. "More arrests of militants to come, warns Dr M". Malaysiakini, 
29 September. www.malaysiakini.com 
Utusan Malaysia. 2000. "Stop inflaming communal feelings, PM warns extremist 
groups". Utusan Malaysia, 30 August.  
Utusan Malaysia. 2001a. "Govt will fight those who oppose true teachings of 
Islam". Utusan Malaysia, 11 November. 
http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/archive.asp?y=2001&dt=1111&pub=U
tusan_Express&sec=Front_Page&pg=fp_01.htm 
Utusan Malaysia. 2001b. "Mahathir disappointed with IPF's decision". Utusan 
Malaysia, 12 February. 
http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/archive.asp?y=2001&dt=0212&pub=U
tusan_Express&sec=Home_News&pg=hn_01.htm 
Utusan Malaysia. 2001c. "M'sians must defend country against terrorism, says Dr 
Mahathir". Utusan Malaysia, 17 November. 
http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/archive.asp?y=2001&dt=1117&pub=U
tusan_Express&sec=Front_Page&pg=fp_05.htm 
van Amersfoort, H. 1995. "Institutional Plurality: Problem or Solution for the 
Multi-ethnic State?" In S. Periwal Ed., Notions of Nationalism. pp. 162-
181. Budapest: Central European University Press. 
Vasil, R. K. 1971. Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal 
Political Parties in West Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Vasil, R. K. 1972. The Malaysian General Election of 1969. Singapore: Oxford 
University Press. 
Vatikiotis, M. 1993a. "Nearly There". Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 July p. 
15.  
Vatikiotis, M. 1993b. "Party Games". Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 July p. 27.  
Vatikiotis, M. 1993c. "Taking Sides". Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 August 
pp. 16-17.   
348
Vatikiotis, M., & D. Tsuruoka. 1993. "Young Turks on the move". Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 30 September pp. 18-21.  
Vincent, A. 1997. "Liberal Nationalism: an Irresponsible Compound?" Political 
Studies, XLV(2) pp. 275-295. 
Viroli, M. 1995. For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
von der Mehden, F. R. 1982. "Malaysia in 1981: continuity and change". Asian 
Survey, 28(2) pp. 212-218. 
von der Mehden, F. R. 1991. "Malaysia in 1990". Asian Survey, 31(2) pp. 164-171. 
von der Mehden, F. R. 1992. "Malaysia in 1991: Economic growth and political 
consolidation". Asian Survey, 32(2) pp. 111-118. 
Von Vorys, K. 1975. Democracy Without Consensus: communalism and political 
stability in Malaysia. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Wan Hamidi Hamid. 2000. "Mahathir says Al-Ma'unah followers PAS members". 
The Straits Times, 21 July.  
Wang, G. 1981. Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the 
Chinese. Kuala Lumpur: Asian Studies Association of Australia. 
Wang, G. 1986. "Reflections on Malaysian Elites". Review of Indonesian and 
Malaysian Affairs, 20(1) pp. 100-128. 
Weiss, M. L. 2001. "Overcoming Race-based Politics in Malaysia: Establishing 
Norms for Deeper Multiethnic Co-operation". In K. L. Ho & J. Chin Eds., 
Mahathir's Administration: Performance and Crisis in Governance. pp. 
62-99. Singapore: Times Books International. 
Williamson, T. 2002. "Incorporating a Malaysian Nation". Cultural Anthropology, 
17(3) pp. 401-430. 
Yap, M. C. 2002. "Mahathir defends ISA again in Washington". Malaysiakini, 16 
May. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/200205160015625.php 
Yap, M. C. 2003. "Chia: Why Gerakan backs 'Islamic country' tag". Malaysiakini, 
4 November. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/2003110400112950.php 
Yi, B. L. 2002. "DBP magazine slams English language policy". Malaysiakini, 20 
December. www.malaysiakini.com/news/200212200018646.php 
Yi, B. L. 2003. "PKR launched, promises to be truly multi-racial". Malaysiakini, 3 
August. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/2003080300111555.php  
349
Yi, B. L. 2004. "Syed Husin points to three factors for BA's rout". Malaysiakini, 
21 April. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/2004042100115241.php 
Yoon, S.-M. 2004. "Eric Chia's CBT trial in August". Malaysiakini, 10 February. 
http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/2004021000113969.php 
Zainul Arifin. 1999. "IMF: Positive results silence critics of steps taken by 
Malaysia". New Strait Times, 10 September.  
Zakaria Haji Ahmad. 1985. "Malaysia in 1984: No more free lunches". Asian 
Survey, 25(2) pp. 206-213. 
Zakaria Haji Ahmad. 1987. "Stability, Security and National Development in 
Malaysia: An Appraisal". In K. Snitwongse & S. Paribatra Eds., Durable 
Stability in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Zakaria Haji Ahmad. 1989. "Malaysia: Quasi Democracy in a Divided Society". 
In L. Diamond, J. J. Linz & S. M. Lipset Eds., Democracy in Developing 
Countries: Asia. pp. 347-382. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher. 
 